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Abstract
HUMAN CAPITAL: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTHEASTERN
ABOLITIONISM, 1763-1833
by
Michael A. Crowder

Advisor: James Oakes

“Human

Capital” explores the relationships between the moral imperatives of the

antislavery movement in the New England and the mid- Atlantic, and their connections to
evolving manufacturing and agricultural political economies premised on free labor regimes.
Tracing the sweep of history from the British-American imperial crisis through the American
Revolution, and into the Early American Republic, “Human Capital” argues that northeasterners
like Rhode Island textile capitalist and abolitionist Moses Brown, radical democrats like Thomas
Paine, and political economists like Tench Coxe developed visions of capitalism in which chattel
slavery’s gradual abolition in the northeastern states acted as a spur to economic development.
These visions, it shows, brought them into direct political and economic conflict with southern
planters and a small, but wealthy and powerful number of northeastern merchants at the national
level by 1820, precisely as the Missouri Crisis over slavery’s proposed western expansion
reached a crescendo. The dissertation concludes by laying the intellectual and political-economic
groundwork for antebellum abolitionism by emphasizing the under-appreciated bridge figure of
Benjamin Lundy and the formation of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1833.
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Introduction: The Problems of Slavery, Abolitionism, and Capitalism in Early America

In July 1823, Quaker abolitionist Benjamin Lundy’s newspaper Genius of Universal
Emancipation featured “THE FATHERS OF EMANCIPATION,” an extract of a letter from “an
aged member of the Abolition Society, in Pennsylvania.” The man described his experiences
fighting the African slave trade to the United States in 1787 and 1788. He witnessed a ship
anchor off a secluded island near Port Penn, Delaware, sixty miles southeast of Philadelphia,
advertised as “From Guinea, with 1500 Slaves on board.” “This electrified me,” he remembered,
“and I kept strict eye and ear, and close mouth to all that passed” until after the master and
supercargo had negotiated with customers and went on to enjoy an evening of “feasting and
drinking.” He rushed an express letter to Pennsylvania Governor and Pennsylvania Abolition
Society (PAS) president Benjamin Franklin warning him of the ship's presence and purpose,
which arrived within thirty hours. But because the ship never entered Pennsylvania's jurisdiction,
the PAS could not press charges against the ship's owner, master, supercargo, and crew under
Pennsylvania state law.
His efforts bore fruit soon after, however, because the “affair roused the public sentiment;
it gave energy to the exertions of the Abolition Society to attend the election, to have proper men
elected.” After abolitionist “champion” William Lewis secured election to the state assembly
from Philadelphia, the aged abolitionist described how Lewis set about creating an antislavery
coalition able to pass supplemental legislation to the Keystone State's 1780 slavery abolition law.
The assembly committee assigned to report the bill contained a mixture of abolitionists and
slaveholders. Lewis even convinced slaveholding colleague General Joseph Meister to support

the bill, and it passed. The 1788 act patched loopholes in the 1780 law, including restricting
masters’ right to transport slaves and servants out of state, and providing stricter penalties for
engaging in the foreign slave trade. It is certainly fair to say that the grizzled abolitionist's rangy
narrative from personal experience to the successful passage of antislavery legislation was fuzzy
and teleological. On the other hand, by 1823 Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, New
England, and the Old Northwest states had abolished slavery, or had recently finished fighting
off its legalization, in the case of Illinois. To Lundy, the old Pennsylvania abolitionist's lessons
rang true: antislavery politics could work.1
National antislavery politics emerged from economic and social conditions created by the
wave of abolitionism which swept across the northeastern states in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries, generating significant tension in debates over national political economy.2 Ten years
after Lundy printed the Revolutionary Era abolitionist’s remembrance of fighting the slave trade,
his Genius of Universal Emancipation spilled over with detailed coverage of the Nullification
Crisis, a national political conflict over national tariff policy with inescapable connections to the
growing conflict between slavery and freedom in the antebellum United States. The crisis, a
product of import tariffs narrowly rammed through Congress at the end of John Quincy Adams’s
term as president in 1827, and cynically backed by southern Democrats as a political ploy in

Genius of Universal Emancipation, III (July 1823), pp. 9-10. On the Pennsylvania Abolition Society’s
antislavery work in Early Republic, see Edward Needles, An Historical Memoir of the Pennsylvania
Society… (New York: Arno Press, 1969 [1848]); Richard S. Newman, The Transformation of American
Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002),
esp. Ch. 1-3, is the most thorough modern account of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society and its activities.
2
The terms “Northeast” and “northeastern” refer to the states which abolished chattel slavery and
participation in the foreign slave trade before 1833: Vermont, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. While the political economies and
social structures of these states differed, I group them together because each state instituted chattel
slavery abolition by the first decade of the nineteenth century. “Northern” and “North” refer to the
antebellum period, to include the Old Northwest region.
1

2

hopes of generating northeastern support for the party of Jackson, clearly favored northeastern
manufacturing interests that had long clamored for protective tariffs to encourage American
consumption of American-made manufactures. Protective tariffs had long been opposed by
power slaveholding interests in Congress and the state legislatures, in concert with a small but
influential faction of northeastern merchants that specialized in importing a wide array of
European manufactures. Slavery escalated what might have been a relatively benign political
dispute over commercial policy, but the peculiar institution always had a way of rearing its
divisive head in debates over how to orient American political economy.
Lundy’s newspaper, as it had since its founding in 1821, put its finger on the pulse of the
politics of slavery and abolitionism in its coverage of the Nullification Crisis. In May 1833, the
Genius included long extracts from South Carolinian George McDuffie’s analysis of the Crisis,
with trenchant commentary on the leader of the South Carolina Nullification Convention’s
thoughts on American political economy. According to the Genius’s report of McDuffie’s
comments on the convention proceedings, South Carolina slaveholders complained that
northerners “told us, openly, that we must pay for the vice in our institutions: that the free labor
of the north must not—shall not be degraded to the same footing as the slave labor of the south.”
McDuffie accused politicians from the free North of attempting to foment civil war by
supporting the national tariff policy, an insistence that the Genius found ridiculous, given that the
Palmetto State’s Nullification Convention had openly discussed the prospect of secession. “In
our opinion,” the Genius editorialized, slavery “never was a topic which those disposed to make
war on the Union, could press into service of their cause, with less prospect of converting it to
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the purpose intended, than the slave question.”3 Abolitionists did not pick the fight, in other
words, the South Carolinian slaveholders did, but they claimed to be victims of free state
economic aggression.
For all the conflict that the Nullification Crisis generated between the sections, even
staunch abolitionists continued to believe the Union could continue to persist. A further editorial
comment even suggested that southern slavery could be beneficial to free labor, that slavery is
“most advantageous to free labor in its present location [because] it aids the climate in
diversifying the products of the different sections of the country.” This was a surprising
admission from avowed abolitionists, but a close parsing of this statement reveals the Genius’s
real agenda—slavery, if it must exist in the southern states, should be contained to the southern
states. This, in other words, was a non-extension of slavery argument, and the editorial went
further in suggesting that “if southern cultivation were carried on by the same class and character
of people as it is in the north, the skill of the cultivator would soon supply all his wants from the
soil, and exclude from his market much that is now drawn from the north.” If labor in the South
was not debauched to the status of chattel slavery, if slaves could be extended self-ownership,
then manufacturing would take root and conflicts over national tariff policy would be moot.
Slaveholders should become free labor capitalists, the Genius concluded, but southern planters
and their political representatives remained hell-bent on preventing the loss of their slave
property. The furor over the Tariff of Abominations rustled up by the nullifiers disguised the

Genius of Universal Emancipation XIII (May 1833), p. 105. In April 1833, Lundy left his residence in
Washington D.C. to continue his travels in Texas and Mexico, seeking land to settle free black
communities. He apparently continued to contribute to the Genius while on his travels, but left daily
operations in the hands of “friends, who had given proofs of their capability, and of their devotion to the
cause.” Benjamin Lundy, Life, Travels and Opinions of Benjamin Lundy..., Thomas Earle, ed. (New York:
Arno Press, 1969 [1847]), p. 263. For this reason, I do not specifically identify Lundy as the author of this
commentary.
3

4

“grand spring” of southern agitation. “The tariff is the scape-goat,” proclaimed the Genius, “but
slavery is the bitter root” from which conflict grew.4
As reflected in the Nullification Crisis, in the seventy years between 1763 and 1833, an
already-existent political-economic divergence between the Northeast and the Upper and Lower
South continued to widen, especially after the establishment of the American Republic and in the
decades of the Early Republic, as the nation expanded into the Northwest and Southwest. By
1833, the national political schism over the relationship of capitalism to slavery and abolitionism
in the American republic threatened to tear the nation asunder, a polity that encompassed a huge
swath of the North American continent, tens of millions of acres of land, contained capital goods
valued at hundreds of millions of dollars, produced bounteous agricultural yields, and hosted
increasingly complex systems of financial exchange and conducted extensive international trade.
But the problem of slavery, abolitionism, and capitalism in nineteenth century America was a
paradox that generated conflict at every turn: a nation split between two incompatible labor
systems. Chattel slavery denied self-ownership to the enslaved, but it made many fortunes for
large slaveholders, endowing the most influential of the slaveholding classes with staggering
wealth and political power disproportionate to their numbers. While the southern slave
economies harbored a respectable middle class of slaveholders as well as small-scale farmers
that owned a handful of slaves, chattel slavery created a political economy of exaggerated wealth
inequality between slaveholding and non-slaveholding whites, maintaining cohesion through the
powerful social and cultural adhesive of white supremacy.

4

Genius of Universal Emancipation XIII (May 1833), pp. 105-106.

5

Meanwhile, the northeastern and later northwestern states—the free North, by the
antebellum period—contained political economies structured on the free household model, in
which patriarchal family units unbound to an external authority operated as free agents in
economic conditions which supported the rise of domestic manufacturing and increased
agricultural productivity within the reach of farm families. The free household model was not
perfect, and did not inherently guarantee the security and happiness of every person in the free
North. Social stratification accelerated in the 1840s and 1850s, the work regimes of many free
household members left much to be desired, especially in the growing industrial zones of the
Northeast, and social problems often plagued free state communities and individual households.
But spurred by moral and political economy of northeastern abolitionism in the Revolutionary
Era, which resulted in the abolition of slavery in New England and the mid-Atlantic, the free
household model came to dominate the free North by the 1830s. In moral terms, northeastern
state slavery abolition eliminated the sin of slavery, the legal right to buy, own, and sell other
human beings as articles of property, rights which northeastern communities rose in opposition
against in the Revolutionary Era and Early Republic. This was the moral economy of
abolitionism: popular disdain for chattel slavery and the slave trade as unfair and immoral modes
of economic organization, alongside a dislike for poltical and economic power of slaveholders.
The political economy of northeastern abolitionism developed by men like Rhode Island
abolitionist and textile capitalist Moses Brown, and members of Early National northeastern
abolition societies, emphasized the use of state authority to promote the free household unit and
domestic manufacturing and agricultural improvements designed to capitalize on family labor.
Tench Coxe, a Treasury department official and foremost Early American political economist,
while not an abolitionist in the more familiar mold of antebellum Garrisonian moral suasionists,
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developed a vision of American political economy that included a place for slave-grown cotton
but prioritized the interests of the northeastern free household model. Northeastern abolitionists
and advocates of antislavery political economy envisioned society free of the inhibitive effects of
chattel slavery on the cultural trait of industriousness, and the material development of industrial
capability, by promoting the free household as the bedrock labor unit of the region. Many also
envisioned state and local governments in which the political power of slaveholders could be
subdued; the national government, however, was a different story.
The core argument of this dissertation is at clear odds with a surge of “slavery
capitalism” scholarship that yokes antebellum northern capitalism directly to southern chattel
slavery. Those works are often persuasive in describing the contours of slavery-based capitalist
regional economies of the Upper and Lower South, and later the southwestern Cotton Kingdom,
where chattel slaves produced export commodity crops in violent and dehumanizing conditions.
When slavery capitalism scholars assert an antebellum northern capitalism inextricably linked to
southern chattel slavery, however, they do not account for the clear divergences of the American
regional economies, evident before the American Revolution and which accelerated in the Early
Republic.
In treating economic development outside the plantation context, the “slavery
capitalism” historians tend to identify finance and international trade as the nation’s economic
engines, downplaying or outright ignoring free household agriculture and the domestic
manufacture of a multitude of goods, the backbone northeastern regional capitalism. Commerce
and finance were important, but large merchants and financiers constituted only a wealthy
minority in the Northeast, and their power did not go unchallenged. In political contests related
to slavery and the slave trade, the interests of slaveholders most often aligned with those of
7

wealthy urban merchants. Northeastern antislavery analysts and politicians grounded their
visions of American economic development in agricultural and manufacturing improvements
designed to capitalize on the free household model. They sought to expand the consumption of
domestic goods by free households and a growing pool of single wage workers, and northeastern
state abolition of chattel slavery complemented these broader developments.5
The key work in “slavery capitalism” scholarship is Edward Baptist’s 2014 opus The
Half Has Never Been Told. Despite focusing almost exclusive attention on the slave economy of
the New South, Baptist claims that cotton, and therefore slavery, played an indispensable role in
the development of northern capitalism by the 1840s and 1850s. This argument assumes that
antebellum northern capitalism emerged almost entirely on the back of cotton textile
manufacturing, which ignores free household agriculture almost entirely, and also reduces the
vibrant manufacturing economy of the antebellum North to dependence on one fiber. I argue that
reducing free state capitalist development to cotton textiles and the finance networks of southern
slavery not only posits a narrow and restrictive basis for northern capitalism, but also American
textile manufacturing development. If Baptist is correct, Americans did not wear woolens, linens,
cotton-linen and cotton-woolen blends, and the only basis for American industrialization was

The best introduction to the new slavery capitalism literature are the essays collected in Sven Beckert
and Seth Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic Development
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). See also Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global
History (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the
Making of American Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Calvin Schermerhorn, The Business of and the
Rise of American Capitalism, 1815-1860 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Walter Johnson, The
River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2013). For a critique that emphasizes the limitations of the slavery capitalism approach, see James Oakes,
“Slavery and Capitalism and the Civil War,” International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 89 (Spring
2016), pp. 196-220. Another critique that interrogates the trend’s theoretical limitations and points out
factual inaccuracies committed by Baptist, in particular, is Alan M. Olmsted and Paul W. Rhode, “Cotton,
Slavery, and the New History of Capitalism,” Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 67 (December 2017),
pp. 1-17.
5
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textiles. In the early stages of the growth of American mechanized textile manufacturing in the
Early Republic, cotton from the Lower South played a relatively insignificant role, and
northeastern manufacturing pursuits encompassed the production of hundreds of consumer goods
and industrial inputs aside from textiles.
Sven Beckert’s Empire of Cotton, another key work in the emergent “slavery capitalism”
scholarship, shows that cotton was a significant input for capitalist development—but primarily
for Great Britain and Europe. A recent edited volume by Beckert and Seth Rockman, Slavery’s
Capitalism, brings together a variety of scholarly perspectives in the “slavery capitalism”
paradigm.6 Among the most persuasive of these essays are works by Caitlin Rosenthal, Joshua
D. Rothman, and Bonnie Martin, which provide fine-grained analysis of the contours of the
southern slave economies, framing southern slavery as a uniquely modern form of capitalism.
Andrew Shankman’s essay reveals deep conflict between the dueling political economies of
slavery and freedom at the pivotal turning point of 1819-1820.7 On the other hand, essays which
develop the argument of northeastern “complicity” with the growth and persistence of southern
and West Indian slavery assume narrow, export-trade and finance-based capitalist economies
more reminiscent of the southern economies than the free household agriculture and domestic
manufacturing-based Northeast.8 As this dissertation shows, the northeastern colonial and Early

Caitlin Rosenthal, “Slavery’s Scientific Management: Masters and Management”; Bonnie Martin,
“Neighbor-to-Neighbor Capitalism: Local Credit Networks and the Mortgaging of Slaves”; Joshua D.
Rothman, “The Contours of Cotton Capitalism: Speculation, Slavery, and Economic Panic in Mississippi,
1832-1841,” in Beckert and Rockman eds., Slavery’s Capitalism, pp. 62-86; 107-121; 122-145.
7
Andrew Shankman, “Capitalism, Slavery, and the New Epoch: Mathew Carey’s 1819,” in Ibid., pp. 243261.
8
Eric Kimball, “‘What Have We To Do With Slavery?’: New Englanders and the Slave Economies of the
West Indies,”; Stephen Chambers, “‘No Country But Their Counting Houses’: The U.S.-Cuba-Baltic
Circuit, 1809-1812”; Calvin Schermerhorn, “The Coastwise Slave Trade and a Mercantile Community of
Interest,” in Ibid., pp. 181-194; 195-208; 209-224. The first of these essays disinters an interpretation of Eric
Williams’s famed argument that the proceeds of British Caribbean sugar plantations funded British
6

9

National economies exhibited far more diversification and complexity than the Upper and Lower
South, conditions which laid the basis for northeastern state abolition of chattel slavery and the
slave trade beginning in the 1780s, and which the settlement and establishment of free household
based agricultural economies in the Old Northwest complemented.
When “slavery capitalism” historians claim that antebellum northern prosperity depended
on southern cotton and slavery, they presuppose a degree of political and economic integration
between the sections that did not exist in reality. They downplay antimonies between slave-labor
and free household economies that existed even as the thirteen British North American colonies
battled for independence from the Empire, antimonies which further widened in the Early
Republic. Put another way, this scholarship elides the basic fact that chattel slavery abolition
happened in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, setting the Northeast (and later the
Old Northwest) and Upper and Lower South on different developmental trajectories. As this
dissertation argues, northeastern state abolition of slavery was a process initiated and completed
with a rapidity unprecedented in the Atlantic world, and contemporaries clearly understood the
difference the transformation of northeastern abolition wrought.
The relationship between the political and moral ideologies of the American Revolution
to the emergence of organized transatlantic antislavery movements has long absorbed historians.9
capitalism, and attempts to apply it to New England. See Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941).
9
David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1975). See also Davis’s essays in conversation with Thomas Bender and John Ashburn in The
Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism As A Problem in Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1992). Robin Blackburn’s several works on the construction and abolition of New
World slavery are also crucial, though they tend to focus on the Caribbean. See Blackburn, The American
Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation, and Human Rights (London: Verso, 2011); The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery:
1776-1848 (London Verso, 1988); The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 14921800 (London: Verso, 1997). See also Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of
British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). These works only partially

10

The foundational work on the Age of Revolutions and the problems of slavery and antislavery,
and their relationship to capitalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries is David Brion Davis’s
The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution. In this magisterial work, Davis explores the
relationships between abolitionists—in particular British and American Quakers—and a
capitalist mentalité that emerged over the course of the eighteenth century.
Birthed in large part from Quaker business networks, an “antislavery international”
which coordinated slave trade abolition campaigns, and in the American northeastern states
chattel slavery abolition, became the nerve center of abolitionism in the Anglo-Atlantic world.
Davis’s analysis of abolitionism and capitalism draws out multiple ambiguities: Quaker (and
non-Quaker) abolitionists did not pursue their campaigns against slavery and the slave trade
because they stood to reap direct financial benefits from abolition, and yet the moral core of
abolitionism was tempered by the social differentiation that capitalist relations generated.
For Davis, the core ambiguity that begs explanation is how the relationship between a
movement aimed to eradicate an oppressive and morally destructive regime (chattel slavery) was
prosecuted by many of the same people who trumpeted an emergent economic regime
(capitalism) which was clearly not egalitarian. Little needs to be said about the often destructive
impact that industrial capitalism had on workers and their families, and Quaker abolitionists were
quite clear about their desires to inure wage laborers to work discipline regimes that undermined
their individual and family economic autonomy. Thus, abolitionism must not be characterized as

address northeastern state abolition, as they adopt “Atlantic,” or global frameworks. The last work to
systematically examine northern state slavery abolition as a regional phenomenon unleashed by the
American Revolution is Arthur Zilversmit, The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), although Manisha Sinha, The Slave’s Cause: A History of
Abolition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016) does devote some attention to the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, emphasizing black activism.
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wholly righteous, nor should capitalism be treated as an unqualified boon to all classes in
American society. This dissertation does not directly attempt to resolve these deep ambiguities, if
they can be at all, but to situate American northeastern abolitionism in the economic context in
which it flowered: the spread of agrarian, proto-industrial, and mercantile capitalism, an
outgrowth of the massive transformation of the American Revolution.
A direct outgrowth of the Revolution, the organization of abolition societies in the
American Northeast (and the Chesapeake) spurred the development of abolitionist political
programs. The activities of abolition societies varied in response to local and state contexts;
some societies focused primarily on fighting the African and intercontinental slave trades, others
on securing state-level abolition legislation. To different degrees and with varying resources,
northeastern abolition societies organized petition campaigns to state and national governments,
pressed for the passage and subsequent enforcement of state-level abolition legislation, created
programs to promote moral and economic uplift for freed black Americans, and worked to
uphold state and national slave trade prohibitions and regulatory legislation. Scholars have
debated the overarching aims and effectiveness of groups like the Pennsylvania Abolition
Society, the New-York Manumission Society, and the Providence Society for Abolishing the
Slave-Trade, to name a few prominent examples. To date, there is a significant historiography
that emphasizes the slow and halting processes of northeastern state abolition of the slave trade
and slavery, and the continued existence of racial oppression. 10

The touchstone for literature which stresses northeastern abolition’s halting nature, though it does not
entirely endorse northern state abolition’s incompleteness, is Zilversmit, The First Emancipation. Gary B.
Nash and Jean R. Soderlund, Freedom By Degrees: Emancipation in Pennsylvania and Its Aftermath (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Joanne Pope Melish, Disowning Slavery: Gradual Emancipation and
“Race” in New England, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Richard Newman, The
Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2002); Emily Blanck, Tyrannicide: Forging an American Law of Slavery in Revolutionary
10

12

Whether they were elitist conservatives or precursors to modern-day liberalism,
northeastern abolitionists and their societies initiated a decades-long, often aggressive political
and public relations campaigns that ultimately resulted in the eradication of chattel slavery north
of the Chesapeake and significant, if at times illegally flouted, sanctions on the foreign slave
trade before Congressional abolition in 1808.11 While this dissertation recognizes that
northeastern state abolition was an imperfect process, it emphasizes the successes of
Revolutionary Era and Early National abolitionism. Several recent works, especially books that
explore race and racial politics in these periods, either implicitly or explicitly ignore that
northeastern state slavery abolition happened at all.12 This dissertation offers a new history of
northeastern abolition, one that attempts to explain why it happened, rooting the processes in
moral and political economies that reflected deep prejudices against chattel slavery and the
political and economic power of slaveholders.
The title of this dissertation deserves brief explanation. The usage of “human capital”
bears a slight relation to labor economists’ use of the term, in that it is meant to evoke
northeastern abolitionists’ widespread belief that abolishing chattel slavery would promote

South Carolina and Massachusetts (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2014); James J. Gigantino, The
Ragged Road to Abolition: Slavery and Freedom in New Jersey, 1775-1865 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2016). One need not deny white racism and discrimination, however, to argue that
northeastern state abolition was historically unprecedented, and initiated and completed with historic
rapidity between 1777 and 1827. See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for a more detailed discussion of the
processes of northeastern state abolition. In any case, antislavery and anti-racism were philosophically
inseparable. See Herbert Aptheker, Anti-Racism in U.S. History: The First Two Hundred Years (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1992).
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“industry” and “economy,” to use diction they constantly invoked in their writings. This usage is
inspired by Revolutionary Era philosopher and economist Adam Smith’s conception of skills
acquired by workers as a valuable form of fixed capital, “the acquired and useful abilities of all
the inhabitants or members of society.”13 When northeastern abolitionists justified chattel slavery
abolition as a way to promote “industry” and “economy,” they meant not only the cultural
attributes of sobriety and industriousness, but also the tangible industries of commodity
production. Sobriety and industriousness could be promoted in African-Americans, and in
society as a whole, through abolishing the status of chattel slavery, thus motivating labor and
encouraging technological experimentation and agricultural improvements. They believed that
industry and economy could be encouraged by policy in individuals, but more importantly in free
households, in which parents retained secure, legal right to their children. In these conditions—
communities freed of the deleterious effects of chattel slavery and which encouraged
industriousness—domestic manufacturing would bloom, securing American economic
independence and fulfilling the promise of the North American continent’s bounteous natural
resources. “Human capital,” then, denotes a vision of slavery abolition encouraging labor
productivity and economic diversification emphasizing unbound labor and the free household
model.
In order to buttress the two major arguments of this dissertation, that the northeastern
abolition of chattel slavery was historically rapid, and secondly that it was rooted in diversified
agrarian, proto-industrial, and lastly mercantile northeastern capitalist economies in the Early
Republic, this dissertation is organized into six chapters and conclusion. The first chapter
provides a survey of the northeastern regional economies through 1775, the purpose of which is
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to establish a broad comparative context for understanding the regional differences between the
New England and the mid-Atlantic—the Northeast, in the terminology I employ—and the Upper
and Lower South. The second chapter explores the British-American imperial crisis after 1763,
focusing on the activities of abolitionists like Anthony Benezet, among others, and the
efflorescence of abolitionist literature in response to the unfolding crisis. The third chapter shifts
the analytical lens to the individual state level, re-examining the individual processes of state
chattel slavery abolition in the Northeast, and the conditions and politicking that made their
initial success possible. The first three chapters function as an opening tryptic, establishing a
contextual basis for the conflicts of the political economy of slavery and freedom that grew in the
Early Republic.
The fourth chapter picks up the story of northeastern abolitionism after the ratification of
the Constitution, detailing the activities of abolitionists and abolition societies as they strove to
uphold chattel slavery abolition and counter northeastern merchants’ participation in the African
and intercontinental slave trades. The analysis then transitions in the fifth chapter to an
exploration of the conjunctions between abolitionism and capitalist economic development. It
develops the concept of antislavery capitalism: visions of economic development rooted in
agricultural improvements and the promotion of domestic manufacturing. Proponents of this
political economy were not always abolitionists—that is, they did not necessarily directly
contribute to abolitionist political and public relations campaigns—but their visions of regional
and national political economy had distinctly antislavery implications. Moreover, capitalists like
Moses Brown, whose investment funded the first successful mechanized textile mill in the
United States, viewed capitalism and abolitionism as related, even consonant. If men like Tench
Coxe, for example, believed that cotton textiles manufacturing had a significant role to play in
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promoting American economic security, it would be a mistake to argue that they supported the
interests of southern slaveholders to the extent that the “slavery capitalism” historians suggest.
The sixth and final chapter extends this analysis through 1820 and the Missouri Crisis,
incorporating discussion of western expansion into the Old Northwest. The conclusion gestures
towards the explosive political conflicts over slavery, freedom, and expansion in the antebellum
period.
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Ch. 1: Free Household Farms, Manufactures, and Merchants That Traded Slaves:
Northeastern Economies and Capitalism in the Colonial Period

Medford, Massachusetts, in Middlesex County a handful of miles north of Boston, had an
economy typical of New England in the eighteenth century, centered on free household
agriculture and family-based craft manufactures. While free households predominated in
Medford, slavery had long existed the New England countryside and local merchants
participated in the African slave trade on a small scale. Men like Medford merchant Timothy
Fitch financed, organized, and directed trade in commoditized human beings, like the 1761
voyage that brought the future poetess Phillis Wheatley to Massachusetts. As the eighteenth
century progressed, Medford’s agricultural and household manufacturing economies became
increasingly integrated with Boston. According to a nineteenth century historian of Medford, as
“Boston became a large town, [Medford’s] farmers were prompt in supplying it with milk… This
led to raising cows on an extensive scale; while this, in its turn, led to raising grass and hay in
preference to corn.” The mid-nineteenth century authors of Medford’s town history remarked
that of industrial plants, “Medford has never had many, in the modern sense of the term. Among
the towns first settlers, every house was, in one sense, a factory; for almost every one had a
spinning wheel and loom.” At the same time, the town also harbored a saltpeter manufacturer, a
small spermaceti candle works, as well as brick makers, distillers, and small ship builders.
Gauzy as this 1855 description of Medford’s early free household economies might be, it did
contain kernels of truth. It described the early stages of Medford’s transition to market
production, a process that unfolded in the Northeast in the eighteenth century, a step towards the
development of diversified regional economies that wove together free household agriculture,
manufactures, and local and external commerce. This account, in other words, described
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Medford’s transition to capitalism. The authors further elucidated a shift in the town’s social
structure that portended significant change not just for Medford, but for New England and the
Northeast as a region. By the late colonial period, Medford’s growth led to a corresponding
move away from using enslaved labor. In 1754, forty-nine slaves inhabited the town, but ten
years later, at the beginning of the British-American imperial crisis, the community counted
forty-nine free blacks in its population.1
Why did chattel slavery decline in Medford, and why did its town meetings repeatedly
petition the Massachusetts assembly to proscribe slave importations in the 1760s and 1770s, even
as locals like Timothy Fitch clearly profited from the slave trade? The foundations of slavery’s
decline in the Northeast in the Revolutionary Era had roots in the interconnected agricultural,
household manufacturing, and commercial economic traits that towns like Medford developed by
the late colonial period. The British North American colonies in the Upper and Lower South did
not exhibit the same contours of economic development before the American Revolution,
because their plantation-based economies often generated large profits for slaveholders, but
resulted in exaggerated wealth inequality within the free population—not to mention the
dehumanizing violence and psychological torture the enslaved endured daily. While plantation
slavery did not take root in the Northeast, current scholarly paradigms emphasize the complicity
of the entire North American continent in the entrenchment of chattel slavery in the Chesapeake,
Lower South, and Caribbean. It is now a truism among historians to say that New Englanders

Charles Brooks and William Henry Whitmore, History of the Town of Medford, Massachusetts, From its First
Settlement, in 1630, to the Present Time, 1855 (Boston: James M. Usher, 1855), pp. 19, 352-353, 438. New
England town histories dating from antebellum and post-Civil War periods often omitted or underplayed
the presence of both enslaved and free blacks. Even accounting for such omissions, the decline of slavery
in Medford and other towns like it is the salient point for this discussion. For more detail on Wheatley’s
life, see Vincent Carretta, Phillis Wheatley: A Biography of A Genius in Bondage (Athens, GA: University of
Georgia Press, 2011).
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were just as responsible for the inhumane system of American chattel slavery as southern
mainland and Caribbean planters, because the slave trade contributed mightily to their
commercial economies, and by the nineteenth century southern cotton developed into an
important American commodity crop. Scholars that highlight northeastern complicity in southern
mainland and Caribbean plantation slavery also tend to emphasize the importance of enslaved
labor in the social structures and internal economies of New England and the mid-Atlantic
colonies, usually centering their analyses on coastal cities and their commercial economies.2 This
historiographical trend, however, ignores the structural foundations of New England society and
economy: the free household agriculture and family-based manufacturing in rural localities.
Scholarly interpretations of agricultural development in the British North American
colonies, particularly the Northeast, pivot on the question of “market-dependence,” the extent to
which free household farmers specialized their output to generate income, or remained selfsufficient with little need or desire to engage in market participation. The former, a
“commercialization-staples” model, argues that late colonial period farmers experienced “the
intensive development of commodity-production and exchange,” meaning that free household
farmers chose to maximize their output, and therefore potential profits, to invest in land
purchases and farm improvements. The latter, or “demographic-frontier” model, emphasizes the
extensive geographic growth of colonial agriculture as a result of the uniquely low North
See, for example, the essays in Beckert and Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism, discussed in the
Introduction. Wendy Warren, New England Bound: Slavery and Colonization in Early America (New York:
Liveright, 2016), a widely praised book that asserts the fundamentality of African and Native American
slavery to early Massachusetts, but which confuses the existence of slavery in Massachusetts with its
social and economic significance. Part of the confusion arises from a consistent failure to adequately
distinguish labor regimes and legal statuses. Thus, for example, Warren claims that “The role of slave
labor in the West Indies in fueling [the English imperial economy’s] tremendous growth is clear… The
role of enslaved labor in New England in creating the wealth is, however, largely invisible, because
enslaved people there did not do different work from their English counterparts; their slave labor was not
distinguished from free labor.” Ibid., pp. 117-118. See also Jared Ross Hardesty, Unfreedom: Slavery and
Dependence in Eighteenth-Century Boston (New York: New York University Press, 2016).
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American ratio of labor-to-land. This model explains agricultural expansion on the western
frontiers as independent of external market coercion, because colonists had abundant access to
western land after Native American removal, over which imperial authorities had very little
power to enforce legal property claims of coastal and metropolitan land speculators.3 By the late
eighteenth century, it is clear that free household farmers in southern New England, and those in
proximity to northeastern towns and cities, increasingly produced for external markets. Even so,
by the late colonial period market production did not dominate the rural agricultural and
household manufacturing economies of New England and the mid-Atlantic.
Across the Northeast, agrarian social structures and economic culture discouraged the
concentration of vast individual landholdings, unlike in the Upper and Lower South colonies.
While in the late colonial period slave-holding was common in mid-Atlantic agricultural
operations, especially in the Delaware and Hudson River Valleys and Long Island, intensive
concentrations of landed wealth and human property did not predominate. Northeastern
abolitionists made this point repeatedly in the late 1760s and early 1770s, as they denounced the
horrors of the slave trade and the moral and political iniquity of slavery as a pillar of economic
organization.

**********

These two models are characterized by Charles Post, The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in ClassStructure, Economic Development, and Political Conflict, 1620-1877 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), esp. pp.
73-102, 103-130, 155-194. Quotation p. 160. The two interpretations have long been the subject of scholarly
debate. Recent work has cast doubt on the view of northern family farmers as technologically backward,
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overview provided by Russell R. Menard, “Colonial America’s Mestizo Agriculture,” in Cathy D. Matson,
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For most people living in New England in the eighteenth century, family farming and
craft manufacturing of textiles, household and leather goods, and foodstuffs defined life and
labor. While the West Indian and transatlantic trades were robust, as they circulated fish and
lumber products throughout the Atlantic world and returned sugar and molasses, luxury
manufactured goods, and most importantly specie, the most recent works on the economy of
early New England give the distinct impression that external trade was fundamental to sustain
life in New England.4 The region, moreover, was ironically a significant participant and yet still
a periphery in the transatlantic currents of commercial life in the British Atlantic world in the
eighteenth century. The basic fact of colonial New England was that the majority of colonists
lived outside coastal cities and worked in mixed agricultural-commodity production economies.
Many New Englanders lived in towns like Medford, close to growing urban clusters, but the
family farm and small town remained the focus of their laboring lives. While variations among
towns and micro-regions always obtained, it is possible to sketch a generalized description of the
mixed farming-commodity production economies of rural New England.
The free household farm was the primary unit of agricultural production through the late
colonial period and Revolution. In the decades after the initial Puritan settlement of
Massachusetts, the New England colonies developed land distribution patterns that emphasized
the replication of free household units that primarily utilized family and seasonal labor to

This is in part due to the fact that merchant houses kept detailed records which are often easily
consulted by modern historians. In a broader sense, moreover, after three decades of first Atlantic, and
now global, historical frameworks becoming entrenched, many historians’ instinct is to look for external
economic connections. One consequence of these developments is that agriculture is sidelined as a crucial
economic activity, except when agricultural activities were forcibly performed by slaves on plantations in
the Caribbean and southern mainland North America. This is in stark contrast to the social historians of
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, that wrote detailed micro-histories of towns and rural localities especially in
New England. The methodologies of social history were applied to the New England “transition to
capitalism” debates of the 1970s and 1980s, discussed below.
4
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produce agricultural products for immediate family and local consumption.5 Authorities in New
England towns closely regulated local labor markets so that agricultural and craft production
proceeded on relatively small landholdings, prioritizing free household patriarch and local
authorities’ control over production regimes. Over several generations New England
landholdings became increasingly parcellized, as inheritance patterns created smaller family
farm holdings, leading to social differentiation in New England towns, which some historians
view as the precondition for capitalist development in the region.6 Still, the New England
agricultural economy never developed extreme concentrations of land ownership among
relatively few persons, as did the Upper and Lower South colonies. Unlike the Upper and Lower
South, New England developed a unique political economy which suppressed the concentration
of wealth in vast landholdings and ownership of human property.
New England’s town-based system of economic organization was far more egalitarian
than the Upper and Lower South, and slavery was relatively rare outside of cities and large
towns.7 A 1762 English encyclopedia of North America noted these dynamics of property
ownership, comparing them to Kent county in southeastern England. While many large
landholders rented land to tenants or hired overseers to administer their estates, “the greater part
of the people is composed of an independent and substantial yeomanry.” The custom and law of
inheritance, which encouraged parcellized landholdings, “makes the people the more ready to go
backward into the uncultivated parts of the country, where land is to be had at easy rates.” While

Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994) shows this process in detail in this county of ten
towns. Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of New England (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1995) argues that a “civic ecology” that emphasized community-based economic relations
defined New England.
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western migration led to the dispersal of family and kinship networks, it also had salutary effects
on the lived experience of the average New Englander: “In no part of the world are the ordinary
so independent, or possess so many of the conveniences of life.”8 During the imperial crisis, New
England abolitionists grounded their arguments against slavery and the slave trade in a desire to
perpetuate this relatively egalitarian mode of agricultural production, believing that to perpetuate
slavery would fatally damage their unique political economic organization, one that suppressed
the concentration of landed wealth and property.
By the late colonial period, New England family farmers produced a wide range of crops
for their own subsistence needs, as well as for local trade and barter. Outside observers typically
noted the poor quality of soil in the New England colonies when describing the region’s free
household agricultural economies, arguing that New England farmers should pursue
improvements to wring maximum production out of rocky and resistant soils.9 Southeastern New
England contained the best soils in the region, consisting of “a black mold on a red loam or
clay,” but throughout the region the primary subsistence crop mixes included maize, garden
vegetables, and fruits, in addition to dairy products produced by farm wives and children.10 At all
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several Powers who have Possessions in America. Illustrated with proper Maps, 3 Vols. (London: A. Millar,
1762), I: “England, New” entry. There is no pagination in this three volume encyclopedia. For this and all
future citations, I will refer to the entry title. The next line would bode ill for the British Empire little more
than ten years later, at the height of the imperial crisis: “They are raised from infancy to the exercise of
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turns, family members provided the overwhelming majority of farm labor in the late colonial
period, with chattel slavery and indentured servitude rare in rural New England, being largely
confined to the large towns and cities.
While New England towns relied heavily on Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey
for importations of wheat and flour, one traveler noted that farms usually “raised a small quantity
of common wheat” in addition to barley and oats.11 In general, however, across the region family
farms raised maize as their primary grain crop. According to another English chronicler of New
England agriculture, “Indian corn… makes the common food of the lowest sort of people,”
suggesting that wheat and flour imported into the region was primarily consumed by wealthier
New Englanders in large towns and cities.12 In general, maize, and in some cases rye, was the
first crop planted by colonial pioneer farmers, especially in the southern portions of the region.
New Englanders consumed corn in several ways, as bread and in ears, extracting the syrup as a
sweetener, as well as using it to brew a beer that “is not despicable,” according to a rather
haughty English description.13
Apples were the primary orchard fruit produced in New England, and contemporaries
noted that “there is no farmer, or even cottager, without a large orchard: some of them of such
extent, that they make three or four hundred hogsheads of cyder a man.”14 Other observers noted
that particularly fecund apples trees could produce “six or seven barrels, at the rate of eight or
nine bushels to the barrel.” In 1767, Middlesex County, Massachusetts alone produced 33,436
barrels of cider, and Connecticut Rev. Timothy Dwight recorded the cultivation of more than a
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dozen apple varieties throughout the region.15 In addition to apples, other fruits native to the
region and harvested by free household farms included grapes, currants, strawberries,
raspberries, and “whitehorn-haws, as big as [English] cherries.”16
While the quality of New England’s soil was generally of inferior quality than that of the
mid-Atlantic and the Upper and Lower South, in general it allowed for significant pasturage,
which made farm animals and the foodstuffs and farm products derived from them a significant
aspect of New England’s agricultural economy. By the mid-eighteenth century, English
pasturage grasses spread throughout the region, and family farms produced considerable
quantities of hay, with two to three tons a common yield.17 Free household farms preferred to
maintain about two acres of their landholdings in pasturage, “as they are thereby enabled to
support large herds of cattle, and flocks of sheep, which must improve their farms.”18 Indeed,
family farms devoted significant energy to tending cattle, sheep, and swine, from which they
derived value in foodstuffs and wool.
Colonial New England farmers, English travelers sometimes noted, hesitated to adopt
advanced English farming techniques like the introduction of nitrogen-rich fodder grasses such
as clover, or the systematic use of manure as fertilizer, but it was also just as likely that they
remained unaware of these advanced techniques at mid-century. Intensive convertible husbandry,
pioneered by English agricultural reformer Jethro Tull around the turn of the eighteenth century,
did not become widespread in the Northeast until after the Revolution, though by the 1770s some
scientific-minded farmers in southern New England began to experiment with Tull’s
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techniques.19 Even without advanced techniques, northeastern free household farms typically
produced more than subsistence. Most importantly, by the Revolution excess crop and dairy
production in New England began to find important domestic markets linked to nascent urban
centers and the coastwise trades, as was the case for Medford. The spread of agricultural wage
labor markets in Massachusetts, moreover, suggests that free household farms increasingly relied
on temporary wage labor outside the family to meet their production needs when necessary at
specific points throughout the year, especially harvest. Wage rates for temporary and seasonal
agricultural laborers remained relatively constant from 1750 until the Revolution, although there
was a steep spike in per day wages as the war began in 1776.20
New England free household agriculture centered on local communities. Family farms
congregated around small and large towns often operated in self-sufficiently, with householdmade manufactures circulating in relatively small trade networks.21 With the important exception
of lumber products like staves, shingles, and shook-down barrels that found markets in the West
Lemon, “Agriculture and Society in Early America,” p. 84. An American, American Husbandry, I: pp. 5354, described how farmers in “some parts” of Connecticut and Rhode Island had begun to adopt “the
English system of making clovers a preparation for corn; they leave the grass upon the land as many
years as it will yield tolerable crops, and then plough it up, and sow wheat, which is found a much better
management than the common one.”
20
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Indies, the New England countryside did not produce significant trade commodities primarily
intended for external markets.22 Typically, the furthest external markets for rural commodities
were large towns and cities like Boston, Providence, and New Haven, and it was in the cities that
the countryside free household agriculture and manufacturing and the Atlantic commercial
economies interacted. In this economic context, the cultural attribute of industriousness and the
growth of household manufacturing pushed free households to work to achieve a “competency,”
a minimum level of household consumption and a respectable standard of living.23
Contemporaries noted the high productivity of farms in the Pennsylvania, New York, and
New Jersey, usually attributing their fruitfulness to the region’s superior soil quality. One
observer in the 1770s recorded that “many parts of [New York] yields a larger produce than is
common in England,” and that the quality of the soil was “in general very good.” The “richness
and freshness of the soil” yielded 20 to 30 bushels of wheat per acre, “and this with such bad
husbandry as would not yield the like in England, and much less in Scotland.” He also remarked
on the extensive cultivation of corn and barley “in all the southern parts of the province,” though
he considered New York’s of inferior quality to that grown in Europe. Potatoes were also widely
cultivated in New York, which he attributed to higher quality soil, a “black, loose, fresh
woodland” that produced “very great crops.” Crucially, the growing urban center of New York
City provided a “constant and ready market” for locally grown produce, a comment that was
equally true of the southeastern hinterlands of Pennsylvania which supplied Philadelphia. He
described “rich pastures” and the cultivation of a wide variety of fruits like peaches and
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nectarines, as well as “immense quantities of melons” grown near New York City. The fecundity
of kitchen gardens also jumped out to this observer, which exhibited the “same superiority [that]
runs throughout all their fruits…”24 In and around Albany, observers noted significant
agricultural productivity. In addition to pear, peach, and cherry trees, the predominantly ethnic
Dutch and German farmers in the region grew maize “in great abundance,” as well as profitably
producing wheat. A traveler noted of German family farmers lived in large villages, and “sow
great quantities of wheat, which is brought to Albany; and from thence they send many yachts
laden with flour to New York.”25
Grains cultivated by Pennsylvania farmers included maize, barley, and oats, but most
importantly wheat, “the grand article of the province.” Pennsylvania farmers produced “immense
quantities” of wheat on farms near Philadelphia and increasingly in the western backcountry, in
average quantities of “25 to 32 bushels per acre.”26 Like New York, in the early 1770s
Pennsylvania farmers remained largely unacquainted with Jethro Tull’s innovative techniques,
though some more modern-minded, and wealthier, farmers began to adopt the latest English
innovations before the Revolution. Even without the widespread utilization of Tull’s techniques,
by the late colonial period land distribution policies in Pennsylvania led to the widespread
ownership of freeholds in rural Pennsylvania, and family farmers who worked the land as tenants
did so on less onerous terms than earlier in the eighteenth century. These developments largely
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owed to the Penn family’s sale of proprietary lands at reasonable prices after 1733, and
Pennsylvania farmers took advantage of widespread freehold property ownership to expand
production of wheat to supply flour to Philadelphia merchants, who then distributed to coastwise
markets in North America, and from thence secondarily to the West Indies and southern
European markets.27
Common vegetables raised in Pennsylvania included cabbage and turnips, cultivated for
both human and cattle consumption. Raised to an “immense size, and without any very
extraordinary culture, though they seldom attempt them without dung,” these vegetables graced
dining tables and filled cattle troughs throughout the colony.28 Cattle raising was an important
part of the agricultural economy in the hinterlands near Philadelphia, as farmers kept “great
flocks of cattle: some of them have forty to sixty horses; and four or five hundred head of horned
cattle, oxen, cows, bulls, calves, and young cattle…”29 A British traveler to North America
summed up the fecundity of the mid-Atlantic agricultural economies by way of comparing them
to his observations of Chesapeake farms and plantations. The Rev. Andrew Burnaby, an
Anglican minister at Leicester, described southeast Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey as
being “much better cultivated” than Virginia and Maryland, which he had just visited at length.
He found the soils of the region to be “extremely strong and fertile,” and concluded that
“cultivation is carried to a high degree of perfection,” in both quantity and quality of farm
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produce. He further contrasted Pennsylvania with the southern colonies, where in the latter he
found agriculture to be “in a very low state.”30
The organization of agricultural production in the Northeast generated economies
relatively independent from the immediate need to produce directly for external markets. More
so than the commodity-export commercial and agricultural economies of the southern colonies,
the northeastern colonies supported extensive domestic consumption markets rooted in free
household agriculture and manufacturing economies by the late colonial period, even as they
groaned under British imperial manufacturing restrictions. Undoubtedly, external commerce in
transatlantic trade networks contributed English manufactures, Caribbean sugar products,
southern mainland tobacco, and dozens of other commodities which helped fuel the development
of domestic consumption in the Northeast. At the same time, Revolutionary Era abolitionists
could conceive of the region shorn of direct connections to slavery in the Caribbean and the
African and intercontinental slave trades because their agricultural and household manufacturing
economies participated in, but did not fundamentally rely on, the “slave(ry) trade.”31

**********

The agricultural labor force in the mid-Atlantic consisted primarily of family members,
but also included a significant population of British and European servants and to a lesser extent
African slaves. Temporary bound labor was commonplace especially in Pennsylvania, a fact
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widely acknowledged by contemporary observers and emphasized by historians. The reasons for
Pennsylvania freeholders’ utilization of bound labor were two-fold: first, and most importantly a
pressing need for labor on rural farms; and secondarily, because potential British and European
bound laborers viewed Pennsylvania as an attractive site for emigration, and thus submitted
themselves and their families to temporary bound labor in the hopes that “the best poor man’s
country” was not an empty moniker. The irony of Pennsylvania’s colonial reputation as a haven
for the oppressed, but the reality of its freeholders’ use of bound labor has certainly not escaped
historians: the key modern work on life and labor in Pennsylvania is entitled “Runaway
America,” and juxtaposes the lived experience of bound laborers with Benjamin Franklin’s
homilies promoting working-class industriousness.32
Foreign travelers to Pennsylvania noted the unique labor regime of Pennsylvania (and the
broader mid-Atlantic region), but clearly contrasted slavery and servitude—a distinction that
modern historians sometimes elide in discussions of “unfree” labor in the British Atlantic.33
“Pennsylvania is not without negroe slaves for cultivation,” an observer noted, “though the
number bears no proportion to white servants.” As in England, it was common practice for
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Pennsylvania farmers to hire servants by the year, and in the 1770s wage rates for male farm
hands hovered between £10-£16 per year, with female “maids” earning from £5-£7 annually. A
second kind of servitude especially common in Pennsylvania was indentured “redemptioners,”
typically families that could not (or would not) pay their passage from Europe or Great Britain in
whole, and thus contracted their labor for a period of years in exchange. British travelers noted
that Pennsylvania law strictly regulated the master-servant relationship, compelling masters to
feed and clothe their bound laborers, and indentured servants, redemptioners, and seasonallyemployed wage workers often experienced quite different work regimes and treatment. “These
distinctions in servitude are met with in our other colonies,” a British visitor noted, referring to
the northeastern colonies, “but they do not occur so often, because for one newcomer in them,
there are twenty at Philadelphia.”34
Recent historiography cuts several different, and often contradictory, ways with regards
to the significance of slavery and servitude, as well as the economic significance of the slave
trade, to New England and the mid-Atlantic. A tendency of the “slavery capitalism” historians is
to assume the importance of chattel slavery and the slave trade to the entire portion of North
America that would become the United States, though recognizing the obvious distinctions in
significance between the Northeast and Upper and Lower South.35 Another recent work finds
significant differences in the political economy and labor markets of New England and
Pennsylvania, counterpoising the tightly controlled labor markets of New England (where
slavery and bound servitude were relatively uncommon) with the “free labor markets” of
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Pennsylvania. In this view, the higher prevalence of temporary bound labor in Pennsylvania
existed in stark contrast to Massachusetts.36
A mid-18th century Swedish traveler to the mid-Atlantic, Pehr Kalm described wage and
temporary bound labor with an air of familiarity, and chattel slavery with a tinge of academic
dislike. Kalm observed three forms of labor: “quite free” laborers who agreed to work for wages
and could leave their employer on their own will, indentured servants and redemptioners, and
chattel slaves. The latter he described as “the purchaser’s servant as long as he lives, unless he
gives him to another, or makes him free.” Kalm noted that Pennsylvania Quakers had a history of
moral antislavery—personal qualms about the propriety of slavery rooted in religious beliefs—
but did not let the sect entirely off the hook, noting that “they are no longer so nice, and they
have as many Negroes as other people.” Immediately after this comment, Kalm pivoted and
identified a strain of antislavery that extended beyond Pennsylvania Quakers, and thus the views
of most historians of pre-Revolution antislavery. “However many people cannot conquer the idea
of [slavery] being contrary to the laws of christianity to keep slaves,” Kalm pointed out, due to
an aversion against the total alienation and bodily disownment of the chattel principle. He
proceeded to analyze, at length, all the ways in which the enslaved were held in a state of
debasement in the mid-Atlantic, North America, and the Caribbean, but the fact that he observed
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non-Quaker antislavery points to a latent critique of slavery that would be politically unleashed
in Pennsylvania in 1778, culminating in its March 1780 abolition law.37

**********

Before the American Revolution, most rural northeastern farm families either produced
their own woolen and flaxen textiles, or obtained them through local trade markets. In the 1760s
and early 1770s, as British textile manufacturers inaugurated a shift towards industrial
production, in New England (as well as Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey), most people
lived outside urban areas, and therefore had intermittent access to British or European made
textiles. Spinning was an activity typically performed by women and children, and while men
had traditionally predominated in weaving, historians have discovered that the task was
increasingly “feminized” by the Revolutionary Era. References to “homespun” clothing abound
in accounts of New England communities, and the cloths and material objects that New
Englanders produced in their homes spawned a culture of local consumption and production that
later generations accustomed to industrial textiles romanticized as “the age of homespun.” As the
leading historian of the economy and culture of “homespun” notes, the expansion of participation
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in and production for markets outside local communities, northeasterners consumed “storebought” and homemade fabrics in tandem by the end of the eighteenth century.38
Production statistics for northeastern “homespun” production are noticeably lacking
before 1790, when the Washington administration attempted to assess the productivity of
American manufacturing, textile and otherwise, led by Treasury Secretary and Assistant
Secretary Alexander Hamilton and Tench Coxe.39 By the 1760s, however, household textile
manufacturing was sufficiently widespread in the Northeast that elite men began to form
improvement societies that offered rewards for the best specimens of woolen and linen thread
and woven fabrics. The emergence of improvement societies was inspired by the nonimportation movements to protest British imperial policy in the mid and late 1760s. These nonimportation movements, however, built on a pre-existing base of household textile production,
and were primarily concerned promoting American production of fine linens and woolens to
replace luxury English-made goods.40 While households and plantations throughout colonial
North America produced “homespun” textiles, contemporaries and modern historians primarily
identify them with New England and mid-Atlantic free farming households.
Travelers to Pennsylvania noted that “manufactures are very considerable,” providing the
example of “thread stockings” made at Germantown. By his estimate, the town’s inhabitants
produced sixty thousand pairs of the stockings the year before, which retailed for one dollar per
Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, The Age of Homespun: Objects and Stories in the Creation of An American Myth
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), esp. pp. 3-5. Ulrich opens the book with an insightful discussion of
the 1851 centennial celebration of Litchfield, Connecticut’s founding, where Rev. Horace Bushnell
delivered a speech that celebrated “Litchfield’s pioneers as the Kings and Queens of ‘homespun.’” Ibid.,
pp. 15-16.
39
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pair. One traveler also noted the productivity of Irish linen weavers in Pennsylvania; of New
York, he noted that its household manufactures lagged behind those of their southern neighbors.
Even so, New York households manufactured “a small amount of cloth, some linen, hats, shoes,
and other articles of apparel.”41 In 1767, on the other hand, Royal Governor of New York Sir
Henry Moore conducted a tour of the colony, and he noticed “the custom of these course cloths
in private families throughout the whole Province, and in almost every House a sufficient
quantity is manufactured for the use of the Family, without the least design of sending any of it
to market.” In Pennsylvania and New Jersey, authorities reported no textile factories “which
deserve to be called by that name,” but that household textile manufactures were common and
widespread.42
Most importantly for the political and economic developments of Revolutionary Era and
Early Republic, the “homespun” production of free households in the Northeast formed the
template on which capitalists with antislavery instincts like Moses Brown grafted industrial
production methods in the 1780s and 1790s.43 Burgeoning industrialists like Brown, his son in
law Nicholas Almy, and their English master mechanic Samuel Slater initially employed family
units at their early machine-spinning plants, and contracted the weaving of their machine-spun
yarn to farm families.44 This is not to deny that southern plantations and non-slaveholding
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families in the Upper and Lower South also produced “homespun” textiles, nor that imported
English and European textiles were unimportant as consumer goods in the late 18th century.
Rather, the northeastern reliance on “homespun” goods reflected the broader dynamics of the
free household agriculture and craft manufacturing economies that differentiated New England
and the mid-Atlantic from the Upper and Lower South. Further, because the Upper and Lower
South produced very little cotton before the American Revolution, the household textile
manufacturing processes which late 18th century capitalists drew upon to develop industrial
capitalism centered on woolens and linens, and not cotton.45
Advanced manufacturing technology was largely absent in British North America in the
colonial period, due to imperial restrictions on colonial industry which supported productions of
the home isles. A pillar of the mercantilist system, imperial suppression of colonial
manufacturing took many forms, from direct penalties on individuals and communities that
attempted to implement new production processes, to discriminatory tariffs on raw materials. But
much to imperial planners’ chagrin, by the 1760s and 1770s colonists in the Northeast
increasingly desired to make finished consumer goods and industrial materials for themselves,
ranging from finer grades of textiles to sophisticated iron products and luxury goods like clothing
accessories and glass. North America’s bounteous natural resources held promise that the
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colonies could develop extensive manufacturing and extractive industries, and the Empire’s
mercantilist prevention of manufacturing moved from critique to grounds for rebellious activity
by the 1770s, especially in New England.46 The 1750 Iron Act, for example, encouraged colonial
iron production, but only crude pig and bar iron. The Empire restricted the privilege of producing
more refined and valuable iron products such as wrought iron to ironmongers in the home isles.
It was telling that in November 1772 the Boston Town Meeting cited imperial restrictions,
“restraining us from erecting Slitting-Mills for manufacturing our Iron, the natural produce of
this country,” claiming “an Infringement of that Right which God and Nature have invested us,
to make use of our skill and industry in procuring the necessaries and conveniences of life.”47
Imperial manufacturing restrictions handcuffed prospective colonial manufacturers of
advanced iron products, but by the late colonial period the New England, middle, and Upper
South colonies had achieved a relatively robust crude iron industry. As early as the 1640s,
Massachusetts colonists had established rudimentary iron foundries, which Bay Colony
authorities further promoted after the English Civil War.48 By the mid-18th century, however, the
middle colonies had overtaken New England as the chief iron producers in the Northeast, and
Virginia and Maryland had also developed extensive crude iron-making capability, the largest
among the North American colonies. Between 1763 and 1775, Pennsylvania exported an average
of 590 tons of pig iron to England, while New York exported an annual average of 725 tons. By
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comparison, Virginia and Maryland combined to export and average of 1,843 tons of pig iron to
the mother country in the same years.49
The majority of pig and bar iron produced in the British North American colonies was
intended for domestic use, evident in the amount of North American-made bar iron circulated in
the North American coastal trade.50 The New England colonies imported the majority of bar iron
produced in the Upper South and mid-Atlantic. Between 1768 and 1772, the New England
colonies imported an annual average of 17,458 hundredweights of bar iron from other colonies,
with Massachusetts absorbing the overwhelming majority, primarily for use in the Bay Colony’s
extensive shipbuilding operations.51 North American-produced pig and bar iron drove a nascent
refined iron industry in the New England, as skilled ironworkers transformed crude pig and bar
iron into custom-made components needed for shipbuilding and other applications. Between
1760 and 1775, the northeastern colonies counted 114 ironworks, 66% of the total across the
thirteen colonies.52 These ironworks, however, depended on bar iron produced largely in
Pennsylvania and Virginia, a connection that involved slavery and temporary bound labor.
The labor regimes of iron mines and foundries in the Chesapeake and mid-Atlantic (the
source of the majority of American iron) blended enslaved, temporary bound, and free wage
labor. A thorough study of the Pennsylvania and Virginia iron industry emphasizes the
importance of enslaved labor in mines and foundries, as aspiring “adventurers” often preferred to
use slaves and temporary bound laborers in their enterprises because alienated workers could be
more easily controlled. This was especially important in mines, where the disagreeable and
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dangerous work often turned off free wage laborers, and thus contributed to labor unrest.
Through the prism of the iron industry in Pennsylvania, then, the contention is that slavery was
critical to the emergence of industrial capitalism in Pennsylvania. Iron products did contribute
significantly to economic development in the Northeast in the late colonial period, especially as
inputs in New England shipbuilding, and the table below makes clear that New England was the
primary importer of bar iron produced in the mainland colonies. In this rendering, capitalism did
not come over on the first Puritan ships to North America, but emerged from the ships built in
Massachusetts dockyards in the eighteenth century. But while Pennsylvania iron “adventurers”
relied on enslaved and temporary bound labor before the American Revolution, after
independence they increasingly shifted towards using free wage laborers, not a coincidental
development considering the ongoing process of slavery abolition in the Keystone State
beginning in 1780.53
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Table I: Bar Iron Imported from Mainland Colonies, 1768-1772 (in hundredweights)
Year

New England Total

New England Percentage

1772

North American
Total
33,156

22,428

67.6

1771

28,084

18,539

66.0

1770

28,338

20,304

71.6

1769

21,860

13,947

63.8

1768

16,905

12,070

71.3

Average

25,669

17,458

68.1

Source: Historical Statistics of the United State, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975), Series Z, pp. 360-373.

Connected to, and arguably more important than iron production to the Northeast was the
shipbuilding industry. Tentative estimates suggest that New England shipbuilders produced
44,173 in ship tonnage between 1769 and 1771, 68% of the British North American total;
roughly 40% of this tonnage was sold to offshore metropolitan mercantile interests, contributing
an average of £75,000 in foreign exchange earnings to British North America, of which New
England accounted for £44,000.54 The development of the shipbuilding industry created
networks of production and consumption with tentacles that reached across the Northeast.
Lumber products, locally fabricated iron components, and dozens of other inputs necessary to
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ship-building, in addition to the employment of thousands of workers in ship-building yards and
on the wharves, contributed significantly to northeastern regional economic diversification.55
By the 1770s, vessels manufactured primarily in New England counted as the fifth-most
valuable colonial export.56 The structure of the Chesapeake and southern colonies’ economies
were such that capital and labor, in the form land and slaves, heavily concentrated in plantation
commodity agriculture, therefore leading to the under-development of capital-intensive
shipbuilding operations. In the Upper and Lower South shipbuilding lagged far behind the
Northeast, even though the former did not face competitive disadvantages in natural resources.
From 1769 until 1771, Maryland and Virginia produced 122 vessels ranging from topsails to
sloops and schooners. In the same years, Massachusetts alone built 411 vessels, evidence of its
merchant-capitalists ability to invest capital in shipbuilding enterprises, as well as the availability
of artisans and common laborers. New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut combined to
contribute an additional 468 topsails, sloops and schooners between 1769 and 1771.
Pennsylvania and New York produced 143 vessels in the same years.57
New England had some competitive advantages that helped the region to produce
shipping more efficiently and cost-effectively, though often of lower quality, but these were
balanced by some disadvantages. While all the North American regions had access to timber,
New England’s lumber industry was historically better-developed; and the same time, it lacked
direct access to iron ore. The development of shipbuilding in New England was an outgrowth of
the region’s increasingly diversified commercial economy, as the industry became an important
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component of the “mixed-farming-fishing-timber economy” that developed in the 17th and 18th
centuries. New English civil authorities and mercantile interests promoted shipbuilding to
provide an additional commodity base aside from ocean fisheries, because it could not match the
staple crop production of the southern colonies. The nature of shipbuilding, in particular its
demand for processed lumber products, ironwork, and skilled and semiskilled labor, generated
forward and backward linkages that further contributed to the region’s economic
diversification.58 By the eve of the American Revolution, New England shipyards produced
vessels far more cheaply than their North American neighbors. While historians have debated the
exact cost-per-ton shipbuilding prices at various points in the 17th and 18th centuries, it is clear
that New England routinely produced ships inexpensively compared to its continental neighbors,
a minimum of £2 per measured ton.59
Pennsylvania merchant-financiers began investing heavily in shipping and shipbuilding
in the early 1770s, though as the above table indicates their shipbuilding operations hewed closer
in scale to the Upper and Lower South than New England. Whereas earlier in the 18th century,
metropolitan merchants owned the majority of ships registered in Philadelphia, Philadelphians
owned more than 75% of locally registered ships by 1775. From 1770-1775, Philadelphia
merchants annually invested an average of £61,652 in their local shipbuilding industry. One
historian calculates that by the outbreak of the Revolution, Pennsylvanians had invested almost

Innes, Creating the Commonwealth, pp. 271-307. Newell, From Dependency to Independence argues that
New England manufacturing and commercial development (including shipbuilding) were the direct
outcome of civil authorities’ desire to promote internal economic growth through promoting investment
in extractive and manufacturing pursuits after 1640, especially through the use of government-backed
paper currency.
59
Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America,
p. 243.
58

43

£500,000 in shipbuilding, and that industry directly or indirectly impacted the business activities
of the majority of Philadelphia merchant-capitalists by 1775.60
The extraction and manufacture of timber into shipping containers and construction
materials was a significant economic activity in the northeastern colonies, given the ubiquity of a
wide variety wooden containers for storing and transporting trade commodities.61 New England
took the lead in producing shipping containers to supply the West Indian sugar colonies for use
in storing and transporting their sugar and molasses, significant percentages of which the sugar
islands exported back to the Northeast. Shingles, house frames, furniture, masts, and pine,
walnut, and oak boards were also important lumber products produced largely by the
northeastern colonies for domestic, intercolonial, and external markets. Lumber products and
processed fish, alongside the carrying trade (to be discussed below) were perhaps New England
and the mid-Atlantic’s most direct contribution to the transatlantic mercantile economy, and
therefore their most direct sustained economic connection to the Caribbean sugar colonies. The
New England-Caribbean trade axis is well-known to historians: New England shipped lumber
products and processed fish to the Caribbean, which returned molasses and rum, thus sustaining
the region’s commercial economy.62 By the late colonial period the New England and to a lesser
extent Middle Colonies annually sent an average of almost £70,000 in wood products to the West
Indies, the vast majority from New England. Further, pickled and dried fish also contributed to
the New England-Caribbean trade, as New England merchants annually exported 189,697
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quintals of dried fish to the West Indies, but also 114,734 to southern Europe and the “wine”
islands.

Table II: Value of Selected Wood Products Exported by the New England and Middle
Colonies by Region, 1768-1772 (in pounds sterling)
West Indies

1772

94,684

Southern
Europe/
Wine Islands
3,249

Great
Britain

Total

8,915

106,848

West
Indies
Percentage
88.6

1771

75,133

4,365

9,318

88,816

84.6

1770

67,689

4,193

11,558

83,440

81.1

1769

51,632

3,919

6,795

62,346

82.8

1768

56,516

6,298

6,505

69,319

81.5

New England
Percentage

73.9

30.7

69.4

Source: Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial
North America, Appendix IV, Tables 2-5. Note: These figures represent the combined value of pine
boards, staves, and headings.

Numbers like these would seem to support the idea that Caribbean slavery contributed
directly to the growth of northeastern capitalism, in a manner similar to that described by Eric
Williams in Capitalism and Slavery. In the American Northeast, however, capitalism emerged in
the rural agricultural economies which spawned domestic consumption markets for both
domestic and foreign manufactured consumer goods, not in the transition from mercantile to
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industrial capital in Great Britain described by Williams for Great Britain.63 Further, it is unclear
how much New England lumber and fish were consumed by northeasterners themselves, but
patterns of the regional North American coastal trade suggest that northeasterners consumed as
much of each as did West Indian slaves. And undoubtedly northeasterners purchased, distilled,
and consumed large amounts of Caribbean molasses and rum, though the importance of rum to
North American participation in the African slave trade has been overstated. But contrary to the
“slavery capitalism” historiographical trend, New England capitalist development did not
fundamentally depend on the Caribbean trade—the relationship was actually reversed. It was
because of emergent capitalist development in the New England countryside that trade
connections with the West Indies were so significant in the late colonial period.
This discussion is not intended to downplay the importance of external commerce with
the West Indies, or to any of the slave-based economies of the Atlantic world, to the northeastern
economies. As David Brion Davis explained several decades ago, many Quaker merchants in the
American Northeast and Great Britain, including influential members of the Philadelphia-based
Pemberton family, derived large fortunes in part from the West Indian trade which allowed them
the leisure and resources to pursue humanitarian causes, including slavery and slave trade
abolition campaigns. Thus, it would seem that the relationship between abolitionism and

Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery. A common reading of Williams flattens his rather complex
argument into the assertion that British capitalism depended on Caribbean slavery, because profits from
Caribbean sugar were the bedrock investments of the textile industry in England. At times Williams
made this assertion, but his larger point was that the 18 th century saw a shift in power from mercantile to
industrial capitalists, and that the latter had little incentive to support the West Indian interests. What
Williams did not stress, however, is that the reason textile capitalists did not have a direct interest in the
West India lobby was because their customers lived in the British Isles and western Europe, and had been
transformed into consumers by the earlier agricultural capitalist transformation “industrious revolution.”
This reading of Williams’ argument would seem to suggest that it inspires modern “slavery capitalism”
historians, but as H. Reuben Neptune suggests, they surprisingly do not seem to read much of Williams.
Neptune, “Throwin’ Scholarly Shade: Eric Williams in the New Histories of Capitalism and Slavery,” MS
essay, presented at The Graduate Center, CUNY, 9 March 2018.
63

46

economic concerns—while never deterministic—ran through merchant capitalism. But that
relationship in fact ran three ways, towards eliminating chattel slavery from the agricultural
countryside, encouraging the growth of industry and the development of an industrious (and
ideally, easily controllable) manufacturing labor force, as well as through the mercantile
connections of abolitionists like Rhode Islander Moses Brown and the Pemberton family.64

**********

Shifting focus to broader patterns of trade and commercial finance, it is beyond doubt
that the northeastern colonies had developed into significant mercantile economies by the late
colonial period. New England merchants had firmly established reputations as kings of the North
American “carrying” trade by the 1760s, and colonial trade statistics reveal significant
differences among the mainland North American regional commercial economies. By the mid18th century, the northeastern colonies’ increasingly diverse agricultural and household
manufacturing economies yielded balances of trade with the British Isles quite different than the
Upper and Lower South colonies. While the latter’s slave-based plantation-staple economies
generated higher export totals of raw commodities, they imported comparatively less than their
northeastern neighbors, which also boasted higher rates of free household consumption. These
differences in part contributed to the development of divergent attitudes towards the slave trade,

Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, pp. 233-249; see also Davis’s further elaboration on
these themes in his reply to Thomas Bender’s critiques in “Reflections on Abolitionism and Ideological
Hegemony” in John Ashworth, David Brion Davis, and Thomas L. Haskell, The Antislavery Debate:
Capitalism and Abolitionism as A Problem in Historical Interpretation, Thomas L. Haskell, ed. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992), pp. 161-179.
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slavery, and economic development by the late colonial period, which accelerated after the
Revolution and during the Early Republic.
The most complete statistics for calculating colonial British North American import and
exports, overall values, and price series exist for 1768-1772. In 1767, the Townshend Acts
created the American Board of Customs, empowered to tightly control the implementation and
collection of trade duties. Historians believe the Board finished tabulating trade records through
1772 in 1774, not long before the imperial crisis became declared war. Statistics for 1768-1772
reveal fluctuation and decline by region and commodity as a result of the relative effects of local
non-exportation agreements.65 The importance of slave-grown staple-crop exports to the Upper
and Lower South is illustrated in the average values of the five most valuable commodities
exported from North America in these years. Tobacco, rice, and indigo, all commodities
produced by the southern slave-based economies, combined for 67.8% of colonial commodity
exports. Raw commodity export totals, however, mask the dynamism of the northeastern
agricultural, household manufacturing, and commercial economies, where diverse and
increasingly creative uses of capital in growing urban clusters like Boston, Philadelphia, and
New York City supplemented relatively low totals of raw commodity exports.66
Comparing regional variations in the value of imports from and exports to England adds a
layer of nuance to commodity export averages. In 1763 the northeastern colonies accounted for
only 14.9% of the total value of North American colonial exports to England, but 47.8% of the
value of the thirteen colonies’ imports from England. Statistics for 1763 reflect the aftermath of

Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, Appendix IV, pp. 204-5, Table II. These scholars also
note that the disruption of the American War for Independence likely led to the loss of import/export
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the French and Indian War, which disproportionately affected the northeastern frontier regions,
but the disparity between regional shares of exports and imports reveal significant regional
difference.67 In 1765, for instance, the northeastern colonies sent 19.6% of North American
exports to England, but absorbed 61.6% of the total value of English imports to the thirteen
colonies. By 1770 the Chesapeake and Lower South colonies continued to produce the lion’s
share of the value of North American exports, 75.8%, but accounted for less than half of
consumption of British imports, 47.1%. In 1774, the last full year of peace before the outbreak of
armed conflict, and in which October the non-importation Association agreement was
announced, the northern colonies accounted for 19.1% of the value of North American exports to
England but 62.8% of English imports.68 What accounted for the fact that the Upper and Lower
South consistently exported far more to England and Scotland than they imported? Southern
plantations tended to be self-sufficient, especially for the needs of the enslaved, which
suppressed the growth of free household-based local consumption markets unlike the Northeast.
The trade commodities, destinations, and average annual value of trade exports of the
British North American colonies of further shows regional distinctions, as well as the
interconnectedness of Atlantic trade patterns. Between 1768 and 1772, the New England annual
value commodity exports averaged £439,101, 63.3% of which went to the West Indies in the
form of dried and salted fish, livestock, wood and whale products, and grains. New England’s
annual value of exports to Africa those years averaged £17,194, almost entirely rum, while the
region’s annual value of commodity imports averaged £1,053,800.69 The figures for

For an extensive overview of the Seven Years’ War see Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’
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Pennsylvania and New York are proportionally similar, accounting for an average annual value
of £526,545, 42.6% to the West Indies and only .002% to Africa, while their annual value of
imports was £1,202,200. 70
Meanwhile, the Upper South colonies’ annual value of exports from 1768-1772 was
averaged £1,046,883, more than double the total commodity exports of New England and the
middle colonies.71 Tobacco accounted for 72.2% of that total, with the British Isles their chief
market as mandated by the Navigation Acts, absorbing 79% of the Upper South’s exports.72
Meanwhile, Virginia and Maryland accounted for a combined average annual import value of
£1,131,800.73 The Carolinas and Georgia exported an annual average value of £551,494, 75.6%
of which was rice and indigo also bound to the home isles by the Navigation Acts, accounting for
71.4% of the lower South’s exports.74 Meanwhile the region’s average annual imports amounted
to £534,200.
Taken together, these statistics make visible two broad, contrasting trends in the
northeastern and Upper and Lower South commercial economies. First the northeastern colonies,
where abolitionism was earliest and most effective, contributed disproportionately to the growth
of domestic consumption markets, absorbing 57% of commodity imports to North America in
the late 1760s and early 1770s. Second, northeastern colonial import-export statistics show

McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British North America, Table 9.3, p. 199. Eighty percent of exports
to the West Indies were grains and grain products, with the remainder mainly consisting of flaxseed,
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significant diversification by the 1770s, compared to the narrower, export-driven, slave property
regimes and commodity-staple economies of the Upper and Lower South colonies.

Table III: Average Annual Value of Exports from and Imports to British North America,
1768-1772
(In Thousands of Pounds Sterling)
Region

Exports

Percentage of North
American Total

Imports

Percentage of North
American Total

New England

439.1

17.1

1,053.8

26.9

Middle
Colonies
Upper South

526.5

20.5

1,202.2

30.6

1,046.9

40.8

1,131.8

28.8

Lower South

551.5

21.5

534.2

13.6

Sources: McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British North America, Tables 5.2, 6.1, 8.2, 9.3; HSUS,
II: pp. 1182-1183, Series Z 287; Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic
Development of Colonial North America, pp. 91-93.

Other indices of British North American commercial development complement the
regional differences evident in import-export values. Import-export statistics, because they
measure “visibles” in the form of trade goods and commodities, do not account for the total
productivity of the northeastern regional economies. Commercial services and “invisibles,” for
instance merchants’ growing marine insurance and freighting businesses, made crucial additions
to the New England commercial economies because they contributed cash credits to colonial
accounts in the metropole.75 “Invisibles” earnings contributed a critical source of revenue that
allowed the New England and middle colonies to redress trade deficits with the metropole that
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are suggested in the raw import-export statistics. Between 1768 and 1772, the North American
colonies consistently maintained trade deficits due to trade with the metropole. In 1768, for
example, the colonial-metropolitan trade deficit totaled £1,408,000, of which the northeastern
colonies generated £1,202,000. Non-importation movements organized by urban merchants in
response to the Townshend program drastically reduced colonial-metropolitan trade in 1769, but
from 1770 through 1772 the colonial trade deficit averaged £2,371,000, reaching a peak of
£3,480,000 in 1771. New England and the middle colonies’ share of trade deficits with the
metropole in those years totaled 64.4%, 79.9%, and 78.4%, respectively. The northeastern
colonies’ trade deficits were far more balanced with the West Indies, their second most important
regional trading partner after the British Isles.76
“Invisibles” earnings contributed significantly to balance northeastern trade accounts
with the metropole, much more so than the African and intercontinental slave trades so closely
identified with the region’s commercial economies. In 1768, for example, the combined value of
shipping earnings and “other invisibles” generated in the Northeast totaled £596,000 (81.5% of
the North American total), more than six times the total £83,000 value of slaves imported into all
the North American colonies that year. In 1770, the region’s shipping and “invisible” earnings
reached £695,000 (82.2%), compared to £108,000 value of slaves imported to North America. In
1772, northeastern shipping and “invisibles” earnings reached £740,000 (76.8%), while the value
of slave imports reached a post-1763 high of £392,000.77 “Invisibles” earnings took two primary
forms. First, and most importantly, were earnings derived from the shipment and distribution of
export commodities in transatlantic commerce on colonial-owned ships, and second profits
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derived from colonial shipping insurance underwriters.78 Between 1768 and 1772, North
Americans earned an average of £601,400 annually from shipping earnings on voyages to all
regions of the Atlantic world. The New England and middle colonies contributed
disproportionately to “invisibles” earnings, especially because of trade with the British Isles and
the Caribbean.

Table IV: British North American Shipping Earnings by Region, 1768- 1772 (in pounds
sterling)
Region

New England

Middle Colonies

Total

165,000

Upper/Lower
South
94,000

1768

296,000

1769

313,000

176,000

110,000

599,000

1770

323,000

188,000

95,000

606,000

1771

348,000

174,000

89,000

611,000

1772

354,000

181,000

95,000

630,000

Average

326,000

176,800

96,600

601,400

Percentage

54.2

29.3

16.1

561,000

Source: Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of
Colonial North America, Table 7.6, p. 128. Note: This table omits shipping earnings from the British
Canadian colonies and those derived from Florida, the Bahamas and Bermuda. Together these regions
accounted for less than 5% of total North American shipping earnings.

The second major source of “invisibles” earnings, marine insurance services, similarly
exhibited significant regional variations. Insurance services generated fewer profits compared to

See the thorough discussion of “invisibles” earnings in Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade,
and the Economic Development of Colonial North America, pp. 124-136.
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shipping earnings, and profits to be made from underwriting marine insurance policies varied
significantly depending on the proposed destinations and routes. Colonial merchants preparing to
sail for the West Indies and southern European markets tended to purchase policies from local
providers, with interest rates that varied from two to three percent, while voyages to Africa in
pursuit of slaves but also commodities like gold, ivory, and pepper usually cost between eight
and eleven percent. Insurance policies on ships bound for the British Isles bore the least
expensive interest rates, often no more than 1%.79 When included with port fees and various
minor ancillary revenue streams, marine insurance earnings constituted a small but important
contribution to “invisibles” earnings, because ship-owners tended to pay insurance premiums in
specie or foreign exchange credits to colonial accounts.
Critical to the northeastern colonies, “invisibles” earnings allowed colonial merchants to
address their trade imbalances with metropolitan merchants. When expressed in concert with
trade commodity export statistics, their significance is even more obvious. The average annual
value of “invisibles” earnings were second only to the value of tobacco imports, generating
£610,000 to tobacco’s £766,000, almost double rice and more than five times as valuable as
indigo exports.80 Though it is common to note that New England, in particular, could not
produce commodity crops like tobacco, “invisibles” earnings impacted the northeastern
commercial economies on a similar scale as tobacco and indigo did the Upper and Lower South.
The dynamics and patterns of the northeastern commercial economies described in brief
suggest some aspects that bear upon this discussion’s primary focus, the relationship of
northeastern abolitionism to the region’s emergent capitalist economies in the late colonial
period. When the American Revolution unleashed political possibilities for northeastern
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abolitionists to pursue political campaigns, they benefitted from several social and economic
preconditions. First and most obvious, comparatively few slaves in the Northeast muted the
political power of slaveholding interests in the region—and yet, as I will discuss in subsequent
chapters, northeastern state slavery abolition still encountered significant opposition. Second, the
free household basis of agricultural production, especially in New England, generated patterns of
property ownership more, but not absolutely, egalitarian than in the Upper and Lower South. The
prevalence of household manufacturing at the time of the Revolution, moreover, presented
market opportunities, but also increasingly dependence, and slaveholding was beyond the
economic competency of the vast majority of northeastern free households.81 Finally, the
northeastern commercial economies exhibited more diversification than the Upper and Lower
South, and therefore while northeastern commerce was not the sole source of capitalist
development, the merchant classes still wielded significant political and economic significance.
And many of those merchants dabbled in slave trading.

**********

The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database records that merchant-financiers and ship captains
disembarked 271,950 enslaved Africans on mainland British North American shores from the
infamous initial sale of nineteen Africans to Virginia colonists in 1619, until the eve of the
American Revolution. Of these, 124,951 were imported to the Chesapeake colonies, 120,464 to

The absence of industrial manufacturing in North America in the 1770s, and therefore the often
appalling work conditions of industrial emerging simultaneously in England, meant that unlike the latter,
slaveholding interests in the Northeast could not cudgel abolitionists for ignoring the plight of the white
working classes. See the discussion of industrial labor discipline in England in David Brion Davis, The
Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, pp. 458-468. It is noteworthy that northeastern industrial
capitalism, particularly textiles, emerged after state slavery abolition began, not before.
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the Carolinas and Georgia, 10,814 to the mid-Atlantic, and 6,455 to the New England colonies.82
Recent research on the inter-colonial slave trade further estimates that 46,275 slaves were
exported or transshipped from the British Caribbean to the mainland North American colonies
from 1651 until 1775.83 Though but a fraction of the more than six million Africans transported
to the Americas by 1770, slave imports to Britain’s North American colonies provided a
demographic foundation from which slave populations naturally reproduced by the late colonial
period, certainly in the Upper and Lower South.84
The northeastern colonies never regularly received large-scale slave importations in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a fact typically explained by their distance from Africa
compared to the Caribbean and southern mainland, their climates and failure to develop
plantation economies, and therefore their lack of demand for slave labor. New England
merchants, however, have long been characterized as eager and prolific slave traders as suppliers
to the southern mainland and Caribbean, and scholars have invested the region’s slave trade
merchants a significance that is in some ways disproportionate to the slave trade’s overall
economic impact on the Northeast. But the African and intercontinental slave trades, because
unique nature of their cargo and the wealth of successful slave trading merchants, attracted much
attention from contemporaries and historians. Rhode Island merchants and ship captains, in
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particular, were active participants in the slave trade, and the colony’s economy supported
extensive rum-distilling operations in Newport and Bristol that helped grease the trade for
African slaves.85 Although New England’s climate and natural resource base precluded the
establishment of plantation-staple economies like the Chesapeake and Lower South colonies, the
story is usually framed, New Englanders were deeply complicit in the establishment and growth
of American slavery through their participation in the transatlantic slave trade. W.E.B DuBois’s
influential study of the African slave trade to North America asserted that “vessels from
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and, to a lesser extent, New Hampshire, were early
and largely engaged in the slave trade.”86 While New Englanders did not necessarily desire
slaves for their own colonies, then, they had no compunction, and indeed profited handsomely,
from supplying African slaves to the Caribbean and southern mainland colonies.87
As early as 1649 Massachusetts ships engaged in the African slave trade, as the Fortune
set out for “the coast of Ginny, thence to Barbados and so for New England.” As did many
slaving voyages, the Fortune’s generated acrimony between the ship’s captain and its merchantfinancier, resulting in an arbitration panel to determine damages incurred during the ship’s
Atlantic passage.88 By the mid-18th century Massachusetts colonists had established a somewhat
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regular, if small, presence in the Atlantic slave trade. Between 1746 and 1757, Boston’s Customs
House recorded six ships entered in from Africa or Barbados with enslaved cargo on board, in all
cases importing fewer than six men or women. Those handfuls of slaves were mostly skilled
artisans or children, suggesting that merchants desired them for their specific skill sets or for
training as domestic servants. The Customs House also recorded fourteen ships cleared out for
Africa between 1748 and 1757.89 Some New England merchants and slave traders like Medford
resident Timothy Fitch, who financed and directed the 1761 voyage that included seven-year old
Phillis Wheatley and resulted in the deaths of twenty-one Africans en route from Senegal,
invested in the African slave trade as one component of their commercial portfolios.90
Massachusetts merchants also continued to participate in the African trade as the BritishAmerican imperial crisis escalated, clearing at least twenty-two ships for Africa between 1771
and 1774.91 In all, through 1775 ships cleared from Massachusetts ports carried 9,852 Africans to
slavery in the Americas, 6,945 to the Caribbean and 2,663 to the North American mainland,
before warfare paralyzed New England trade.92
Rhode Island, the North American colony most closely identified with the Atlantic slave
trade in the Revolutionary Era, entered the trade much later than its northern neighbor. In 1708
Gov. William Cranston wrote the Board of Trade that the colony had not received any African
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slaves “on account of the Royal African Company, or by any of the separate traders,” for ten
years. In 1700, the governor reported that three ships co-owned by Rhode Islander Edwin Carter
and Barbadian merchants Thomas Bruster and John Bates made African slaving voyages. The
voyages succeeded, as the vessels made “the disposition of their negroes” in Barbados. Cranston
pointed out that until that time, Rhode Island had never received slaves direct from Africa, “that
the whole and only supply of negroes to this colony” arrived from Barbados, roughly twenty to
thirty slaves annually. The Governor noted that Rhode Island “planters” did not desire largescale importations of African or West Indian slaves anyway, fearing their supposed “turbulent
and unruly manners.” Rhode Islanders rather preferred “to employ white servants before
negroes.”93
By the middle of the eighteenth century Rhode Island mercantile interests entered the
Atlantic slave trade on a much larger scale, and they began earning their reputations as North
America’s premier slave traders. In 1732 the colony’s General Assembly repealed an import duty
of £3 per each slave imported into the colony, seemingly in response to the British Empire’s
long-standing policy of discouraging slave importation duties they deemed prohibitive.94
Relaxing the duty, it was hoped, might encourage local merchants to further invest in Atlantic
slave trading. The 1733 account book of a Rhode Island slave ship noted that the voyage netted
119 slaves along the West African coast. In exchange, the captain and supercargo traded barrels
of rum, tar and sugar, as well as fabric, iron bars, and sundry other trade commodities.95 Between
November 1747 and February 1755, thirty ships cleared out for Africa from Newport, Rhode
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Island’s chief port, while six ships entered from Africa and one from Barbados, presumably
having disembarked its slave cargo there.96
By the 1750s and 1760s Rhode Island merchants had emerged as the most important
North American players in the African slave trade. Prominent merchants like the Brown, Vernon,
DeWolf, and Lopez families began to increase their investments in African slaving voyages, in
the process generating large profits from successful voyages.97 In April 1756, for example,
Samuel and William Vernon wrote Charleston, South Carolina associate George Austin, that “as
[we] have several Vessels gone to Africa whom we have ordered to Barbados… be pleasd
therefore to be particular and frequent with your Advices” on the South Carolina slave market. 98
Newport’s Custom House records for 1763 show that fourteen ships cleared that port for Africa,
while fifteen ships left the port bound for Africa in 1765. 99 That same year, however, Brown
family’s Providence mercantile firm organized a disastrous slaving voyage to Africa, as the
Sally’s crew were forced to put down a slave insurrection which led to the deaths of fifty slaves.
The voyage led a member of the family firm, Moses Brown, to reevaluate his views on slavery
and the slave trade and embark on a career as an abolitionist in the 1770s.100
In 1767 and 1769, after the Sugar and Stamp Act protests and as the Townshend program
generated increased colonial dissatisfaction with British imperial commercial policy, Newport
continued to clear out ships for Africa, albeit in smaller numbers, as five ships left the port for
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Africa in each year.101 Overall, between 1650 and 1775, ships clearing from Rhode Island ports
delivered 51,371 slaves from Africa to the Americas, 34,549 to the Caribbean and 8,032 to
mainland North America.102 Rhode Island also received slave importations from the Caribbean
over that time, and though the exact number is not quite clear, a conservative estimate puts it
between 1,000 and 1,500.103 As the imperial crisis reached a boiling point by the mid-1770s,
Rhode Islanders clearly assumed a position as North America’s premier slave traders. Even so, in
1774 Rhode Island was the first North American colony to attempt to end slave importations by
statute, as abolitionists led by took advantage of political and economic leverage of the unfolding
crisis, and increasing popular disdain for the iniquitous trade, to press for anti-slave trade
legislation.
While the bulk of scholarship on North American (and later United States) participation
in the Atlantic slave trade has focused on New England, New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians also
supplied their own and other British American colonies with imported slaves. Unlike the New
England colonies, until the mid-18th century New York and Pennsylvania overwhelmingly
imported slaves transshipped from the Caribbean, rather than directly from Africa. The middle
colonies’ trade patterns reflected a growing commerce in grain provisions and lumber products
sold to the West Indies by mid-century, and slaves in varying-sized lots were included in return
shipments from the Caribbean.104 By the 1760s, both Pennsylvania and New York merchants
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began to expand their investments in the African slave trade, though the British-American
imperial crisis proved an obstacle to their participation in the commerce in human beings.
After the English takeover of Dutch New Amsterdam in 1664, New Yorkers slowly
developed an involvement in the Atlantic slave trade. Between 1701 and 1726 the colony
imported 1,573 slaves from the British West Indian colonies, and at least 822 direct from
Africa.105 It was not until the 1740s, however, that New York merchant interests began to enter
the African slave trade on a larger scale. In that decade, twelve ships cleared from New York
City bound for Africa; from 1750 until 1759, that number increased to twenty-four.106 New
Yorkers’ investment in the Atlantic slave trade fluctuated between the 1750s and 1770s. At the
outset of the French and Indian War in 1754, for example, New York merchants and ship
captains cleared out one hundred and thirty tons of shipping to Africa, accounting for 1.22% of
the colony’s total cleared tonnage. After the war ended in 1763, tonnage cleared to Africa rose to
one hundred and forty, but the overall percentage declined to 0.98%. Tonnage cleared to Africa
reached a pre-revolutionary peak of 290, 1.72% of the absolute total, in 1765-1766. In the same
years, entrances from Africa reached their highest total: 230 shipping tons, 1.96% of overseas
tonnage entering New York.107 Overall, between 1650 and 1775 a total of 7,648 slaves were
delivered to mainland North America and the Caribbean by slaving voyages cleared from New
York.108 Meanwhile, merchants imported an estimated 4,250 slaves to New York from the
Caribbean in that span.109
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As the British–North American imperial crisis intensified in the early and mid-1770s,
New York merchants continued to seek profits in the Atlantic slave trade by supplying the
British West Indian and southern mainland colonies with enslaved persons. New York-based
merchant Levinus Clarkson, for example, served as commercial agent responsible for
coordinating trade between the West Indies, South Carolina, and New York, in a partnership
with fellow New Yorker David Van Horne. From 1772 until 1775 Clarkson resided in
Charleston, South Carolina, acting as the partnership’s agent dealing in a considerable variety of
trade goods, most importantly slaves, rice, flour, wheat, rum, and processed lumber manufactures
like pipe staves. In March 1773, Clarkson wrote to Van Horne requesting that he inquire of his
associates “whether they intend sending to my address the Guinea Men which Mr. Mason
informed, before my departure from New York.” Clarkson warned that if it was “not a certainty
of one or more [slaving] vessels being consigned to me,” he would invest the partnership’s funds
in three hundred barrels of rice destined for markets in southern Europe.110
In a letter to Van Horne the next month, April 1773, Clarkson described his travels to
Georgia to investigate commercial opportunities in the growing colony. Clarkson was
particularly anxious to learn about opportunities to import slaves to supply Georgia’s expanding
plantation economy. He unfortunately became sick, perhaps accounting for his surly description
of Georgia, as a “flourishing Province… [where] considerable Estates might be made for
Posterity,” and at the same time “a perfect Grave.” Most importantly, Clarkson was irked that he
had yet to hear from Van Horne in New York about “the Rice cargo, Indigo cargo & Negro
cargos.” After returning to Charleston, Clarkson resolved to “stay here until I know if I have

Levinus Clarkson to David Van Horne, March 4, 1773, Correspondence 1773 Folder, Levinus Clarkson
Collection, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.
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anything for sale to the New York Guinea Men or to any from Newport for it is needless for me
to stay here at a season when little or no business is done…”111
Clarkson and Van Horne’s commercial activities in New York and South Carolina,
including slave dealing, continued through 1774 and 1775, though the emergent imperial crisis
proved an obstacle to the normal flow of business activity. In July 1774 Clarkson wrote to Van
Horne from Charleston that he was in the process of “disposing of a Cargo of Slaves.” He then
lamented, “but as the present Contest for Liberty is Such in this Province, as to Indure the worthy
Carolinias to non Importation as well as a Surmise they will [support non-] Exportation,” shortterm commercial prospects for slave sales there seemed dubious at best. If non-importation and –
exportation continued, Clarkson worried, “in what manner is the merchant to make his
Remissions to his Guarantor [?]…”112 Clarkson and Van Horne were rightfully concerned that
the rising tide of antislavery political and moral sentiment in the Northeast might threaten a
lucrative, but risky and unstable, portion of their business.
Pennsylvania’s relationship to slavery, the slave trade, and the emergence of antislavery
morality is in many ways the most complicated of the northeastern colonies. Scholars of the
development of abolitionism in North America have for decades, and indeed centuries, tended to
point to Pennsylvania Quakers as the fathers of American antislavery sentiment and
organization.113 The demographic origins of the colony, its geographic situation as a neighbor of
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colonial slave societies Maryland and Virginia, and its leading role in British North America’s
eighteenth century commercial economies made Pennsylvania’s role in the Atlantic slave trade
both unique and significant.
Founded after Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York, in 1681, Pennsylvania’s
merchants also came to participate in the Atlantic slave trade last among the northeastern
colonies. In the colony’s first decades, slaves were imported sporadically as the Holy
Experiment’s burgeoning merchant class slowly developed trade connections with the British
West Indian colonies, and eschewed participation in trade with the African continent. For more
than half a century, Philadelphia merchants focused their efforts on importing white indentured
servants, only gradually shifting to African slaves by the mid-eighteenth century. Early slave
importations tended to be piecemeal affairs, handfuls of slaves purchased by Philadelphia
merchants as just one kind of merchandise in mixed trade cargoes in Caribbean trade. Only after
1730 did Philadelphia merchants begin regularly importing West Indian slaves specifically for
sale in local markets.
Over time, slave cargoes from Africa and the West Indies imported to Pennsylvania
became larger, sometimes reaching two hundred per ship by the early 1760s.114 In the mid-18th
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century both Quaker and non-Quaker merchants were active in the trade, although Quaker
merchants’ participation sharply declined under pressure from local, monthly, and annual
meetings after 1758. Even so, the 1750s and 1760s were the peak of Pennsylvania’s participation
in the Atlantic slave trade, coinciding with the general emergence of the colony’s mercantile
class as major North American players in transatlantic trade.115 Between 1759 and 1765,
merchants imported an estimated 1,243 slaves into Pennsylvania, but unlike earlier importations
the majority of these came to the Delaware River Valley directly from Africa.116
Port records that would provide precise accounting of the exact number and origin of
slaves imported through Philadelphia before 1776 are not extant, but scholars have been able to
construct some estimates, estimating that 4,200 slaves were imported to Pennsylvania, Delaware,
and West Jersey between 1675 and 1770.117 Meanwhile, the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database
records a total of 788 slaves imported to the Americas by ships cleared from Pennsylvania
between 1700 and 1775, of which 383 were brought to mainland North America, most between
1760 and 1765. These figures almost certainly under count the total numbers of slaves brought to
the Americas by Pennsylvanians, and other scholars have uncovered evidence that the total
approached several thousand between 1720 and 1766.118 Nonetheless, the early and mid-1760s
were the peak years of slave importations into Pennsylvania, as well as overall Pennsylvanian
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participation in the Atlantic slave trade to the Americas.119 The table below shows that by the
late 1760s and early 1770s, slave importations to the Middle Colonies fell off sharply after the
earlier peak. From 1768 to 1772, Pennsylvania imported a total of ten slaves from Africa, the
West Indies, and other British continental colonies, and while this does not mean that
Pennsylvania merchants abruptly stopped supplying other British colonies with slaves, it shows
the colony almost entirely ceased importing slaves to supply its domestic labor markets.
Pennsylvanian voices, moreover, were among the most vociferous voices that called for slave
trade abolition in the 1760s and 1770s, their arguments energized by the brewing politicaleconomic conflict with the British Empire.

Table V: The Slave Trade to North America by Destination and Origin, 1768-1772
Region

Africa

West Indies

Total

52

Continental
Colonies
20

New England

52

Middle Colonies

97

32

1

130

Upper South

3,502

2,482

72

6,056

Lower South

14,159

5,215

954

20,328

Total

17,810

7,781

1,047

26,638

124

Source: HSUS, II: p. 1172, Series Z 133-144. Note: For 1768 figures for West Indies include African
slave imports. West Indian slave imports averaged 41.5% of African slave imports from 17691772. This percentage is used for 1768.The Middle Colonies includes New York and
Pennsylvania, and the Lower South includes North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
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Modern scholarship generally accords the slave trade a significant role in the northeastern
commercial economy, and suggests that later industrial development in New England accelerated
because of the “slave(ry) trade,” which included slaves and commerce in goods ancillary to the
slave trade, most importantly rum.120 Economic historians critique the complicity thesis, noting
that the African slave trade accounted for only a small percentage of New England rum
production, the majority being consumed by local domestic markets or exported to other
mainland colonies.121 David Eltis has determined that the majority of slaves imported to
mainland North America were not brought by North American ships before the American
Revolution. The “story of slave arrivals in colonial America,” he points out, “is very much a
British one,” such that between 1661 and 1775 North American ships never brought more than
twenty percent of slaves imported to the mainland, and less than seven percent of slaving
voyages to Africa embarked from British North American ports.122 The lucrative African slave
trade was a monopoly of the Royal African Company (RAC) until 1698, and over the course of
the eighteenth century independent British merchants and the RAC fought for market share,
especially after the empire secured the Spanish Asiento in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht.123 Intense
competition and the Empire’s direct support for slave trading merchants from the mother country
dictated that even the most active North American slave trading merchants were reduced to a
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secondary role in the British imperial slave trading commercial complex before the American
Revolution.

**********

Even if North American participation in the foreign slave trade did not have a measurable
economic impact commensurate with its notoriety, it was the latter that mattered to northeastern
abolitionists as the imperial crisis brewed after 1763. Economic determinism, in other words,
does not capture the significance of the slave trades on the politics of the 1760s and 1770s, nor in
the minds of North American colonists at a time when the bases of imperial and colonial
authority quaked in the tumult of the early stages of the Age of Revolutions. The key point for
this discussion is to highlight the underlying social and economic conditions that gave rise to the
first effective abolition campaigns in the Americas—those of northeastern abolitionists that
powerfully emerged after 1763.
At the outset of the imperial crisis in 1763, the agricultural, manufacturing, and
commercial bases of the Northeast and Upper and Lower South colonies developed significant
different contours. The diversified commercial economies of the northeastern colonies showed
an increasing maturity which the southern colonial slave societies matched with the powerful
singularity of their plantation-export economies. While northeastern merchants invested in the
African and intercontinental slave trades, there is little evidence to suggest that the regional
economies would have collapsed in the absence of the slave trade. As the imperial crisis
unfolded and metropolitan policy generated successive waves of colonial protest, abolitionists in
the Northeast elaborated scathing critiques of the British empire’s colonial plantation economies,
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grounded both in the ideological terms of the empire’s violation of North Americans’
constitutional right to consent as subjects, as well as in political-economic calumniation of
chattel slavery.
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Ch. 2: The British-American Imperial Crisis and Abolitionism in the Northeastern Colonies,
1763-1776

In May 1763, Pennsylvania Quaker abolitionist Anthony Benezet wrote to fellow Friend
Joseph Phipps “on a subject that which has long been a matter of deep concern to many well
minded People in these Parts.” The subject he wished to broach was the “the Negro Trade, the
purchasing & bringing of poor Negroes from their native Land, and subjecting them to a State of
perpetual Bondage, and that often the most cruel and oppressive, in which the English Nation is
so deeply engaged…” Convinced that abolitionism would not take root in North America
without political pressure on colonial assemblymen, royal authorities, metropolitan imperial
planners, Parliament and King George III, Benezet commenced a wide-ranging campaign to turn
popular opinion against slavery and the slave trade.
Benezet feared that Britain’s victory over the French in the Seven Years’ War would
accelerate the expansion of slavery in North America. Slavery, he wrote Phipps, “with additional
sorrow, we observe to be greatly encreasing in these Northern colonies, by the New Acquisitions
the English have lately made of the Factories on the great River Senegal” from the French, by the
terms of the Treaty of Paris signed three months before in February 1763. Benezet pondered how
slavery had become so entrenched in British North America to begin with, how “an evil of so
deep a dye; has so long not only passed unnoticed, but has even had the Countenances of
Government, and been supported by Law…” He concluded that the “gracious Kings, & many
worthy men in government” who dominated colonial assemblies and imperial politics embraced
the “corrupt Motives which gives life to slavery,” and had no motive to circumscribe slavery or
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the slave trade. Abolitionism in North America, then, depended on an upsurge of popular disdain
for the political and economic inequalities inherent to slave societies.
Benezet understood the economic magnitude of colonial slavery and the Atlantic slave
trade, and the considerable political power colonial planter and metropolitan mercantile interests
wielded as a result. He nevertheless hoped that the fruits of victory in the Seven Years’ War,
especially England’s acquisition of French North American territory east of the Mississippi
River, would spur the Empire to limit slavery’s continental expansion and to allow individual
North American colonies to amend slaves’ legal status to resemble indentured servitude. He
hoped that western lands would “provide the Government an Advantageous opportunity of
beneficial employment for the Negroes,” through a “prohibition to the [slave] Trade and [that] a
Provision be made for… freedom of those now amongst us, after a reasonable time of service.”
Fortunately, Benezet lived to see Pennsylvania’s Assembly adopt a plan for gradual abolition
along very similar lines in 1780. He was correct in sensing that post-war years would be decisive
in the expansion of abolitionism, though in ways he could not foresee in May 1763.1

**********

The 1764 American Duties Act was one of the first pieces of parliamentary legislation to
arouse colonial opposition after the Seven Years’ War, most critically in New England. The Act
halved pre-existing import duties on foreign sugar and molasses, critical to New England’s rum
distilling operations, and invested imperial admiralty courts with increased authority to enforce
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the Act’s provisions. It also threatened to undermine commerce in Madeira wine, foreign textile
imports, and lumber exports, and exacerbate the already depressed post-war colonial economies.2
Merchants in Massachusetts and Rhode Island immediately protested the Sugar Act, fearing the
destruction of their commerce and blaming the insidious political influence of West Indian sugar
interests in Parliament for the its passage. Bostonians argued that the Act constituted an outright
attack on the carrying trade, fisheries, and commerce of New England, the pillars of the region’s
mercantile capitalism, and began mobilizing merchant opposition to imperial trade policy.
Although rum has often been characterized a crucial New England export to Africa in
exchange for slaves, economic historians estimate that North Americans consumed ninety
percent of rum distilled or imported into New England. 3 But trade connections between New
England and the West Indies remained significant, and the former’s merchants foresaw economic
disaster in the Sugar Act, stressing that it would lead to economic ruin for both the northeastern
colonies and their West Indian brethren who relied on them for ocean fisheries and lumber
products. Some New England merchants even predicted that “the duty will in a short time put a
period to the African trade from this continent,” most notably the (relatively minor) export
business in distilled spirits to Africa and southern Europe. They warned that a decline in New
England commerce would harm the sugar colonies, because their commercial ties with New
England “consequentially tends to increase the number of laborers” in the West Indies and “to
add to the cheapness of their support, and upon these it’s well known the growth and value of
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those colonies must absolutely depend.”4 New England merchants disdained the Sugar Act, in
other words, because they believed it would harm their trade connections with the British
Caribbean. But at the same time an emergent colonial protest literature sparked by the Act, most
notably James Otis’s The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, introduced the
argument that imperial taxation and restrictive economic regulation constituted the political
‘enslavement’ of colonial subjects.5 Coupled with the next year’s Stamp Act, protests erupted
over imperial regulation of the northeastern mercantile economies, protests which abolitionists
learned to use to their political advantage.
The May 1765 Stamp Act, an internal revenue tax designed to provide funds to offset the
costs of maintaining British troops in North America, the first instance of a standing army in the
thirteen colonies, was a turning point in the beginning stages of the imperial crisis. The Act’s
provisions are well known, as are the political protests it generated: petitions from colonial
assemblies, the meeting of delegates from nine colonies in New York at the Stamp Act Congress,
and on-the-ground physical resistance to its implementation and collection spurred by local
chapters of the Sons of Liberty from New England to Charleston, South Carolina. Stamp Act
protests against Parliament’s authority to levy internal taxes on British colonies, especially from
New England, began to frame objections to imperial taxation policy as an antislavery argument.6
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Thus, Rhode Island Governor Stephen Hopkins argued that the Sugar and Stamp Acts were an
attack on colonists’ liberties as British subjects, “the greatest blessing that men enjoy, and
slavery the heaviest.” “Those who are governed at the will of another,” wrote Hopkins, “and
whose property may be taken from them by taxes or otherwise without their own consent and
against their will, are in the miserable condition of slaves.”7 Actual slaves, of course, were held
as chattel property by colonial masters and denied not only the privileges of subjecthood, but the
right to self-ownership.
The ‘enslavement’ argument developed by British North American protestors in 1764
and 1765 would lead to charges of moral and political inconsistency, directed especially at
southern slaveholding patriots.8 Everyone knew that New England merchants controlled the
North American market share of the Atlantic slave trade, and that Pennsylvania, New York, and
New Jersey had relatively large slave populations. But because the northeastern regional
economies were more diversified, agrarian property ownership more dispersed, wage labor more
common, and domestic consumption markets therefore more expansive, the valences of
northeastern ‘enslavement’ rhetoric registered with less hypocrisy than from southern
slaveholding political leaders. While slaveholders argued against their supposed ‘enslavement’
from the perspective of men whose economic livelihoods were fully enmeshed in the imperial
plantation-staple complex, northeastern colonial protestors could more plausibly claim that
imperial ‘enslavement’ hindered their commercial economies, even though some New England
and mid-Atlantic merchants participated in the West Indian trades that connected them indirectly
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to plantation slavery. The political economy of northeastern protest and resistance to
parliamentary sovereignty emphasized dismay over the colonists’ inability to consent to imperial
regulations through direct representation in Parliament expressed as diatribes against the colonial
‘enslavement,’ themes readily adopted by abolitionists in the 1760s and 1770s as they wove an
antislavery argument into revolutionary politics.
Parliament’s passage of the Townshend Acts in summer 1767 escalated colonial fears
that the imperial apparatus aligned contrary to their interests. A series of revised import and
export duties on commodities like tea, glass, and paper designed to mitigate the metropole’s
share of colonial maintenance expenses, protests against the program mushroomed into a series
of local-level non-importation agreements. These became the first instances of productive crosscolonial cooperation by 1770, albeit haltingly as the merchant classes did not embrace nonimportation evenly, particularly in Philadelphia.9 Into this breach stepped abolitionists, grasping
an opportunity to expand their audiences by applying the logic of colonial political protest to the
trade and ownership of commodified human beings.
Cambridge, Massachusetts Congregational minister, merchant, and abolitionist Nathaniel
Appleton published Considerations on Slavery in a Letter to a Friend in 1767, framed as advice
addressed to a man purported to “have thoughts of being concerned in the African slave-trade.”10
Appleton opened the pamphlet to his unnamed “Friend,” a man of “example and influence” in
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Massachusetts, by declaring the bedrock principles of his opposition to slavery and the slave
trade. “However profitable the trade may be to some readers,” he admitted, “it is contrary to
humanity, christianity, the interest of the province, and of private families.” He aimed to
convince his “Friend” to use his influence to “in time, to produce an act of government to
prevent the further importation of slaves among us; and I flatter myself that the example of this
province may influence others; but if not, we can be gloriously single.”11Appleton appealed to a
tradition of British antislavery moral economy which emphasized local sovereignty over the
regulation of labor markets that had historical roots in New England, noting that the British
Empire “does not permit a slave on her happy island; but gives to every one freedom, which
stamps him image of his God.”12 Appleton, writing five years before the famed Somerset case
where Chief Justice Lord Mansfield ruled that only positive municipal law legalized slavery,
realized that the appeal of his antislavery argument, and therefore its political possibilities, rested
on an appeal to a localist understanding of colonial legislative sovereignty vis-à-vis the
metropole. This logic also fueled colonial protest to imperial economic policy after 1763.
Building on Anthony Benezet’s earlier publications which described the horrors visited
upon the African continent to feed American slave markets, Appleton fulminated that “this trade
for the lives of men being once established, has set all Africa by the ears.” “All honest industry
among them is laid aside to the more profitable business of trepanning one another,” he bluntly
observed.13 He offered lurid descriptions of the overland march to the West African coast and the
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Middle Passage to establish the physical and psychological terrors of slavery, then pivoted to
discuss the perverse ways slavery warped the moral and political economy of New England.
Appleton flatly declared his disgust for the argument that slave-owners and traders were “not
men-stealers, having bought them with their money.” The African and intercontinental slave
trades were economically perverse because “by the importation of slaves, we prevent the
importation of white servants.” Abolitionists like Appleton preferred to encourage the
importation of laborers bound by the contractual, temporary status of indentured servitude for
several reasons. Temporarily bound laborers were not ripped from their communities and home
continent and forced to endure the Middle Passage, so servants, of which “it is well known that
there are thousands in Europe,” provided labor but were not degraded to the status of chattel
property. They posed less potential danger to colonial communities, and in any case Appleton
submitted that servants cost one quarter of the purchase price of African slaves.14
Appleton’s antislavery vision for Massachusetts socioeconomic development rested on
the idea that the existence of slavery promoted internal conflict and prevented the development
of community cohesiveness. “I take it to be the policy of a state to consult measures to have the
greatest number of laborers, and those so interested in the welfare of a community, as to be
always desirous and ready to support and defend it,” he argued. Slavery led to “the great
inconvenience” of “our poorer sort of people… who would gladly serve us for a support, but
then they must be upon a level with negro slaves.” Living among slavery and slaveholders
caused the servant class, who could expect to gain freedom after their indentures expired, to
become idle and dissolute, and devolve into vagrancy. Slavery also ruined the moral fabric of
private families, because the introduction of slaves into households introducing an “amazing
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distinction” between freedom, and slaves who “as to choice or property, they have none…”15
Appleton closed the pamphlet with a poem written by a British West Indian, James Grainger,
which invoked the “tyrannic sway” of slavery, the same formulation black Bostonian Phillis
Wheatley used five years later in a poem dedicated to Lord Dartmouth, Secretary of State for
Colonial Affairs. “Freedom,” the poem closed, was checked by “laws, Oppression’s scourge,”
which legalized slavery in the colonies.16
Anthony Benezet continued his efforts to encourage the development of antislavery
political and public sentiment through publishing and circulating abolitionist tracts written by
himself and others. Having published A Caution and A Warning to Great Britain and Her
Colonies in 1766, in April 1767 he wrote to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG)
to appeal for their aid in promoting the colonial antislavery argument by distributing the
pamphlet to its members. But, he was dismayed to learn, the Anglican-operated SPG refused to
do so on the grounds that “they cannot condemn the practice of keeping Slaves as unlawful,”
both scripturally and by colonial laws.17 Meanwhile Benezet wrote to Friend John Smith of
Burlington, New Jersey, forwarding one hundred copies of A Caution for local distribution, and
sent additional copies to Philadelphian David Barclay requesting, “thou wilt be pleased to read
the Treatise, when I am persuaded thou wilt perceive it to be a Matter which calls for the most
deep Consideration, of all who are concerned for the civil, as well as religious Welfare of their
Country.” Benezet noted of his work that “much might have been said” to southern slaveholders,
“of the continual Danger the southern Colonies are exposed to, from the vast disproportion
between the Negroes & the whites, but this was thought to be a Subject of too tender a nature to
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be exposed to view, in places where it might fall into the Hands of the Negroes.”18 Northeastern
audiences, he was learning, proved far more receptive to the antislavery argument he worked
tirelessly to promote than southern planters.
In 1770 thirteen year-old Connecticut boy John Trumbull added his voice to an energized
northeastern abolitionism, in a satirical essay proclaiming that “it is strange that any persons
should be so infatuated, as to deny the right of enslaving the black inhabitants of Africa.” “The
inestimable privilege” of slave-owning, the future portraitist of the elite founding generation
wrote, was a “natural, moral, and divine right” of Anglo-Americans.19 Trumbull dedicated most
of the short essay to mocking proslavery arguments based in scripture, which often invoked the
Curse of Ham, and defenses of the institution that positively emphasized slaves’ exposure to
Christianity. He shrewdly satirized the property relation of slavery by claiming that “the whole
world is the property of the righteous; consequently the Africans, being infidels and heretics,
may rightly be considered as lawful plunder.” To ward off claims that Africans were fit to be
enslaved because they lacked natural intelligence, Trumbull mordantly claimed to know at least
three slaves in Connecticut “who know half the letters in the alphabet, and have made
considerable advances in the Lord’s prayer and catechism.”20 He closed by proposing that
slaving expeditions be sent to Rome and Constantinople, “to fetch off the Pope and the Grand
Signior,” if enslaving infidels was indeed a legitimate act. While Trumbull’s essay is not
necessarily notable as an extensive political-economic critique of slavery and the slave trade, it is
nonetheless further evidence of an efflorescent northeastern abolitionism.
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**********

A series of cases heard at the Court of King’s Bench in the early 1770s, most notably
Somerset v. Stuart (1772), ruptured the legal bases for slavery within the British Empire, in large
part due to the efforts of antislavery attorney Granville Sharp. In many ways the culmination of a
long and vibrant debate over the legitimacy of property-in-man, the Somerset case held special
significance for abolitionists because it affirmed that slavery—and by extension, the importation
of slaves into colonies—was a matter of positive, local law. While colonists debated the meaning
of the Somerset decision and individual interpretations depended on a variety of factors,
Mansfield’s ruling implied a large degree of local autonomy over slavery’s future in the
northeastern mainland colonies.21 Colonial newspapers covered the trial breathlessly, as London
correspondents provided day-by-day reportage of the oral arguments. On May 15, 1772, one day
after Mansfield decided in favor of Somerset, granting him freedom, a report of the trial pointed
out the “this Cause seems pregnant with consequences extremely detrimental to those
Gentlemen, whose estates consist in Slaves: It would be a means of ruining our African Trade if
it should be decided in favor of the Negroes.” The correspondent further prophesized that should
the case be decided in favor of Somerset, England would be flooded with “black Gentry,” and
argued that to prevent racial mixing, the “importation of Negroes” to the home isle should be
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prohibited by “some Method.” Racist fears of growing black populations in the home isle aside,
the Somerset case did suggest political possibilities for northeastern abolitionists.22
In August 1772, a few short months after Mansfield issued his ruling, Granville Sharp
wrote to Benezet to weigh in on his plan to organize an antislavery petition campaign to the King
and Parliament. Sharp’s advice reflected the larger debates over the political and legal authority
of Parliament vis-à-vis the colonies, by summer 1772 a question of increasingly heated
dynamics, as well as the uncertainty over slavery and imperial law in the post-Somerset context.
He counseled Benezet that the plan to present anti-slave trade petitions to Parliament was
“certainly very proper,” but that “with respect to the Toleration of Slavery in the Colonies, I
apprehend that the British Parliament has no right to interfere.” Here Sharp acknowledged the
Somerset decision’s interpretation of colonial slave law. “Because I think our brethren of the
Colonies can’t be too much upon their Guard with respect to the dignity & independence of their
own Assemblies,” Sharp advised Benezet that it would be wise to send petitions praying for the
abolition of slavery in individual colonies “only to the King, or the King in Counsel,” and not to
Parliament. “Respect must be had to the rights of the Colonies,” Sharp continued, “and a Petition
from thence if addressed to the Parliament ought to relate to the Slave trade in general, with its
bad effects & dangerous consequences in general, and not merely to the importation of Slaves
into the Colonies, because they have a right themselves to prohibit such importations…” Sharp
counseled Benezet to limit efforts to secure antislavery legislation to the colonial assemblies
because he believed it a more successful approach, and “even less than a thousand hands I
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shou’d think it a very considerable point gain’d as it would afford an excellent argument ag:st the
pretended necessity of holding Slaves in the Colonies, which is always Alleged as the reason of
the encouragement: given by Parliament to the African trade…”23
After 1772 the volume and intensity of northeastern political abolitionism escalated in
tandem with the broader political conflict of the imperial crisis. That year merchant, financier,
and recent Scots transplant to Boston James Swan addressed fellow Bay colonists, North
Americans, and imperial planners in a pamphlet that harangued against the African slave trade.
Swan followed the format pioneered by Benezet, opening the pamphlet by quoting witnesses to
the horrors of the slave trade on the African coast and establishing the cruelty of slave usage in
the Americas. He then pivoted to imbue language from the 1691 Massachusetts charter, a
product of the constitutional settlement of the Glorious Revolution, with an antislavery
interpretation. Because the Bay Colony’s charter explicitly protected “all liberties and
immunities of free and natural subjects within the dominions of us… as if they and every one of
them were born within our realm of England,” Swan argued that the slave trade, and slavery,
were illegal “for making slaves of British subjects.” This interpretation led the Scotsman to hope
that “means will be used by the legislature of most, if not all of the provinces of North-America,
totally prohibiting the importation of Negroes, and setting at liberty those who are now in
bondage, which will be an honor to human nature.”24
By promoting colonial assembly action to abolish slave importations, Swan built on a
history of Massachusetts town and assembly statements asking for a cessation of slave
importations into the Bay Colony. As early as 1700, a committee of Bostonians asked the
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assembly to lay a forty-shilling tax on each slave imported into the colony, “to discourage the
bringing of them.” The next year, the Boston Town Meeting petitioned the assembly to promote
the immigration of white servants and to “put a period to Negroes being slaves.”25 In 1755 Salem
petitioned the Massachusetts General Court to ban slave importations, and in the years after 1763
local statements in support of slave trade abolitionism steadily proliferated.26 In 1765, Worcester
instructed their representative to the colonial assembly to urge the passage of abolition
legislation, and in 1766 the Boston Town Meeting instructed theirs to push “for the total
abolishing of slavery among us, [and] that you move for a law to prohibit the importation and the
purchasing of slaves for the future.”27 On March 13, 1767, the Massachusetts House of
Representatives passed a bill “to prevent the unwarrantable and unusual Practice or Custom of
inslaving mankind in this Province, and the importation of slaves into the same.”28 Royal
Governor Sir Francis Bernard struck down this effort, as were subsequent attempts in 1771,
1773, and 1774.29 One Massachusetts resident, “very sorry to find that the [1767] Bill… had
miscarried for the present,” urged the continued publication of abolitionist literature like
Nathanial Appleton’s recent Considerations on Slavery. “And tho’ the very desirable Act which
was in Agitation has not been attained,” the writer urged, “yet such Publications will I doubt not
lessen the future Importation of Negroes…”30
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Localized, town-based opposition drove the rise of abolitionism in Massachusetts. In late
1772, Medford again gave its House of Representative member instructions to officially record
the town’s hostility to the slave trade. Medford residents had turned decisively against the slave
trade and merchants involved in it, including Timothy Fitch, the man responsible for importing
Phillis Wheatley to Massachusetts. As early as the mid-1760s, Medford’s slave population had
virtually disappeared, and its residents clearly wanted that to remain the case.31 Like other
localities in Massachusetts, the town had a recent history in support of slave trade abolitionism,
having instructed its representative in December 1767 to “give his Suffrage… to effect the total
Abolition of that standing Reproach to the Nations of Christendom- The Slave Trade.”32 At a
freeholder meeting on December 28, 1772, Medford’s selectmen instructed “the Representative
of this Town… [to] use his utmost Influence to have a final Period put to that most cruel,
inhuman, and unchristian Practice, the Slave Trade.”33
Medford’s freeholders justified their action by citing the Boston Committee of
Correspondence’s November 1772 statement on colonial rights, written by patriot leader Samuel
Adams. It opened by declaring that “all men have a right to remain in a state of nature as long as
they please; and in case of intolerable oppression, civil or religious, to leave the society they
belong to, and enter into another.” Adams based his defense of the civil and political liberties of
Massachusetts on a reading of John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, emphasizing the
antislavery implications of the political philosopher’s concept of the social contract. Adams
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argued that “In the state of Nature, Men may, as the Patriarchs did, employ hired servants for the
defence of their Lives, Liberties and Property; and they should pay them reasonable wages.”34
Slavery, the personal ownership of human property, was therefore beyond the pale. Implicitly
linking slaveholding to Parliament’s ongoing political oppression of the North American
colonies, and Massachusetts in particular, Adams argued that “the Legislative has no Right to
absolute arbitrary Power over the Lives and Fortunes of the People: nor can Mortals assume a
Prerogative, not only too high for men, but for Angels…” 35 He recited a lengthy list of
grievances visited upon Massachusetts, emphasizing the theme of Parliament and the Empire’s
arbitrary use of power, decrying the colonies’ inability to consent to legislation through direct
parliamentary representation. The linkage between Medford and other Massachusetts town’s
previous endorsements abolitionism and the Boston Committee’s declaration of colonial rights
and liberties, then, is evidence of the intertwined projects of liberty from arbitrary imperial rule
and the antislavery critique of the absolute power of masters over slaves.
At the 1774 First Provincial Congress, an extralegal body that conducted business in
defiance of the Empire’s dissolution of the colonial assembly, delegate and abolitionist Nathaniel
Appleton received a letter asking the body to countenance abolition in light of the escalating
crisis. Appleton’s request built on the decades-long emergence of abolitionism in Massachusetts,
especially town-based opposition to slavery and the slave trade rooted in fears of the economic
inequality that accompanied the chattel principle. After “some debate,” the Provincial Congress
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formed a committee to debate how Massachusetts patriots could eliminate slavery, clearly
inspired by the politics of the imperial crisis, and which reflected a long-standing aversion to the
peculiar institution in much of Massachusetts.36
To be sure, not all New Englanders had been fully convinced of the immorality of the
slave trade, or the propriety of using the politics of the imperial crisis to promote abolitionism. A
January 1773 contribution to the Boston Post-Boy decried the rising spirit of abolitionism in New
England. The author, writing as “S.M.,” claimed that the “many Essays have lately appeared in
the News-Papers” promoting abolitionism relied on woefully inaccurate information on
conditions in Africa, and therefore made fallacious arguments in favor of emancipating slaves.
He argued that African slaves were “redeemed by European traders” from “the bloody tyranny”
of despotic African kingdoms. “S.M.” positively compared the lived experience of colonial
slaves and “common English laborers,” whose livelihoods depended on the whims of wagepaying capitalists who were not compelled to provide for their laborers like colonial
slaveowners. “The negroes of the British colonies are much more happy and easy than the slaves
to necessity in any part of the world,” including Africa, when compared to the plight of
impoverished agricultural laborers groaning under the “arbitrary” imperial governments of
continental Europe. In summation, the author warned that “if therefore the African trade is
prohibited as an infraction upon the liberty of mankind” then both colonial and imperial
commerce would face complete and utter destruction. But this sort of anti-abolitionist argument,
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which often doubled as a critique of North American patriotism, steadily became the minority
position across the northeastern colonies after 1773.37

**********

Pennsylvanians William Dillwyn and Benjamin Rush also contributed to the flowering of
northeastern political abolitionism in a pair of 1773 pamphlets. Dillwyn’s Brief Considerations
on Slavery, and the Expediency of Abolition opened with an appeal for legislative action to
abolish the slave trade. Dillwyn explained that the “religious and moral obligations we are under
in a private capacity, to do our utmost to promote the true interests of mankind, increase with our
powers and opportunities of action.” The security and happiness of communities rested in
enlightened legislatures that did not sanction the existence of slavery of the participation of its
citizens in the slave trade. Abolitionism, to Dillwyn, was the apotheosis of the northeastern
colonies’ economic destiny, and he criticized a political economy of colonial protest detached
from abolitionism, declaring that “I hope it may be attributed to the multiplicity of other
engagements, which have much engrossed the attention of government, that the iniquitous nature
of this traffick has not been adverted to…”38 He admitted that while the northeaster colonies’
commercial economies were not reliant on the African slave trade, there were still no excuses for
inattention to the abolitionist project. Complacent northerners needed to be convinced to “view it
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as a matter sufficiently important for the extraordinary interposition of a legislature,” or else
slavery in the northern colonies would become “a bondage which, in our southern colonies and
islands, is more cruel and oppressive than the most of us in the northern colonies have had an
opportunity of forming an idea of.”39
For Dillwyn, to encourage slavery was to distort the regional political economies of the
Northeast. Slavery and the slave trade “attended with many inconveniences, [which] has been
lately set forth by several writers.” The northeastern colonies had to avoid the deleterious effects
the chattel principle visited upon the southern economies through promoting legislative abolition,
because “the riches of a free state consists in the number of members, who enjoying its privileges
and blessings, are thereby interested in its preservation and advancement.” Incapable of
contributing to a “free state,” slaves posed danger to domestic security, and did not contribute to
domestic consumption markets.40 To Dillwyn, like Nathanial Appleton, promoting the
emigration of indentured servants to the northern colonies was the far more preferable solution to
expanding the northern colonies’ labor supply. The indentured servant, by “setting out with the
animating hope of acquiring independence in the community… and the protection of the laws,
heartily unites in promoting the prosperity of his country…”41 On the other hand, slaves were
understandably internal enemies, and slaveholders had little incentive to promote political and
economic equality with non-slaveholders.
Dillwyn’s ultimate goal was the abolition of slavery, but “the first and most important
step” was “absolutely to prohibit any future importations into these colonies.” Dillwyn expected
push-back from imperial planners and Parliament, and noted that “if by royal instructions, our
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governors are prevented the exercise of their own judgements; provincial addresses to the crown,
would be likely to remove the difficulty” of forwarding abolitionism. In a nod to presumed
opposition of southern planters abolitionism, he argued that “if we cannot obtain a total
prohibition of the importation, we shall certainly be indulged in obtaining it for the colonies
which petition for it.”42 If southerners and their legislatures persisted in their hostility to
abolitionism, in other words, then so be it. Dillwyn devoted the last pages of his pamphlet to
sketching out gradual abolition schemes for the northeastern colonies, concluding with an appeal
for slave emancipation, to “of enemies make them friends and useful members of society, by
conferring on them such privileges as will interest them in the general welfare.”43
Benjamin Rush’s An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America,
Upon Slave-Keeping echoed Dillwyn’s insistence that encouraging slavery and the slave trade
warped the free labor underpinnings of northeastern capitalist development. Rush devoted much
attention to elaborating this argument, arguing that “if the plantations in the islands and southern
colonies were more limited, and free men only employed in working them, the general product
would be greater, though the profits to individuals would be less…” Agrarian economies
grounded in free labor principles, while assuredly “diminishing opulence in a few, would
suppress luxury and vice, and promote the more equal distribution of property, which appears
best calculated to promote the welfare of society.” Rush connected abolitionism to the promotion
and growth of domestic consumption markets, a transformation in northeastern capitalism
underway in the late colonial period. He argued that free laborers consumed four times the
“quantity of British goods” as did slaves, and added that “slaves multiply in all countries slowly.
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Free men multiply in proportion as slavery is discouraged.”44 Bewildered how the slavery and
the slave trade became entrenched throughout the Empire, Rush beckoned to future historians
“who, when they read accounts of the slave trade (if they do not regard them as fabulous) will be
at a loss which to condemn most, our folly or guilt, in abetting this direct violation of the laws of
Nature and Religion.”45
Like Dillwyn, Rush’s plan for abolition began with the slave trade: “the first step to be
taken to put a stop to slavery in this country, is to leave off importing slaves.” He urged that the
mainland colonial assemblies unite in opposition to the slave trade by petitioning the King and
Parliament to “dissolve the African Company,” the empire’s sanctioned slave trading enterprise.
Rush denounced the Company as an “incorporated band of robbers.” As for independent
mainland merchants who participated in the slave trade, he proposed to marshal public opinion to
shame slave traders out of dealing in human merchandise. They should be “shunned as the
greatest enemies to our country,” Rush declared, “and let the vessels which bring slaves to us, be
avoided…”46 For domestic slave populations Rush urged gradual abolition legislation. He was
particularly concerned that young slaves should benefit from laws “made to limit the time of
their servitude, and to entitle them to all the privileges of free-born subjects.” However, he
proposed that elderly slaves should continue in their service, not out of concern for masters’
property rights, but because their care should remain the responsibility of those “from whom
they contracted those vices and infirmities.”47 Rush’s plan anticipated the basic structure of
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Pennsylvania’s 1780 gradual abolition legislation. But in 1773, his and other abolitionists’ focus
was to leverage the imperial crisis to antislavery ends.
Meanwhile, Rush and other leading abolitionists worked political back channels in the
metropole to promote their agenda. In May 1773 Rush opened correspondence with Granville
Sharp, sending him copies of An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America.
He proudly pointed out that a decades-long rhetorical and political fight against the slave trade
reaching back to Quaker antislavery pioneer John Woolman had decisively influenced public
opinion in Pennsylvania, claiming that “three-fourths of the province as well as [Philadelphia]
cry out against it.”48 At the same time, Benezet set to work “using the best endeavours in our
power to draw the notice of the Government upon the grievous iniquity & great danger attendant
on a farther prosecution of the Slave Trade…” Benezet contemplated plans for abolition that
included gradual emancipation coupled with the resettlement of black Pennsylvanians “from the
West side of the Allegany Mountains, to the Missisipy, on a breadth of four or five hundred
miles…” He opposed to racially segregated rural communities, though, because “the only
rational, safe, & just expedient both natural and religious would, I think, be that they be mixed
amongst the whites & by giving them a property amongst us, make them parties & interested in
welfare & security.” Benezet also worked to convince Benjamin Franklin, at that time the
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colonies’ agent in London, to pursue an abolitionist agenda, and pressed leaders in colonial
assemblies to publicly assail the Atlantic slave trade.49
In February 1773 Benezet, in concert with other Quaker abolitionists, presented a petition
with two hundred signatures calling for the end of slave importations to Pennsylvania, and the
abolition of the entire British-American slave trade to the Pennsylvania Assembly. The assembly
assigned a committee to report a bill providing for prohibitory duties on the importation of
“Negro and Mulatto Slaves into this Province,” which provided for a duty of £20 as a
discouragement to the trade.50 According to Benezet, assembly members approved the duty
because they believed it inexpedient to send a petition requesting immediate abolition to the
King or Parliament, better “for the present, to lay a farther duty on all Slaves, to be imported,
into this Province…” Benezet took the measure of assemblymen and concluded that the newlyperpetual £20 duty “will amount to a tacit prohibition of the trade… they apprehend that the
passing or refusal of this law, by the King and Council, will better enable them to judge what
farther step to take, with respect to making head with the King and Parliament, that the Slave
Trade may be put an end to, which all orders of people here desire may be done.”51 Benezet
pushed Benjamin Rush to publish his Address at this exact moment, hoping that the young, welleducated, and non-Quaker Rush’s influence would bolster abolitionism among Pennsylvania

Anthony Benezet to John Fothergill, 28 April 1773, in AINAMAB, pp. 268-269. Waldstreicher, Runaway
America, pp. 175-209, details the political tightrope that Franklin navigated on slavery and the politics of
the imperial crisis as colonial representative in London to both Pennsylvania and Georgia.
50
Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania, XIII: pp. 6937, 6942;
Brown, Moral Capital, p. 140; Darold D. Wax, “Negro Import Duties in Colonial Pennsylvania,”
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 97 No. 1 (1973), pp. 22-44. Wax quotes Benezet as
believing that “if time had allowed… we might have had several thousand hands to the Petition; the
people generally cheerfully concurring.” Ibid., pp. 37-38.
51
Anthony Benezet to Granville Sharp, 29 March 1773, quoted in Wax, “Negro Import Duties,” p. 38.
49

93

assemblymen.52 The immediate abolition of the slavery and the slave trade by appealing to
reform-minded assemblymen and imperial officials proved difficult to achieve, even in the face
of mounting popular abolitionism, the Empire consistently refused to assent to proposed colonial
abolition legislation.
Anthony Benezet continued to pump his connection with Granville Sharp to promote the
abolitionist political agenda in the home isle in 1774. That January, Sharp wrote Benezet that his
efforts to present North administration officials with abolitionist literature proceeded apace,
though not as successfully as both men might have wished. Sharp reported that “I have dispersed
a great many Manuscript Papers relating” to slave trade abolitionism “among all those persons of
my acquaintance, whose interest I thought of as sufficient consequence to have weight in
promoting a Reformation,” including copies of the 1773 petition to the Pennsylvania Assembly
and Virginia’s 1772 anti-slave trade petition to Parliament. Sharp described his repeated attempts
to convince the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the North American colonies, to
publicly embrace slave trade abolitionism. “I have given his Lordship a copy of the Pennsylvania
Petition,” he reported, “and he promises to take particular notice of the Act of Assembly, which
passed in consequence of it, for a Duty on Negroes, whenever the said Act is transmitted to His
Majesty; for he don’t recollect that he has yet seen it.”
Sharp pressed forward in this advocacy of colonial abolition petition campaigns,
believing that political pressure on the North administration was the most prudent path for
Benezet and his colleagues to pursue. “Petitions to the King,” Sharp counselled, “subscribed by a
considerable number of respectible inhabitants of any, or each, of the Provinces (showing the
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sense of the iniquity and danger of Slavery, like that to the Assembly of Pennsilvania) would
have considerable weight, but this I mention from myself.”53 In the next several years, however,
as the political breach between the thirteen colonies and the Empire widened, northeastern
abolitionists shifted away from seeking imperial action to direct appeals to public opinion to
support abolitionism in their assemblies. With the partial exception of New York, where
according to British military officials many of the political and merchant classes remained loyal,
“the most submissive and obedient to the laws and acts of Parliament of any province on this
continent,” by late 1774 and 1775 men and women across the northern colonies increasingly lent
their support to slave trade abolitionism and pressed the abolitionist case to their assemblymen.54
Benezet also corresponded with Quaker convert and Rhode Island abolitionist Moses
Brown, brother of notable slave trader John Brown, to promote the abolitionist program. In 1773,
Moses converted to Quakerism and became an active abolitionist. Born into a prominent Baptist
family of merchants and spermaceti candle manufacturers, Brown went through inner turmoil
when his family firm invested in the African slaving voyage of the schooner Sally in 1765.55
Brown also served in the Rhode Island colonial assembly, and by the early 1770s was financially
comfortable and seemingly content, until his wife passed away in 1772. After his 1773
conversion to Quakerism, Brown manumitted slaves that he and his recently-deceased wife had
inherited, and embarked on public campaigns to press for abolition from his home in Providence,
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no easy task considering that political and economic power of slave-trading merchants in
Newport and Bristol.
In 1774, Benezet reported to Brown on anti-slave trade legislation presented in the
legislatures of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, noting that “a considerable duty on any
further importation of Negroes & other slaves” had been passed by the New York General
Assembly, notwithstanding New York City’s influential Loyalist merchant and landed classes
that opposed abolitionism. Unfortunately, that effort “was refused by the Governor & Council.”56
New York’s Assembly had, in fact, passed a prohibitory duty in early 1773, but the additional
duty proposed in 1774 to “more effectually” suppress slave importations was a step too far for
the colony’s imperial officials.57 Benezet’s efforts to convince Moses Brown to press the Rhode
Island assembly to act against the slave trade bore fruit, however, as Brown pressured the
legislative body to consider abolition legislation. In June 1774, the Rhode Island General
Assembly contemplated “an Act prohibiting the importation of Negroes into this Colony.” The
bill provided “that for the future, no negro or mulatto slave shall be imported into this colony;
and in case any slave shall hereafter be brought in, he or she shall be, and hereby, rendered
immediately free.” Such persons would be granted “personal freedom, and the enjoyment of
private property, in the same manner as the Native Indians.”58
The Act’s provisions reflected the political and legal uncertainties generated by the
imperial crisis. While it provided protection for the slave property of British subjects who were
permanent residents of other colonies, the act also required temporary visitors to remove slaves,
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and children born of them while resident in Rhode Island, upon leaving the colony. It
acknowledged imperial support for the African and intercontinental slave trades and the legal
geography of slavery in the Empire, providing that “nothing in this Act shall extend, to any negro
or mulatto slave brought from the coast of Africa, into the West Indies, on board any vessel
belonging to this colony, and which negro or mulatto slave could not be disposed of in the West
Indies, but shall be brought into this colony.” In that instance, the bill provided for a bond of
£100 per each slave brought to Rhode Island, “that such negro or mulatto slave shall be exported
out of the colony, within one year of the date of such bond.” Finally, the Act levied a £100 fine
for Rhode Islanders convicted of “receiving, harboring, or concealing” slaves “clandestinely”
brought into the colony. 59 The Board of Trade overturned the Rhode Island Act, as it did the
prohibitive duties in Pennsylvania and New York, but clearly that Rhode Island public opinion
turned decidedly in favor of abolitionism by the mid-1770s. The abolition of slavery and the
slave trade would have to wait until the next decade, when Moses Brown’s efforts bore fruit
when the Rhode Island Assembly abolished chattel slavery in the Ocean State.
The Providence Town Meeting inspired a 1774 Rhode Island Assembly attempt to
abolish the slave trade. In May 1774, the Town Meeting offered a statement of abolitionism that
matched Benezet and others’ deep hostility to slavery and the slave trade, evidence of the appeal
of abolitionism in the North American colony most closely identified with human trafficking. In
response to the intestate death of Jacob Schoemaker, who possessed “six negroes, four of whom
are infants,” the meeting declared “that it is unbecoming the character of freemen to enslave the
said negroes; and they do hereby give up all claim of right or property in them, the said
negroes…” While “engaged in the preservation of their rights and liberties” vis-à-vis the Empire,
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it made political and moral sense to direct the town’s assembly representatives to “use their
endeavours to obtain an act of the General Assembly, prohibiting the importation of negro slaves
into this colony; and that all negroes in this colony, should be free, after attaining to a certain
age.”60 The heady brew of opposition to the imperial apparatus in the mid-1770s made many
Providence residents reassess their colony’s relationship to slavery and the slave trade; the
politics of resistance offered leverage for Rhode Islanders like Moses Brown to pursue an
abolitionist legislative agenda successfully.
The Rhode Island Assembly later supplemented the 1774 Act in November 1775, a few
short months before war with the empire resumed and the thirteen colonies declared
independence. The 1775 Act built on the previous year’s relatively strict focus on preventing
slave importations, proposing a plan for gradual abolition. It began by reasserting the context of
the imperial crisis, that “the Inhabitants of America are generally Engaged in the preservation of
their own Rights and Liberties, among which that of Personal Freedom must be considered the
greatest…” For that reason, the Assembly concurred that “those who are desirous of Enjoying all
the advantages of liberty themselves, should be willing to extend personal Liberty to others.” The
act reiterated the previous slave importation ban and provided freedom for slaves “clandestinely”
brought into the colony. Illegally imported slaves were to be “rendered immediately free, so farr
as respects personal freedom and the Enjoyment of Private property…” The 1775 Act expanded
on the earlier legislation by providing for the emancipation of slaves born in the colony after the
act’s passage. It cited the Rhode Island colonial charter and “the declarations of our rights at
Sundry Times since asserted” to declare that “all Persons born within this colony, are as free to
all Intents and Purposes as those born within the Realm of England, where the laws expressly
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Exclude personal slavery,” referring to the recent Somerset decision. The Act furthered provided
encouragement to slaveholders to voluntarily manumit their slaves by applying for a “Bill of
Freedom” with their local Town Council, to be issued pending council approval that decreed
manumittees not become public charges.61 Looming war with the empire put a temporary halt to
further discussion of the subject in the halls of New England assemblies, but a wave of
abolitionism in the northern states began to crest, which would unleash forces of political
antislavery by the end of the decade.

**********

The North administration’s implementation of the Tea Act in May 1773 and the famed
“Tea Party” protest of Boston patriots fueled abolitionism in the Northeast. Because the act
extended a monopoly on the North American tea market to the East India Company, radical Bay
colonists interpreted it as a direct assault on the political and economic liberties of New
Englanders. Parliament’s response to Boston’s intransigence, the so-called ‘Intolerable’ Acts,
was the immediate context for the attempts of individual colonies to pass slave trade abolition
legislation described above. Aimed specifically at Massachusetts but cause for alarm across the
mainland, the collection of acts closed Boston’s port, curtailed the colony’s town meetings to one
per year, and altered the Bay Colony’s royal charter to suppress further protests. Coupled with
the Quebec Act, which fueled fears of a popish plot to suppress the region’s hegemonic
Protestantism, the Intolerable Acts generated sympathy for Massachusetts across North America
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and led to a continental non-importation movement that culminated in Continental Congress’s
Association agreement in October 1774. The most recent historian of the subject has identified
protests to the Tea and Intolerable Acts as the most important factor in the mobilization of North
America, because they “encouraged a strident, often hyperbolic language unprecedented in the
evolution of non-importation.” Non-importation and –consumption, in the context of 1774 and
1775, did not have directly antislavery implications; on the other hand, the rapid emergence of
political abolitionism in the decade prior was a genie that patriot leaders could only partially put
back in the bottle. 62
Black Americans also pressed for slavery abolition during the imperial crisis, most
forcefully in Massachusetts. Slaves there presented petitions to colony’s General Court and
House of Representatives requesting abolition legislation in January 1773, a few short months
before the passage of the Tea Act. The petitioners protested their enslaved status by pointing to
the obvious: “…We have no property! We have no Wives! No children! We have no city! No
Country!”63 As the pace of events in 1773 and 1774 drove Massachusetts patriots to unify the
political economy of colonial resistance to imperial authority, so did the pace of black petitions
escalate. Free and enslaved blacks collaborated with sympathetic whites to protest the chattel
principle as incompatible with Massachusetts’ moral and political economy. Black Bostonians
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requested that antislavery pamphleteer James Swan reprint his Dissuasion to Great Britain and
the Colonies, so that copies could be distributed amongst the black population of Boston and
presented, along with other abolitionist materials, to the Massachusetts General Court.
Inspired to publicly press freedom claims by the imperial crisis, black abolitionist
petitions increased in 1774 and 1775. Slaves in Connecticut leveraged the politics of colonial
resistance to press freedom claims as did those in Massachusetts. Signed “Liberty,” an October
1774 letter to the printer of the Connecticut Gazette written by a sympathetic citizen of property
and standing described the efforts of enslaved blacks there to claim freedom. “I have now before
me a ‘humble petition of a number of poor Africans, to the SONS OF LIBERTY in this colony,’”
the letter began, “humbly praying” for recognition of natural rights for the same reason that
white patriots were fighting against “the arbitrary designs of those who would subject us to
slavery…” Their argument “cannot be denied consistent with sound policy, much less from a
principle of justice.” After denouncing the horrors of the African slave trade and the
commoditization of human beings in scriptural terms, “Liberty” directly connected the slaves’
cause to the imperial crisis. “Under such a load of guilt,” he challenged Connecticut whites,
“how can you with any face contend for your own rights?- how can you condemn a North or a
Bute, or the greatest parricide that that ever disgraced the British court?”
In an unpublished 1774 pamphlet entitled Some Thoughts on the Subject of Freeing the
Negro Slaves in the Colony of Connecticut, Connecticut minister Levi Hart elaborated a political
and economic critique of slavery and the slave trade that included a detailed plan for statesponsored gradual abolition of slavery.64 Hart, a New Divinity Congregationalist, wrote the
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pamphlet in response to the Intolerable Acts, crafting an argument that has been described as “an
amalgamation of republican, enlightened, and New Divinity Calvinistic principles.”65 The
pamphlet opened by offering scriptural refutations of the legitimacy of slavery, but Hart devoted
much attention to articulating a secular antislavery argument that was increasingly familiar—and
attractive—to northeasterners.
“I am sensible,” Hart acknowledged, that the plan “will be objected to, by some who are
not owners of Slaves, as being unreasonable that they who have had no hand in the slave trade
should be punished together with the guilty persons, by being obliged to bear a part of the
expence of their freedom.” But Hart summarily rejected this line of argument. Rather, he
observed that “this trade hath carried on under the patronage of the legislature but is not the
legislature a representation of the whole body of the people, so that each man is in effect, present
& hath his voice in the enacting the laws?” He connected abolitionism to patriot protests against
the denial of consent to imperial legislation, at that point widely accepted throughout the thirteen
colonies, arguing “& what ground do we have of complaint against taxation by the british
parliament as less friendly to liberty than if done by our own Legislators[?]” Therefore “each
individual in the colonies, is as really concerned in the Slave Trade as the owners of Negroes and
therefore as really obliged to bear his part of the expence in procuring their freedom.”66
“Procuring” Connecticut slaves’ freedom, though, need not “bring a vast & insupportable
expense upon the Colony,” because Hart had devised a plan for abolition that minimized the cost
of reimbursing slave owners in exchange for their human property.
Some aspects of Hart’s plan found their way into northeastern state abolition laws after
the Revolution. “All the Negro Slaves in the colonies, & in a state of Minority,” Hart proposed,
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“must be supposed to pay for their education by a certain age… it is presumed this time of
Service could not be equitably lengthened out beyond the age of 24 or 25 years for males &
something less for females…” He urged that elderly slaves should be maintained by their current
owners to avoid public expense, and “if they are made free their owners would be entitled to no
reward as they would sustain no loss” for having engrossed their slaves’ prime working years.67
Hart presented detailed calculations for gradual abolition legislation with as little expense to the
state as possible. He designed the plan to provide minimal pecuniary compensation to
slaveowners while allowing freed slaves to prepare for and enter wage-labor markets as
efficiently as possible. Hart calculated that Connecticut’s 1,700 slaves could be emancipated via
a taxpayer-funded purchase program of sixty-eight slaves per year between the ages of twentyfive and thirty-seven, at a rather high valuation of £60 for males and £40 for females. Slaves
younger than twenty-five were to be freed at that age, having repaid their masters for their
“education” with labor in their adolescence and early adulthood. Hart concluded that his plan
would cost Connecticut’s public coffers £22,984, a considerable but not prohibitive amount. “A
colony tax of 3 pence on ye pound will raise 26450- a sum more than sufficient to defray the
expence with a surplus of 2616 pounds which may be applied in a manner hereafter proposed
when we exhibit a plan for treating the Negros after they are free,” he argued.68 Hart’s plan for
abolition would not be adopted immediately as imperial restrictions remained and war became an
increasingly realistic prospect. In October 1774, however, the Connecticut assembly outlawed
slave importations, and extended the prohibition after the war in 1784, pairing the extension with
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the gradual emancipation of slaves at the age of twenty-five, as Hart had suggested a decade
before.69
Hart further elaborated concepts of emancipation in a pamphlet published in October
1774, and not coincidentally, given the Connecticut assembly’s nearly simultaneous ban on slave
imports. The immediate context was the meeting of the First Continental Congress, which
convened in Philadelphia that September. Slavery and the slave trade were heinous because they
violated the Lockean precept of the social contract. Thus, because “society evidently originates
from mutual compact or agreement, so it is equally evident, that members who compose it, unite
in one common interest; each individual gives up all the private interest that is not consistent
with the general good, the interest of the whole body…” Slaveowners did not promote the
general good by depriving others of self-ownership, and slaves could not be expected to uphold
the common interest in societies in which their legal status was chattel property. Tellingly for a
New Englander, Hart compared colonial social and economic development to trading companies,
because both were “possessed of a common stock, into which every one hath given his
proportion; the interest of this common stock is now the property of the whole body, and each
individual is benefited in proportion to the good of the whole…” Slavery violated the common
good, and moral governance required that slavery and the slave trade be abolished by legislative
fiat. 70

**********
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The first opportunity for the northeastern abolitionism to find expression in a unified,
cross-colonial context was at the First Continental Congress. Among the urgent matters on the
delegates’ agenda included crafting official petitions and declarations against British imperial
economic policy, and to construct a legitimately unified non-importation agreement.
Unfortunately for abolitionists there was little direct discussion of slavery and the future of the
slave trade to North America as the delegates debated the creation of a non-importation
association, with unity in opposition to the imperial policy paramount. On September 22, 1774,
the Congress issued a “Resolution Not To Import,” which urged “Merchants and others in the
several colonies, not to send to Great Britain, any orders for goods, and to direct the execution of
all orders already sent, to be delayed or suspended, until the sense of the Congress, on the means
to be taken for the preservation of the liberties of America, is made public.”71 This laid the
groundwork for a congressional non-importation agreement, meant as a show of economic force
against the Empire.
In early October, the Congress considered several proposals for a continental
Association. On October 20, 1774 the delegates voted to ratify the Association agreement, set to
take force on September, 10, 1775, and prepared it for public distribution. The agreement opened
with a brief statement of colonial grievances, which recited the familiar themes of colonial hatred
of imperial economic regulations, Parliament’s unconstitutional use of legislative power, and
violations of the colonists’ consent to imperial rule. These grievances, “which threaten
destruction to the lives, liberty, and property of his Majesty’s subjects, in North America” led
Congress to the “opinion, that a non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation
agreement, faithfully adhered to, will prove the most speedy, effectual, and peaceable
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measure…”72 The opening resolve expressed a general statement of non-importation, set to take
effect on December 1, 1774, while non-exportation of North American commodities was to
begin on September 10, 1775. The second resolve declared “we will neither import nor purchase,
any slave imported,” declaring that “we will wholly discontinue the slave trade, and will neither
be concerned with it ourselves, nor will we hire vessels, nor sells our commodities or
manufactures to those who are concerned in it.”73 To what end did the Continental Association
include slave importations, and how was it connected to emergent northeastern abolitionism?
The inclusion of slave importations made sense in the broader context of what the
Congress, and especially northeastern delegates, wanted to achieve with the Association: a
unified program of economic resistance against the Empire in the hope that Parliament could be
brought to the bargaining table on terms that gave North Americans some political leverage.
Because the Continental Congress designed the Association agreement to ban both the demand
and supply of British import prohibiting slave importations made sense, and was cause for
celebration for abolitionists. Abolitionists’ hopes, to be sure, did not include a widespread belief
that unified, cross-continental action was possible. In the short-term, any immediate economic
problems the slave import ban might create would presumably affect northeastern merchants
who invested in slaving voyages, men well acquainted with the public turn against slavery and
the slave trade in their communities.
The northeastern press largely celebrated the Association agreement, and local
Committees of Correspondence began preparations to enforce its provisions. The Connecticut
Courant, for instance, lauded the congressmen for “having, in a manner highly honourable to
themselves and to their Constituents, and serviceable to their Country, finished the important
72

JCC, I: p. 76.

73

JCC, I: pp. 76-77.
106

Business on which they were appointed… for a great and increasing nation.” The newspaper
especially celebrated provisions in the Association agreement that promoted the “increase and
encouragement of sheep… and to the improvement of manufactures of all kinds.”74 The New
York Journal reported in November 1774 that the city’s Committee of Correspondence had
already set to work enforcing the Association agreement’s strictures. Information had circulated
that a ship was bound to the West Indies with eighteen sheep on board, in violation of the
agreement. “A number of citizens waited on the Captain,” according to the Journal’s report,
“and informed him that the exportation of sheep was contrary to the resolution of the continental
Congress…” The captain promised to abide by the agreement, but then tried to clear out in the
middle of the night, when he was met by two hundred New Yorkers and led by four members of
the local chapter of the Committee of Correspondence. The merchant whose goods, including the
eighteen sheep, protested but under public pressure the sheep were disembarked and the “people
being satisfied, peaceably dispersed.”75 Eighteen sheep, of course, did not a revolution make. But
popular opinion in New England and the mid-Atlantic did support the implementation and
execution of the Association agreement, though oftentimes with difficulty, as the calendar
flipped to the critical year of 1775.
The Association agreement completed, the First Continental Congress adjourned in late
October 1774. At the Second Continental Congress, convened in May 1775, the exigencies of
brewing war demanded the delegates’ attention. The congress’s records show that slavery and
the slave trade generated very little discussion as the body continued to meet throughout 1775,
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simultaneously planning for war and considering ultimately unsuccessful attempts to reconcile
with the Empire. Letters from delegates to the Congress offer only brief glimpses into the
reactions of colonial publics to the Association agreement’s slave trade prohibition. After the
First Congress had adjourned, on December 14, 1774 Rhode Island delegate Samuel Ward wrote
to Pennsylvanian John Dickinson to report on the Rhode Island General Assembly’s view of the
Association agreement. “The people are Universally satisfied with the proceeding of the
congress,” Ward wrote, “and determined to adhere to the Association, even the Merchants who
suffer most by discontinuing the Slave Trade, Assure Me They shall most punctually conform to
that Resolve and the Country is general is vastly pleased with it.”76 Other than other glancing
references, the delegates seem not to have discussed the slave trade any further. From the
perspective of northeastern abolitionists, the inclusion of the slave trade in the Association
agreement augured well for the future of their project. Abolitionists continued to promote their
vision of moral and political economy at the local-level, leading to the creation of the first
abolition society in the Atlantic world.
On April 14, 1775, at the Rising Sun Tavern at the intersection of Germantown and York
Streets in North Philadelphia, ten men, including Thomas Paine, met to discuss the formation of
an antislavery pressure group. Convened a mere five days before the battles at Lexington and
Concord, the group later referred to as the Pennsylvania Abolition Society got off to a modest
start, meeting four times in 1775 before warfare interrupted their activities until 1784. The
proximate reason for founding the society was to offer protection and legal guidance to
Pennsylvania blacks illegally claimed as slaves, and to press freedom claims in courts.77 The case
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of mixed-race woman Dinah Nevil seems to have been the direct impetus for the creation of the
PAS. Nevil and her four children made their way from New Jersey to Philadelphia in winter
1773, where she instigated a freedom lawsuit on behalf of herself and her children. Spearheaded
by Thomas Harrison, a Quaker tailor of modest means, Nevil’s case motivated organized
antislavery cooperation in Philadelphia and eastern Pennsylvania.78 The PAS’s earliest historian
claimed that by 1775 “so numerous” had freedom suits become, “that many benevolent
individuals whose sense of justice prompted them to interfere, found the labour too onerous to be
borne.” A growing supply of freedom suits pressed by black Pennsylvanians, it seems, met a
popular demand for organized antislavery activity in the Keystone state.79 Though the war
curtailed the PAS’s earliest activities, by the mid-1780s it would re-emerge as a vanguard group
that pushed slavery abolition and antislavery political programs in the Keystone State, and
beyond. As 1775 turned to 1776, and independence developed into a legitimate possibility,
abolitionism was temporarily sidelined as a political movement. Still, abolitionists pressed their
case in publications designed to keep alight the flame of their cause in the minds of men and
women increasingly preoccupied with the prospect of war.
In early 1776, Newport, Rhode Island New Divinity minister Samuel Hopkins published
A Dialogue Concerning the Slavery of the Africans, the most complete statement of the moral
and political economy of northeastern abolitionism published before the thirteen colonies’
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declaration of independence in July 1776. The events of the escalating imperial crisis in the early
1770s led Hopkins to become increasingly active in promoting abolitionism from his pulpit in
Newport, a city whose merchants had long been active participants in the African and
intercontinental slave trades.80 In January 1775, before writing and publishing A Dialogue,
Hopkins corresponded with Levi Hart to offer his comments on the unpublished manuscript
Some Thoughts on the Subject of Freeing the Negro Slaves in the Colony of Connecticut.
Hopkins was buoyed by Some Thoughts, especially the detailed arithmetic of Hart’s plan for
abolition in Connecticut. Hopkins thought “the plan you propose is practicable, if the public
attention could be gained, & people could be earnest about it.” Hopkins’s critiques concerned
Hart’s treatment of slaveholders’ rights to their property. He wished Hart had argued “that all
owners of slaves are under indispensable obligations to free them, whether the public will
compensate them, or not…” Hopkins suggested that Hart’s calculations could be tweaked to
assuage slave holders that they would receive fair compensation for their loss of property. “It
will be said the master is not compensated,” he offered, “tho’ he should receive the sum he gave
for his slave… A compensation can be nothing of the real worth of the slave to his master. And if
it is unjust to take [a slave] away without some compensation, it is unjust to deprive the master
of his service without a full compensation.” Not usually the most positive personality, Hopkins
thought Hart’s work a good, but still preliminary first step. Many New Englanders despised the
slave trade and disliked the powerful merchants that invested in it, he wrote, but because many
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“who have not attended to the injustice of keeping these slaves, who have been made so by this
trade, in perpetual slavery, perhaps something more particular ought to be said, on this head…”81
Hopkins accepted his own challenge with the publication of A Dialogue in early 1776. He
prefaced the publication with an address to the delegates of the Second Continental Congress,
convened in May 1775, saluting the delegates’ efforts to “[obtain] the approbation and applause
of your constituents… in the important, noble struggle for LIBERTY…” Strongly supportive of
the ban on the slave trade in the October 1774 Association agreement, Hopkins wrote in behalf
of the growing number of abolitionists, who “have particular encouragement thus to apply to
you, since you have had the honour and happiness of leading these Colonies to resolve to stop
the slave trade; and to buy no more slaves imported from Africa.” He denounced the
inconsistency of arguing against the political ‘enslavement’ of imperial policies towards the
thirteen colonies without taking further, united action against chattel slavery in North America.
He urged Congress “that your wisdom and the great influence you have in these colonies, will be
so properly and effectually exerted, as to bring about a total abolition of slavery, in such a
manner as shall greatly promote the happiness of those oppressed strangers, and the best interest
of the public.”82
Hopkins structured A Dialogue as a series of exchanges between two New Englanders,
one an abolitionist, the other a skeptic of abolitionism for a number of social, political, and
economic reasons. The pamphlet opened with the skeptic acknowledging the efflorescence of
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abolitionism, yet maintaining that “this is not a proper time to attend to it, while we are in such a
state of war and distress, and affairs of much greater importance demand all our attention…”
Hopkins’s abolitionist countered this argument against the expediency of abolition by decrying
slavery as a “public sin.” Even though “there are but few of these slaves, indeed in NewEngland, compared with the vast numbers in the islands and the southern colonies,” New
Englanders could not be excused for failing to take action against slavery and the slave trade.
Slave trade abolitionism having received the endorsement of the Association agreement, he
believed, was a necessary but not sufficient development. A conviction against the slave trade,
Hopkins wrote, “has been so spread of late, that it is has reached almost all men on the continent,
except some who are too deeply interested in it, to admit the light which condemns it.” The
Association agreement signaled approbation of the slave trade, but that did not mean that antislave trade sentiment was shared equally across the North American colonies, and the local law
of slavery remained undisturbed.83
Much of the abolitionist’s argument in A Dialogue concentrated on proving that slavery
and the slave trade were moral and political evils that threatened the foundations of the North
American commercial and agricultural economies. Thus, the abolitionist argued that “if African
slaves had never been introduced, or this slavery were now abolished; and every man had his
farm or plantation, no more than he could cultivate to his best advantage, by the help of his
children, and perhaps a few hired men; this would introduce industry, temperance, and
economy.” Had plantation slavery not taken root in the Upper and Lower South colonies, by this
logic, their economies would have mimicked those of the Northeast. Slavery led to political and
economic inequality, as the power of masters over slaves mimicked the arbitrary power of
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tyrannical monarchies over their subjects—the fear of every republican-minded North American
patriot.84 By connecting antislavery political economy to patriotic republicanism, Hopkins forged
links between the politics of the imperial crisis and the abolitionist argument.
Abolition, Hopkins argued, would stimulate the expansion of free labor markets in the
northeastern colonies. Local governments needed to direct this process so that potential freedmen
and women were put in a position to positively contribute to their communities. Thus Hopkins’
abolitionist countered concerns that free blacks would become pauperized and drain public
coffers, by arguing that they should “be subject to the same restraints and laws as other freemen;
and have the same care taken of them by the public.” New England town meetings historically
controlled the allocation of labor in local markets and provided social welfare, and Hopkins saw
no reason why black New Englanders should be ostracized from the public weal. “If not put
under peculiar disadvantages, as freed negroes commonly are,” he wrote, and if they were given
“reasonable wages for their labour,” there could be no doubt that blacks would be fit subjects for
full inclusion in New England society and economy.85 Hopkins continually emphasized the
linkages between the abolitionist argument and the politics of non-importation and consumption,
arguing that while the Association agreement’s ban on slave importations, as well as attempts by
colonial assemblies to block slave importations were positive steps, still “holding these blacks in
a state of slavery, is a practical justification of the slave-trade…” “By keeping these slaves,” he
continued, “and buying and selling them, they actually encourage the slave trade… For so long
as slaves are bought and possessed, and in demand, so long the African trade will be supported
and encouraged.” If slavery were to be abolished throughout the thirteen colonies, putting a stop
to foreign slave importations was a significant, but preliminary step. “For if it be wrong to import
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and buy them now, it was always wrong… and we have made them our slaves without the least
right, and ought to retract it, and repair the injury done to them, so far as it is in our power, by
setting them free and compensating them otherwise, so far as we are able.” 86
The New England skeptic accused Hopkins’s abolitionist of promoting measures that
would lead to widespread loss of property, and even worse, possibly servile insurrection. “Many
make such a clamour about holding our Negroes in bondage,” the skeptic argued, “and have so
inveighed against the African slave-trade, and even keeping our blacks in slavery, that many
negroes are become very uneasy, and are much more engaged to obtain their liberty than they
used to be.” Therefore questions surrounding slavery’s future in the thirteen colonies should be
segregated from the political questions of the imperial crisis, kept “in private.” Public
consideration of the revolutionary antislavery argument, especially by members of the clergy like
Hopkins, was dangerous “lest the blacks should take it fully into their heads that they are treated
hardly, and never be easy till they are set at liberty.” 87
Hopkins’s abolitionist retorted that “the present state of our public affairs” demanded that
abolitionism be taken seriously, because of political and moral inconsistency: “while the poor
Negroes look on, and hear what an aversion we have to slavery… necessarily leads them to
attend to their own wretched situation.” Thus, “they see themselves deprived of all liberty and
property,” he wrote, and “they see the slavery the Americans dread as worse than death, [as]
lighter than a feather, compared to their heavy doom.”88 The only morally sound plan of action
was to marshal public opinion, and therefore political power, to fight slavery. Abolitionism
“ought doubtless to be attended to by the General Assemblies, and Continental and Provincial
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Congresses; and if they were as much united and engaged in devising ways and means to set at
liberty these injured slaves, as they are to defend themselves from tyranny, it would soon be
effected.”89 Slavery and the slave trade negatively impacted everyone in North America;
therefore, abolition was a proper subject for colonial legislators to entertain.90
Hopkins wrote “An Address to the Owners of Negro Slaves, in the American Colonies”
as a concluding salvo to A Dialogue. He challenged slaveowners to defend the peculiar
institution without resorting to appeals to property rights in chattel slaves, which he and other
abolitionists believed illegitimate, or on grounds of political inexpediency. He acknowledged
that “the several legislatures of these colonies, the magistrates, and the body of the people have
doubtless” been complicit in the allowing the dehumanizing chattel property regime of slavery to
persist. But he pivoted to warn slaveowners that the political economy of imperial crisis had had
a deafening impact on the minds of non-slaveholders: “And is it not worthy of your
consideration, that they who are not interested in this practice, and have no slaves, are generally,
if not every one, fully convinced it is wrong?” While doubtless an exaggeration, certainly if
applied to the Upper and Lower South, Hopkins did have a point. He only had to look outside his
own window for evidence that this assertion was sustainable at the local level. He referred to
Rhode Island’s 1774 and 1775 overturned slave trade abolition laws as proof that the yawning
inconsistency between patriot cries of political ‘enslavement’ by the Empire and American
chattel slavery was not an insoluble paradox. “Men love not to be inconsistent with themselves,”
Hopkins noted acerbically, and the Rhode Island General Assembly had proven that it was
possible for New England patriots to elude inconsistency.91 The contours of northeastern

Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., p. 46.
91
“An Address to the Owners of Negro Slaves, in the American Colonies,” in Ibid., pp. 61, 63.
89
90

115

agrarian, mercantile, and infant manufacturing capitalism through the 1770s, in contrast to the
Upper and Lower South, made the inconsistencies of Revolutionary rhetoric and American
slavery less a contradiction than a function of imperial restrictions patriots readied themselves to
overthrow.

**********

Preparations for war with the British Empire consumed the attention of the Second
Continental Congress in late winter and spring 1776. Complex negotiations over financing the
Continental Army, coordinating troop requisitions, preparing defensive strategies, and working
to massage public opinion in favor of supporting the monumental undertaking of a war for
independence were critical tasks if the shoots of the “seedtime of revolution,” to borrow Thomas
Paine’s suggestive metaphor, were to bloom. By June 1776 congressional support for a
declaration of independence, an explanation of colonial grievances against the Empire, and a
plea for international diplomatic recognition of the patriot project, reached a critical mass.
Congress reiterated the October 1774 Association agreement’s ban on slave importations
in April 1776, as the delegates edged closer to declaring independence after the previous July’s
Olive Branch petition was denied by King George III and Parliament.92 On April 6, 1776, the
Congress declared in a series of non-imported and exportation resolves, “That no slaves be
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imported into any of the thirteen United Colonies.” The Congress further recommended to the
state legislatures that they appoint agents responsible for “observing the regulations made by the
Congress, or assemblies, or conventions, concerning trade, and for securing the observation of
such parts of the association as are not inconsistent therewith.”93
As in September and October 1774 when the First Continental Congress debated the
Association agreement, there was very little direct mention of slavery or the slave trade as the
delegates moved towards approving the creation of a committee to draft a declaration of
independence. In April 1776, the delegates to the Congress worked to untangle a confusing
patchwork of legalities of individual colonial assemblies, only three of which—Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut—were legally operational vis-à-vis the Empire. During the same
month, John Adams wrote to fellow Bay Stater Joseph Warren that New England and four slave
societies on the southern mainland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, stood
firmly in support of a declaration of independence, while in Pennsylvania, New York, New
Jersey, and Delaware support for independence among the political and mercantile classes
wavered.94 By early June 1776, however, the Congress agreed to appoint a committee to draft a
declaration, with Thomas Jefferson chosen to perform the bulk of the writing under the
supervision of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Robert Livingston, and Roger Sherman.
The story of the drafting process of the Declaration of Independence is as celebrated a
chain of events as exists in American history and popular memory, as is Thomas Jefferson’s role
as the primary author of the document. As David Armitage has made clear, the document was
primarily an appeal for international diplomatic recognition clothed in natural rights talk par
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excellence.95 The Declaration was also a statement of revolutionary principles that exposed deep
underlying contradictions about American slavery and American independence. At the heart of
these contradictions lay Jefferson’s condemnatory, and ultimately excised clause which accused
King George III—the “Christian King of Great Britain”—and his predecessors for perpetuating
the “piratical Warfare” of the African slave trade, for “waging cruel War against human Nature
itself.” The Declaration’s slave trade clause contained language that scholars have noted was the
most inflammatory in the entire document, both in substance and in tone.96
In haranguing the King and his predecessors for having forced the slave trade upon North
Americans for well over a century, Jefferson needed only to point to repeated colonial assembly
attempts to proscribe slave importations into their communities. Jefferson claimed George III
“prostituted his Negative for Suppressing every legislative Attempt to prohibit or to restrain an
execrable Commerce, determined to keep open a Markett where Men are bought and sold.”
Jefferson infamously lambasted the King for “exciting those very People to rise in Arms among
us, and to purchase their Liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people who
also obtruded them…”97 These remarkable assertions shocked many of his colleagues, prompting
John Adams to describe Jefferson’s handiwork as a “vehement philippic against Negro slavery.”
98
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language, or the precedent it would have enshrined had it been included in the finished product.
Deep southerners’ misgivings about including the “vehement philippic” in the Declaration
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motivated them to push for the excision of the clause in the debates of July 1-3, before Congress
formally approved the document and released it to the American public.
Jefferson implied in his personal notes of the proceedings that South Carolinians, led by
Edward Rutledge, disapproved of a resolution to convene the Committee of the Whole to vote on
the declaration, because they wanted the clause excised. He later wrote that the clause
“reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa was struck out in complaisance to South
Carolina & Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on
the contrary still wished to continue it.” He also noted that some of “our Northern brethren I
believe felt a little tender” about the implications of the clause, most likely Rhode Islanders who
were directly or indirectly interested in African and intercontinental slave trading.99 This sort of
tenderness, though, had as much to do with the public turn against slavery and the slave trade in
the Northeast as it was direct evidence of widespread support for the slave trade as a central
pillar of the mercantile and agrarian economy of the region.
Jefferson’s political motivations for crafting this passage, how they related to the
emphatic statement of natural rights elsewhere in the Declaration of Independence, and what it
tells us about his and other slaveholding patriots’ deep ambivalence about the politics of slavery
and revolution are not the central concern of this analysis.100 If considered as an outcome of
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congressional politicking, the excision of Jefferson’s striking condemnation of British imperial
complicity in perpetuating the slave trade and slavery is understandable. South Carolinians,
Georgians, and a few New Englanders did not want it in the Declaration, and unity carried the
day. If considered as part of the tangled, and indeed insoluble views of Jefferson on slavery and
his evolving sense of American political economic development, the episode is the textbook
definition of a paradox. At bottom, the excised clause was a failed political ploy to engender
sympathy for the insurgent American patriots in the international diplomatic community while
tarring the British imperial apparatus with the slimy stigma of political ‘enslavement.’ The
Articles of Confederation, the new nation’s first governing charter, created a decentralized
structure of governance on which New England states and Pennsylvania capitalized to unleash
abolition to promote the accumulation of free labor human capital, by breaking the property
relationship of slavery.
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Ch. 3: Abolition Unleashed: The Revolution and Northeastern State Abolition, 1776-1788

Political abolitionism percolated in the mid-Atlantic and New England states after the
Revolutionary War escalated in spring 1776, and spread rapidly across the region as British
military strategy shifted to the South beginning in 1778. Abolition in the Northeast advanced
unevenly and in response to tumultuous local contexts, but by the mid-1780s six states had
initiated he abolition of chattel slavery. In March 1780 the Pennsylvania state assembly made
history, passing the first abolition law in the Anglo-Atlantic world. The Quok Walker cases and
their resolution in the 1783 Commonwealth v. Jennison decision cemented slavery’s abolition in
Massachusetts, though successful freedom suits and socioeconomic aversion to slavery paved the
way for judicial abolition for over a decade. Connecticut’s legislature provided for gradual
abolition in 1784, while Rhode Island’s assembly instituted gradual emancipation the same year
in a politically fraught process. In 1785, New York’s assembly came close to passing abolition
legislation, only to be overturned by the Council of Revision because of concerns that the
proposed law did not guarantee freed-persons’ political and civil rights. Slaveholding politicians
and their constituents across the Northeast objected strenuously to abolition, but with the
temporary exceptions of New York and New Jersey, they fought a losing battle in the 1780s. By
1788, all of New England and Pennsylvania had abolished slavery, slave importations, and made
their citizens’ participation in the slave trade illegal. While New York and New Jersey did not
pass abolition legislation until 1799 and 1804, respectively, abolition swept forcefully and with
remarkable rapidity between 1780 and 1788.1
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Before the Revolution escalated in the spring and summer of 1776, slavery in the
Northeast underwent a series of political, rhetorical, and legislative attacks. The disruption of
war also unleashed a variety of opportunities for the enslaved to stake claims to liberation from
their status as chattel property. Since North American transatlantic commerce was paralyzed
during the war, so too were the African and intercontinental slave trades. The challenge of war to
the legal and social structures of slavery in the thirteen states varied in response to local law,
customs, and the relative intensity of antislavery political agitation activated by the imperial
crisis. The impact of destructive military campaigns was also borne unevenly, striking the New
England and the mid-Atlantic first before the Empire’s shift in military strategy to focus on
crushing the American rebellion from the Chesapeake southward. By 1783, the war and creation
and implementation of the Articles of Confederation together combined to obliterate political
obstacles to the adoption of abolitionist programs in New England and Pennsylvania.
During the war the free and enslaved blacks powerfully asserted claims to freedom, as
activists like Prince Hall and Paul Cuffee organized petition campaigns that reflected their deep
understanding of the emancipatory principles embedded in the Declaration of Independence.2
Recently emancipated, Phillis Wheatley continued to wield her pen, eloquently protesting the
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iniquity of slavery in letters and poems. Enslaved New England men seized opportunities to
serve the American war effort in exchange for freedom and- potentially- political inclusion.
Escalating since the 1760s, enslaved New Englanders continued to press freedom suits, legal
claims to mitigate their status as chattel. 3 The British Army’s occupation of New York City
effectively foreclosed black New Yorkers’ legal avenues to freedom, but the city was
increasingly filled with enslaved and freed Afro-Britons who were swept to the city along with
Loyalists from across North America.4
The most direct external challenge to slavery during the war—British military
emancipation—was not applied to the mid-Atlantic and New England. Virginia Governor Lord
Dunmore’s famed proclamation of November 7, 1775 applied only to that state, and while the
June 1779 Phillipsburg Proclamation expanded the policy to the enslaved of all American
patriots, it could only be effectively enforced in the Upper and Lower South, where the majority
of British military resources were concentrated by 1780. Thousands of Afro-Britons escaped
slavery in the Chesapeake and Carolinas, and Thomas Jefferson’s “faulty math” led him to
estimate that 80,000-100,000 southern slaves reached freedom, though modern assessments
suggest a lower figure of 25,000-30,000. New England military emancipation, offers of freedom
in exchange for service, freed upwards of one thousand men, mostly in Rhode Island,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts. 5 The war’s impact on slavery in the Northeast was indirect, as
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it led states to re-organize their governmental structures, thereby opening political breaches that
abolitionists worked to exploit. At the same time, the war spurred the creation of free black
communities that supported political abolitionism.

**********

The delegates to the Continental Congress began to debate the structure of the Articles of
Confederation in summer 1776, as war rapidly escalated. While several issues concerning
slavery generated heated debate, the delegates broadly agreed that the Articles’ basic structure
should be grounded in what one historian has called “extreme federalism.” The states, in other
words, remained sovereign vis-à-vis the national government. In the context of the imperial
crisis, this broad consensus made sense. The delegates clearly wanted to avoid creating a national
government that could potentially mimic the centralization of the British Empire. “Extreme
federalism” was also accepted, in part, because the states wanted as much control as possible
over the law of slavery. For the slave societies from the Chesapeake southward, this was both an
acceptance and repudiation of the principles elucidated by Lord Mansfield in the 1772 Somerset
decision, where declared slavery a municipal institution upheld only by positive local law. The
Congress did not intend the Articles of Confederation to threaten slavery’s legality in the states.
For southern slaveholders, however, the consequences of the Somerset decision’s adoption of the
“freedom principle” and its potential transmission national law had worrisome future
Freedom: Runaways of the American Revolution and Their Global Quest for Liberty (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006),
pp. 3-74; Gerald Horne, The Counter-Revolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the United States of
America (New York: New York University Press, 2014), pp. 234-252; Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy:
Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772-1832 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013), pp. 13-54.
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consequences. The law of slavery, southern slaveholders agreed, must be jealously guarded as a
state prerogative.
Recent scholarship on the relationship between municipal slavery and the Articles of
Confederation emphasizes how the framework’s structure protected southern slavery from an
interventionist national government. The Articles of Confederation, in other words, shielded
slavery where it already existed, leading historians to claim it was a ‘victory’ for slaveholders.
Some scholars go further, to arguing, that the Articles not only protected slavery where it existed,
but set the stage for the institution’s later southwestern expansion. Thus the debates over slavery
between northerners and southerners at the Continental Congress constituted “dramatic evidence
of the power of the slave states, as well as of the major political weight of slavery as an element
in structuring the revolutionary government.”6
Scholars that emphasize protections for slavery that were embedded in the Articles of
Confederation have several good reasons for doing so. The Articles, they point out, embraced the
principle of “confederal law” with reference to slave property. Among other things this meant
that slaves held as chattel under southern state laws could not be confiscated in states where the
legality of slavery faced a dubious future. The Articles’ Privileges and Immunities clause
guaranteed slaveholders the right to recover fugitive slaves, and to sojourn with their enslaved

George Van Cleve, A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics, and the Constitution in the Early American
Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), pp. 45-57, quotation p. 157. See also Paul
Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2000), pp. 20-69; Finkelman, “Slavery and the Founders: Little Ventured, Little Gained,” Yale
Journal of Law and Humanities, Vol. 13 (2001); Don Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of
the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 3-49,
presents a more measured view, but concludes that the Articles set the tone, later transposed into the
Constitution, of a national government that was “functionally proslavery.” David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s
Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), shows the powerfully
ambiguous role that race and slavery played in the creation of the Articles and later the Constitution,
while similarly noting the political possibilities for antislavery in the decentralized articles.
6

125

property throughout Confederation states and territories. Slaveholders also received protections
against the confiscation of slave property in the event that individual states passed legislation
banning slave importations, which individual colonies had attempted to implement
unsuccessfully in the tumult of the imperial crisis. Critical to slaveholding interests, southern
politicians demanded these protections as the asking price for confederation.7
The most contentious debates in Congress over provisions relating to slavery in the
Articles concerned taxation. The central question was whether slave property should be included
in taxation quotas. Southern slaveholders voiced near unanimous opposition to the inclusion of
slave property in tax quotas, arguing that this would unfairly burden the slaveholding states.
Maryland’s Samuel Chase declared including slave property inappropriate because no such
proposal to tax the cattle and horses of the northern states was on the table. Led by South
Carolinians, congressional slaveholders threatened defection should slave property be included
in tax quotas. Because the distribution of tax burdens was such a critical issue, regional
divergences in property regimes threatened to derail the Confederation from the beginning.
Proposals to include all property, excluding “household goods,” as the basis for taxation went
nowhere. Debates over slavery and taxation ended in late 1777, as the Congress ultimately
decided to include land and buildings as the bases for determining tax quotas, removing
population from the tax formula. The exclusion of slave property has been interpreted as a
victory for slaveholding interests. In any case, scholars are in unanimous agreement that the tax
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structure crafted by the Congress resulted in a deeply flawed and unworkable system that
doomed the Articles government to failure.8
While the Articles insulated southern slavery from external legal assaults, allowed
slaveholders right to their enslaved property under the Articles’ “confederal” regime, and
ultimately excluded slave property from tax quotas, the nation’s first governing charter should
not be interpreted as an unmitigated victory for southern planters, regardless of their national
political influence. Because of the Articles’ “extreme federalism,” from the perspective of
antislavery northeasterners, the Confederation offered unprecedented opportunities to abolish
slavery within their states. Scholars who emphasize the Articles’ protections for slavery
implicitly acknowledge this understanding. But because abolitionism is so often characterized as
weak and halting, their interpretations gravitate towards an emphasis on protections for southern
slavery, leaving several questions unanswered. If northern delegates at the Continental Congress
agreed that the Confederation government could not force an individual state to abolish slavery
or deny slaveholders the right to their property—and there is not one suggestion in the Journals
of the Continental Congress that these positions were ever on the table—why are “confederal”
protections for slave property held up as an unqualified victory for slaveholders? Why did
slaveholders fret, and threaten disunion, over counting slaves as property for tax quotas if
northern abolitionism was weak and isolated? What were southern slaveholders worried about?
These questions do not deny that the Articles provided protections to southern slaveholders, but
rather that their decentralized structure summarily obliterated all political obstacles to state
Journals of the Continental Congress [hereafter JCC], ed. Washington C. Ford et al. (Washington, D.C.,
1904-1937), IX: 785,-788, 793-797, 800-801. The Articles left the states broad discretion to elect delegates to
serve in congress, only mandating that each state should have no less than two or more than seven
delegates. Each state was given complete responsibility for maintaining their delegates to Congress, and
each state received one vote in Congress. Therefore, conflicts over slavery and representation, which later
proved so divisive at the Constitutional Convention, were avoided under the Articles. AoC, Art. V, §2-3.
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abolition in the Northeast. Abolitionists in New England and Pennsylvania capitalized on
national political decentralization to force through legislative and judicial abolition, against often
strident opposition, the first instances of slavery abolition in the Americas.
The Articles did not extend the possibility of forced abolition on the southern states, but
at the same time, they did not prevent northeastern abolition. The Articles’ decentralization with
regard to trade, moreover, meant that the states retained authority to regulate the importation and
exportation of goods into their jurisdictions. This allowed state legislatures absolute authority to
allow, or ban, slave importations.9 Therefore conflicts over whether to sanction slave
importations, or whether to circumscribe slaveowners’ right to sell slaves out-of-state, were
exclusively fought within state legislatures and not at the national level. As we will see below,
mercantile and slaveholding interests in New England and the mid-Atlantic fought against the
abolition of slave importations and participation in the slave trade, ironically leading their states
prevent the sale of slaves out-of-state and gradually abolish slavery before outlawing their
citizens’ participation in the slave trade. The locus of the politics of slavery from 1776-1788 was
the state, not the weak and ineffectual national government.
Northeastern abolitionists still petitioned the Confederation Congress to symbolically
gesture against the immorality of slavery, and to recommend that state legislatures restrain the
slave trade. After the Treaty of Paris took effect in September 1783, Pennsylvania Quakers
resumed their petition campaigns. In October, they sent a petition containing over five hundred
signatures on the subject of the slave trade. Severely limited by the Confederation Congress’s

AoC, Art. 9, §1: “… no treaty of commerce should be made, whereby the legislative power of the
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inability to act independently of the states, the petition solicited Congress’s “Christian
interposition to discourage prevent so obvious an evil, in such a manner as under the influence of
Divine Wisdom you shall all meet.” They grounded the petition’s requests in the familiar
language of natural rights, buttressed by the “solemn declarations often repeated in favor of
universal liberty” that the Revolution had wrought.10 Aware that Congressional paralysis and the
extreme federalism of the Articles made their request largely symbolic, the petitioners relied on
antislavery New Jersey delegate David Howell to keep them abreast of developments in
Congress.11 The petition was received and submitted to a committee of three for consideration
which included Howell.12
In January 1784, the committee submitted a report to the whole, which resolved that the
Congress consider the Quaker petition “as a testimony of their sincere concern for the essential
good of their country …” The Congress’s Journal indicates that “that essential good of their
country” was struck through and replaced with “the rights of mankind,” which spoke volumes
about southern opposition to even a faint suggestion of Congressional interest in anti-slave trade
rhetoric. The committee also resolved to encourage state legislatures to take measures to restrain
the slave trade, “to compass the object” of the First Continental Congress’s October 1774
Association agreement, which prohibited slave importations as part of a broader non-importation
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program. Not officially approved by Congress, the failed petition revealed the limitations of
national antislavery political action under the Articles.13
In September 1784, Philadelphia Quaker James Pemberton reported to Moses Brown that
David Howell’s efforts to reignite congressional discussion of Quaker anti-slave trade petitions
proceeded slowly. Howell tried to “embrace the first opportunity to bring on” discussion of antislave trade petitions, but was “met with obstruction from the southern slave holders.” Pemberton
assured Brown that the Philadelphia Meeting for Sufferings remained busy planning petition
campaigns, as well as assisting Afro-Pennsylvanian freedom claims. The Pennsylvania Abolition
Society had recently been reorganized, and the society shouldered the burden of enforcing
Pennsylvania’s 1780 abolition law quickly. While Pemberton rued that the Articles constrained
that northeastern abolitionists, he noted with approval that abolitionist sentiment was ascendant
in Great Britain, largely the work of abolitionists Granville Sharp and Thomas Clarkson.
Pemberton noted sanguinely that “it would be a desirable point gained, could a total prohibition
to the trade in every government be brought about.” By 1787, Pemberton would be partially
fulfilled in his hopes. But at the national level, the only antislavery policy that had any chance of
fulfillment under the Articles was the prohibition of slavery in United States territories.14
Crafting policies to promote orderly western expansion was the most pressing task for the
Confederation Congress. Faced with untangling overlapping state land claims in territories west
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of the original states, the Congress encountered questions over slavery and western expansion.15
A congressional committee consisting of Thomas Jefferson, Jeremiah Townley Chase, and
abolitionist champion David Howell issued a report in March 1784 that recommended a process
of state land cessions and broad surveying procedures, and to abolish slavery north of the Ohio
River by 1800. It is unclear if this proposal was inspired by northeastern gradual abolition laws,
which had been secured in Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island by March 1784. There
has been much scholarly debate about Jefferson’s personal motives for promoting abolition
provisions in the Northwest Territory, and how they relate to his vision of yeoman political
economy.16 Ultimately the slavery provision was dropped from the final text of the 1784 Land
Ordinance Act. Delegates from New England and the Mid-Atlantic States voted unanimously to
strike out this provision, for reasons that are not entirely clear. Presumably delegates with proven
antislavery credentials like David Howell desired an immediate prohibition in the territories, well
within the Congress’s authority to enact.17 Nevertheless, proposals to reserve the Northwest
Territory for non-slaveholding New England settlers returned in 1785.
That year, the Confederation Congress once again addressed the problem of providing for
orderly western settlement. The previous year’s Land Ordinance Act created the Northwest
Territory as a national domain, but it remained for Congress to provide more specific instructions
for distributing western land and organizing territorial governance. In March 1785, antislavery
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delegate Rufus King of Massachusetts successfully entered a resolution that proposed to ban
slavery in the Northwest immediately, a proposal supported by all of the New England states,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York.18 Virginia delegate William Grayson noted that King
decided to wait until discussion of an expanded Ordinance bill resumed in April 1785 to further
push for a slavery ban. Grayson believed that seven states “may be found liberal enough” to
support the ban on slavery.19 But Congress did not extensively address the slavery question in the
1785 debates. Most of the debate centered on resolving technical questions of land surveying, the
disposition of government moneys derived from land sales, and provisions to set aside public
lands for schools.20 Congress did extend the “confederal” legal regime of the Articles to the
Northwest Territory, securing slaveholders’ right to recapture fugitives in the territory.21
Consideration of the slavery ban was not taken up again after King’s March resolution. The 1785
Land Ordinance Bill, passed May 20, 1785, provided for detailed surveying and land distribution
procedures, but the question of slavery in the Northwest returned once again in spring 1787.
The events leading to the passage of the Northwest Ordinance on July 13, 1787, are
shrouded in ambiguity. The Confederation Congress debated versions of the bill for more than
two years. They debated a draft bill twice in April and May 1787, and again when Congress
reconvened in New York that July.22 By that time, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
was deep in the midst of debating slavery and congressional representation. Just before Congress
took up the bill for final consideration, Massachusetts delegate Nathan Dane proposed the
inclusion of Article VI, which banned slavery and involuntary servitude north of the Ohio River,
JCC, XVIII: p. 164. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia voted against the immediate
ban on slavery.
19
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while recognizing southern slaveholders’ right to reclaim fugitive slaves in the territory.23 There
was no recorded discussion of Article VI by the whole, and on July 13 the Confederation
Congress’s most important piece of legislation passed by unanimous vote.
Historians have puzzled over why the Ordinance was passed so quickly, and with so
little discussion of the momentous decision to use congressional authority to ban slavery from an
entire section of the national domain. Most importantly, they ask why southern delegates
acquiesced so easily to Article VI. A confluence of motivations influenced these decisions. First,
southerners likely accepted Article VI as quid pro quo for allowing slavery’s legalization in the
territories south of the Ohio River, where slaveholding pioneers were already settling the future
slave states of Kentucky and Tennessee.24 Second, there is tantalizing evidence that Congress
rushed the Northwest Ordinance into passage at the instigation of Manassah Cutler, who
represented the New England-based Ohio Land Company. The Company wanted to purchase
five million acres of north of the Ohio River, and the national treasury desperately needed an
infusion of funds to pay down domestic debt. According to some sources Cutler harbored
antislavery views, and while some scholars doubt their sincerity, it is nonetheless clear that the
company’s potential customers were New Englanders who would not move to the territory if
forced to compete with slaveholders. Regardless, Article VI generated no direct opposition in
Congress.25 While the Ordinance did not immediately and completely abolish slavery in the
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Northwest Territory and the five states carved out of it, as masters sojourning from southern
states retained property rights, Article VI remained in effect and the Northwest developed into an
agrarian free labor economy by the mid-nineteenth century.

**********

Pennsylvania followed an ironic path to slavery abolition.26 On the one hand, as the
Revolution dawned it had the largest and best organized cadre of antislavery activists in the
Anglo-Atlantic world, largely the work of Anthony Benezet and the Quaker “Antislavery
International” which he spearheaded. But with war came problems for Quakers, as their pacifism
made them suspect and open to accusations of Toryism.27 The state ratified a radical new
Constitution in September 1776, the first clause declaring that “all men are born equally free and
independent, and have certain natural, inherent, and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the
enjoying and defending of life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” The new Constitution was the work of a coalition
skeptical of Lynd’s chronology in tracing the machinations behind a compromise that encompassed both
the Confederation Congress (meeting in New York) and the Constitutional Convention (Philadelphia).
26
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of Philadelphia radicals led by Thomas Paine and Scots-Irish Presbyterians headed by George
Bryan. Coupled with the war, the coalition effectively displaced Quakers from power in the state
government, which also reflected a popular backlash against the political and economic power of
wealthy Philadelphia merchant class, which included many Quakers. Amidst these
transformations in state politics, revolutionary abolitionism still found a voice in Assembly
politics and in the court of public opinion.28
In fall 1778, newly-appointed Executive Council President George Bryan asked the
unicameral State Assembly to consider antislavery legislation. Bryan’s message exhorted the
assemblymen to gradually abolish slavery, “so disgraceful to any people, and more especially to
those who have been contending in the great cause of liberty themselves..." Maintaining
consistency with Declaration principles, the message framed gradual abolition as Pennsylvania’s
opportunity to make history by becoming the first government to declare slavery illegal and
“establish the rights of human nature.” The Council offered to produce a draft bill for Assembly
consideration within a week, which spurred the Assembly to debate and craft its own bill. After
some back-and-forth between the Assembly and Executive Council about which body had the
authority to officially propose the bill, by March 1779 an Assembly committee on abolition
reported a bill to the whole. Abolition legislation did not leave the Assembly’s agenda for the
next year.29
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The draft preamble applied the logic of patriot radicalism to the problem of slavery. The
familiar revolutionary abolitionist call to avoid the hypocrisy of claiming political enslavement
while holding slaves “in a state of thralldom” was the central argument. With the shift in British
military strategy to the South, the preamble closed by rejoicing in “our own happy deliverance
from that state of unconditional submission to which we were doomed” as colonies.30 A draft bill
released for public consideration in early March 1779 proposed the emancipation of children
born to enslaved mothers at eighteen and at twenty-one for males. Other provisions included
slave registration procedures, holding masters responsible for freed people who became
“chargeables,” and another that maintained a pre-existing prohibition on white-black
intermarriage. Crucially the draft bill proposed dismantling the legal property relation of slavery
amending slaves’ status to resemble indentured servitude, specifically applying the law of
servitude to Afro-Pennsylvanians, and by extending legal protection to slaves accused of crimes
on the same grounds as free inhabitants (albeit preventing slave testimony against freemen in
court). The draft bill finally proposed that “no man or woman of any nation or color… shall be
deemed, adjudged or holden, as slaves or servants alike,” though it made no direct mention of
preventing Pennsylvania freemen from participating in the foreign slave trade. As would be the
case in Rhode Island and Connecticut several years later, the legislative process of abolition in
Pennsylvania unfolded from internal to external, from gradual abolition within the state by
amending slaves’ legal status, to restraining its’ citizens participation in the slave trade.31
There does not appear to have been much public commentary on the proposed bill in the
spring and summer of 1779, and the Assembly scheduled it for consideration after a newly-
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elected legislature convened that fall. Accordingly, legislators began discussion of the bill in
December 1779. After some debate, the proposed ages of emancipation were lengthened to
twenty-eight for both sexes. Otherwise, its provisions were similar to the March 1779 draft bill.
The assembly printed the new bill for public consideration, and to promote its passage supporters
took to the press. According to a series of public letters attributed to George Bryan, by winter
1779 a member of the Assembly, the debate was of mild tenor.32 “An inconsiderable number of
persons, residing in the western parts” of Pennsylvania, a reference to Westmoreland County,
soon to be annexed from Virginia, opposed the bill. Bryan was irked to find that the “few
opposers” of the bill included fellow Presbyterians, but was otherwise confident that public
opinion overwhelmingly titled in favor of gradual abolition. “The longer this benign proposal has
been contemplated” by the public, he wrote, “and the oftener it is brought up to view, the higher
advances it makes in public approbation.”33
Elsewhere, Bryan justified the bill by countering arguments that emancipated slave
children could not become responsible freed people, retorting that because “the vilifying effects
of slavery … without doubt, destroy industry,” emancipated children raised “with the certainty of
freedom, would be characters of a different cast.” The deleterious effects of slavery were not just
limited to the enslaved, as “slaves ever perjorate the citizens of any country” by dishonoring
labor, inducing laziness in masters and mistresses, and suppressing technological advancement.
Pennsylvanians ought to know, Bryan warned, that “a journey in into the Southern States would
illustrate this beyond any description. A citizen of Pennsylvania or New England, going into that
country, is shocked at the train of mischiefs, moral and political, which are caused by servitude.”
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in states that claimed to be free, as Pennsylvania did in its 1776 Constitution, permitting slavery
was to encourage “bad subjects” and the presence of “internal enemies.” Abolishing slavery
would surely increase Pennsylvania’s economic and political power vis-à-vis slaveholding
neighboring states, because if Pennsylvania were to be “disembarrassed” of slavery, it would
acquire comparative economic strength over Virginia. While Virginian slaveholders worried
over controlling their slave populations and could not diversify economic activity without
difficulty, a free Pennsylvania filled with “hardy, diligent, and enlightened citizens” would
develop industry “which cannot be expected, where slavery prevails.”34
The first months of 1780 were hopeful for antislavery Pennsylvanians, Quaker or
otherwise, as public support for gradual abolition seemed widespread. The Assembly received
five petitions in favor of the bill, and two in opposition from Presbyterian Scots-Irish in
backcountry western counties, to which George Bryan applied his persuasion. In eastern
Pennsylvania, and especially in Philadelphia, popular opinion was decidedly in favor of gradual
abolition.35 In the Assembly, Bryan and a newly-appointed clerk with antislavery principles,
revolutionary radical Thomas Paine, shepherded the bill through the legislative process. The
essay “African Slavery in America,” possibly an early Paine article, was published in March
1775 weeks before the founding of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, of which Paine was a
founding member. The essay assailed slave trading merchants and systematically skewered the
philosophical and practical justifications for slavery, and proposed the outlines of a plan for
gradual abolition. Young able-bodied slaves, it argued, should “with the assistance of
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legislatures, determine what is practicable for masters, and best for them.” 36 Almost exactly five
years later, Paine was in a position to actualize a plan for abolition in Pennsylvania.
The draft bill taken up by the Assembly in late February 1780, and passed shortly
thereafter, was quite similar to the draft made public in November the previous year. The
preamble declared that “we rejoice, that it is in our power, to extend a portion of that freedom to
others, which has been extended to us; and a release from the state of thralldom, to which we
ourselves were tyrannically doomed, and from which we have now every prospect of being
delivered.” The bill broke the property relationship of slavery by abolishing lifetime slavery or
servitude, and freed children born of enslaved mothers after its passage. One critical difference
from the earlier draft pertained to the age of full emancipation for children born after its passage,
twenty-eight for both males and females, a concession to slaveholders opposed to the bill. Freed
children would not be held to service as chattel property, as the bill provided that their status
would convert to “the manner on the conditions whereon servants bound for indenture for four
years.” It further compelled masters of this newly-created class of Afro-Pennsylvanian servants
to register them with county clerks by November 1, 1780, to regulate the process of gradual
abolition.37 On March 1, 1780, the Assembly voted thirty-four to twenty-one in favor of passage.
In its final form, the 1780 act was something close to revolutionary in terms of the
thoroughness with which it dismantled the legal structures of colonial slavery in Pennsylvania. 38
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The act’s provisions systematically contravened decades of Pennsylvania slave codes,
specifically transferring Afro-Pennsylvanians’ legal status to match that of white free persons
and indentured servants. It provided specific protections for Afro-Pennsylvanian families, for
example, its provisions designed to prevent the “unnatural separation and sale of husband and
wife from each other and their children.”39 The act’s architects clearly intended the law a
through-going repudiated of chattel slavery, evidenced through the repeated usage of language
that plainly declared slavery illegal and removed race as a justification for enslavement. Section
10, a clause designed to allow visiting delegates and ministers to temporarily bring enslaved
persons into Pennsylvania, declared “that no man or woman of any nation or colour [except
registered Pennsylvania slaves and servants and those brought by outside officials] shall at any
time hereafter be deemed, adjudged, or holden within the territories of this commonwealth as
slaves or servants for life, but as free men and women.”40 But the complete repudiation of
slavery contained in the first piece of abolition legislation in human history, of course, did not
come to fruition uncontested.
The twenty-one Assemblymen that voted against the bill collectively released a statement
justifying their opposition, and their argument centered on how gradual abolition in Pennsylvania
affected the continental confederation. They believed the Assembly undermined Pennsylvania’s
relations with states to the South, especially Maryland and Virginia, “in adopting a measure, to
which some of them cannot in their present invaded condition (with its attendant calamities)
conform…” In an ironic twist, they argued against abolition precisely because as the British
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military shifted southward, they feared that abolition in Pennsylvania would lead southern slaves
to act upon “the sound of freedom… to a demand of an immediate and intire freedom.” The
opposition also appealed to white racism and fears that racial violence would be stoked by the
potential elevation of Afro-Pennsylvanians to full citizenship. They argued that “we think they
would have been well satisfied, and the Legislature would have sufficiently answered their
humane purposes, had these unhappy people been enabled to enjoy the fruits of their labor, and
been protected in their lives and property” as were white Pennsylvanians, but that
enfranchisement and the possibility of blacks serving in office and intermarrying with whites
were a step too far. In other words, the opposition did not fully condemn gradual abolition in
principle, just the potentiality of black citizenship.41
A Pennsylvanian writing as “Liberal” responded to concerns raised by the Assembly
opposition, reminding them that the gradual abolition bill should have come as no surprise, given
that public discussion of the proposed legislation had been ongoing for over one year. Thus,
southern delegates to the Confederation Congress meeting in Philadelphia had plenty of time to
acquaint themselves with the draft bill and register objections, though the Congress could not
prevent Pennsylvania’s Assembly from passing the law. “Liberal” flatly rejected opposition
concerns that Pennsylvania’s law would undermine slavery in neighboring states, criticizing their
“imagined dangers for the rice, indigo, and tobacco planters.” Furthermore, “Liberal” viewed
opposition to an individual state abolition law as unfounded because of “strange reasoning, that
when the British Generals everywhere proclaim liberty for slaves, any relaxation of their
bondage, on our part, should provoke the negroes against the Americans.” He reminded the
opposition that South Carolinian Henry Laurens, president of Congress and a planter with
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antislavery sympathies, was in the midst of proposing a regiment of South Carolina slaves in
exchange for their freedom. The “gradual freedom” extended to Pennsylvania’s relatively small
enslaved population, therefore, “must be drowned and lost in the magnitude of the worthy
[Laurens’] proposition.” Concerns over miscegenation and potential intermarriage were
overblown, he argued, and fears that blacks were not competent to give evidence in trial
assuaged by noting how Massachusetts blacks had long enjoyed that right “without
inconvenience.” “Liberal” concluded by reminding the opposition that the preamble of the 1776
state constitution compelled them to extend freedom to Afro-Pennsylvanians, to honor
revolutionary freedom principles.42
Historians of abolition in Pennsylvania have characterized the bill as a half-measure,
instead focusing on its silences and limitations. The Act did not provide for a state apparatus to
directly monitor masters’ compliance with the slave registration procedures, nor did it provide
punishments for masters who sought to sell slaves out of the state in order to evade relinquishing
their slaves without remuneration. Initially, moreover, slaves not registered by their owners
under the act’s provisions did not qualify for gradual emancipation. The process of abolition, to
be sure, was agonizingly long for many enslaved Afro-Pennsylvanians, who could only expect to
obtain their “freedom by degrees” and often faced evasive and unscrupulous masters.43
Pennsylvania masters used devious methods of binding enslaved minorities to longer terms of
service than provided for in the 1780 act, which abolitionists criticized as fraudulent, while many
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in the western counties claimed ignorance of the law’s registration provisions. In November
1781, the state assembly initially rejected a motion to give relief to such masters by a vote of
thirty to twenty, though the next month the assembly extended the registration window in
deference to requests by masters in Westmoreland and Washington counties, the former recently
annexed from Virginia.44 While Afro-Pennsylvanians heavily felt the liminal period between
enslavement as chattel property and attainment of total freedom, and the 1780 law was by no
means a perfect piece of legislation, it is misleading to characterize gradual abolition in
Pennsylvania as halting or tentative. While Pennsylvania masters could and did retain rights to
the labor of their slaves, the 1780 act’s chief achievement was to insert state authority to
regulate, and extinguish, the chattel principle.
After the 1780 act’s passage, when proslavery assemblymen immediately fought back
against the act claiming that it unfairly burdened masters in the western counties, abolitionists
worried that the law might not withstand legal or political challenges. After 1782, however,
organized opposition to the act in the assembly died down, though individual masters continued
to petition the legislature for redress from the act’s provisions.45 Pennsylvania courts tended to
uphold the act’s provisions. A male slave named Alexis was brought into the state by a French
subject and sold to a Spaniard after the act’s passage, for example, and eventually declared free
by Pennsylvania courts.46 After 1784, the reformation of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society was
a critical development in upholding the law’s provisions as the PAS acted as an adjunct to the
state government, its members taking on pro bono freedom suits and otherwise using the state’s
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legal apparatus to enforce the law as best they could to prevent illegal enslavement and slave of
slaves out-of-state.47 In 1785 prominent abolitionist Dr. Benjamin Rush, writing to British friend
of America Dr. Richard Price, noted that gradual abolition had salutary effects on the AfroPennsylvanian population. “We perceive already the good effects of the abolition of Negro
slavery,” Rush wrote Price, and “the slaves among us are in general more industrious and orderly
than the lowest class of white people.” He noted that a Quaker school for freed children, largely
the work of recently deceased abolitionist Anthony Benezet, continued to educate the first
generation of freed children as well as adults seeking self-improvement through education.48 But
as Rush and other abolitionists realized, though slave importations had been made illegal in
1780, individual participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades remained legal, and
thus turned their efforts to preventing Pennsylvanians from participating in the slave trades
entirely.
In a letter to John Coakley Lettsom dated May 14, 1787, Benjamin Rush noted that the
PAS and its president Benjamin Franklin turned their attention to persuading the Constitutional
Convention to act against the slave trade. The Convention having just convened, abolitionists
from Pennsylvania and elsewhere viewed its meeting in Philadelphia as an opportunity to
impress anti-slave trade principles upon the men who would craft the federal Constitution.49 In
the Pennsylvania state assembly, abolitionists led by the PAS pressed legislators to pass a law
closing loopholes in the 1780 act, and forbid Pennsylvanians’ participation in the slave trade. In
Philadelphia newspapers, commentators noted the incongruence of disallowing slave
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importations but not entirely cutting off Pennsylvanians from the foreign slave trade. “Though
the law for the gradual abolition of slavery forbids the importation of slaves,” one correspondent
wrote, “yet it does not restrain your inhabitants from prosecuting the slave trade.” The solution
was simple: “It is high time… that the legislature should again interpose their authority, and put
an end to, at least in Pennsylvania, to this horrid business altogether.”50
Pennsylvanian attention to the horrors of the slave trade, while having been energized
from at least 1763 forward, intensified during public outrage over the enslavement of
Pennsylvania sailors working aboard the Dolphin by Barbary pirates.51 As vessels continued to
fit out for Africa, public opinion in and around Philadelphia coalesced against the slave trade and
merchants who profited from it.52 In early 1788, months after Pennsylvania’s convention ratified
the Constitution, Quaker abolitionists began a petition drive to ask the state assembly to outlaw
participation in the slave trade and revise the abolition act. They collected two thousand
signatures, prompting the assembly to assign a committee to report proposed revisions to the
1780 law. The PAS appointed a committee to lobby state legislators for a revised abolition law
that fully severed Pennsylvania and its inhabitants from the foreign slave trade, and printed one
hundred copies of the anti-slave trade petition for distribution among lawmakers.53 Persuaded by
the petition and the intensification of anti-slave trade public opinion, an assembly committee
tasked to consider revisions of the 1780 law released a report in early March 1788 that identified
four particular weaknesses in the law, all related to the sale of slaves out-of-state and continued
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participation in the slave trade by Pennsylvania merchants and sailors. The assembly then
resolved to report and debate a revised bill.54
Work on the revised bill moved rapidly, and by March 25 the assembly discussed a
revised bill twice and released it for public consideration.55 Passed on March 29, 1788, the
revised law included all of the recommendations of the assembly committee. It made the sale of
slaves out of the state without their consent illegal under penalty of fine, immediately freed
slaves imported into Pennsylvania from abroad, and declared that vessels engaged in the slave
trade were liable to forfeiture. Additionally, the 1788 revision provided penalties for
Pennsylvanians convicted of outfitting vessels intended for the slave trade. The revised law
effectively closed the most significant loopholes in the 1780 act, and the PAS’s earliest historian
called it an “efficient supplement.”56 The act did not prevent some unscrupulous merchants and
seamen from illegally engaging in the quite profitable trade in commoditized bodies, nor did it
accelerate the previously mandated process of gradual abolition. Yet, by 1790 Pennsylvania’s
slave population had dwindled to 3,737, less than one percent of the state’s total population.57
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Rhode Island was the first New England state to pass legislation designed to regulate the
chattel principle and proscribe masters’ property rights in slaves during the Revolutionary War,
in preparation for a more thoroughgoing gradual abolition. An October 1779 act passed by the
General Assembly banned masters’ ability to sell slaves out of the state without their consent, a
containment policy that would eventually be adopted elsewhere in the Northeast in the 1780s and
1790s.58 Not coincidentally, the law passed simultaneous to the British army’ voluntary
withdrawal from Newport, effectively ending Rhode Island’s direct involvement in the war.
The 1779 act’s passage was in part due to the continued efforts of abolitionist Moses
Brown to marshal public opinion and political power in favor of antislavery legislation. Rhode
Island abolitionists’ public campaigns against slavery began to revitalize as the war in New
England drew to a close. Political supporters of the 1779 bill clearly intended to lay the
groundwork for gradual abolition, and the General Assembly justified the law by arguing that
allowing the sale of Rhode Island slaves out-of-state “is against the Rights of human Nature, and
tends to greatly aggravate the Condition of Slavery, which this General Assembly is disposed
rather to alleviate, till some favorable Occasion may offer for its total abolition.” Masters found
to have carried off slaves by land or water would forfeit their property and labor rights in those
persons, who were to receive “Certificate[s] of his or her total Emancipation” approved by two
local Justices of Peace. The act empowered Justices of the Peace to recover payment for the
value of each slave illegally, but successfully, sold out-of-state, one moiety payable to the state
treasury and one to the informer. The 1779 act had clear limitations: it did not provide for fullscale gradual abolition, and none of its provisions directly affected Rhode Island merchants’
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future participation in the transatlantic slave trade. As with amelioration and abolition legislation
in Pennsylvania, the act provided little in the way of direct enforcement mechanisms, and did not
authorize a dedicated state agency empowered to prosecute violations. Emphasizing the act’s
limitations as an instrument for immediate and total abolition, however, can obscure its
significance as the first piece of antislavery reform legislation passed in the United States after
the Declaration of Independence.59
Moses Brown and the antislavery network he cultivated felt optimistic about the
prospects of gradual abolition laws in Rhode Island and throughout the Northeast. Privately,
Brown pressured merchant firms which he learned considered investing in the slaving voyages.
In August 1783, as he ramped up a public campaign in preparation for introducing abolition
legislation to the General Assembly, Brown wrote to William Clark and Joseph Nightengale, a
prominent Providence mercantile partnership reputed to have designs to finance a slaving voyage
to Africa. Brown recounted how his family firm’s 1764 Sally voyage to Africa pricked his
conscience, eventually leading him to convert to Quakerism and embrace abolitionism. He sadly
recalled that he did not speak out against slave trading at that time, because he was not yet
familiar with the antislavery publications of Anthony Benezet and others. “I have many times
since thought,” he wrote, “that if I had known the sentiments of others, or had their concurring
Testimonies to those Scruples, I then had, I should have been preserved from an Evil …” He
urged Clarke and Nightengale that “for your preservation from so great an evil as I have found
that Trade to be… with a view to dissuade and discourage your pursuing the Voyage, that you
may avoid the unhappy reflections I have had…”60 Brown drew on his two decades of business
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experience in an attempt to discourage them from trafficking in human beings, but did not
succeed in convincing Clark and Nightengale, as the partnership later dabbled in the African
slave trade in 1790.61 Brown’s application of direct and personal intervention in this instance was
but one strategy abolitionists used to pursue their agenda.62
Rhode Island abolitionists’ preferred organ for disseminating their antislavery views was
John Carter’s Providence Gazette, joined in 1784 by Bennett Wheeler’s United States Chronicle.
Through these Brown and others published a stream of antislavery commentary in the early
1780s, including nearly every issue of the Gazette in 1783.63 In the fall and winter of 1783-4
both newspapers printed ringing denunciations of slavery and the slave trade, and also
disseminated draft versions of a gradual abolition law Brown personally drafted for public
consideration. The Providence Gazette printed an early version of an abolition law in September
1783, chiefly concerned with ending Rhode Islanders’ participation in the slave trade. The early
draft’s provisions provided for stiff penalties, requiring £1000 bonds posted to the state for any
vessel bound to Africa. Any master attempting to evade this provision by clearing out for another
destination before traveling to Africa would also be subject to a £1000 fine. In a radical flourish,
the draft also proposed to temporarily ban any Rhode Islander convicted of violating the
proposed law from “enjoying[ing] the rights of a free subject, which he has been depriving his
fellow men of, in violation of the laws of the State and humanity” until payment of the £1000
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fine.64 The State Assembly dropped the disenfranchisement provision from the final draft bill,
perhaps in response to negative public opinion, but it signaled the aggressive tenor of Brown’s
vision for the process of abolition.
Brown worked political back channels that he mastered during service in the colonial
assembly in the 1760s and early 1770s, By late 1783 he and his antislavery network seemed
tantalizingly close in their efforts to turn public opinion and the Assembly in favor of a gradual
abolition statute. Written by Brown but signed by the New England Meeting for Sufferings, a
December 1783 petition asked the General Assembly to consider abolition legislation. Citing the
“unalienable rights of man,” the petition acknowledged that “we are sensible [that] the Slavery of
the Negros is not an evil which has taken its life in the present day,” but argued that the “late
publick calamities & afflictions have served to open the Eyes of the People” against slavery. The
war ignited popular abolitionism, they argued, and popular opinion demanded that the foul stain
of chattel slavery be dissolved. The petition accordingly asked for laws “most conducive to the
Entire Abolition of Slavery,” emphasizing the principle of “Personal Liberty,” which
undergirded colonial protest during the imperial crisis and equally motivated the growing public
conviction that slavery.65
Under public pressure from abolitionists and amidst growing popular antislavery
sentiment, the General Assembly debated Brown’s abolition bill in late February 1784. Brown
worked the bill into the Assembly through the Providence Town Meeting, which he and other
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leading abolitionists had lobbied for several months.66 In drafting the act, he drew inspiration not
just from the earlier 1774, 1775, and 1779 laws. He seems to have borrowed the general
framework of the draft bill from a May 1652 act passed by Rhode Island General Court,
apparently at the instigation of Rhode Island founder Roger Williams.67 The 1652 law
emancipated enslaved minors at age twenty-four and limited terms of bound service to ten years,
for the protection of “black mankinde” and “white beings.” The act proscribed the sale of slaves
and servants outside the colony under penalty of £40, anticipating Rhode Island’s 1779 law by
over a century. Though long-forgotten, and virtually ignored by modern scholarship, the 1652
act’s provisions anticipated the northeastern gradual abolition and anti-slave trade laws of the
1780s.68
Brown’s draft bill, debated by the Assembly’s lower house on February 25 and 26,
proposed an aggressive program of emancipation, providing that all children born to slave
mothers after March 1, 1784 would be free and that “Servitude for Life or Slavery of Children in
Consequence of the Slavery of their Mothers, shall be and hereby is Utterly taken away,
Extinguished and forever Abolished.” 69 The draft act further liberalized private manumissions,
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granted freed persons the rights and liberties of “those born to free parents,” and provided that
masters support the children born free of enslaved mothers until age twenty-four for males and
twenty-one for females. It further prevented masters from manumitting slaves over the age of
forty-five, judged incapable of supporting themselves by Town Councils. Brown urged access to
education for freed persons, and to accomplish this goal he provided that it “be Lawfull for the
Respective Town Councils, and they are hereby required, upon application of those who may
hold the mothers of such may be freed by this Act” to bind out children and adolescents for a
period not to exceed four years after their term of service to compensate masters for education
and instruction. Finally, Brown’s bill proposed to enact strict regulations on merchants
participating in the slave trade, citing the October 1774 Association agreement’s ban on slave
trading and importations, retaining the prohibitive mast bond of £1000 on all ships clearing
Rhode Island for Africa as a deterrent to the slave trade.
After submitting the draft bill to the Assembly, Brown and others published declarations
of support for the proposed legislation. Signed “A Friend to every honorable Branch of
Commerce,” one opinion piece hoped Assemblymen “will find but very few, if any, of their
Constituents disapprove of a Work so well begun.” The writer, likely Brown, pointed to the
success of abolitionism in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, and what seemed to be providential
signs of progress in New Jersey and Delaware, as proof that Rhode Island’s proposed move
towards abolition reflected the broader emancipatory spirit of the Revolutionary Era. He also
reminded readers of Rhode Island’s overturned 1774 and 1775 slave importation bans, that “this
State, while under British government, was the first which ventured to pass and Act discouraging
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the Importation of Slaves: It is to be wished she may still keep the lead, rather than fall behind
any of her Sister States.” 70 With public opinion duly massaged in favor of abolition, the
Assembly commenced the consideration of the bill.
As Brown predicted, it was met with stiff opposition from Newport Assemblymen, who
represented Rhode Island’s premier slave trading port and objected to the harsh provisions
against participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades. But the most strident
opponent of the bill was Moses’ elder brother John, a noted Providence merchant, businessman,
and unabashed profiteer, later the slave trade’s staunchest defender in the United States Senate in
the 1790s.71 Moses attended the Assembly sessions of February 25 and 26, where he recorded
brief notes on the debate.72 John Brown, ignoring instructions from the Providence Town
Council to support the draft bill, first objected to its slave trade provisions based on “just-war”
doctrine, because African “Slaves in their own Country were to be Destroyed if not Sold it was a
piece of humanity to bring them away and make Slaves of them.” This was a well-worn
argument typically deployed to downplay the violent process of enslavement, and justify the
slave trade. John called as witness a slave ship captain named Benson to support this claim, and
continued his assault on the bill by proclaiming his brother’s invocation of the 1774 Continental
Congress slave trade ban inappropriate because it was promulgated before the Declaration of
Independence. Thus, according to John, the state Assembly should apply to the Confederation
Congress for guidance on the matter, confident it would provide no resolution. John speciously
claimed that allowing Rhode Island participation in the slave trade “would pay the Interest of
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whole debt of the Country,” because the slave trade generated rum sales and therefore impost
taxes.73 Moses’s biographer concludes that his brother’s opposition to his handiwork was “much
to [his] embarrassment and chagrin, but not to his surprise,” and John’s opposition proved
effective as the Assembly rejected the draft bill by a two-to-one vote.74
For Moses Brown the final version of the bill, passed February 27, 1784, proved
somewhat of a disappointment.75 Fortunately it retained much of the original preamble’s
emancipatory language, which grounded the law in the declaration principles. The bill
emancipated children born of slave mothers after March 1, 1784, in fact lowering the ages of
emancipation to twenty-one for males and eighteen for females. It also included Moses’s
language expressing his conviction that freed persons needed access to education, but it provided
no specific legislative framework providing for state support of educational initiatives. Most
significantly, two provisions diverged from the vision Moses Brown laid out in the draft bill.
First, the burden of support and maintenance of freed persons shifted to town councils, whereas
Brown intended that former masters should support freed persons if necessary. This shift was
crucial, as fears that freed persons would become public charges underlay opposition to gradual
abolition at the local level. Second, due to John Brown and Assembly opposition, the final bill
entirely omitted regulation of the transatlantic slave trade.76 Focusing on the bill’s limitations,
which are understandable given the intense opposition to its slave trade measures, again obscures
the achievement of gradual abolition. While the bill had loopholes, as did Pennsylvania’s 1780
act, it began the process of dismantling the chattel principle in Rhode Island.
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In April 1784, two months after the Assembly approved the pared-down law, Newport
Congregational minister Samuel Hopkins wrote to Moses Brown to express gloomy sentiments
about the future prospects for gradual abolition. The pessimistic Hopkins worried that Newport’s
merchant class would continue their participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades
to supply the slave societies of the southern mainland and Caribbean. Hopkins’s public
endorsement of abolitionism dating back to the mid-1770s still rankled Newport’s merchants a
decade later, leading him to conclude that “this town, I greatly fear, will be the last in the State to
do what they ought to do, and be foremost in it, respecting that most abominable traffic, and the
consequent slavery that is among us.” Even worse, he feared the new gradual abolition law
would be repealed or heavily amended at that fall’s General Assembly. Hopkins worried about
the political impact of a new slate of Newport assemblymen, because “though some of them are,
in many respects, worthy men, I believe not one of them will vote for any law to discourage the
slave trade, or the slavery of the Africans.” Hopkins’s pessimism was not necessarily unfounded.
From after the revival of the transatlantic slave trade in the mid-1780s until national abolition in
1808, Rhode Island merchants purchased and sold more enslaved persons than any other New
England state. Hopkins’ worst fears about the prospects of gradual abolition in Rhode Island,
however, would ultimately prove misplaced.77
The one provision of the 1784 act that aroused some indignation in the Ocean State
outside the merchant class was that which made town councils responsible for supporting
indigent freed persons. Opposition to the clause was significant enough that in October 1785 the
state assembly considered an amendment to the abolition law. Passed that same month, the
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amendment declared that “subjecting towns to the support and education of such children is
extremely burthensome, and is incompatible with the principles upon which” the 1784 act was
based. The amendment was an altruistic measure intended to unequivocally support freed
persons, for while it removed the burden of support from the towns, it did not compel former
masters to support freed adults. In effect, the amendment placed the burden of support on freed
persons themselves after they reached twenty-eight years of age, or on the parents of freed
juveniles. While the revision placed the burden for support for children born to enslaved mothers
on their masters, upon the manumission of enslaved mothers the former masters were discharged
from providing future support. For abolitionists like Moses Brown, this alteration to the 1784 act
felt bittersweet. But after 1784, their attention focused on a more pressing issue, to prevent
Rhode Island merchants and sailors from participating in the slave trade.78
Rhode Islanders’ reputation as North America’s premier slave traders is well known, and
historians have made significant efforts to chart Ocean State participation in the Atlantic slave
trades.79 As American transatlantic commerce resumed after the Treaty of Paris took effect in
May 1783, North American merchants resumed participation in the African slave trade. Of sixtyeight documented slaving voyages to Africa under the American flag between 1783 and 1788, at
least forty were carried out by ships registered in or departing from Rhode Island, the majority in
Newport but also a handful from Providence. Collectively these voyages disembarked 3,683
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enslaved Africans, primarily to markets in the Caribbean and South Carolina.80 The resumption
of the slave trade sparked Moses Brown and other abolitionists to spearhead public campaigns to
press the state assembly action against Rhode Island participation in the slave trades. Brown and
Samuel Hopkins corresponded frequently on the subject, attempting to build a crossdenominational coalition, and on several occasions Hopkins sent Brown copies of anonymous
anti-slave trade articles he wished Brown to submit for publication in Providence newspapers,
notably the Gazette and United States Chronicle. Hopkins, residing in the slave trading center of
Newport, worried that his identity would be revealed if he published in Newport newspapers.81
Meanwhile, Hopkins corresponded with abolitionists across Connecticut, trading pamphlets with
Congregational minister Levi Hart of Connecticut, desiring Hart to distribute them in the hopes
of spreading “a conviction of the evil of the slave trade and slavery.” Brown himself hatched a
plan to sponsor an essay contest based on the following query: “Would it not be worthwhile to
attempt to get the Convention of clergy in Boston, the General Association in Connecticut, and
the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, to remonstrate against the [slave trade] to Congress, or
[in] some other way bear their testimony against it?”82
Ever the pessimist, Samuel Hopkins remained unconvinced that the Rhode Island
assembly would act against the slave trade. In May 1787 he wrote Brown that “I do not think it is
likely that the Assembly will take the matter up, so as to the slave trade, at the next session.” He
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further pleaded with Brown to submit anti-slave trade essays for publication, as the slave trade
lobby in Newport, “that wicked set of men,” shuttered the city’s presses to his writings.83 Brown
and the Rhode Island Quaker Yearly Meeting pressed on with plans to present a petition to the
assembly asking lawmakers to pass legislation banning the slave trade in the fall 1787 session,
undoubtedly expecting intense opposition to the proposed legislation based on assembly hostility
to the failed slave trade provisions in the 1784 gradual abolition law. Remarkably there seems to
have been very little opposition. Perhaps Newport and Providence merchants bowed in the face
of public disapprobation of the African slave trade, or maybe they expected that a proposed law
would have sharp teeth but little bite. Either way, the assembly took up the proposed legislation
in early November 1787.84
An act to prevent the slave trade passed on November 3, 1787, in a near-unanimous vote,
with only four members of the House of Representatives and none in the upper house in dissent.
The act prevented Rhode Island citizens and residents, either as “Master, Factor, or Owner” from
importing or transporting slaves from Africa. The act provided for £100 fines for each slave so
transported, and £1000 for each ship engaged in the trade. The act contained one obvious
loophole: it applied only to slaves purchased in Africa, but not to slaves purchased and sold in
the American intercontinental trades. In the following years prominent slave traders like John
Brown and the D’Wolf and Vernon families devised strategies for illegally participating in the
African slave trades.85 Still, Brown and other abolitionists could look back at the years since
1779 and feel that their project largely succeeded. Shortly after the act’s passage, Brown said as
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much to Levi Hart. “Is it not extraordinary, that this State,” Brown wrote, “which has exceeded
the rest of the States in carrying on this Trade, should be the first Legislature on this globe which
has prohibited that Trade?”86

**********

Vermont seized the honor of being the first state to abolish slavery in the Anglo-Atlantic
world in its July 1777 state constitution. Vermont’s constitutional abolition was unique among
the uneven processes of northeastern abolition after 1776. Previously an eastern district of New
York, Vermont’s abolition reflected the insignificance of chattel slavery in the thinly populated
state where free household agriculture dominated the state’s political economy. Scholarly
assessment of Vermont’s abolition agrees that constitutional abolition was a direct and explicit
method ridding the state of the chattel principle.87 There seems to have been no legislative debate
or public opposition to abolition, a policy elaborated in a clause entitled “A Declaration of the
Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Vermont,” which affirmed that “all men are born equally
free and independent…” The clause declared that no person “born in this country, or brought in
from over sea, ought to be holden by law, to serve any person, as a servant, slave or apprentice,”
freeing males at twenty-one and females at eighteen.88 Elsewhere, the Granite State’s
Constitution extended the franchise to all free men regardless of race.89 Vermont’s constitutional
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abolition was the most straightforward and unambiguous in the Northeast, and by the first
Federal Census in 1790 its slave population had dwindled to sixteen.90
In New Hampshire, Vermont’s neighbor to the west, slavery abolition occurred as a
product of murkier circumstances. As the war progressed, the enslaved in New Hampshire
petitioned the state legislature to ameliorate their condition, as did their compatriots in
Massachusetts. A November 1779 petition signed by nineteen enslaved men, for the sake of
“justice, humanity and the rights of mankind,” asked the legislature to amend their status
“whereby we may regain our liberty and be ranked in the class of free agents…” The legislature
rejected their petition in June 1780, with a brief comment that the “House is not ripe for a
determination in the matter.”91 Abolition in New Hampshire was eventually secured not through
legislation, but through freedom principles embedded in the state’s constitution, as in Vermont.
New Hampshire selected delegates to create a new constitution in 1783, and the new document’s
Bill of Rights declared that “all men are born equally free and independent,” and extended
“natural, essential, and inherent rights” of property ownership to all inhabitants in the state,
implying that this rights extended self-ownership to slaves.92 Slavery was not explicitly
abolished in the New Hampshire constitution, but by 1790 the institution had withered away as
the first national census recorded just one-hundred and fifty-eight slaves in the state.93 It was not
until 1857 that New Hampshire’s legislature finally passed abolition legislation, though slavery
had died out decades before.
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Abolitionism in Massachusetts was a potent force before 1776.94 African-Americans in
the Bay Colony took advantage of the tumult of the imperial crisis to press freedom suits in local
and state courts beginning in the early 1760s, and Massachusetts jurists expressed sympathy for
the plight of enslaved people, particularly against the physical dominion that masters could
exercise over slaves. In 1766 the Massachusetts State Supreme Court decided Slew v. Whipple in
favor of mixed-race woman Jenny Whipple, granting her freedom and damages. Other freedom
suits in the late 1760s and early 1770s combined to cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of
holding chattel property in slaves in Massachusetts. Massachusetts courts recognized the
enslaved as legal persons, a recognition that slaves in the Chesapeake and Lower South colonies
never enjoyed. These cases collectively undermined the legal basis for slavery, spearheaded by
persistent free and enslaved black activism.95 Freedom petitions and suits increasingly filled
Massachusetts courts and legislatures by 1776, sending slavery in the Bay State on the path to
final extinction. While some jurists remained willing to uphold limited property rights in the
enslaved, and the particular circumstances of individual cases did not always lead to unequivocal
declarations of freedom, the future of slavery seemed tenuous at best. Black activism was
undergirded by a new state constitution which offered an emphatic statement of freedom
principles, the product of growing popular disapproval of the chattel principle in Massachusetts.
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The first attempt to create a Massachusetts state constitution began in summer 1778.
Created by a convention drawn from the ranks of state legislators, it made no direct mention of
slavery, and Massachusetts towns rejected the proposed constitution on a variety of grounds.
Some opposed to the draft because it was crafted by a convention drawn from sitting members of
the legislature produced it, and not a convention of delegates elected specifically for the purpose.
Moreover, the draft constitution was not initially offered for public debate.96 It is equally clear,
however, that town councils also disapproved of the 1778 draft because its failed to apply the
freedom principle to abolish slavery, contained no provision abolishing the slave trade to
Massachusetts, and because it explicitly excluded “negroes, Indians, and mulattoes” from
citizenship rights 97 According to opponents of the latter clause, withholding citizenship rights to
these groups perverted the very reasoning behind the movement for independence. “By holding
up this clause in our constitution,” spoke John Bacon in the convention, “we sap the foundation
of that liberty which we are now defending at the expense of all that blood and treasure which we
so liberally part with in the prosecution of the present war with Great Britain.” To counter
supporters of disenfranchisement who claimed that lower taxes on non-whites compensated for
excluding them from citizenship, Bacon, exasperated, argued that “if this is not to establish
slavery by a constitution, the foundations of which, it is pretended, are laid in the most extensive
principles of liberty, I confess, Sir, I am utterly ignorant of what the terms liberty and slavery
mean.”98
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Largely the work of John Adams, a man not known for strident antislavery beliefs or
actions, the 1780 Massachusetts State Constitution laid the philosophical basis for slavery
abolition. Over the course of his career as a lawyer, Adams participated in several freedom suits,
at times representing masters seeking to recover the property in the labor of servants. Adams
knew well the public turn against slavery in the Bay State which intensified after 1763. He
drafted the constitution quickly, as citizens from western Massachusetts clamored for a duly
constituted state government that reflected revolutionary principles. Most importantly, the
constitution needed to address widespread opposition to disenfranchisement and the de facto
recognition of slavery’s legality implicit in the failed 1778 draft. The first article cleared up these
issues, echoing Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution in declaring that “all men are born equally free
and independent, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights…” In adopting
sweeping revolutionary language, the constitution brought Massachusetts in line with the
freedom principles that suffused the antislavery arguments of the imperial crisis. It also reflected
a long-standing aversion to slavery in Massachusetts evident in rural towns, whose freeholders
had asked Massachusetts legislatures to abolish the institution and proscribe slave importations
into the Bay State repeatedly in the previous decades.
While early nineteenth century Massachusetts jurists interpreted the 1780 constitution to
have “virtually abolished” slavery, later generations questioned the immediate impact of Article
I’s language on the enslaved.99 As early as 1866, historians of slavery in Massachusetts doubted
whether the 1780 constitution in fact abolished slavery, or was merely a statement of principles
that did not effectively free all slaves from bondage immediately. More recent historians argue
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that the 1780 constitution, while it included rhetorical denunciations of slavery typical of the
revolutionary moment, was not a product of widespread public antipathy to slavery in
Massachusetts, nor did it immediately end slavery.100 While the Massachusetts constitution did
not directly and explicitly abolish slavery, it oriented the new state government towards
antislavery legal principles, which within a short three years led to judicial abolition in
Massachusetts.
A series of decisions culminating in 1783 known as the Quok Walker are viewed as the
impetus behind judicial abolition. Even before the final decisions in the Walker cases, however,
state courts interpreted the state constitution to have banned slavery in Massachusetts.
Massachusetts courts approved the freedom suit of Elizabeth Freeman in 1781 on the basis of
Article I, before Jennison v. Caldwell emancipated Quok Walker, who claimed was falsely held
to service as a slave to Nathaniel Jennison. The 1783 decision directly repudiated the chattel
principle in Massachusetts, cementing a developing body of legal precedents that extended the
right of self-ownership to the blacks in Massachusetts. Judge Levi Lincoln flatly declared that
the 1780 constitution could not be construed to legitimize either chattel property claims of master
like Jennison, or to deny Massachusetts blacks the protections of state law. Lincoln argued that
“when one subject is restrained of his liberty, it is an attack on every subject…”101 Slavery in
Massachusetts was effectively made illegal through the combination of legal precedent and the
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freedom principles of Article I. What remained legal, however, was Massachusetts citizens’
ability to participate in the slave trade. By 1788, the final nail in the coffin of the slavery
complex in Massachusetts would be definitively hammered home.
As elsewhere in New England and in Pennsylvania, proscription of the slave trade in
Massachusetts occurred after state slavery abolition. The impetus behind the drive to abolish the
slave trade was the 1787 kidnapping of three free blacks, who were then sold into slavery in
Martinique. Several years before, in 1785, the state legislature began to consider legislative
methods to restrain Massachusetts citizens’ participation in the slave trade. Consideration of
slave trade legislation moved slowly in 1786 and 1787, but the kidnapping episode spurred state
lawmakers to act more quickly, and Governor John Hancock personally intervened to support a
slave trade ban.102 The episode aroused widespread public indignation, with one commenter
railing against the kidnapping as a “wicked and abominable insult upon this government,” and
urging “every person of the least humanity, [to] execrate the authors of this villainy…”103
The Rev. Dr. Jeremy Belknap took the lead in whipping up a petition campaign to goad
the legislature into action, as did black activist Prince Hall, who simultaneously attempted to
convince the legislature to grant him trading privileges along the African coast with the intention
of resettling some Massachusetts blacks across the Atlantic.104 In early spring 1788, these efforts
paid off, as the Massachusetts legislature began to debate and draft a slave trade bill. Passed on
March 25, 1788, the act banned Massachusetts citizens and residents from participating in the
African slave trade. To prevent the kidnapping of free blacks, the law further provided an
explicit legal framework whereby the friends and family of kidnapped persons could bring action
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to recover their kin and press for damages.105 The law was not perfect, and in the following
decades some unscrupulous merchants and ship captains illegally participated in the foreign
slave trade, especially to the Lower South and Caribbean. But by the time Massachusetts’
ratification convention approved the Federal Constitution in 1788, both chattel slavery and the
slave trade had been firmly abolished in the Bay State.
In Connecticut, slavery abolition took a circuitous path. Unlike in Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and Pennsylvania, for all their peculiarities, there is little surviving evidence of the
political processes behind abolition in Connecticut. Along with Rhode Island, Connecticut first
outlawed slave importations in 1774, at the same time the state laid the groundwork for gradual
abolition. Enacted in the heated atmosphere of the imperial crisis, the slave trade law went
unnoticed during the war. Unique among the thirteen original states, Connecticut’s state
government was not reconstituted in the years after 1776, and the state retained the colonial
structure of government: governor, council, and elected assembly. In effect, Connecticut’s 1662
colonial charter became the state’s constitution with no alterations other than a declaration of
Connecticut’s sovereignty.106 Political abolitionists in Connecticut, then, could not appeal to
revolutionary freedom principles embedded in a new state constitution, as in Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania. While Connecticut could lay claim to leadership among the northeastern states in
taking action against slavery and the slave trade, the legislative history of abolition in
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Connecticut after 1776 was more distinctly political, largely a story of maneuvering in the state
assembly.107
The Connecticut legislature entertained the prospect of gradual abolition in 1776 and
1777, in both years failing to enact legislation, though the assembly did pass a bill in October
1777 that eased the liability requirements masters faced when desiring to manumit individual
slaves.108 Gradual abolition came before the assembly yet again in late November and December
1779, when a draft bill entered the legislature’s agenda. While no copy of the proposed bill is
extant, it appears to have proposed the emancipation of children born to enslaved mothers at
twenty-eight, and according to scattered newspaper items, there was significant assembly support
for the proposed bill. Only six assemblymen expressed outright opposition to gradual abolition,
while two members opposed it because “they thought the age of twenty-eight years, for the entire
freedom of the young blacks, hereafter born, was unreasonably long.”109 For reasons that are not
entirely clear the bill did not pass, and another attempt the next year made it through the state
legislative council, only to be aside by the state House of Representatives for later consideration
and not taken up again.110
Obstacles to the advancement of gradual abolition legislation in the state assembly
prompted Connecticut abolitionists to consider alternative ways of securing an abolition law.
Spearheaded by Roger Sherman and Richard Law, antislavery assemblymen discovered an
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opportunity to do so in early 1784 when the legislature undertook to revise and update state laws,
and chose Sherman and Law to supervise the project.111 Among the revised laws was “An Act
Concerning Indian, Molatto, and Negro Servants and Slaves.” Upon first glance, its provisions
seem a rather straightforward series of regulations on bound laborers’ behavior and physical
mobility—in other words, a slave code. Similar to the local law of servitude throughout the
colonial and revolutionary eras, it punished infractions harshly, and was clearly designed to
apply only to non-whites. Perhaps because of its racialized provisions, the law did not clearly
differentiate between the legal statuses of non-white servants and slaves, providing the same
punishments for each. Buried within the revised law, however, were two provisions long desired
by antislavery assemblymen, and many ordinary Connecticut citizens.112
The first was a brief provision prohibiting the importation of slaves into Connecticut,
which simply declared that “no Indian, Negro, or Mulatto slave, shall at any Time hereafter, be
brought or imported into this State, by Sea or Land, from any Place or Places whatsoever, to be
disposed of, left or sold in this State.” Unlike other northeastern state abolition laws,
Connecticut’s law provided for fines of $334 per each slave illegally imported, sold, or
purchased.113 Second was the law’s final provision, far more significant in scope. “Whereas
sound policy requires that the Abolition of Slavery should be effected,” the provision began,
after March 1, 1784 children born to enslaved mothers would be freed at twenty-five. The
clause’s brevity and its situation as the final provision of an otherwise non-emancipatory law has
led to speculation that it was a backdoor method of achieving abolition, shrewdly calculated by
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Sherman and Law.114 Unlike gradual abolition laws in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, the
Connecticut law did not include detailed provisions. Scholars have noted that it did not provide
for an explicit state enforcement mechanism. According to this interpretation, the law did not
immediately emancipate all Connecticut slaves, and further, Law and Sherman intended the law
to prevent the growth of a free black population in the Nutmeg State.115 Given New England’s
economic development through the Revolution, however, it is equally clear that legislators
intended the law to rid Connecticut of the chattel principle and promote the growth of
agricultural and urban wage labor markets stocked with unbound laborers. In any case, slavery
steadily declined in Connecticut. By 1790 only 2,764 of 237,946 total inhabitants retained the
status of slave, and that number dwindled over the next decade. Gradual abolition may well have
taken a circuitous route towards implementation in Connecticut, but by the turn of the century
slavery in Connecticut had effectively been abolished.
While the 1784 abolition law was intended to prevent the importation of slaves to
Connecticut, by 1787 abolitionists believed additional legislation necessary to flesh out the law’s
provisions in further detail. While Connecticut merchants never were large-scale participants in
the slave trades, abolitionists led by Levi Hart joined in the wave of slave trade abolitionism that
reverberated throughout the Anglo-Atlantic world in 1787 and 1788.116 With encouragement
from Quaker Meetings in New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, the state’s House of
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Representatives passed an additional act in October 1788.117 The new law actually lowered the
fines per slave illegally imported from $334 to $167, but added an additional $1667 fine per ship
involved in the slave trade. It declared insurance policies taken out on ships proven to have
ferried slaves to the Americas void, and fined masters $334 for each slave sold out of
Connecticut, but did allow masters who intended to move out of the state to legally take their
slaves with them. The law’s final clause provided for slave registration procedures to ensure that
gradual abolition proceeded as the 1784 act intended, ordering masters to register slaves freed at
age twenty-five within six months, at a penalty of $7 per slave for each month after the grace
period. A brief piece of legislation that clarified legal procedures to recover slave registration
fines passed in 1789. By the dawn of the Early Republic Connecticut’s path to the total abolition
of slavery was clearly marked, and the Connecticut merchants banned from participating in the
Atlantic and intercontinental slave trades.118

**********
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The fifty-five men who gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 at the
Constitutional Convention encountered thorny questions about slavery as they debated a new
governing charter to replace the Articles of Confederation. The heated debate concerning slavery
at the Convention is well-known to historians, and thus require but brief mention here.119
Debates over slavery, congressional representation, and the future of the slave trade were the
most divisive. Lower South delegates like Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina
bridled at suggestions from New England and mid-Atlantic delegates that the new national
government ought to regulate and proscribe the slave trade, seeing it as an attack on the
municipal law of slavery in the states. In response, antislavery delegates like Pennsylvania’s
James Wilson countered that sanctioning the slave trade would stain the moral fabric of the new
Republic, and ran counter to the revolutionary freedom principles enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence. Debates over whether to count slaves for the purpose of determining
representation—debates not had during the creation of the Articles—were also highly
contentious. Lower South slaveholders, in particular, desired that slaves count the same as free
persons. Many New Englanders and Pennsylvanians fought back against these suggestions, as
their states had already begun the process of gradual abolition.

The literature on slavery debates and the resultant clauses concerning slavery in the Constitution is
vast. One vein of scholarship, adopting views first expounded by abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison,
argues for an instrumentally proslavery constitutional paradigm. See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the
Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Finkelman, An Imperfect
Union; Finkelman, “Slavery and the Founders: Little Ventured, Little Gained”; Van Cleve, A Slaveholder’s
Union. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic is a more measured example of this interpretation. Less
common are interpretations that emphasize the antislavery implications of the Constitution, an
interpretation that has roots in the antebellum radical abolitionist thought of Lysander Spooner and
others. See William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism, 1760-1848 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1977). David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution does not explicitly endorse either
view, but emphasizes the deep ambiguity of slavery and race in the making of the Constitution.
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While the Convention scrapped the Articles of Confederation entirely, it retained the
“confederal” regime of municipal state slave law. The Convention’s Journals record no
suggestion that the reconstituted national government could interfere with slavery where it was
already legal. At the same time no one suggested that the national government could force the
New England states and Pennsylvania to overturn slavery abolition, thereby creating a “federal
consensus.”120 This consensus was not created by the Constitutional Convention, but an
inheritance from the “extreme federalism” of the Articles. The passage of the Northwest
Ordinance by the Confederation Congress, simultaneous to the Convention’s meeting, created
one precedent about national authority over slavery in the territories, but it was clear that slavery
would remain legal in territories south of the Ohio River. Debates over slavery and expansion, so
divisive in the antebellum decades, caused little tension at the Constitutional Convention. The
municipal law of slavery, and of abolition, was not disturbed by the Constitution.
The Constitution’s slavery clauses famously did not mention the word, in deference to
northeastern delegates who did not wish to see the new governing charter sullied by its inclusion.
The three-fifths clause granted slaveholders congressional representation disproportionate to
their numbers, a political advantage that had the most impact between 1790 and 1820.121 The
fugitive slave clause, guaranteeing slaveowners’ right to recapture fugitives throughout the states
and territories, was a holdover from the “confederal” understandings of slavery under the
Articles of Confederation.

Wiececk, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism coined this phrase.
See Leonard Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000) for a detailed explanation of how southern slaveholding
politicians came to dominate the federal government at every level, with the assistance of the three-fifths
clause.
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The Convention did break new ground in the Article I, Section 9, the slave trade clause,
which denied Congress the ability to abolish slave importations for twenty years. There was a
range of opinion across New England and the mid-Atlantic about the twenty-year moratorium.
At state ratification conventions in 1788, delegates debated whether the slave trade clause
contained antislavery implications, or was a concession to Lower South slaveholders that
signaled acquiescence to continued American participation in the slave trades. Thus in the
Massachusetts convention, one delegate opposed the slave trade clause because of “the idea, that
the slave trade was allowed to be continued for twenty years,” which obliged him “to bear
witness against any thing that should favor making merchandize of the bodies of men.” In
response, a fellow delegate suggested that the clause was a “step taken… towards the abolition of
slavery” because Congress could “totally annihilate” the slave trade as soon as 1808.122 One
Pennsylvania commentator remarked that because the Constitution invested the national
government with authority to regulate commerce, it was “disgraceful to the last degree, that we
should except [the slave trade] from the exercise of power” for twenty years. He opposed the
Constitution on this ground, and believed the slave trade should be “expressly abolished” and
that the general government authority to “make such regulations as should be thought the most
advantageous for the gradual abolition of slavery, and the emancipation of slaves which are
already in the states.”123 This was wishful thinking because southern slaveholders bitterly
opposed abolition in their state legislatures in the 1780s and 1790s, beating back tentative efforts
to introduce slavery amelioration legislation in Virginia and Maryland.124 Even so, by the end of
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1788, as we have seen, the New England and mid-Atlantic states abolished slave importations
and their citizens’ participation in the trade, as had Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas.125
The ratification of the Constitution marked the end of the revolutionary period with
regards to slavery and abolition. By 1788, abolition had been unleashed across New England and
the mid-Atlantic, only narrowly overturned in New York and New Jersey. Northeastern abolition
was a revolutionary achievement, collectively the first instances dismantling the property regime
of slavery in the Americas. Though political and legal processes of abolition unfolded unevenly
in response to varied local contexts, it remade the legal, political, and economic geography of
slavery and freedom in the American Northeast. The years of the Early Republic were host to the
emergence of new theaters of conflict over the future of slavery in the United States.

For a chronological survey of these laws, see W.E.B. DuBois, The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to
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Ch. 4: The Fruits of Northeastern State Abolition, I: The Politics of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Abolitionist Activity in the Early Republic, 1787-1808

By 1788, optimistic sentiments permeated the writings and correspondence of
northeastern abolitionists. Even the notoriously pessimistic and cantankerous Rev. Samuel
Hopkins of Newport, Rhode Island believed that Ocean State public opinion had firmly turned
against chattel slavery and the slave trade. For close to two decades, Hopkins occupied the pulpit
of the First Congregational Church in Newport, the central node of American merchants’
participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades. “For near twenty years, I have
openly opposed both by preaching and by writing the Slave Trade and the Slavery of the
Africans,” Hopkins wrote Pennsylvania Abolition Society member Rev. George Rogers, “and I
have had the Satisfaction of seeing the conviction of the moral and political evil of this abuse of
our fellow men increasing…” Well aware that the political and economic power of Newport and
other New England merchants who dabbled in the slave trade remained significant, Hopkins
proceeded to list the legislative and moral victories abolitionists chalked up in the Revolutionary
Era. He celebrated the series of northeastern state slavery abolition statutes passed between 1780
and 1787, as well as state laws that prohibited, “on Severe penalties,” participation in the African
slave trade. Hopkins further noted that black activism played a crucial role in these
developments, including petition campaigns and Paul Cuffee’s ambitious plan to resettle black
New Englanders in Africa. Though optimism did not often enter Hopkins’ outlook, he had reason
to believe that northeastern abolitionism was a potent force.1

Samuel Hopkins to Rev. George Rogers, 22 September 1788, Pennsylvania Abolition Society Papers
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Others shared Hopkins’ belief in the rising tide of public sentiment against the slave
trade, and implicitly the powerful merchants that financed and operated slavers from
northeastern ports. Also writing to Rev. William Rogers, Hopkins’ fellow Newport resident Eli
Hitchcock described his “pleasure to observe an emerging disapprobation of the African Slave
Trade.” “In this age of freedom,” Hitchcock commented, “the public is revolting from the horrid
practice- & in america there are none so inconsistent as to defend it except the few who have
made it their interest that it should be right.” In a note appended to the Hitchcock’s letter, Rogers
recorded that his correspondent put his beliefs into action. Hitchcock recently purchased the
freedom of two black children aged eleven and twelve, due to be sold illegally into slavery in the
Lower South. While these children were not born free as per the post-nati provisions of Rhode
Island’s 1784 gradual abolition law, a subsequent Ocean State statute made the sale of slaves out
of state illegal. Hitchcock apparently did not attempt to press the children’s claim in Rhode
Island courts, but the conditions of his purchase transferred their status to indentures and
provided for their freedom at age twenty-five. This episode showed that even if public opinion
tilted decidedly in favor of antislavery measures throughout much of New England, the processes
of gradual abolition and preventing illegal human trafficking did not unfold smoothly, nor
without contestation.2
Anti-slave trade petition campaigns were the most politically significant activities
pursued by the abolitionists. The abolition societies and closely-related regional Quaker
Meetings peppered legislative bodies with requests to step as far as they could to restrain the
importation of foreign slaves, and American participation in the Atlantic slave trade complex.

Eli Hitchcock to Rev. George Rogers, 18 September 1788, PASP, Series II, Loose Correspondence,
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The petition drives of the late 1780s built on a tradition of anti-slave trade activism that reached
back to the early stages of the imperial crisis in the 1760s, which escalated simultaneously with
northeastern slavery abolition campaigns after 1780. The abolition societies and Quaker
Meetings sent dozens of petitions to state legislatures, and until 1787 the Confederation
Congress, which couched their requests in both moral and political terms.3 A June 1787 petition
to the Rhode Island State Assembly submitted by the New England Yearly Meeting appealed to
both the egalitarian implications of republicanism and the Golden Rule. These, the petition
argued, justified exercising the “authority entrusted to [the Assembly], [to] contribute your
endeavours to prevent the sufferings of multitudes” of African slaves forced to endure the
Middle Passage and chattel slavery in the Caribbean and southern mainland by self-interested,
profit-seeking Ocean State merchants.4
Later that same year, the New England Meeting petitioned the Senate and House of
Representatives of Massachusetts to act against the slave trade. Composed and signed by
abolitionist and soon-to-be textile manufacturing capitalist Moses Brown, the petition evinced
specific knowledge of the politics of public opinion in the Bay State. While recognizing that
“notwithstanding the length of time the inhabitants of [Massachusetts] has been unhapily [sic] in
the Slave Trade,” the Meeting’s research showed that the vast majority of lawmakers represented
constituencies hostile to the trade. Previously that year, the state legislature approved a law that
provided for heavy penalties against the participation of Bay Staters in the Atlantic slave trade.
The Meeting pointedly noted that only four of forty-eight members of the State House opposed

See, for example, the sample of over one dozen petitions sent to various legislative bodies in the 1780s
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the bill, “all of which were concerned in the trade or Distilling [rum] for it,” and that the Senate
voted unanimously in favor of the bill. The petition simply asked that the bill’s provisions be
firmly enforced. Careful to note that they did not petition with strictly “Commercial Views,”
Brown emphasized the Meeting’s humanitarianism, a nod to the fact that powerful merchants
commanded disproportionate political power. Yet this and dozens of other legislative petitions
made clear that public opinion had turned decidedly against northeastern participation in
commerce in human beings.5
Such was the volume of anti-slave trade petitioning intended to capitalize on public
hostility to the trade that anonymous authors satirized the Quaker Meetings and abolition
societies in the press. In June 1787, the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer published a short,
comedic piece that lampooned the widely-discussed politics of slavery and the slave trade.
Created by a Pennsylvanian who styled himself “An Enemy to the Society for the Abolition of
Slavery,” the author deliberately fudged whether or not they supported abolitionism. “I observe
an advertisement… of a plantation to be sold in Maryland for ‘negroes, merchandize, or cash,’”
it began, and “from this appears that NEGROES are to be introduced in that State instead of
Paper-Money…” The writer proposed a system of currency based on bodies and body parts, a
clear reference to the decades-long agitation of abolitionists against the commodification of
human beings. Valuing healthy middle-aged men and women at three hundred dollars and
younger adolescents and children proportionately lower amounts, the schema reached grotesque
levels with its proposals for “change.” A head was valued at twenty dollars, a right arm sixteen

“To the Committee of the Assembly and Senate of the State of Massachusetts on the Memorial of the
People called Quakers,” November 1787, House Unpassed Legislation 1787, Docket 2660, SC1/Series 230,
Massachusetts Archives, Boston, MA. The disclaimer of not having “Commercial Views” related to a
common public defense made by slave trading merchants, that abolitionists like Moses Brown acted not
from sincerity, but to damage their businesses for their own personal gain.
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and left arm twelve, legs eight each, hands and feet four, and little fingers and toes one-third of a
dollar. “To prevent any inconveniences form the smell of this species of change when it is first
emitted,” the “Enemy” suggested, “it is proposed to harden it by exposing it to salt and smoke,
before it is taken from the mint.” Whether intended as an oblique attack on the PAS and other
abolition societies, or as a pure satire of antislavery and proslavery argumentation, the piece
certainly suggests how deeply these debates penetrated the public consciousness by the late
1780s.6
The abolition societies crafted public addresses designed to capitalize on growing
northeastern public hostility to chattel slavery and the slave trade in the late 1780s. A November
1789 PAS public address expressed many of the moral, political, and economic critiques of
slavery that bloomed in the Revolutionary Era. The address combined enlightened republican
principles and hostility to chattel slavery and slave importations on the grounds of
humanitarianism and public safety. It opened by gesturing to the ongoing success of northeastern
state slavery abolition campaigns, and continued with language familiar to readers of abolitionist
literature across the northeast. “Slavery is such an atrocious debasement of human nature,” the
society declared, “that its very extirpation, if not performed with solicitous care, may sometimes
open a source of serious evils.” The experiences of the Middle Passage and chattel slavery so
debauched the enslaved that “freedom may often prove a misfortune to himself, and prejudicial
to society.” Enlightened leadership from the abolition societies and legislators was essential in
order to direct safely enact gradual emancipation and channel public opinion into the proper
channels. While paternalistic and overly optimistic in their confidence of success in achieving
abolition in the southern states, such addresses evinced a potent strand of northeastern public
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opinion towards chattel slavery and the slave trade. The twinned institutions not only flagrant
debased the natural rights of humanity, but also threatened the social and economic prosperity
even of those states, like Pennsylvania, where their final extinction was but a matter of time.7
In 1789 and 1790, Quaker Meetings and abolition societies in Pennsylvania, New York,
New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland submitted several petitions to the First Congress that
requested the legislature to make use of its newly created constitutional authority to restrain
American participation in supplying foreign places with slaves. In October 1789, the Quaker
Yearly Meeting of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and western Virginia and Maryland petitioned
Congress to exercise its authority to encourage the “Suppression of Vice, Infidelity and
Irreligion, and every Species of Oppression on the Persons and Consciences of Men, so that
Righteousness and Peace, which truly exalt a Nation, may prevail throughout the Land…”8 Thus
began a renewed campaign in which Quaker Meetings and the abolition societies attempted to
utilize pressure politics to sway the First Congress into considering anti-slave trade measures,
within the bounds of the freshly-ratified Constitution.9
The two petitions that generated the most division in the First Congress were those
submitted by the mid-Atlantic Quaker Yearly Meeting’s Warner Mifflin, and by the PAS in
February 1790.10 The PAS’s February 3, 1790 petition to Congress, signed by an elderly
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Benjamin Franklin, asked legislators to regulate the slave trade to the fullest extent allowed in
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, and to countenance measures to promote the ultimate
extinction of chattel slavery.11 Franklin’s views on slavery and the prospect of abolition were
fraught with complications and ambiguities over the course of his long life, not least because at
various times he owned household slaves, and made the pages of his Pennsylvania Gazette host
to hundreds of runaway slave and servant advertisements beginning in the 1720s. During the
British-American imperial crisis, moreover, Franklin found himself in the awkward position of
simultaneously representing the interests of Pennsylvania and Georgia, where public opinion
concerning chattel slavery differed considerably before and after the Revolution. While
Franklin’s motivations for attaching his name to the PAS petition shortly before his death have
been subject to considerable scholarly debate, the content of the petition clearly demonstrated
stringent antislavery principles.12
The language and requests of the February 1790 petition aligned with those of previous
Quaker Meeting petitions to the state legislatures and the Confederation Congress in the 1780s.
The PAS opened the petition by referring to its members’ own success in pressuring the
“Memorial of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, the Relief of free
Negroes Unlawfully held in Bondage, & the Improvement of the Condition of the African Race,” 3
February 1790. MS, LOCO: https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/franklin. Accessed 21
November 2017. Nicholas P. Wood, “A ‘class of citizens’: The Earliest Black Petitioners to Congress and
Their Quaker Allies,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 74 No. 1 (January 2017), pp. 109-144 has recently
shown that Quaker petitions campaigns were conspicuously biracial. Matthew Mason, Slavery and Politics
in the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006) is a thorough account of
slavery and slave trade politics, mainly focusing on the United States Congress and debates in the public
sphere that related to slavery politics in direct, but often oblique ways.
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Pennsylvania state assembly to pass gradual abolition legislation in March 1780, and its
continuous efforts to uphold the law’s provisions and persuade the Pennsylvania Assembly to
pass supplementary legislation in 1788. The PAS appealed to Congress to exercise the newlycreated “Salutary Powers… invested in you for Promoting the Welfare & securing the blessings
of liberty to the people of the United States.” These blessings “ought rightfully be administered,
without distinctions of Colour, to all descriptions of people…” Members rooted the petition’s
language firmly in Declaration principles, repeatedly referring to natural rights, liberties, and
“blessings,” the fruits of American independence from the British Empire. The PAS argued
against the blatant “Inconsistency” of perpetuating chattel slavery in the Chesapeake and Lower
South (not to mention New York and New Jersey), in direct contradiction to the “General
enjoyment of the blessings of Liberty.” In closing, the society moved away from florid language
and made the petition’s one specific request of Congress: to “Step to the very verge of the
Powers vested in you for discouraging every Species of Traffick in the Persons of our fellow
Man.”13 In other words, the PAS did not ask for an outright prohibition of the foreign slave trade
to the United States, but that Congress prohibit American citizens from supplying foreign nations
and colonies with slaves, and further to prevent foreign ships from outfitting slaving voyages in
the United States.
The mid-Atlantic Quaker Yearly Meetings’ petition used significantly more stringent
language in lambasting the national government’s acquiescence to American participation in the
slave trade. Signed by Meeting Clerk Nicholas Waln and submitted by Warmer Mifflin, the
petition to President Washington and Congress railed against “the enormities abhorrent to
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common humanity [in] this abominable commerce.” It argued for widespread public antipathy to
the slave trade. As evidence, it pointed out that “divers of the legislative bodies of the different
states on this continent, have since manifested their sense of the public detestation due to the
licentious wickedness of the African trade for slaves, and the inhuman tyranny and blood
guiltiness inseparable from it…” In conclusion, the Meeting appealed to legislators’ sense of
“Justice and mercy,” undoubtedly aware that those sentiments did not prick the consciences of
many in the Upper and Lower South and some members of the New England merchant
community.14
Together, the PAS and Quaker Meeting petitions touched off the first sustained and often
vituperative debates in Congress, as legislators hashed out exactly what authority the body could
exercise over slavery and the slave trade in a Declaration of Powers. Intense invective
characterized the proceedings after a committee report was entered for debate. Reporting to his
brother James from New York City, the nation’s temporary capitol, John Pemberton’s
description of the debates captured the divisive tenor of national discussions of slavery and the
slave trade. In a pattern that would repeat throughout the Early Republic and antebellum periods,
South Carolinians took the lead as the most animated proslavery avatars. Speaking for almost
half an hour, Aedanus Burke heaped scorn upon abolitionists. “I could not hear much what he
said,” Pemberton wrote his brother, “but I understand it was principally abuse & in his Close
presented us as Satan Flying like a Coromoranth.” This comment elicited laughter from other
Lower South members before the Speaker restored order. Fellow South Carolinian William
Smith then rose and spoke with “Billingsgate Language” so outrageous that apparently a brief
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moment of levity broke the tension. New Englanders, however, often framed as ardent defenders
of American right to participate in the slave trade, were “Galled” by the South Carolinian’s
rhetoric and behavior.15
Such discordant exchanges characterized subsequent debates, because men on all sides of
the equation knew that their outcome would set a significant precedent for the United States
government’s relations to slavery and the slave trade.16 Lower South congressional
representatives continued to excoriate Quaker abolitionists and their allies for proposing what
they believed to be unwarranted intrusions in the private property relations of chattel slavery, by
attacking American participation in the African and intercontinental slave trades. William Smith
once again warned northeasterners that “those who are not interested” in slavery “ought not to
interfere.” The slave trade debates immediately followed those of Alexander Hamilton’s Report
on the Public Credit, and they too had ramifications for government revenue collections. Smith
and other South Carolinians, of course, had no desire to allow the ten-dollar per-slave imported
tax allowed for in the Slave Trade Clause to become law. Thus, they opted for an offensive
strategy, assailing abolitionists at every turn, hoping to prevent both slave trade regulation as a
precedent, and paying taxes on slaves they might wish to import in the future.17
Fearful of allowing acrimony to fester and eager to address other business, particularly
Alexander Hamilton’s government finance plans, James Madison stepped in to broker a
compromise. Based on Madison’s compromise proposals, the debates resolved when Congress
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agreed to a formal Declaration of Powers on March 5, 1790. The Declaration of Powers restated
what was already common knowledge to legislators regardless of their particular interests,
reiterating that Congress could not “interfere in the internal regulations of particular states,”
meaning it could not force slavery abolition on states against their wishes. But the Declaration
also stated that Congress “are equally constrained, from interfering in the emancipation of slaves
who already are, or who may be… imported into or born within any of the said States.” In other
words, the committee declared that Congress could neither force abolition on a state, nor
override state abolition statutes, a restatement of the “federal consensus” agreed to by delegates
the the Constitutional Convention three years before. The Declaration of Powers also reasserted
that Congress could not abolish the foreign slave trade before 1808, a fact stated clearly in the
Constitution and not up for serious legal or political challenge. Importantly for the abolition
societies, it acknowledged congressional authority to prohibit foreign slaving ships from
outfitting in American ports and American citizens from aiding and abetting the African and
intercontinental slave trades. 18
While Congress intended the Declaration of Powers to subsume conflicts over slavery
and the slave trade, the vim and vigor of the debates that produced it laid bare the fundamental,
and to many frightening, regional differences. Writing to David Stuart in late March 1790,
George Washington expressed dismay over the “jealousies” exposed by the congressional
debates. Worried that abolitionist petition campaigns succeeded in “poisoning the minds of the
Southern people,” the president asked rhetorically, “was it not always believed that there are
“Abolition of Slavery. Communicated to the House of Representatives, March 5, 1790,” American State
Papers (hereafter ASP), 037, Misc. Vol. 1, 1 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 12. An earlier draft of the Declaration of
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congressmen, particularly South Carolinians. Compare the draft committee statement and that version
accepted by the whole body in DuBois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of
America, 1637-1870 (New York: Longmans and Green, p. 78.
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some points which peculiarly interest the Eastern States?” Desperate that the Union not fracture
over the slavery question, Washington acknowledged that regional distinctions could not be
papered over. But he argued that diversity of opinion defined the new nation, even pointing out
significant conflicts between upcountry and coastal Virginians and Carolinians on a variety of
issues. This was undoubtedly true of many political, economic, and social problems, but slavery
and the slave trade were different. Washington feared an emergent antislavery front in New
England and the mid-Atlantic, potentially a threat to southern slavery. “And I will ask another
question (of the highest magnitude in my mind),” Washington wrote, “and that is, if the Eastern
& Northern States are dangerous in Union, will they be less so in seperation [sic]?” He feared
that slavery might split the nation, and that in the event, “independent of other considerations
what would Virginia (and such other States as might be inclined to join her) gain by a seperation
[sic]? Would they not, most unquestionably, be the weaker party?”19

**********

In December 1790, Rhode Island abolitionist Thomas Arnold wrote to PAS President
James Pemberton, in response to a circular letter requesting information on the present state of
the slave trade in the northeastern states. As a member of the Providence Society for Abolishing
the Slave-Trade, Arnold knew well the powerful Rhode Island merchants that invested in the
risky business of human trafficking seeking substantial profits.20 While the recently founded
George Washington to David Stuart, 28 March 1790, Founders Online, National Archives,
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Providence Society worked to establish its organizational apparatus, Arnold noted that in Boston
politically powerful merchants thwarted a similar effort in the Massachusetts legislature, which
contradicted the wishes of most Massachusetts residents. “I am in hopes that business is so far
finished as to leave the members of Massachusetts Now at Liberty to Act their own Constituents
sentiment with a brimming spirit of freedom.” Arnold commented, “it is hard to conceive how
any, who acknowledge the Enormity of the Evil, and the Powers of Congress… can yet appear to
act with indifference.”21 On the other hand, both Rhode Island senators had joined the
Providence Society, and they offered assurance to Arnold they would use their position to act
against the slave trade. Lower South members of Congress were the most intransigent, but he
hoped even they could be “softened.” South Carolinians need not fear an interruption to the slave
importations, he ironically commented, because even their own state legislature temporarily
halted made them illegal due to market saturation and economic depression. “The more northern
states have been larger partakers in the Traffick arising from the trade,” especially Rhode Island,
“but the Interest or Influence of those who still allow themselves to pursue it… is comparatively
too little and Inconsiderable to attract the notice of this Legislature [U.S. Congress].” While New
England merchants continued to participate in the slave trade, paradoxically the trade was
insignificant enough in the context of other trade-related business that Congress temporarily set
aside the issue.22
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And yet in spring 1792 Pemberton complained to Moses Brown that proslavery
legislators, alongside northeastern merchant allies like Moses’ brother John, “remain deaf to all
entreaties… to the exercise of that authority which the house of Representatives of Congress has
acknowledged themselves to possess.” Because of “political considerations” between “Southern
and Eastern Members,” congressional action to prevent foreign ships from using American men
and resources to fit out for the slave trade stalled until that point.23 In the face of opposition to
slave trade regulation, abolitionists across the Northeast developed plans to convene a meeting of
delegates from state and local societies to coordinate national antislavery political campaigns. By
early 1793, correspondence between northeastern abolitionists and their constituent societies
began to converge on plans to organize an umbrella society to promote more effective regional
and national coordination.
Spearheaded by the PAS, the American Convention for Promoting the Abolition of
Slavery, and Improving the African Race, first met in Philadelphia on New Year’s Day 1794.
The N-YMS, Providence Society, and societies from New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware,
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Wilmington (DE), Maryland, Chestertown (MD), and Virginia elected delegates to attend the
inaugural meeting held at Philadelphia City Hall. The first American Convention prioritized the
crafting of an anti-slave trade petition that would reflect a unified abolitionist stance, as well as
what they believed to be popular opinion throughout the mid-Atlantic and New England. The
Convention’s very first resolution was to present a memorial to Congress “praying that body to
prohibit, by law, the citizens of the United States, from carrying on a commerce, in slaves, for
the supply of foreign nations.” This perfectly constitutional request, Convention delegates
believed, was a significant preliminary step to begin severing the United States from the Atlantic
slave trading complex. It was consonant with the 1790 Declaration of Powers, since it recognized
that the Constitution prevented Congress from instituting an outright national prohibition of slave
importations before 1808. The Convention quickly drafted a congressional petition based on the
resolution which it dispatched to Congress, meeting at nearby Congress Hall, on January 7,
1794.24
Abolitionist allies in Congress quickly drafted a bill with the legal guidance of PAS
counsel in January and February 1794, and shepherded the legislation through the legislative
process with remarkable efficiency. The law passed on March 22, 1794 with surprisingly little
formal opposition, though a few Congressmen from the Lower South wailed against what they
believed to be unwarranted legislative intrusion into private property relations. The provisions
almost exactly reflected the American Convention’s wishes, banning foreign slavers from
outfitting in American ports and American citizens from participating in foreign slaving
expeditions in any way. The law provided for fines of up to two hundred dollars for each
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violation, and incentivized informants by offering them one moiety of any penalties levied on
violators. From the perspective of abolitionists, the sole disappointments in the 1794 act were
that it did not provide for potential imprisonment, nor did it create a government agency
specifically to prosecute accused violators.25 The individual states, moreover, remained free to
permit slave importations if they chose, though only Georgia allowed them in the mid-1790s.
The act’s enforcement limitations allowed some unscrupulous American merchants and ship
captains to profit by illegally supplying West Indian colonies with African slaves. The fact that
the national legislature overwhelmingly passed an act that restricted American participation in
supplying the slave markets of the Caribbean and South America, however, was a significant
legislative victory for northeastern abolitionists.26
While the abolition societies and Quaker Meetings considered the 1794 Act a victory,
deceitful merchants, ship-owners, and captains quickly developed methods to evade prosecution.
A committee designated to create the Convention’s annual agenda described several deceptive
strategies at the 1797 American Convention delegate meeting. First, American captains routinely
and “clandestinely” used the Danish flag when transporting slaves to the West Indies, because
Denmark allowed its subjects free participation in the Atlantic slave trade. The committee urged
the Convention to draft an official address to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, requesting
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that he commence negotiations with the Danish court “for the prevention of the use of their flag
and registers.”27
Another impediment to the enforcement of the 1794 act lay in the initial identification of
ships suspected of fitting out for slaving voyages. To identify a vessel fitted out specifically for
the slave trade was relatively easy; the tackle and appurtenances needed to carry out devoted
slaving voyages obviously suggested its purpose. In response the to the Act’s passage, men
seeking to evade prosecution shifted to transporting fewer numbers of slaves on vessels “not
specially fitted out for that purpose, the act being thereby evaded,” according to the Convention
committee. They proposed petitioning Congress to amend the act, suggesting that it require shipowners to swear “on oath or affirmation” that they would not receive on board any slaves bound
for sale in foreign markets. The committee further urged Congress to require ship-owners to post
significant bonds liable to forfeiture “in case a sale of any slave so put on board should take
place.”28 In an additional step to rectify the obstacles to the enforcement of the 1794 Act, the
Convention consulted legal counsel which assured them that the sale of slaves in foreign markets
by Americans in vessels not specifically fitted out for that purpose “are equally a breach of law
with those made on board of vessels originally destined for this traffic.” The Convention
complained that enforcement of the law was often lax, particularly because certain customs
collectors interpreted the law only to apply to dedicated slaving vessels. The Convention pointed
to the “difficulty of bringing to justice those who are concerned in evading the provisions of the
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law in question,” which “renders it necessary that great care should be taken to remove every
possible pretext for acting in opposition to the [1794 act].”29
The American Convention attempted to persuade the southern state legislatures to
constrain the slave trade, albeit with little success. Given the strictures of the federal system,
northeastern abolitionists could only petition southern state governments to voluntarily
circumscribe the African and intercontinental slave trades. Aware that southern state authorities
could not be counted upon to effectively enforce the 1794 act, not to mention their own laws that
supposedly banned slave importations, the American Convention crafted entreaties that
emphasized the dangers of freshly-imported African slaves to community safety. In 1795, for
example, the Convention petitioned the South Carolina state legislature to remind them of “the
dangers to which the citizens of the United States are exposed, while a numerous class of men
exist among them, deprived of their natural rights, and forcibly held in bondage…” The “first
and principle object” of the memorial was to convince Palmetto State legislators to ban both
slave importations and exportations. The Convention hoped that South Carolina slaveholders
would also consider methods to ameliorate slavery and promote “the diffusion of knowledge
among them,” but believed that “nothing can be effectual while the number of slaves may be
daily increased by importation…” Northeastern abolitionists had some reason to believe that
Lower South slaveholders might be receptive to these requests, given that the Haitian Revolution
continued to escalate near the southern mainland.30
As the Haitian Revolution intensified over the course of the 1790s, southern slaveholders
increasingly feared that black Jacobinism would infect the enslaved and free African-American
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populations. Refugee white Haitian planters fled to the United States, particularly Charleston and
Philadelphia, where they spun horrifying tales of an apocalyptic race war.31 In this context,
politicians from the Upper and Lower South were willing to accept additional legislation that
would upgrade the penalties provided for in the 1794 slave trade act. Given the limitations of the
1794 act, particularly that it lacked direct enforcement mechanism, it was not significantly
challenged by southern congressmen after its passage. In an ironic alliance of slaveholders who
feared revolutionary Haitians in their midst and antislavery northeasterners who desired more
stringent penalties for Americans violating the 1794 act, in early 1800 Congress began
consideration of an updated slave trade act.
Passed in May 1800, the supplementary slave trade act broadened the earlier law’s
provisions by applying it to non-citizen residents as well as American citizens. Thus, no person
residing in the United States could participate in ferrying slaves to foreign places, which
legislators hoped would prevent the importation of dangerous persons into the country. The 1800
law contained two new additions to the 1794 act. First, it provided that owners of ships used
illegally in the foreign slave trade had to forfeit the ship, tackle, and “goods and effects, other
than slaves.” Furthermore, it provided that “all persons interested in such vessel shall be
employed at the time of such capture, shall be precluded from all right or claim to the slaves
found on board such vessel…” An antislavery reading of this clause suggested that ship owners
convicted of violating the act faced forfeiting their property rights to persons legally enslaved
aboard the vessel, in addition to slaves illegally purchased for sale in foreign markets. The
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second new feature of the 1800 law was an explicit declaration that Congress in no way meant to
contradict or counteract state laws prohibiting participation in the slave trade, slave importations,
and the sale of slaves and servants out-of-state.32
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, legislators in the two remaining states north of
the Chesapeake where chattel slavery remained legal again turned their attention to the subject.
In New York, which had the largest enslaved population in the Northeast, a gradual abolition law
was overturned narrowly by the state Council of Revisions in 1785. The debate over slavery
abolition in New York was intensely contested in the public sphere, and Empire State
slaveholders concentrated in the Hudson Valley and Long Island wielded considerable political
power compared to their counterparts elsewhere in the region. Founded just before gradual
abolition initially failed in 1785, the New-York Manumission Society (N-YMS) worked
assiduously to encourage private manumissions and abolition legislation. The N-YMS’s
members also made moral and economic uplift particular priorities, and in 1787 the society
founded the African Free School to further those goals. By 1799, because of the N-YMS’s
lobbying efforts and a drift in public opinion towards gradual abolition, the State Assembly once
again considered abolition legislation, which it enacted on the felicitous date of July 4. The path
to slavery abolition in New York was rocky, and the 1799 gradual abolition law was by no
means inevitable. Moreover, it was not until 1827 that black New Yorkers were no longer held as
chattel property. Nevertheless, when viewed from the lens of northeastern regional economic
development and the unfolding of state abolition elsewhere in the mid-Atlantic and New
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England, it would have been surprising if the New York State Assembly had not instituted
gradual abolition.33

**********

After 1788 fighting the slave trades—both the importation into and exportation of slaves
from the states—was a battle waged at the state and local levels. State slavery abolition,
antislavery societies recognized, would be rendered ineffective if the formerly enslaved did not
have legal control of their persons and enforcement apparatuses to prevent illegal kidnapping and
sale down South. At its inaugural meeting, the American Convention’s second resolution
prodded state legislatures to “grant to such of them as have been, or may be emancipated, such a
participation of civil privileges,” and to strengthen enforcement of state gradual abolition laws
already in existence. As “subjects of property,” slaves were too often “carried off, by force, and
transferred to places, where even the severity of their former bondage is encreased.” The
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delegates knew that state legislatures across the northeast had already banned slave importations
and the sale of slaves out-of-state. But in the absence of “a radical abolition of slavery itself, by
exploding the general opinion, that the colour of a man is evidence of his deprivation of the
rights of man,” respectful petitions to state legislatures was the farthest national political step
abolitionists could take. The abolition societies could and did, however, function as enforcement
agencies that worked tirelessly to prevent slavery from entering or escaping their communities.
Preventing slave importations and the sale of slaves scheduled to be emancipated ranked among
the most important tasks of the abolition societies.34
In the states that had already passed laws to ban slave importations and their residents’
participation in the trade, abolitionists could do more than respectfully petition. In Pennsylvania
and the coastal New England states, abolitionists pressed lawsuits against merchants and ship
captains that flouted anti-slave trade legislation. The PAS devoted significant time, energy, and
resources to tracking down and prosecuting accused slave traders and their accomplices. PAS
members, most importantly Quaker tailor Isaac Hopper and Thomas Harrison, acted on
information they received from a variety of sources about possible illegal slave trading. If they
deemed such information sufficient they initiated lawsuits in Pennsylvania state courts, and after
March 1794 the United States Eastern District Court in Philadelphia.
In 1788, the PAS formed the Committee on the African Slave Trade to construct a
political and legal agenda to suppress American participation in the foreign slave trade. The
committee drafted petitions that demanded more stringent enforcement of Pennsylvania’s 1788
state slave trade prohibition, on which they gathered more than two thousand signatures and
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forwarded to state legislatures throughout the Northeast. The committee also opened
correspondence with the Providence Society to coordinate their respective anti-slave trade
activities, aware of Rhode Island merchants’ continued participation and expertise in the Atlantic
slave trade. The PAS and its correspondents urged each other always to “persevere in application
to governments” to fight the slave trade, a political solution workable within the constitutional
strictures of the United States’ federal system of government.35
The 1794 act incited the Committee on the African Slave Trade actively to seek out and
prosecute violators, as would the subsequent 1800 supplementary act. On the ground, the
society’s efforts to enforce the regulation of slave trade law took a similar form as its betterdocumented legal work in adjudicating freedom claims.36 It collected information about ships
cleared for Africa and their owners and operators, and developed legal strategies to prosecute
them. For example, in autumn 1795 the Committee prepared and circulated a memorandum
describing ships they suspected of operating as slaving vessels in violation of state and federal
law. The memorandum listed the Hannah, Sally, Eliza, Ascension, Betsey, Ann, and Mary, ships
that hailed from ports throughout the Northeast. If possible, they provided their last known
locations, identified their captains and owners identified, and inquiries made into the
whereabouts of their crews to obtain depositions. A similar list exists for 1799.37 By collecting
and disseminating information about suspected slaving vessels and their operators, the PAS
provided opportunities for abolition societies throughout the Northeast to bring anti-slave trade
suits in state and federal courts.
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In summer and autumn 1800, the PAS became embroiled in the United States Navy’s
capture of the Phoebe and Prudent, vessels captured by the brig Ganges in US waters laden with
slaves for sale in the West Indies in violation of the 1794 and 1800 regulatory acts. The Ganges
brought the ships to Philadelphia, and the PAS engaged to help determine the fate of the
recaptured men, women, and children. The society created a Committee of Guardians to secure
the emancipation of the captives taken from the vessels. Registered to Newport, Rhode Island
merchants Benjamin Fairbanks and James Weeden, the Ganges intercepted the Prudent while
bound to Havana. Ganges Captain James Maloney discovered sixteen enslaved Africans
onboard. The Committee of Guardians took the captives—those “such as are to be found free”—
and “bound them by Indenture to suitable persons, residing chiefly in the country,” adults for
four years, and male minors until twenty-one and females until eighteen.38
The PAS simultaneously commenced a libel case against the owners of the Charlestonregistered Phoebe, John and Alexander Anderson.39 Led by Thomas Harrison, the society
devoted significant time and expense to ensuring the recaptured men, women, and children
received apprenticeships to responsible Pennsylvania masters and instruction in various trades,
some in Philadelphia and others in nearby rural counties. Handled by the U.S. Eastern District
Court, the sheer number of indentures in the Phoebe case led the PAS to contract for the printing
of indenture contract templates, listing Harrison as the citizen responsible for their execution.
Unlike the Prudent case, the indenture lengths varied considerably depending on the assumed
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age of each individual. While many of the freed captives were apprenticed as “labourers” and
domestic servants, like the Prudent case, the society placed more than two dozen in
apprenticeships that promised training in trades like hat-making and tailoring. Not
coincidentally, Isaac T. Hopper, along with Harrison the most active member of the Committee
of Guardians and Committee on the African Slave Trade, was a tailor by trade.40 Several years
later a traveling English Quaker encountered one of the survivors of the Phoebe case, a boy
named Sado, then a servant in the home of fellow Quakers, the Painter family. He recorded that
Mrs. Painter told him the “Society instituted for the Abolition of the Slave Trade” placed Sado
with her family.41
The extant records of PAS anti-slave trade suits are most complete for the period
immediately before national abolition, from 1805 to 1807. By late 1805, the PAS juggled at least
sixteen lawsuits brought by individual members of the Committee on the African Slave Trade in
the Pennsylvania U.S. Eastern District Court under the 1794 and 1800 federal laws. Often court
actions initiated by PAS members took the form of libel suits, because the 1794 law provided the
incentive of a one-thousand-dollar reward to the informer should an accused slave trader be
found guilty. In Thomas Harrison v. Brig Tryphenia, the Committee entered into its record a
short deposition by a seaman named John Nick, who served on the vessel Minerva. Nick testified
that while in “the Havanna,” he witnessed the Tryphenia with “12 to 18 negroes on board which
he understood were slaves.” He believed that a man named Louis Crousillat offered them for
sale, because no one went to “the Havanna without horses or slaves, [and he] saw no horses on
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board.” In addition, Nick testified that he and his Minerva crewmates warned their counterparts
on the Tryphenia “something of the consequences of navigating a vessel carrying slaves.” Other
seamen corroborated Nick’s testimony, claiming that the Tryphenia sailed from Philadelphia
bound for St. Thomas in July 1805, where the master proceeded to purchase fifteen slaves before
heading to Havana to sell them- a clear violation of both Pennsylvania and United States law. 42
At the same time, under the leadership of Quaker tailor Isaac T. Hopper the PAS brought
libel suits against the brig Eliza and its owner Pierce Maher and Captain Edward McDermott. As
with the Tryphenia cases, the committee recorded depositions from several crewmembers, and
the evidence was filed with the Clerk’s Office of the Pennsylvania U.S. Eastern District Court.
Hopper also shepherded several suits brought against the schooner Sally, another ship owned by
Pierce Maher. According to evidence provided by crewmember Stephen Murray, the Sally sailed
from Philadelphia to Barbados, Tobago, Trinidad, St. Thomas, and then proceeded to the “River
Gambia,” where the supercargo purchased two-hundred and fifty slaves and sold them at La
Guira and Havana—a clear violation of the 1794 law. Apparently, some of the slaves were then
resold in South Carolina- which had resumed slave importations in 1803 but which was not a
violation of US law. However, it was a violation of Pennsylvania state law for crewmembers
who were citizens of that state.43 Although there are no extant verdicts for the cases of the Eliza
or the Sally, these episodes illustrate both the PAS’s anti-slave trade legal strategies, and the
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tangled web of state and federal law that complicated the society’s efforts to remake the Atlantic
Ocean into the eastern boundary of the antislavery cordon of freedom.44
Committee on the African Slave Trade member Isaac Sherman shepherded libel suits
brought against the owners and operators of the brigs Good Intent, Hannah, and Arctic and the
sloop Experiment. In the case of the Experiment, the Committee recorded long depositions from
testimony by James Johnson and his wife Sarah, who had previously been married to Experiment
crew member William Robins. Her testimony traced the ship’s route from Philadelphia to St.
Bartholomew, then to the Senegal and the Cape Verde Islands and back to the Caribbean, as PAS
counsel attempted to prove that its captain illegally supplied foreign colonies with slaves. One
PAS memorandum forwarded to US District Court Judge Richard Peters described depositions
that proved that the Good Intent had been “employed and made use of in carrying slaves from
one foreign country to another,” in direct violation of the 1794 Act. In the case of the Arctic,
Sherman petitioned the South Carolina US District Court, which could hardly be expected to
hand down an anti-slave trade ruling, to prosecute the ship’s owners and operators, accused of
selling slaves in Montevideo, Uruguay purchased in Zanzibar. Although the South Carolina court
had jurisdiction because the Arctic was registered at Charleston, and though South Carolina
reopened its borders to slave importations in 1803, Sherman hoped the court might enforce the
1794 and 1800 laws. At the very least, in all cases Sherman and the PAS made clear that it
monitored the enforcement of anti-slave trade regulatory law as closely as possible.45
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In April 1807, one month after Congress’ passage of the bill to abolish the foreign slave
trade scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1808, the PAS’ Committee on the African Slave
Trade continued apace with its efforts to fight the trade. It persisted in collecting and arranging
evidence against suspected illegal slave trading and funneling it into the appropriate legal
channels. That same month, a Committee on the African Slave Trade memoranda frankly
assessed the successes and failures of its anti-slave trade litigation. The Committee pondered
whether to appeal the aforementioned case of the Tryphenia to the United States Supreme Court,
thus forcing the nation’s highest tribunal to pass judgment on the efficacy of slave trade
legislation. The memoranda glumly noted that Chief Justice Bushrod Washington’s court
previously interpreted the 1794 Act narrowly by not allowing legal action “unless a vessel shall
go to the coast of Africa and make an excurtion into the country and seize the natives who may
be at liberty, contrary to what has ever been the practice of those who engage in this detestable
trade.” Washington’s ruling suggested that American citizens could legally buy enslaved
Africans, and that the 1794 Act only applied to the delivery, but not the purchase of enslaved
persons. Nonetheless the committee pressed on with its work because even though several cases
had been unsuccessful, further litigation would “have a good effect in discouraging [this]
iniquitous traffic in human flesh.”46
Like the PAS, abolition societies and individuals with abolitionist sympathies elsewhere
worked assiduously to prosecute accused violators. For much of 1792 and early 1793, for
example, Saybrook, Connecticut Rev. Elias Mather engaged in prosecuting the mercantile
partnership of White, Pratt, and Newell. These merchants’ families, especially the Pratts, were
prominent in Saybrook. According to Mather’s ministerial colleague Jonathan Edwards, by
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March 1793 expectations were that the lawsuit would receive a favorable hearing in Connecticut
state courts.47 Though prosecuting illegal slave trading was a lengthy and expensive undertaking,
it is clear that northeastern abolitionists were intent on upholding state laws that forbid their
residents’ participation in the nefarious commerce in human beings.
Over the course of autumn 1792, abolitionist Moses Brown conducted a lengthy
correspondence with fellow abolitionist Samuel Eliot, concerning the cases of the illegal slave
trading owners of the ship Abeona registered in Boston, Massachusetts. Ship captain and store
keeper Steven Cleveland pursued the cases, attending to the often-considerable difficulties in
prosecuting illegal slave traders through state court systems. In September 1792, Cleveland spent
a significant amount of time and (Moses Brown’s) money in legal fees to engage Massachusetts
Court of Common Pleas Judge Sullivan, who on several occasions claimed not to remember the
specifics of the Abeona case. Sullivan’s duties, moreover, often meant that he was travelling to
circuit courts when Cleveland most wanted to consult with him about the case. Eliot volunteered
to visit Sullivan, for example, and reported that “I again waited upon him… or rather attempted
to as I found that he had just set out for Worcester Court.” Eliot happily reported that Sullivan
“had however left a Letter, the purpose of which was, to say, that he had been applied to in the
case of Cleaveland” in the September 1792 court at Salem.48
All of this was demanding activity, certainly for Cleveland, who pursued the case only
for expenses pending its outcome, which held the promise of a significant payment because
Massachusetts’ 1788 anti-slave trade law offered one moiety of fines to the informer. As
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Cleveland told Eliot, the case was an important test of Massachusetts abolitionists’ ability to
uphold anti-slave trade legislation, and that he would do so “with Energy being determined to
exert himself in doing all he could for the Establishment of the Freedom of the whole Human
Race.” But attempting to prosecute accused slave traders came at a price for Cleveland. The
Providence Society, Eliot wrote Brown, had to “enter with Spirit” in to the case because “it is
enough, & more than enough, for Mr. Cleveland to bear the personal insults & abuse he
suffered” in retaliation for pursuing the case. Eliot offered to pay “any Assesment, or do
anything that may be reasonably expected” to pursue the case to a successful conclusion. He
further urged Brown to discuss the matter with other members of the Providence Society, and
warned him not to let it “be disgraced, by the want of timely Effort and Exertion—If we do not
support Mr. Cleaveland, as far as appears to me, it would be better if the Society were extinct.”49
The combined efforts of Cleveland, Eliot, and Brown continued in September 1792, as
attorney Edward Pulling certified that he brought suit on behalf of Cleveland against Abeona
owners Joseph Waters and John Sinclair in the Salem Court of Common Pleas.50 By November,
the case continued to drag on, and Samuel Eliot continued to press Moses Brown to assist
Stephen Cleveland as he attempted to prosecute the Taunton slave dealers. Eliot continued to
hope that the Abeona case would be brought to successful conclusion. “The earliest [opportunity]
shall be improved in making the Enquiry of Judge Paine, Dawes or Sullivan,” he wrote Brown,
“& if it may be done, I will forward the 20 dollars to Cleaveland…” Eliot again warned Brown
that the Providence Society had to take action quickly to support Cleveland, as any delay might
lead to a missed opportunity to prosecute Waters and Sinclair. “Delay is… seldom or ever

Samuel Eliot to Moses Brown, 19 September 1792, PAST, MBP, Correspondence, Reel 7.
“Statement of Edward Pulling,” copy in PAST, MBP, Correspondence, Reel 7; also in Donnan, ed.,
Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade, III: p. 86.
49
50

204

unattended by Danger,” he wrote, and “in such a Cause as this, it too clearly will infer Disgrace.”
Such were the small windows of opportunity in which abolitionists had to capitalize to
successfully achieve their antislavery agendas.51
In 1793, the Massachusetts State Supreme Court decided Stephen Cleveland’s suit
against the Joseph Waters and John Sinclair, owners of the Abeona on appeal. Under the
provisions of the Bay State’s 1788 anti-slave trade law, the court assessed the two men a fine of
£4700, declaring Waters, the ship captain, and the merchant Sinclair guilty of purchasing ninety
slaves in Africa and transporting and selling them in West Indies. Cleveland’s work, it turned
out, promised to pay handsomely. Under the state’s 1788 law, the Court levied fines of £50 for
each slave and £200 for the Abeona’s usage in the slave trade, of which Cleveland claimed
£2750. But Waters and Sinclair, unfortunately, could not pay the fine, and Cleveland filed an
additional suit seeking £5000 in damages. Ultimately, John Sinclair was jailed in the Salem Gaol
for non-payment of the fines, and while it turned out that Cleveland did not see the pecuniary
rewards that he hoped would be the fruits of his labor to prosecute the Abeona case, he brought
the slave traders to heel. The case highlighted many of the difficulties that ambitious men who
wanted the slave trade to end encountered, not least the tangled legal processes of bringing
accused slave traders to trial. And yet, the case also showed the effectiveness of Early National
abolitionists and their societies in the quest to end American participation in the slave trade.52
While New York merchants did not have as large a presence in the African and
intercontinental slave trades as their compatriots in New England, the New-York Manumission
Society did its part to help track down and bring illegal slave traders to justice. In 1800, the
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society filed a lawsuit Captain John Read of the William and Margaret, a schooner registered in
New York City to one Thomas Dennis, which had set sail for Africa from Rhode Island and
disembarked enslaved cargo in the Swedish Caribbean colony St. Barthèlemy. Apparently, the
William and Margaret experienced inclement weather, and only thirty-five of an initial one
hundred and five slaves disembarked in the Caribbean. Perhaps the ship struggled into New York
harbor, where N-YMS became aware of its travels. As of early 1801, society president Willet
Seaman notified the American Convention that the case remained pending in the U.S. District
Court. The N-YMS felt “confident, that justice in this case shall be had; and they cannot but
hope, that the punishment of a few such offenders, will put an end, in our country, to the unjust
and cruel trade in question.”53
The illegal sale of slaves out of the northeastern states that instituted abolition was a
significant worry for members of the abolition societies. Both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals
participated in illegal human trafficking, although it is difficult to quantify exactly how many
men, women, and children illegal traffickers smuggled to southern slavery. The American
Convention’s member societies invested significant time and resources to combatting this trade,
seeking to uphold “containment” of slavery and servitude to their states, thereby allowing the
process of gradual abolition to proceed.54 The PAS and N-YMS most actively pursued cases
against illegal sale of servants and free persons out-of-state. The New York Assembly forbade
the sale of slaves out-of-state before legislating gradual abolition in 1799, and Empire State
slaveholders frequently attempted to illegally cash out their slave holdings in anticipation of
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gradual abolition. This practice escalated after the turn of the century, as the N-YMS reported to
the American Convention that “suits were initiated… against certain foreigners, for a traffic in
black people from this to the southern states.”55
The efforts of northeastern abolition societies to restrain the slave trades met with some
measure of success. New England merchants and ship captains still attempted to import slaves
into the northeastern states, albeit in very small numbers, and abolitionists vehemently contested
such illegal importations. They met with less success preventing northeastern merchants from
illegally supplying foreign places with slaves, though as we have seen it was not for lack of
effort. Most galling to abolitionists was the South Carolina legislature’s decision to open the
Palmetto State’s borders to fresh importations in 1803. In the five years between 1803 and 1807,
merchants imported 59,938 slave to the United States, the overwhelming majority to South
Carolina and a smattering to Georgia, the last major period of slave importations in American
history. More than half of the ships that undertook slaving voyages and sold their victims in the
United States either registered in or embarked from South Carolina.56 There is significant
evidence to suggest that New England merchants began to register ships outside their home
states to evade potential prosecution, because northeastern abolitionists had hounded their slavetrading neighbors for years to the best of their ability.57

**********

American Convention, Minutes… (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, 1801), p. 6.
TASTD, search conducted 8 January 2018.
57
On strategies to evade state-level slave trade prohibitions, see Marques, The Transatlantic U.S. Slave
Trade.
55
56

207

In addition to battling the slave trades, abolition societies expended tremendous effort to
prevent the illegal re-enslavement of men, women, and children on the path to freedom as per
state abolition legislation, as well as promoting private manumissions. As Richard Newman has
persuasively detailed, PAS members labored assiduously to protect Afro-Pennsylvanians from
being claimed as chattel property contrary to the Keystone State’s 1780 abolition law.58 To that
end, the society diligently recorded manumissions and indentures of Pennsylvania blacks, as well
as illegally imported Africans like those in the cases of the Prudent and Phoebe. The PAS also
kept detailed records of free black Americans in neighboring slave states Virginia, Maryland,
and Delaware, often at the request of the kin and acquaintances of free blacks who wanted
assurance that freedom documentation was accessible if necessary. This sphere of activity, more
than any other, endeared the PAS to black communities across the mid-Atlantic and New
England. The society’s records are, in many ways, defined by the ledgers of manumissions and
indentures several waves of society members maintained in the decades after its re-formation in
1784. The PAS Indenture Books served a practical purpose, as a back-up to the potential loss of
state government-stored manumission and indenture agreements. To PAS members and free
black communities, the ledgers signified more than quotidian records; they were an archive of
freedom, a bulwark against methods of fraudulent re-enslavement masters unscrupulously
practiced.
To peruse the PAS manumission and indenture ledgers is to see the process of gradual
abolition unfold chronologically. The indenture arrangements that typically accompanied private
manumissions varied widely; while Pennsylvania’s 1780 abolition law clearly proscribed that
children born to enslaved mothers were to be freed at twenty-eight, it was vaguer about the
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procedures for slaves born before the law passed. In addition, the law did not prevent the
manumission of children born to enslaved mothers before age twenty-eight, and PAS members
promoted the manumission of indentured adolescents and young adults whenever possible. The
volume of indentures increased as the 1780s and 1790s progressed. In page after page of eight,
six-column entries, the PAS recorded waves of freedom that attained by Afro-Pennsylvanians in
the first decade of the nineteenth century.59
PAS Indenture Book C, for example, records 166 indenture and manumission
agreements, and they reveal a wide variety of arrangements. The lengths of indenture before
manumission typically ranged from two to twelve years. Generally speaking, the indenture
lengths for adults aligned with the customary terms of European indentures, from four to seven
years. The term lengths typically corresponded to an individual’s age; thus, terms longer than ten
years usually applied to children and adolescents. Adults rarely served indenture terms longer
than seven years before full manumission.60 In some cases, where financially possible, PAS
members themselves served as masters to enslaved individuals transitioning from slavery to
servitude, and eventually freedom. This was especially true of Thomas Harrison, a man of
somewhat limited personal financial means who nonetheless served as guarantor for dozens of
manumissions, often using PAS funds raised for the purpose. Abolitionist attorney and PAS
Counsel William Lewis attended to much of the legal work, filing manumission and indenture
agreements regularly throughout in the 1780s and early 1790s. Lewis refused to be compensated
for his work, and as the PAS’s first historian noted in 1845, he even had to be convinced to
accept a gift of a “three-pint silver can.” Anxious not to be viewed as profiting from his legal
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assistance, Lewis reluctantly accepted the gift “as a mark of respect from the society, but not as
gratuity for services rendered, for which he determined never to receive a pecuniary award.”61
In New York, the N-YMS also operated as a clearinghouse of manumission and indenture
records, a singularly important task given that the ownership of slaves as chattel property was not
abolished in the Empire State until 1799. Before then, the N-YMS saw its efforts to protect free
and indentured blacks from illegal enslavement as perhaps the most critical aspect of its
activities. The society’s Standing Committee minutes invariably began with reports of pending
freedom cases. The November 1797 minutes, for example, opened by noting that of eighteen
open complaints made by black New Yorkers, “three have been settled and the persons are now
at liberty.” In another case, the Standing Committee member’s direct “interference” led to
another person gaining freedom. The other fifteen cases remained “undecided,” and the
Committee added that ten additional cases brought the Society’s freedom adjudication docket up
to twenty-four.62
The passage of New York’s 1799 gradual abolition act stimulated unscrupulous masters
to illegally attempt to sell slaves and servants “down South” to the rapidly expanding plantation
economies of South Carolina and Georgia. In May 1800, less than a year after the act passed, the
N-YMS noted ruefully that in order for the act to have full effect, a policy of containment must
be pursued. The society’s Standing Committee reported that “a practice has become pretty
generall—to ship Negroes from this to the Southern states & that from thence they are reshipped
to the West Indies and then sold.” The Committee had been informed that foreign nationals
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especially operated this illegal business in New York City. Their intelligence indicated that
“certain Frenchmen have employed an office for some time” to conduct the nefarious and illegal
business. The Committee promised to make significant efforts to “detect and punish the authors
but they have hitherto eluded them.”63
At mid-decade, the N-YMS continued to grapple with freedom cases. In July 1806, the
Standing Committee noted that sixteen new cases reached the society’s attention over the course
of that summer. A worrying number of new cases emerged from New Jersey, where gradual
abolition legislation finally passed the state assembly in 1804. The cases consisted “mostly of
persons, illegally disposed of from the State of New Jersey into this, some of which being so
important we think it necessary to detail.” In yet another instance, a Frenchman apparently made
a business of illegal human trafficking. Under cover of night, the man, Augustus Massot,
attempted to transport four persons to slavery in Savannah, Georgia. One of the four, an
unnamed woman, managed to escape “as she was brought from the Prison door & so sent on
board,” after which she managed to alert N-YMS members. Several of the Standing Committee,
“with 2 or 3 others from our Society,” discovered that the brig Hope was set to sail the next
morning and immediately “took out a suit” against the ship’s captain and engaged a Deputy
Thomas to remove the illegally enslaved persons from the vessel. Two of the three recaptured
persons were immediately set free. One of these was a man who had been free for several years,
residing in New York City with his wife and children. Massot apparently convinced the man to
drink until he was in a “perfect state of intoxication” and then hustled him aboard the Hope, a
method of kidnapping that would be echoed decades later in the better known, unfortunate
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experience of Solomon Northrup detailed in Twelve Years A Slave. A doctor claimed the third
recaptured person, “a Lad of about sixteen years of age,” charging that boy had been kidnapped.
Aided by the brave woman who escaped Massot’s clutches, the N-YMS members arrived just in
time.64
The Massot case took an interesting turn the following morning, as several members of
the Standing Committee visited New York City Mayor DeWitt Clinton. They inquired whether
Clinton had granted a permit to the Frenchman to export any slaves; in a somewhat dismaying
reply, Clinton affirmed “he had granted [Massot] a permit for seven, including the names of
those that were found on board the vessel.” But the Committee members informed Clinton that
Massot had lied in the affidavit presented to the mayor in applying for permission to export his
“slaves.” While Massot claimed that they had been his property for more than one year, the
society could in fact prove that “two of the seven were free people and the remaining five, if
legally his property could only have been so for two or three weeks.” Apparently upset that
Massot had lied to him, Clinton immediately issued a writ for the Frenchman. Suspecting his
ruse had failed, he fled New York City to avoid prosecution— potentially both significant fines
and jail time—for having committed “this act of atrocity.”65
Unfortunately for the N-YMS, but more importantly for the men, women, and children
who suffered such kidnappings, abolition societies were not always successful in preventing
illegal kidnappings, as in the case of Augustus Massot. Although the Frenchman made his escape
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from New York City just in time and did not face the harsh sword of justice, the six of the seven
persons he claimed as slaves regained their personal liberty. But other men, as devious as
Massot, tried to circumvent gradual abolition and anti-kidnapping laws, and they did sometimes
succeed. However, while this theme has been developed by some modern scholars to argue for
the ineffectiveness of northeastern state abolition, and implicitly that northeastern whites
uniformly did not have humanitarian sympathies for black Americans, other, more preponderant,
evidence suggests that gradual abolition was in fact far more thoroughgoing and ultimately
successful.
The N-YMS records show that the rate of slave manumissions began to rise sharply after
1805, which correlated with the ongoing process of emancipation the state assembly initiated in
1799. As the first decade of the nineteenth century came to a close, a large and growing number
of black New Yorkers transitioned from the legal status of chattel property, into a form of
indentured servitude. The state assembly’s acceleration of the emancipation process as part of the
re-drafting of the state constitution in 1819 also led to a spike in indentures preparatory to
abolition. This ongoing process, in the words of a recent historian, created an “antislavery
generation” of children born free to parents held to service as slaves or servants. Between May
and June 1819, for example, masters in New York City alone privately manumitted more than
one hundred slaves, including three owned by Samuel L. Mitchill, a botanist, university
professor, and outspoken proponent of antislavery political economy.66
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In a closely related sphere of activity, the abolition societies expended significant
resources representing free blacks illegally claimed as fugitive slaves, most often from the
Chesapeake slave states. The PAS and N-YMS encountered such cases frequently, especially the
former given its shared borders with Virginia and Maryland. A string of PAS secretaries
maintained correspondence with free blacks and their abolitionist allies in Virginia, Maryland,
and Delaware in the Early Republic. PAS members like Thomas Harrison and longtime society
President James Pemberton remained ready to forward certified copies of freedom papers kept
on file in their records, or to lend legal assistance to blacks claimed as fugitives if needed.
Though the problems of fugitive slaves, illegal kidnapping, and protecting the personal liberty of
blacks in the Free states are more often identified with the antebellum decades and the coming of
the Civil War, they were equally important to abolitionism in the Early Republic.
Alongside the abolition societies, individual abolitionists also participated in offering
protection to free blacks’ personal liberty, as well as assisting African-Americans in a variety of
legal and quasi-legal capacities. Rhode Island abolitionist Moses Brown spent his entire life
assisting free blacks in many ways, and developed close relationships with a network of black
Rhode Islanders, including several individuals and their families owned by him and his wife who
he manumitted in 1773 after his conversion to Quakerism. Brown employed free and servant
black men at this family’s spermaceti works beginning in the 1760s, as laborers on compulsory
civic maintenance projects in Providence, and at the textile spinning firm he founded with sonin-law William Almy and English expert mechanic Samuel Slater in 1789.67 Brown also offered
assistance in a number of formal and informal ways, from serving as a character witness, to
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securing loans, to functioning as a private savings bank for freed blacks with whom he was
personally acquainted.
In late 1794, for example, Brown’s attention was drawn to the troubles of Caesar, a man
he previously employed at the spermaceti works, who had run into trouble trying to protect his
father’s deed to land against confiscation for debts in Dudley, Georgia. Three years prior, Brown
had apparently written to one Edward Davis on the matter, though a foggy memory prevented the
almost sixty year old from recalling exactly. Brown went to the length of perusing letter copies
from the previous four years, in an attempt to determine if he had written on Caesar’s behalf. In
any case, Brown’s understanding was that Caesar had been unfairly deprived of the land by a
man named Colgrove, and he noted that “it is possable [sic] some person may have written in my
name as I have had some such things done…” Brown asked Davis, “please to compare the hand
writing of the Letter in thy hand with this and if it is the same please to send it… with thy order
and the mony [sic] shall be paid thee if I therein promised…” Brown wanted to ensure that
Caesar was properly protected from being deceived by Colgrove, who “had professed to be his
friend and seemed to have confidence in him…” Here Brown offered to serve not only as a
guarantor, but as a concerned friend worried that a free black acquaintance would be unfairly
deceived.68
Another example of abolitionist service is the efforts of wealthy Quaker capitalist Elisha
Tyson, born in Pennsylvania and who spent his adult life in Maryland, amassing a fortune in the
grain milling business and real estate. For decades Tyson served as an active member of the
Maryland Society for the Abolition of Slavery, and devoted his energies to assisting fugitive
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slaves and protecting blacks falsely claimed as fugitives. Typically, Tyson first personally
approached masters accused of illegally claiming persons as slaves. If personal persuasion failed,
Tyson then “proceeded to employ counsel” to file freedom petitions in local courts, “the case
prosecuted to final determination. In an adoring biography of Tyson published after his death, his
son John claimed that Elisha’s lawyers very rarely lost freedom cases, especially in the
Baltimore County Court. The longtime “president” of that Court, Judge Joseph Hopper
Nicholson, though a slaveholder from the Eastern Shore, had apparently been persuaded to act
with humanity by Tyson in deciding freedom cases.69
Although Tyson usually preferred to use personal persuasion and local courts to provide
help to free persons claimed as slaves, he also used political means. In May 1811, Tyson wrote to
members of Congress with whom he made acquaintance and promised to provide information on
the cases of kidnapped free and servant blacks. In the case of Abraham Long, Tyson attested that
“this boy was born on the Eastern Shore [Maryland] & was bound out by his mother.”
Kidnapped and taken to New Orleans, Long was brought to Baltimore by a Dr. Blackburn, who
used him as a “waiting man.” Luckily, Long “made his case known” in Baltimore, and with the
help of the Maryland Society a freedom petition was filed and he received his freedom. “Negro
Phebe,” from Staten Island, New York, “was manumitted to be free at the expiration of a term of
years which had nearly expired,” but tragically was “privately sold” with the purpose of sending
her to New Orleans. “By accident” her case came to the attention of Baltimore citizens (where
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she was imprisoned before shipment to New Orleans), one of whom filed a writ of habeus
corpus on her behalf, whereupon Phebe gained her freedom.70
The experiences of Fairfield, Connecticut resident Isaac Hillard perhaps best illustrates
the actions northeasterners with abolitionist sympathies undertook to uphold state abolition, and
also the intransigence of former masters and kidnappers eager to profit from illegal human
trafficking. Hillard’s story also shows that public antipathy to chattel slavery and human
trafficking was at times widespread, but not absolute, in the Northeast. In 1789, Hillard traveled
to Virginia and was shocked to find two young girls that he recognized, born free in Derby,
Connecticut, kidnapped and sold into slavery. He was so moved that he resolved to prosecute the
two kidnappers under the provisions of Connecticut’s 1788 anti-slave trade law, designed in
Hillard’s words “to punish all those who were wicked enough to steal, or kidnap free negroes,
and carry them off to into other states, and sell them for slaves.” While public opinion across the
Northeast generally disliked against human trafficking, in Fairfield the accused kidnappers and
their allies had enough sway to make Hillard’s prosecution “very unpopular.” In particular, they
accused him of initiating the suits in order to profit from potential fines, tarring him as the selfinterested profiteer. This triggered a seven-year legal battle in which Hillard expended
significant time and money combatting illegal human trafficking.71
In a fourteen-page pamphlet printed at his own expense, Hillard detailed the legal travails
of the case. First, in 1790, the Fairfield County court abated Hillard’s writs, without explanation.
He then appealed repeatedly to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which delayed considering the
suit because of several technical errors in its preparation. “Under these heavy discouragements,”
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Hillard decided to petition the Connecticut Assembly directly, basing his case on the fact he had
only tried to help enforce an Assembly law. He asked the Assembly to grant him an
appropriation equal to the potential fine so that he could continue to finance the case, which the
Assembly approved. Finally, in June 1797, the state Supreme Court of Errors decided in
Hillard’s—and the now adolescents’—favor and forced the two kidnappers to pay fines and
travel to Virginia to purchase the girls and bring them back to Connecticut. Buoyed by this hardearned success, Hillard decided to continue prosecuting other cases of illegal kidnapping,
including several cases of illegal kidnapping of Connecticut free blacks and their sale in New
York.72
Understandably, Hillard was extremely frustrated by the public reaction to his
prosecution of the case, and his address to the public reads with more than a hint of martyrdom.
He repeatedly referred to “wicked” and “unprincipled, impudent men,” and claimed that “it is
hard to find one man in Connecticut, but who professes to disapprove of, and openly bears
testimony against kidnapping, and sending those called slaves out of state; but to my surprise…
are willing to have free children sold.”73 Surely many in Connecticut felt hostility towards
Hillard’s actions, but just as surely many genuinely disliked illegal human trafficking. After all,
according to Hillard, the 1788 state law was passed by an elected Assembly, and he defended his
actions by asking, “have I not done, what the legislature meant to have done?”
Northeastern abolition societies, their members, and individuals with antislavery
convictions viewed the prevention of slave importations and the sale of slaves out of state, as
well as illegal kidnappings, as critical in containing chattel slavery within their boundaries,
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thereby isolating the institution and preventing its expansion. Combined with fighting the slave
trades, abolitionists’ assiduous work recording indentures and promoting manumissions, and
laboring to protect against violations of personal liberty and illegal kidnappings, helped rid the
mid-Atlantic and New England of chattel slavery within a few decades. While it has become
common in modern scholarship to make William Lloyd Garrison and his “immediatist” followers
the litmus test of true abolitionism, and to downgrade the radical nature of Early National
abolitionist activities, Garrison could not have operated the way he later would without the
template set by the ‘first-wave’ of abolitionism. Members of the N-YMS, PAS, the Providence
Society, and others were directly responsible for freeing far more enslaved persons than
Garrisonians ever did.

**********

Through 1808, neither antislavery nor proslavery partisans could plausibly claim to have
secured the upper hand in the national Congress. Continuous tension defined the politics of
slavery, the slave trade, and abolitionism, and yawning questions remained unanswered. Most
importantly, the politically explosive conflicts over slavery and western expansion that would
absorb later generations had yet to be addressed directly. Yet it also seemed clear that support for
heavily regulating the slave trade, within constitutional bounds, was significant in Congress, the
state legislatures, and northeastern popular opinion. By 1808, all of the states on the eastern
seaboard prohibited slave importations, with the exception of South Carolina reopening her
borders to slave importations in 1803, though the proximate reasons for doing so varied. In the
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Northeast, sustained anti-slave trade organizing overtook merchant opposition to slave trade
prohibitions. In the Upper South, slave market saturation led Virginia and Maryland to become
exporters of enslaved people to the Lower South. In the latter states, legislatures passed
prohibitory laws to curb the introduction of dangerous slaves fresh from Africa, as well as
potentially revolutionary West Indian slaves. In 1798, Congress even prohibited slave
importations to the Mississippi Territory, and in 1803 to the Louisiana Territory, though the
prohibitions were only temporary.74
Debates in Congress over the future of foreign slave importations in the Early Republic
effectively ended in March 1807. The final phase of slave trade debate before national abolition
began at the 9th Congress, in December 1805, when Representative James Sloan of New Jersey
proposed to levy the ten-dollar tax on slave importations allowed for in the Constitution’s slave
trade clause. Debate recommenced after the holiday break the following January, and Lower
South representatives again voiced their vehement disapproval of federal government
intervention in slavery-related issues. Congressmen like Robert Marion of South Carolina, while
admitting that the proposed tax was technically constitutional, claimed the measure unfairly
burdened slave importing states. Henry Southard of New Jersey agreed—the proposed tax was
constitutional—his “only regret was, that it was not in the power of Congress to lay a more
effectual tax.”75
The debate continued along lines familiar to legislators and political observers since
1790. Should Sloan’s resolution be reworded to replace the word ‘persons’ to ‘slaves’ for
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purposes of the tax, Connecticut’s Samuel Dana wondered? That would be closer to the truth of
the matter.76 Sloan’s suggestion elicited full throated responses in the negative from southerners
like Willis Alston of South Carolina, who attempted to stall the discussion by asking what good
the ten dollar tax would do when Congress could potentially abolish the foreign trade in two
short years. Such a tax, Pennsylvania’s John Smilie responded pithily, would accomplish a
“higher object” than merely raising revenue: it would signal Congress’s “disapprobation of this
traffic” and “manifest to the world that, as the Representatives of a free people, we will, as far as
we can, express our opinion of it.”77 The resolution was then postponed. But antislavery
congressmen insisted on using Congress’s constitutional power to its utmost extent through the
slave trade clause and past congressional legislative precedent, while southerners worked to
stone-wall those efforts.
Debate over the proposed tax continued to smolder throughout the remainder of the
session. In February 1806, Massachusetts Representative Silas Bidwell gave a lengthy speech in
which he summarized the recent legislative and constitutional history of the foreign slave trade.
While respecting the institution of slavery in states where it existed, he about a “new doctrine”
recently developed by several of his southern colleagues. Proponents of the “new doctrine”
argued that Article 1, Section 9 was a “mere negative provision,” not containing “positive words
of grant,” and which did not “consequently give Congress a power to lay such a prohibition”
even after 1808. This Bidwell argued, was not true. Why, then, would the Constitutional
Convention have specifically restrained Congress from exercising a granted power until a certain
date if that power did not exist?78 If the “new doctrine” was logically and constitutionally
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correct, how could one explain the acts of 1794, 1800, and the later supplementary act in 1803?
The truth was that slaves were merchandise like any other goods for sale. “The very principle of
slavery is that the slave is the property of his master, subject to transfer by bargain and sale,” he
sighed, and everyone knew that Congress most certainly had the power to tax commercial
merchandise.79 Bidwell then proposed a slave trade abolition statute that would take effect on
January 1, 1808. Southerners quickly squashed the proposal, but they could not hold out
indefinitely.
Debate over the proposed ten-dollar tax subsided as the session wore on into spring. In
early February, days after Bidwell’s proposed abolition bill, the American Convention presented
a petition in support of a January 1, 1808 date for slave trade abolition to Congress, not a subtle
reminder of their stand on the issue. At the same time, the future of slavery in the new territories
of the Louisiana Purchase, and petitions by slaveholders in the Indiana Territory to make slavery
legal in portions of the Northwest Territory, complicated matters.80 These interrelated problems
created a divisive atmosphere surrounding the issue of slave importations. In the end, the
questions raised by the debates over the proposed importation tax, and whether Congress could
set a legislative timetable for the abolition of the slave trade had to wait until the next session of
the 9th Congress, convened in December 1806.
A recent detailed examination of the 9th Congress’s discussion of the foreign slave trade
from December 1806 until March 1807 concludes that, though the debate was lengthy, the
shocking attempts of Aaron Burr and his associates to foment rebellion in the southwestern
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territories “overshadowed” the slave trade debates.81 Though they revealed sectional discord
concerning slavery, according to this interpretation, ultimately the passage of the Atlantic slave
trade abolition act was a sideshow to other more salacious events, and implicitly a fait accompli.
In the context of the discussion of previous constitutional parameters and the permissibility of
foreign slave trade regulation, however, these debates read more as the culmination of longdeveloping conflict. Moreover, the 9th Congress’s second session would devote more time to
debating and discussing the foreign slave trade than had any previous Congress.
The debate commenced early in the session. On December 2, 1806, President Thomas
Jefferson sent a message to both houses of Congress asking them to consider a bill to abolish the
foreign slave trade, and Senator Stephen Bradley of Vermont proposed a bill, to take effect on
January 1, 1808. The initial draft the bill contained six sections that abolished slave importations
into the states and territories of the Union, incorporating provisions concerning the outfitting and
operation of slave ships taken almost verbatim from various sections of the 1794, 1800, and 1803
acts.82 The most divisive subject that the 9th Congress’s second session considered apropos the
proposed legislation was the status of slaves recovered aboard alleged slave vessels. Should
violators forfeit property rights in recaptured slaves, like the vessels used to transport them into
the United States?83 New Jersey’s James Sloan quickly attempted to insert an amendment that
would make all such persons immediately free, to which members from the Lower South
immediately objected.
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In response, Massachusetts’ Bidwell argued that “the United States [should] not take
property themselves, or pass it over to any other person,” and thus that “the property shall
entirely terminate.”84 Southern congressmen immediately, and predictably, objected to such a
proposal. They argued the provision would make the law unenforceable, as the several states
“interested” in slavery would never do submit to such as policy. Georgia’s Peter Early argued
that such a provision “would be, to turn loose, in the bosom of the country, firebrands that would
consume” slaveholders.85 The issue arose in almost every debate on the subject through February
1807, in part because past congressional discussion of slave trade regulation had never seriously
confronted the issue, as earlier debates centered on the constitutional limits and possibilities of
federal regulation and their implications. And as evidenced by the acts of 1794, 1800, and 1803,
all made constitutionally possible by the ambiguity of the slave trade clause, no serious argument
could be made that Congress did not have the right to legislate on the subject. By early 1807 it
seemed clear that an abolition bill of some kind was in the offing.
Passed on March 2, 1807, the ten-section piece of legislation was significantly longer and
more complex than previous congressional legislation on American participation in the foreign
slave trade. The act opened by declaring it “unlawful to import or bring into the United States or
the territories thereof from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro, mulatto, or person
of color, as a slave, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose” such person “as a slave, or to be held to
service or labor.”86 It also reiterated, almost verbatim, the prohibition against outfitting vessels
for the slave trade under penalty of forfeiture contained in the 1800 federal law. The owners of
such ships, in addition to the forfeiture of their property, also faced a fine of $20,000, and a five
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thousand dollar fine awaited any “citizen, citizens, or any person resident within the jurisdiction”
of the United States for transporting captives to the United States with the intent to sell or hold
them as slaves.87 Any citizen convicted of having actually sold slave captives in the United
States, in addition to fines, faced no less than five and no more than ten years in prison. Those
convicted of having purchased a slave imported from any foreign country, place, or kingdom, or
from the dominions of any “foreign state, immediately adjoining to the United States,” knowing
that the slave or slaves were imported for the purpose, faced fines of eight hundred dollars per
each slave purchased.
The act also prohibited slave ships outfitted for the trade from docking in the any of the
territorial waters of the United States, and authorized the president to dispatch United States
Navy ships to prevent such actions. Also prohibited was the coastwise use of ships weighing less
than forty tons in the domestic slave trade, a provision that ran counter to southern interests, as
ships weighing less than forty tons were regularly used to transport slaves between United States
ports.88 Finally, it required that slave vessels weighing forty tons or more provide detailed ship
manifests to prove conclusively that their slave cargoes had not been purchased and loaded for
transport after January 1, 1808, and provided detailed instructions on the procedures to ensure
compliance with the law.
The main sticking point in the 9th Congress’s debates, the fate of captives forfeited from
slaving vessels, produced the provision that historians generally agree was the largest loophole in
the bill. As written, the act declared that individuals caught illegally importing slaves
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immediately forfeited any “right or title whatsoever” to the captives. Such persons were to
remain subject to “any regulation, not contravening the provisions of this act, which the
legislatures of the several states or territories at any time hereafter may make, for disposing of
any such negro, mulatto, or person of color.”89 The federal government could not possess
captured slaves and dispose of them, and the states retained full control of the fate of such
persons. In the hands of southern state legislatures, this meant that potential to skirt the 1807 act
existed. But, the ambiguity of that single provision should not obscure the larger significance of
the act. For the first time, and at the first constitutionally permissible moment, the United States
Congress acted to abolish an adjunct of slavery in the United States.
In March 1806, shortly before national abolition of the slave trade and as abolition
proceeded rapidly in the northeastern states, a concerned citizen wrote to Vice President James
Madison on the future of slavery in the United States. Writing as “A Western Virginian,” he
argued that “There exists an awful & Growing evile in our hapy country, viz, Slavery. This is a
curs which British policy entailed on us, and in my humble oppenion as honist & wise men it is
incumbant on Every American to use every practicable means to extricate ourselves hastily from
this evile.” As Americans who lived through the Revolution well knew, slaves could be
dangerous internal enemies at all times, and especially in times of war. While the man was
critical of the political powers slaveholders wielded in Virginia, which they used to stave off
gradual emancipation in the 1780s, he still hoped that southern legislatures would see the
wisdom of imposing abolition as had happened in the Northeast. Warning that “St. domingo is a
solomn lesson to the most partial advocate of Slavery,” the western Virginian urged Madison and
by implication all southern slaveholders “to View the Farms of Pennsylvania & the northern
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States & Compare them with those of the South & see the drary Effects of that pernitious
practice even in time of Peace!” The West Virginian urged Madison to use his power to promote
black resettlement projects designed to encourage gradual, voluntary abolition, but his central
message was unambiguous: slavery was a moral and “political sin.” By the end of presidential
Jefferson’s administration and the beginning of Madison’s, it is fair to say that most
northeasterners certainly agreed, at least in principle. 90
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Ch. 5: The Fruits of Northeastern State Abolition, II: Visions of Northeastern Economic
Development in the Early Republic, 1787-1800

In October 1787, Pennsylvania Abolition Society (PAS) member Robert Wood, Jr. wrote
to fellow PAS member John Parrish on the subject of Samson. Samson was enslaved in Africa in
adolescence, sold first in Barbados and then taken to Philadelphia, where he was freed around
age thirty before settling with his family in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. “I had a few
minutes with him,” wrote Wood, “& enquired about his imigration [sic], freedom, and purchase
of his wife and children.” Samson purchased the freedom of his wife and two children shortly
after he earned his own in 1770, and thereafter had six more children, including a pair of twins.
Wood particularly wanted to describe Samson and his family’s quality-of-life in rural
Cumberland County. He noted that the Samson and his wife “brought up their children
reputably,” and carved out a comfortable life. Samson possessed “seven or eight acres of pretty
good land, has built a comfortable House on it. I suppose the land cost him one hundred fifty
pounds.” Samson also informed Wood that he was “clear of debt & has a Horse, Cattles, &
farming utensils & all necessary household furniture- he has been free seventeen years or
thereabouts.” Samson’s life story encompassed the whole of the Atlantic slaving complex. He
survived enslavement in Africa, harsh slavery in the Caribbean, and a milder variant of bondage
in Pennsylvania. Unlike the millions of enslaved Africans who perished on the Middle Passage
or in bondage in Americas, however, Samson once again tasted freedom. Though Samson gained
freedom before Pennsylvania’s famed 1780 abolition law was passed, his ability to attain
competency for himself and his free household was indicative of northeastern abolitionists’
desire to replace chattel slavery with human capital—freedmen, women, and children operating
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in household-based economic units as free, unbound agents.1 Samson and his family most
certainly encountered racism and discrimination, and perhaps that was why they relocated to
rural Cumberland County. But they possessed physical mobility and economic opportunity.
That members of the PAS took an interest in Samson and his family was unsurprising.
Formed in 1775 and re-organized in 1784, the PAS’s members undertook a wide variety of
activities related to slavery and slave trade abolition, including visitations to inquire after freed
persons like Wood’s visit to Samson. Abolitionists in the PAS and other northeastern state and
local antislavery societies like the New-York Manumission Society and the Providence Society
for Abolishing the Slave-Trade operated in a rapidly changing economic context. In the midAtlantic and New England states, where slavery abolition was initiated or would be shortly after
1788, a transition to capitalism in the countryside, towns, and cities unfolded simultaneously.2
Robert Wood, Jr. to John Parrish, 8 October 1787, PASP, Series II, Loose Correspondence, Incoming:
1784-1795. Compare the framing of Samson and his family’s economic opportunity in a postemancipation context offered here to the narrative of the Venture Smith, who purchased his and his
family’s freedom in Rhode Island by 1772. In his 1797 memoir, Smith recounts many episodes of white
men who attempted to capture the fruits of his enslaved and free labor through devious means. The
salient point for this discussion, however, is the fact that Smith was able to purchase freedom, “vexed” as
his relationship to emergent northeastern capitalist relations might have been. See Venture Smith, A
Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture, A Native of Africa: But Resident Above Sixty Years in the United
States of America (New London, CT: 1797). For a perceptive analysis of Smith’s experience with slavery,
freedom, and capitalism, see David Waldstreicher, “The Vexed Story of Human Commodification Told
By Benjamin Franklin and Venture Smith,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 24 No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp.
268-278.
2
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transformation. Though this debate has faded, at the very least it can be asserted that a transition within
northeastern agrarian social and economic structures, defined by market dependence and the spread of
wage labor relations and a shift away from subsistence farming, was accelerating in the 1790s. For
overviews of the transition debates, see Allan Kulikoff, “The Transition to Capitalism in Rural America,”
The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 46 No. 1 (January 1989), pp. 120-144; Christopher Clark, “Rural
American and the Transition to Capitalism,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 16 No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp.
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dependence well into the nineteenth century. Clark’s 1991 book, The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western
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As subsistence farming transitioned into family agricultural economies partially dependent on
waged work, and as household manufacturing slowly shifted towards proto-industrial production,
the abolition of chattel slavery was both a cause and a consequence of the ongoing northeastern
capitalist transformation. After the Revolution, the northeastern regional economies, freed from
British imperial policy that retarded American manufacturing, underwent a transformation rooted
in agricultural improvement and the expansion of consumption markets, with depth and intensity
lacking in the Upper and Lower South.3 While men and women of all ranks in the Northeast did
not always verbalize the relationship between slavery abolition and capitalist development, the
two processes operated in a dialectic. As the northeastern regional economies increasingly
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that free household farmers produced for markets when advantageous, but preferred to remain
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economies of the Northeast were “composite,” a mixture of subsistence and market dependence, but
rapidly accelerating towards commercial production, a view I endorse. More recent scholarship has
called into question whether a search for the origins of the northern capitalist transformation, or even
whether an accepted definition of “capitalism,” are strictly necessary. For an overview of these positions,
see Seth Rockman, “What Makes the History of Capitalism Newsworthy?” Journal of the Early Republic,
Vol. 34 No. 4 (Fall 2014), pp. 439-466. The most recent work on Early American economic development
tends to focus on finance, international trade, and the formal and informal economies of domestic
commodity distribution and consumption. See the essays collected in Brian P. Luskey and Wendy A.
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3
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oriented towards more sophisticated methods of domestic production, state abolition of chattel
slavery contributed to the spread of capitalist labor relations, which encouraged the further
development of free household economic units with members that worked for wages outside the
home.
The fruits of northeastern state abolition ripened unevenly and always encountered
resistance from southern slaveholding politicians and their political allies, a wealthy sector of
urban mercantile interests. The causes and consequences of northeastern state abolition, and the
shift in political economy it wrought, were apparent several ways. First, as we have seen, state
abolition led to the rapid emergence of organized antislavery in the 1780s and early 1790s.
Local, state, and eventually national societies in the mid-Atlantic and New England agitated to
uphold state slavery abolition, and also devoted significant time and resources to petitioning the
Confederation and Federal Congresses to circumscribe the slave trades at the local, state, and
national levels, though political opposition from slaveholders and their allies and the limitations
of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution often thwarted their efforts. The fruits of
northeastern state abolition were also evident in the proliferation of a culture of improvement in
agriculture and manufacturing across the Northeast. Improvement enthusiasts with antislavery
sentiments of varying intensity, from outright abolitionists like Moses Brown to the more
circumspect antislavery beliefs of Tench Coxe and Alexander Hamilton, to name but a few,
developed visions of economic development premised on the absence of chattel slavery. The
types of agricultural improvements they promoted, their motivations in promoting domestic
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manufacturing, and the political and economic structures they envisioned would abet their goals
amounted to antislavery capitalism.4

**********

The 1780s were depression years for the new nation. After war with Britain ended in
winter 1781, the American regional economies suffered from the collapse of the export trades to
the Americas and Europe. Before independence, British imperial policy discouraged North
American industrial-scale manufacturing of dozens of goods, and in the 1780s most Americans
lived in small towns or the countryside and still produced many of their own articles of
consumption, or purchased them in local markets. In large towns and cities, foreign textiles and
manufactures were more common, and by the mid-1780s urban northeastern markets flooded
with cheap imported goods offered to enterprising merchants by British and European firms
eager to regain access to American consumers. Fearful that political independence from Britain
would result in economic dependence, some influential Americans began to promote the
production and consumption of household and proto-industrial domestic manufactures.
Promotion of northeastern domestic manufacturing was inspired by very real concerns that cheap

David Brion Davis has described the worldview of capitalist entrepreneurs with antislavery convictions
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and indeed celebrated—child labor in their establishments. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of
Revolution, esp. pp. 250-254. The central point for this discussion is not to deny that antislavery capitalists
were driven by profit motives, nor is it to argue that capitalist labor regimes presented unqualified
positive benefits for laborers. Rather, it is to argue that antislavery capitalists disdained the utter control
that slaveholders legally exercised over the lives and bodies of the enslaved, and believed slavery an
immoral and wasteful economic system.
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foreign manufactures, and the wealthy merchants that profited from them, would push the United
States into a pseudo-colonial economic position. Thus New Jersey Gov. William Livingston
wondered “by what strange fatality… has our homespun gone out of fashion... why is this
practice so generally discontinued at present? Must we necessarily determine upon a domestic,
because we have acquired a political revolution?”5 Livingston’s concern was that cheap foreign
manufactures undermined American economic independence and prevented domestic
manufacturing development. Livingston and other northeastern leaders like Tench Coxe believed
that to achieve a balance between free household agriculture and domestic manufacturing and
consumption was to secure national, or at least northeastern regional prosperity.
On August 9, 1787, as the Constitutional Convention prepared to conclude its
deliberations, Tench Coxe presented a speech to the Pennsylvania Society for the
Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts. The Pennsylvania Society, which
anticipated the formation of the better-known Society for the Encouragement of Useful
Manufactures in 1791, pledged to further American economic independence by replacing
foreign-made goods with domestic manufactures.6 A former merchant, land speculator, and

“Homespun,” American Museum, X: p. 17. Quoted in Rolla Milton Tryon, Household Manufactures in the
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(Philadelphia: Aitken & Son, 1787). Coxe wrote the plan, and he was responsible for much of the
organizational impetus behind the Society’s founding. The most thorough biography of Coxe is Jacob E.
Cooke, Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978). On the
foundation of the Pennsylvania Society, see Ibid., p. 102. Martin Öhman, “Perfecting Independence:
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developing theorist of early republican political economy, Coxe used the society’s invitation to
describe how private and public support for manufacturing would solidify the young nation’s
economic independence. He gestured to the United States’ overwhelming bounty of natural
resources—as well as the overwhelmingly agricultural orientation of the American regional
economies—to drum up enthusiasm for manufacturing initiatives. He reminded his audience that
in their previous condition as British colonies, imperial policy prevented manufacturing
development. Having secured independence, the nation’s future economic prosperity was best
assured by promoting manufacturing, and he was careful to note that “in taking measures to
promote the object” of domestic manufactures, “nothing should be attempted, which may injure
our agricultural interests, they being undoubtedly the most important.”
Rather than posing a fundamental conflict between manufacturing and agriculture, Coxe
developed a vision of national and regional economic development in which the manufacturing
and agriculture sectors mutually reinforced each other, while commerce played a secondary role
as a supplier of goods that could not be made using North American resources. “We may venture
to assert,” Coxe announced to fellow members of the Pennsylvania Society, “that more profit to
the individual and riches to the nation will be derived from some manufactures, which promote
agriculture, than from any species of cultivation whatever.”7 Coxe saw the development of
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(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). Peskin explores the intellectual history of
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American manufacturing capability as a boon to agriculture, not an attack on its primacy. But
even as Coxe viewed agriculture as indispensable to economic growth, he did not view
necessarily chattel slaves as the nation’s primary agricultural labor force.
Coxe articulated his faith in the promise of manufacturing as an engine of economic
growth by countering objections to government support for the useful arts that emphasized
factory work regimes’ supposed ill effects for workers. While some feared that the unhealthful
work conditions in British textile mills could not be avoided, Coxe argued that was not
necessarily true. Advances in spinning and carding technology by the 1780s changed the
conditions of work for many British textile employees, as these “formerly manual and sedentary
operations” completed in the home increasingly shifted to factory sites with quickened paces of
work. Proto-industrial manufacturing work regimes, however, were not inherently negative for
Coxe. To begin with, textiles were not the only branch of manufacturing that he and
northeasterners wanted to develop, and agricultural labor included plenty of dangerous tasks. For
Coxe, moreover, the harsh working conditions in British textile mills were not inherent to clothmaking, nor more harmful than other occupations. He pointed out that draining and clearing
swamps and marshes, tasks associated with slave labor from the Chesapeake southward, were
“even more fatal” than working conditions in textile mills.8
Coxe’s expansive vision of the promise of American manufacturing of all varieties, from
textiles to potash to beer and liquor to furniture and agricultural implements, rested on the idea
that manufacturing employment was an effective way to attack poverty and idleness. Whereas
opponents argued that the factory unnecessarily drew agricultural laborers away from the farm
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and closer to the temptations of vice in more densely settled regions, Coxe believed “the
employment of our poor in manufactures, who cannot find other honest means of subsistence”
vital to the national interest.9 Manufacturing could be used inculcate the precepts of
republicanism in workers, and result in the “POLITICAL SALVATION” of the United States,
because promoting domestic production lessened American dependence on imported
manufactures. Coxe’s vision of an American economy based on the twin pillars of agriculture
and manufacturing had distinctly antislavery overtones.
For while Coxe viewed economic diversification and integration as harmonious and
desirable, during the Early Republic he did not envision the institution of slavery as essential to
American economic development. The labor requirements of Coxe’s vision of domestic
manufacturing development prioritized free, unbound laborers and not chattel slavery, because
the latter stifled laborers’ motivation, presented obstacles to technological advancement, and
suppressed domestic consumption markets. Throughout much of his life and career, Coxe found
himself at odds with the economic prerogatives of southern planters and their allies in the
northeastern merchant class, both of whom consistently opposed government aid to domestic
manufacturing and favored low tariffs to ensure access to cheap foreign manufactures.10 Slave
labor, in short, was not fundamental to the policy proposals of economic nationalists like Coxe
and Alexander Hamilton, his superior in the Treasury Department, in the 1780s and 1790s.11

Coxe, An Address, p. 23.
Coxe, An Address, p. 30.
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At most it can be said that Coxe tolerated slavery because it was so deeply entrenched from the
Chesapeake southward, and because he viewed cotton as an important American staple crop which could
be profitably produced by enslaved laborers. It should be noted, however, that he did not assume that
cotton must be grown by slaves, and there is no direct support for chattel slavery in his published
writings. From 1787 until 1789, he served as secretary of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society. Coxe’s most
recent and thorough biographer concludes that he, “more than any other individual deserved credit for
the accomplishments of the group” in those years. On the other hand, Coxe was forced on a few occasions
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Slaveholding politicians from the Lower South were quite aware of the divergent regional
political economies in the Early Republic, not least because of the processes of northeastern state
abolition that began during the Revolution. Delivering the opening speech to the South Carolina
state ratification convention at Charleston in summer 1788, Charles Pinckney these openly
discussed these differences. Pinckney, who spearheaded the inclusion of the fugitive slave clause
at the Constitutional Convention, favored ratification. He argued that “the first knowledge
necessary for us to acquire, was a knowledge of the people for whom this system [the
Constitution] was to be formed: For unless we were acquainted with their situation, their habits,
opinions, and resources, it would be impossible to form a government upon adequate or
practicable principles.” Pinckney proceeded to lay out the differences between the Lower South
and the Northeast, to acquaint colleagues’ ignorant of their social and economic conditions. He
flatly denied that social distinctions in Europe existed under the republican system laid out in the
Constitution, but that wealth constituted the only significant possible social distinction in the
United States. Paradoxically, Pinckney then launched into a harangue against primogeniture,

to comply with legal property rights in slaves owned by business associates. On one occasion, in 1779,
Coxe acted as the intermediary for the sale of slaves to close associate William Hemsley of Maryland.
Cooke, Tench Coxe, pp. 92-94. Coxe was publicly attacked because of a 1787 episode in which his soon-tobe-shuttered mercantile firm, Coxe & Frazier, allegedly received the proceeds from the sale of two
women slaves owned by a Jamaican planter, to satisfy a £90 debt. As late as 1799 Coxe publicly
maintained that, “I had neither contributed, in the smallest degree, to make the women slaves, nor to
keep them in slavery, that I had neither bought them nor in any way owned them…” Coxe, “To the
Citizens of the United States,” Philadelphia Aurora, 21 May 1799. Coxe was a magnet for political and
financial controversy throughout his public and private careers, and was often accused of economic and
political unscrupulousness. He infamously accompanied the British army’s occupation of Philadelphia in
1778, and two decades later switched his political allegiance from the Federalists to DemocraticRepublicans. For detailed discussions of these events and Coxe’s motivations, see Cooke, Tench Coxe, pp.
25-43; 334-347.
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lambasting the system of property inheritance as “a practice no wise state will ever encouraged
or tolerate.”12
At this point, Pinckney isolated the key socioeconomic differences between the Lower
South and Northeast. In the latter, he pointed out, primogeniture had long been abolished. What
separated the region was more egalitarian patterns of property ownership. “In the Eastern and
Northern states,” Pinckney understood, “the landed property is nearly equally divided. Very few
of them have large bodies, and there are few of them that have not small tracts…” Thus
subsistence farming, “handicrafts,” and commerce, in that order, dominated the northeastern
regional economies. Egalitarian property ownership patterns suppressed wealth inequality in the
Northeast, which was not the case in the Lower South, where large slaveholders dominated the
regional economy and political life. The mass of ordinary northeasterners were modest in their
appearances and consumption habits, and even among the largest landowners, “it may be truly
said there are few of them that are rich, or few of them very poor; nor while the states are
capable of supporting more inhabitants than they contain at present…” Pinckney devoted the rest
of his speech to a comparative analysis of the various state governments, noting similarities and
differences between their respective legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The
fundamental point he made to his primarily slaveholding colleagues was clear: the northeastern
regional economies were very differently than their own, which the rapid state-level demise of
slavery only accentuated.13

“Hon. Mr. C. Pinckney’s speech, delivered upon opening the discussion of the federal constitution in
the convention,” Charleston City Gazette and Daily Advertiser, 14 May 1788.
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**********

Pinckney’s observations about the stark differences between the Lower South and
Greater Northeastern regional economies only partially applied to the Upper South. As in the
Lower South, in Virginia and Maryland large slaveholders dominated politics and society. Yet
Thomas Jefferson promoted patterns of American economic development predicated on free
household (yeoman) agriculture, the antithesis of massive landholdings common among
slaveholders in the Upper and Lower South. To this end, Jefferson successfully fought to abolish
entail and primogeniture in Virginia in the 1780s, and over the course of the 1790s his and other
Republicans’ initial hostility to proto-industrial manufacturing steadily waned.14 While historians
have discarded the notion that slavery was in decline in the Revolutionary Era, in the longestsettled regions of the Virginia tidewater and Maryland the deleterious effects of tobacco
monoculture led leaders like Jefferson to seek new ways of promoting economic development
closer in design to northeastern emphases on domestic manufacturing and agricultural
improvement. Yet the failure of gradual abolition in Chesapeake, in addition to the end of shortlived liberalized manumission policies by the late 1790s, provided clear points of contrast with
the Northeast. Slaveholders still retained significant power to shape the political economy of the

See, for example, Jefferson’s 1792 plan in which he proposed government support and private
subscriptions to fund “labour-saving” machinery and production facilities for textiles, iron products, in
addition to other manufacturing pursuits like glass making and tanning. “A Plan for a Manufacturing
establishment in the U.S.,” Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress Online:
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib006737. See also Lawrence Peskin, “How the Republicans Learned
to Love Manufacturing: The First Parties and the ‘New Economy,’” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 22
No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 235-262. On Jeffersonian political economy in general, see Drew R. McCoy, The
Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1980).
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Upper South, and in this sense the Upper South was far more similar to the Lower South than the
Northeast.
Charles Pinckney’s observations to the South Carolina ratification convention were soon
confirmed at the First Congress in New York in spring 1789, when economic policy debates
dominated much of the proceedings.15 The federal government’s new authority to regulate
external and interstate commerce, coupled with a desperate need for revenues, led to stringent
debates over import duties as well as the propriety of government support for promoting
domestic manufacturing. The battle lines emerged early in the proceedings. As Congress
undertook the arduous task of debating import duties on a multitude of goods and commodities,
economic divisions between the Upper and Lower South and the northeastern states became
clear. Pennsylvania Federalist Thomas Fitzsimons argued that “some states were, from local
circumstances, better situated to carry on manufacture than others…” Pennsylvania, of course,
was one center of pro-manufacturing rhetoric, and Fitzsimons himself was also a founding
director of the Bank of North America, a precursor to the Bank of the United States. To counter
slaveholders’ concerns that high import duties would fall unfairly on the southern states,
Fitzsimons further argued that “for his part, he could never conceive that the consumption of
[imported goods] by the negroes of South Carolina would contribute to the revenue as much as
that of the white inhabitants of the Eastern States.”16 Fitzsimons restated a point that northeastern
abolitionists made repeatedly since the 1760s, that the abolition of chattel slavery and the
restoration of self-dominion to the enslaved would spur the further development of domestic
consumption, and in tandem domestic manufacturing pursuits.

The longest continuous string of debates on economic policy occurred in April and May 1789. Annals of
Congress, 1 Cong. 1 Sess., pp. 123-232.
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Annals of Congress, 1 Cong. 1 Sess., pp. 148-149.
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Southern slaveholding congressmen consistently complained that federal promotion for
domestic manufacturing would unfairly benefit the northeastern states, where the “local
circumstances” Thomas Fitzsimons referred to meant the ongoing processes of state-level
slavery abolition. Southern politicians sought to make common cause with sectors of the
northeastern merchant classes whose businesses depended on access to low-duty manufactured
goods, just as slaveholders depended on access to foreign goods they could not (or would not)
make on their plantations. Thus in the debates over duties on imported nails, Virginia
Representative Theodorick Bland wailed that prohibitive duties on foreign nails were “an
unequal tax, burdening the Southern States, but not felt by the Northern, who made only enough
for their own consumption.” In reply, Massachusetts’ Fisher Ames argued that small New
England manufacturers “take the iron rod of the merchant, and return him nails; in consequence
of this easy mode of barter, the manufacture is prodigiously great.” Ames believed nail
production on this basis could take root in other states, much as it had in New England and New
York and Pennsylvania. Echoing abolitionists’ criticisms of the political economy of American
slavery as wasteful, however, Ames slyly noted that nail production was best suited where “the
business can be prosecuted in a similar manner in every State exerting equal industry” to
Massachusetts artisans.17
The debates pivoted on complex negotiations about the merits of imposing duties on a
vast array of goods, and the ways in which such duties favored northeastern, southern, and
western constituencies. Despite their complexity, however, they fundamentally pitted slaveowning versus non-slaveholding interests. That made sense, given the divergent regional
developmental trajectories clearly evident in 1789. When southern congressmen attempted to
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make common cause with northerners, it was typically in appeals to northeastern merchants.
Thus Virginia’s Theodorick Bland argued that “the interest of the landholder is undoubtedly
blended with the commercial interest; if the latter receive an injury, the former will have to
sustain a portion of it.”18 New York’s John Lawrence needled southern slaveholders because
“gentlemen from the Southern States mentioned… that the planters had begun to turn their
attention to other productions than those they were accustomed to… [cultivate]…” Lawrence
knew that southern planters had no wish to re-orient their production processes to promote
domestic manufacturing for external markets. Even if planters could afford to do so—and most
could not, as they held little liquid wealth—chattel slavery, the subjugation of the labor force to
the status of property, was too ingrained in their culture. And besides, slaveholding politicians
had little incentive to change, because they benefitted most from the extreme inequalities of
southern slave economies.
The plantation economies of the Upper and Lower South were profitable for some, but
left slaveholders unable to quickly shift labor and production patterns in favor of manufacturing
for domestic markets, even as plantations were self-sufficient operations. These and many other
examples suggest the outlines of fundamental economic conflict between the South and
Northeast. The debates resolved with the July 1789 passage of the Tariff Act, which created the
first schedule of national tariffs in the young nation’s history. The tariffs varied, and while some
were clearly designed to promote specific domestic manufactures, in general the schedule
provided for five percent ad valorem duties on foreign goods. Not satisfied, northeastern
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manufacturing promoters pressed forward with plans to use government authority to promote
domestic production.
Alexander Hamilton’s “Report on Manufactures” was hailed by contemporaries, and
since recognized by historians, as the most complete statement of American manufacturing
capability in the Early Republic.19 Tench Coxe’s research on Greater Northeastern
manufacturing enterprises formed the basis of the report’s information, supplemented by the
Treasury Secretary’s queries to manufacturers, manufacturing promoters, and civil authorities
across the nation.20 In the report, Hamilton bluntly argued that the nation’s economic future lay
in manufacturing, particularly in the Northeast. Hamilton and Coxe viewed federal and state
government support for domestic manufacturing as a means of “enlarging the sphere of our
domestic commerce” and “increasing [the] surplus of our Agricultural produce.”21 The report’s
recommendations matched the vision of American manufacturing prowess that Coxe had
promoted for several years by the time the report was submitted to Congress in December 1791.
Coxe previously wrote that government failure to promote domestic manufactures, opposition to
which was concentrated among slaveholding interests, “would have been highly criminal.”22 The
most well-known result of the report’s recommendations was a public-private venture, the
Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures (SEUM), founded to promote proto-industrial
production at the Passaic River Valley in New Jersey. Although the society’s efforts failed,

There has been some debate among historians about the extent to which Hamilton stressed domestic
manufactures versus international commerce, especially with Great Britain, the world’s leading
manufacturer in the late 18th century. William Appleman Williams, for example, contended that Hamilton
retained mercantilist views as Secretary of the Treasury. As a starting point, see Williams, “The Age of
Mercantilism: An Interpretation of the American Political Economy, 1763-1828,” William & Mary
Quarterly, Vol. 15 No. 4 (October 1958), pp. 419-438. On the other hand, there is no reason to doubt that
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particularly because of the spectacular bankruptcy of New York financier and SEUM director
William Duer, its vision fit neatly into a northeastern commitment to encouraging domestic
manufacturing. It was not a coincidence that manufacturing promoters in the first years of the
Early Republic operated in political and economic spaces simultaneous to abolitionists’
continued efforts to abolish the legal status of chattel slavery in the mid-Atlantic and New
England states.

**********

The northeastern agricultural economies transformed in the Early Republic, supporting
the emergence of proto-industrial capitalism. A culture of improvement that inspired capitalist
abolitionists like Moses Brown to invest in modern production techniques and promote the
abolition of chattel slavery, found a parallel in northeastern agricultural societies that encouraged
agricultural innovation. In and around northeastern towns and urban clusters, free household
farms responded to opportunities to supply growing domestic consumption markets by investing
capital in dairy sheds and developing truck farming in fresh vegetables and other perishable
produce. Just as importantly free household producers also consumed in greater volume, creating
thick webs of production and consumption patterns that generated regional economic growth. In
the 1790s, the northeastern countryside experienced a pattern of development that expanded in
ring-like fashion from large towns and cities outward. As the population of towns and cities
expanded, so did related agricultural activities to supply their needs. In addition to dairy and
vegetable truck farming, free-household agriculturalists farther outside urban areas supplied
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grains that fed urban wage workers, and forest products that fueled the construction of housing,
manufacturing establishments, and shipbuilding.23 But agricultural investment on the scale of
constructing modern dairy sheds and transportation infrastructure, depended on the ability of
family farm proprietors to develop capital reserves available to invest in such improvements, and
agricultural improvement societies made the ability of free households to produce more
efficiently and profitably their priority.
Like manufacturing societies, northeastern agricultural societies offered cash bounties to
farmers that successfully developed methods to make farming more efficient. In 1788, the
members of the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture offered premiums for a wide
array of queries designed to promote agricultural innovation and efficiency. The most
perspicacious rewarded farmers for “the best experiment made of a course of crops, either large
or small, agreeable to the principles of the English mode of farming,” by which they meant the
use of molded plows and clover in crop rotations. Others bounties included improvements in
cattle folding, methods to prevent frost from ruining wheat fields, methods to prevent insect

Meyer, The Roots of American Industrialization, esp. Ch.2-3. Meyer adopts the model of urbancountryside economic growth of nineteenth century economist Johann Heinrich Von Thunen, and refers
to this pattern of development as “Von Thunen Rings.” Recent work by Ariel Ron has made clear that by
the antebellum period, a culture of improvement was fully developed in the northeast and Midwest, one
result of northern state slavery abolition in the 1780s and 1790s and the exclusion of slavery from the
Northwest Territory. The culture of improvement was evident in the proliferation of farm fairs and
agricultural journals that promoted the newest farming techniques, seed varieties, and agricultural
machine technology. Moreover, by the mid-19th century northern farmers were increasingly insistent that
state support for agricultural improvement was imperative. See Ariel Ron, “Summoning The State:
Northern Farmers and the Transformation of American Politics in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” Journal
of American History, Vol. 103 No. 2 (Fall 2016), pp. 347-374. Christopher Grasso, Speaking Aristocracy:
Transforming Public Discourse in Eighteenth Century Connecticut (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1999), Ch. 4, situates agricultural improvement in the context of colonial debates over religion and
public discourse, through the life and works of Jared Sparks. Sparks published the first American book on
agricultural improvements in 1761, especially promoting the use of drill plows in planting fields. For the
continued preoccupation of elite Bostonians in farm life and agricultural improvements, see Tamara
Thornton, Cultivating Gentlemen: The Meaning of Country Life Among the Boston Elite, 1785-1860 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
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spoilage, for the discovery of new kinds of vegetable matter for cows to produce more and purer
milk. Another premium, “for the best method of recovering worn-out fields to a more hearty
state, within the power of common farmers, without dear or far-fetched manures; but, by
judicious culture, and the application of materials common to the generality of farmers,”
encapsulated the society’s larger goal, to promote improvements that would directly benefit free
household farming families with small landholdings and limited financial resources.24
The following year, Philadelphia physician Enoch Edwards addressed the Philadelphia
Society, enumerating several reasons why northeastern regional economic development
depended on agricultural and domestic manufacturing societies. At a time of precipitous trade
decline and devastated national finances, the aims of agricultural and manufacturing societies
heralded a secure, diversified national economy. Edwards declared that relying on imported
manufactured goods was bad policy because of the “distressing and visible truth that most
foreign articles rise in their prices, while all the productions of our farms bring less at market
than formerly…” Edwards repeatedly referred to a “spirit of activity and vigor” that the
Philadelphia society sought to repicate in Pennsylvania. The promotion and dissemination of
information concerning agricultural improvements would touch all areas of economic activity,
leading to the advancement of communication networks, generating increased standards of living
in the countryside, towns, and cities. “By this association” proclaimed Edwards, “we shall not
only possess the combined knowledge of, but have the advantage of owning a property, as it
were, in the practice and superior skill of every individual, whereby the habits of activity,
Laws of the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture… with Premiums Proposed, February 5, 1788, to
which is prefixed a List of the Members of the Society (Philadelphia: N.P., 1788), pp. 17-21. The society’s list of
members reveals that a smattering of subscribers hailed from the Chesapeake and Lower South,
including slaveholders like Charles Carroll of Maryland, Virginia’s Robert Beverley, and James Wilkinson
from Kentucky. Members with known antislavery beliefs included Tench Coxe, Benjamin Franklin,
Thomas Paine, Thomas Mifflin, John Jay, and Massachusetts jurist Benjamin Lincoln.
24
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industry, oeconomy and public spirit, would be generally inculcated and greatly promoted.”
Promoting agricultural improvements, “useful manufactures,” and therefore “industry and
frugality,” Edwards argued, would lead to the tighter integration of the rural, town-based, and
urban economies.25 “Such is the ardour of improvement at Philadelphia,” wrote another
commentator, “that the city and whole province are now diligently employed in stretching roads
through the country… [and] a spirit of agriculture seems to be disseminated through all the
states.” Soon “manufactures for internal consumption” would spread across the northeast.26
These visions of collective economic improvement had no real counterpart in the Lower South,
though prominent Upper South statesmen like Thomas Jefferson hoped, vainly as it turned out, to
reorient their regional economy similarly, around manufacturing and agricultural improvements
for consumption in domestic markets.
In Massachusetts, prominent men formed the Massachusetts Society for Promoting
Agriculture (MSPA) with similar aims. The MSPA solicited new information on farming
techniques and crop management to make the famously-stony soil of the Bay State more
productive. Founded in 1792 with Revolutionary ringleader Samuel Adams serving as an
organizing force, like other agricultural societies it organized contests to promote innovations
that could be replicated by free household farms, to spur agricultural productivity. At the Board
of Trustee’s first meeting of the society’s Board of Trustees, it defined the society’s role as a
clearinghouse for information collected from similar societies across the New England and the
mid-Atlantic. “There is no country in the world in which there is a greater field for
improvement,” the trustees suggestively stated, “than America, and Massachusetts and several

“An Address (Read the second of February, 1789), to the Philadelphia County Society & c.,”
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other States in the Union have adopted similar sentiments respecting their great object” of
agricultural innovation.27
Like their brethren in other northeastern agricultural societies, the MSPA developed
contests and bounty programs to develop new methods for making free household farms more
productive. One of the society’s first actions was to designate a committee of members hailing
from across the state to disseminate information from their local communities about ongoing
agricultural improvement projects. MSPA leaders believed this was the society’s most important
function. “It is generally to be desired,” the board declared, “that the Community at Large, and
especially the Members of the Society would engage in Earnest in this Business; would aid its
friends, and make communications of any discoveries they may deem usefull with Freedom…”
To this end, MSPA members solicited information widely throughout the Bay State, in order to
keep abreast of the activities of improvement enthusiasts in neighboring states. Thus, member
Cotton Tufts shared a letter from one Justin Ely, resident of West Springfield, who had recently
experimented with “the method of raising Hemp, as practiced by many farmers in the State of
New York.” 28
In the MSPA’s early years, its Board of Trustees built a fund to promote agricultural
innovations of all varieties through personal subscriptions. In November 1792 the Board raised
significant funds in a variety of legal tender. Board President Thomas Russell contributed “three
hundred pounds in four percent stock of the United States,” while Christopher Gore donated
“two Shares in the Bank of the United States, the dividends therein to be appropriated” as a
reward for agricultural innovations selected in consultation with Gore. James Bowdoin made the
Massachusetts Society for Promoting Agriculture (MSPA) Board of Trustees, 3 August 1792, MSPA
Records, Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS), Box 33, Folder 1, Vol. 1..
28
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single largest donation, contributing “four hundred pounds for five years at six percent.” Others
contributed smaller gifts of fifty and twenty-five dollars, while Jeremiah Allen, Esq. supported
agricultural innovation with a ten dollar gift.29 The society dedicated a small portion of these
funds to creating a society seal, necessary after the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the
MSPA in autumn 1792. The Board of Trustees voted that the seal’s imagery should include a
plough connected by chain to a pair of oxen, in addition to “a stone wall and a quick fence with a
gate- the field beyond the fence with sheep and cattle,” while a contended head of a free family
steered a plough in the foreground. The MSPA’s motto encapsulated the culture of improvement
created by northeastern societies, declaring agriculture the “Source of Wealth.”30
In a circular letter created by the MSPA in 1793, with information intended to be
distributed by local ministers, the society described its aims for sharing information on farm
improvements within the means of middling free household farms. “In a country, where
Agriculture is the pursuit of the largest proportion of its inhabitants, every species of information
that tends to its improvement, is of serious importance,” the letter began, and he society served
as a conduit for information on farming techniques and experiments. The members believed the
“success of its exertions will depend as much on the free communications of friends, as on the
labors of those who are induced to make experiments, by the premiums offered.” The society
aimed to cultivate a “spirit of improvement” that would encompass farmers across the state and
beyond. To that end, they asked local ministers to preach a message of improvement and to
encourage the “practical farmer” to relay the results of their practical experiments to the society.
A pamphlet distributed with the circular contained “extracts from foreign publications,
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particularly respecting Butter and Cheese,” foodstuffs made for millennia and in northeastern
family economies the responsibility of women and children. This suggests the antislavery
remises of the moral and political economy of northeastern agricultural societies like the MSPA.
Had the society been interested in perpetuating chattel slavery, or had the northeastern regional
production economies and consumption markets demanded it, members might have sought to
publicize innovations for clearing and planting cotton fields or methods for tending tobacco. The
society rather wanted to “promote the happiness of mankind in this world, as well as in the
next.”31
The New York Society for the Promotion of Agriculture, Arts, and Manufactures also
organized elaborate contests to promote agricultural improvement. In a letter to members and
“supporters of rural economy,” the society proclaimed their “intention, is, to supply the wants
and to relieve the necessities of mankind, and thereby render human life more comfortable,” in
order to “to multiply the productions of the land, to shorten or facilitate the toils of the labourer,
and to excite a spirit of honest industry, whereby riches may become more abundant.”32 To
further those ends, it offered premiums organized around a series of eleven queries each
composed of multiple questions. A query on manure, for example, goaded experimental
agriculturalists to develop methods of producing manure from vegetable matter and minerals.
Other queries included more efficient ways of raising stock animals to make them more
productive, methods of improving fruit and forest trees, and experimenting with the viability of
different grains in New England and mid-Atlantic climates. The eleventh and final query
concerned manufactures, because promoters of manufacturing and agricultural improvements
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viewed them as deeply intertwined. The New York society posed these questions with the
capabilities of free household farmers and mechanics’ workshops in mind, asking participants to
consider improved methods for making paper, steel, leather and hides, potash, oils from various
seeds, and whether they knew of coal deposits. Only one question had an indirect connection to
chattel slavery: “What can be done toward the manufacture of cotton,” the same question
pondered by antislavery capitalists like Moses Brown.33
In a January 1792 address to the New York society, Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchill offered
an explicitly antislavery argument reflecting the northeastern culture of improvement in domestic
manufacturing and agriculture. Mitchill was a botanist and chemist, a member of the New-York
Manumission Society, a sometime correspondent with Moses Brown concerning antislavery
organization, and later congressman and strident opponent of slavery and the slave trade. In
gratefully acknowledging the society’s invitation, Mitchill begged members to “bear with me
then, while I express my meaning in my own way…” His “way” was a series of arguments that
may be appropriately called antislavery capitalism, arguing that “by the wise policy of our
Legislature, the shackles of feudal bondage have been knocked off, and our citizens, who feel
nothing of vassalage or servitude, act with the spirit of Freemen.” Mitchill made this statement
fully aware that only seven years prior, the New York Council of Revision had narrowly
overturned a gradual abolition bill. The abolition of entail and primogeniture, however, was a
crucial step towards loosening oppressive bonds, because they secured “the natural right of every
man to a certain part of the earth’s surface…” Mitchill believed slavery abolition would come to
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the Empire State soon, which would transform property ownership and spur agricultural
experimentation and productivity, furthering local manufacturing.34
Mitchill continued drawing a stark contrast between slave and free labor. Agricultural
improvement, he noted, often required more labor than a family could supply, and the farmer had
two options: “hired free-men and slaves.” Outside of the southern plantation zones, where slave
labor was most efficiently deployed on massive landholdings to produce a limited number of
commodity-export crops, “the labor of free-men is preferred as most consistent with good
oeconomy: accordingly, in the northern States, slavery is entirely abolished.” He noted that in
New York, a rise in private manumissions strongly suggested that in the near future chattel
slavery would have no place in the state’s economic and social structures. Mitchill surveyed
slaveholding acquaintances, and came away convinced that chattel slavery was only profitable
for “men of considerable hereditary estates in land, or of a handsome capital acquired by
marriage or bequest,” a small slice of the American population. “But I cannot name an instance,”
he proclaimed, “of a man of small property, ever getting rich upon the profits of slave labor.”
Slaveholding was a wasteful extravagance for northeastern free household farms, and “it is to a
conviction of the impolicy of expensiveness” of slavery, Mitchill concluded, “rather than to any
moral or religious considerations on the subject, that the decline of slavery is principally to be
attributed.”35 Mitchill offered an explicitly antislavery understanding of northeastern capitalism,
concluding his oration by discussing several agricultural activities which would encourage an
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antislavery political economy, most importantly the manufacture of maple sugar as a
replacement for imported West Indian sugar products.
Extracting and refining maple sap into sugar was an initiative within the means of free
household farms that had, by definition, local, national, and global antislavery justifications. In
the late 1780s and 1790s, promoters of maple sugar manufacturing explained the project as a
means of ending reliance on West Indian sugar cane products, a way to undermine the economic
foundations of the Caribbean slave societies. Tench Coxe believed maple sugar production was
an acknowledgment of “the great and increasing dislike to negro slavery, and to the African trade
among the people” of Pennsylvania. Best produced in February and March, Coxe argued that it
could develop into an important ancillary source, maple sugar manufacturing neatly fit into the
seasonal production schedules of free household farms. Coxe believed maple sugar
manufacturing would become an important source of income for free households, and by 1788 it
was already “more generally known to the Pennsylvanians, that their brethren in the northern and
eastern parts of the Union, had long made considerable quantities, with their family utensils, and
without the expense of hiring assistance…”36
Coxe’s plan for maple sugar manufacturing reveal a political economy of domestic
production rooted in the free farming household as the primary unit of production. He calculated
that the entire United States consumption of Caribbean sugar, from his well-informed estimation
26,000,000 weight pounds per annum of imported brown and loaf sugar and molasses, could be
replaced by the free household farm typical of the Northeast. Using math admittedly of the backof-the-envelope variety, Coxe determined that family farms with one hundred acres of “sugar
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maple land, in a state of ordinary American improvement (that is, one third covered with
judicious reserves of wood and timber, and two thirds cleared for the culture of grass and grain)
can make one thousand pounds weight of sugar with only his necessary farming and kitchen
utensils…” By Coxe’s calculations, this would only require the labor of a husband, wife, and one
child ten years of age. Therefore 26,000 families of three could replace the entire United States
importation of West Indian slave-grown sugar cane products. “The operation,” Coxe argued, “in
a family is as easy, as to make household soap or cheese, or to brew ale or beer, and… there is in
this country much more than twice the above quantity of sugar maple lands, in situations not too
southern.” With direct federal government intervention to impose prohibitive duties imported
sugar cane products, the United States could become economically independent from West
Indian slavery for its sugar consumption. Coxe’s calculations were optimistic at best, but his
vision of the social relations of production typified northeastern antislavery capitalist instincts in
the 1790s.37
Prominent Otsego County, New York proprietor William Cooper devoted significant
time and resources to producing maple sugar on his massive landholdings. Cooper argued it
would engender economic independence from the Caribbean, and promote the global antislavery
cause. With the development of American-made maple sugar, the “importation of sugar from the
West-India islands can be dispensed with,” Cooper wrote, and “if such advantages as I have
pointed out will result from the manufactory advised, what may we not look forward to a time
when the minds of men will become so liberal as to view liberty in its true light—when slavery
shall be done away.”38 Quaker supporters of maple sugar production framed the substitution of
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slave-made articles as “the best means of abolishing both the slavery of Africans, and the
transportation of them to the West India islands.” Maple sugar promised to “become a valuable
oeconomical manufacture” for free-household farm families in the rural northeast.39 In 1793,
Cooper and several associates urged Philadelphia manufacturing promoters Coxe, Benjamin
Rush, and Henry Drinker to promote maple sugar production in the Keystone State.40 Maple
sugar production in the 1780s and 1790s never did supplant Caribbean sugar products in
American kitchens and pantries, but in promoting its manufacture supporters appealed to a moral
and political economy in which capitalist manufacturing pursuits could be harnessed to
specifically antislavery ends, at a time when northeastern state abolition of slavery proceeded
rapidly.41
Northeastern promoters of agricultural innovation were not always stridently antislavery
like Samuel L. Mitchill, or indirectly so like Tench Coxe, but on the whole they supported an
equilibrium between agriculture and manufacturing initiatives like the production of maple
sugar. They framed the questions they asked in terms of promoting the interests of free
household farmers. The language they used to support agricultural improvement dovetailed with
the visions of northeastern textile manufacturing proponents, who imagined production
economies premised on the absence, not centrality, of chattel slavery. Slave labor in the Upper
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and Lower South was closely identified, in both practice and rhetoric, primarily with menial
agricultural labor in the Early Republic. Slaveholders and their political representatives knew
that free household-based agricultural improvements and domestic manufacturing flourished best
in conditions that suppressed chattel slavery, and extreme wealth inequality. The culture and
spirit of improvement that permeated northeastern agriculture rested on the availability of human
capital. Antislavery capitalists offered visions of economic development predicated on the free
household model, where nuclear and extended family units operated as free agents in an
increasingly competitive economic landscape.

**********

While recent scholarship has grounded American manufacturing and later industrial
capitalism in the cotton plantations and finance networks of southern chattel slavery, cotton was
not the first fiber that fueled the growth of textile manufacturing in the United States. These were
woolens and linens, both produced domestically in large quantities by free household units
across the Northeast in the late eighteenth century. In and around Providence, Rhode Island, “in
the Factories & private Families,” free household families and wage workers produced thirty
thousand yards of woolen cloths in 1790.42 In nearby Hartford, Connecticut, though the recently
capitalized Hartford Woolen Factory labored under “Embarrassments… from the scarcity of
Wool, and the subsequent high price of that article,” the establishment produced 12,528 yards of
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various woolen cloths between 1788 and 1790.43 Woolen factories like the Hartford
establishment also suffered from merchant opposition and shortages of skilled workers, as did
the firm Moses Brown capitalized in Providence in 1789, Brown and Almy. According to
another Connecticut reporter, investors in new production facilities encountered obstacles from
the “clashing Interests, or antient prejudices” of urban merchants, as well as “the scarcity of
Materials and workmen.”44 The Hartford proprietors bluntly complained about the “Ignorance,
the Knavery, or the fickleness of our workmen,” in addition to “the interested views and Jealousy
of the British factors and agents in this Country.”45 Aspiring manufacturing capitalists faced
opposition from merchants and slaveholders, and while cotton would become king in the South,
in the Northeast woolens and linens wore the crown during the Early Republic.
Strict focus on the significance of southern cotton to northeastern manufacturing obscures
both the variety and social relations of production in the rural Northeast. Throughout the region,
woolens and linens comprised a significant proportion of domestic textile production. At
Farmington, Connecticut, small local establishments produced “checks, both Cotton & Linen, of
Bedticks, and of Fustian and Jeenes,” while Hartford Woolen Factory operatives worked 20,000
pounds of wool into various goods totaling 12,528 yards of finished cloths.46 In a survey of the
American regional economies written in the late 1780s and early 1790s, Tench Coxe promoted
mechanized textile manufacturing as a means of engendering economic harmony, pointing to
cotton, flax, hemp, and wool as the most important raw materials. While cotton was increasingly
the province of the southern planter, the introduction of flax, hemp, and wool mills was equally
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if not more beneficial to the Northeast, because the raw materials could be grown and made into
consumer goods by free household farm families.47
Hartford, Connecticut observers saw these textile production dynamics clearly. In fall
1791 Alexander King, a Yale College graduate, physician, and former Connecticut Assembly
member, noted that in regards to cotton, “no great Quantities are manufactured in this place,” but
that “about 20 Thousand Wt. of Flax is Annually manufactured in this Town which is Another
important article Manufactures and is done like the Wool in the Domytic [sic] way.”48 William
Williams of Lebanon, Connecticut reported to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton that
“there are manufactures of Linnen [sic] Cloths carried on in very many Families in this Town &
County, & large quantities are made, many private Looms for weaving in Families besides what
is wove by those whose stated business it is…”49
Writing in mid-1788, Coxe noted that textile manufactures “have increased exceedingly
in a few years” in Pennsylvania, which he attributed to the expansion of family and household
manufactures after the destruction of the American Revolution. He publicized water mills for
flax, woolen, and cotton spinning that had begun to dot the Pennsylvania countryside, and goods
produced in the Keystone state including “thread, cotton, worsted, and yarn hosiery… [and] flax,
hemp, wool, wool and cotton cards.”50 Coxe went out of his way to attribute Pennsylvania’s
emerging manufacturing base to state laws that encouraged European immigration to the best
poor man’s country. “We lay no difficulty in the way of any person,” he wrote, “ who desires to
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become a free and equal citizen” because “on the day of his landing, he may buy a farm, a house,
or raw materials” to set their household on the path to independent production.51 Coxe
undoubtedly downplayed the particular social and economic obstacles that freed AfroPennsylvanians encountered vis-à-vis free European immigrants, but the substance of his
comment correctly pinpointed the fundamental differences in the systems of production between
the Upper and Lower South and the Northeast.
Even as mechanized spinning began to emerge in the late 1780s and 1790s, both
qualitative and quantitative evidence reveals that the vast majority of New England residents
were clothed in woolen and linens made by their families or in their communities. Reporting to
Alexander Hamilton, prominent Massachusetts merchant and politician Nathaniel Gorham noted
that “the People in their own Families & for their own use manufacture double what they did 20
years ago,” before the Revolution when British imperial policy suppressed American
manufacturing. “It is now worth the observation of the curious traveler through N[ew] England,”
Gorham continued, “to observe (more especially out of the great Roads) the cloathing of the
Country Family & he will find common cloaths made almost wholly by themselves.”52 Across
Connecticut, observers noted that farm families almost uniformly clothed themselves. “The
manufactures of Wool are of various kinds of Cloth for Servants and the ordinary wear of the
whole Class of our Farmers,” wrote manufacturer Peter Colt, farmers and mechanics “appear
dressed on Sundays and holydays in the manufactures of their Wives and Daughters.”53
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A correspondent from Danbury, Connecticut recorded that “the spirit of manufacturing
has not much prevailed, except in the domestic way; that however in aggregate is very
considerable, as their families are principally clothed in their own manufactures…”54 In the
“Report on Manufactures,” Hamilton concluded that across the mid-Atlantic and New England
states, “two-thirds, three-fourths, and even four-fifths, of all the clothing of the inhabitants, are
made by themselves.”55 Considerable quantities of household-made linen and woolen textiles
sold in regional markets across New England. In 1789, for example, British consul at
Philadelphia Phineas Bond noted that roughly 40,000 yards of “coarse New England linen” sold
in that city alone. In 1791, in Providence free household families wove 25, 262 yards of linen,
5,858 of cotton, and 3,165 of woolen cloths, many using yarns produced in increasing volume at
the mechanized spinning plant capitalized by Moses Brown, with the technical expertise of
Englishman Samuel Slater, Brown and Almy.56
The chorus of pro-manufacturing rhetoric and promotion of agricultural improvements in
the mid-Atlantic and New England peaked in the late 1780s and early 1790s. Slaveholders and
their political allies among wealthy northeastern merchants, who clamored for low tariffs and
government support for foreign imports, consistently opposed federal and state support for
domestic manufacturing. For northeastern supporters of manufacturing, the promise of a national
government with authority to promote manufacturing pursuits after the constitutional settlement
resulted in mixed blessings. A group of New York City manufacturers, for example, lamented
Americans’ reliance on imported foreign goods, which they termed a “growing evil.” They asked
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Congress to “extend a protecting hand to the interests of commerce and the arts,” and not
continue to encourage foreign imports.57 In June 1789 petitioners from Boston urged Congress to
address “the great decrease of American manufactures, and almost total stagnation of American
ship-building.” The Boston petitioners made a crucial point that emphasized the American
regional economic disparities. “Your petitioners need not inform Congress,” they wrote, “that, on
the revival of our mechanical arts and manufactures depend the wealth and prosperity of the
Northern States… unless these important branches are supported, we humbly conceive that our
agriculture must greatly decline…”58 Throughout the 1790s, northeastern manufacturing
promoters hoped in vain for direct national government support for domestic manufactures, but
northeastern merchants and southern slaveholding interests notwithstanding, at the turn of the
century the first slabs of a proto-industrial foundation in the Greater Northeast were in place.
While craft production of woolens and linens for local markets was common across
North America in the late colonial period, plans to develop machine-powered textile
manufacturing enterprises did not meaningfully emerge until after the constitutional settlement.
Through the 1780s, centuries old spinning and weaving technologies predominated in the midAtlantic and New England, and household production for the immediate use of the family and
sale in local markets dominated in the rural communities. In 1800, the vast majority of American
farm families either produced their own textiles and other craft manufactures or purchased them
from local producers.59 Household manufacturing was not limited to yarns and textiles, as
women and children invested significant amounts of time and energy in dairy production, garden
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agriculture and food processing, while men produced rudimentary leather goods in addition to
grain farming. The mixed agricultural-household manufacturing economies which characterized
the northeast slowly transitioned to external market production in the late eighteenth century, and
outside of urban areas most Americans were not entirely dependent on wage work for their
survival. Though the exact timing of transition to capitalism has been hotly debated, the regional
agricultural and manufacturing economies of the northeast developed diversified domestic
production and consumption patterns unlike the Upper and Lower South states by the turn of the
nineteenth century.
In the eighteenth century, the “putting-out” system characterized the relations of textile
production near northeastern towns and urban clusters. In this system, family units took in raw
material, mainly wool, and spun yarn on the rudimentary spinning wheel. Capitalist
entrepreneurs collected the yarn, and paid the male head of household for his family’s labor and
then distributed the yarn to weavers, dyers, and finishers. This system of production was labor
intensive, even more so for making flax into linen yarn and cloth. The “putting-out” system,
already entrenched in Great Britain, first emerged in North America just before the Revolution.
By the 1780s, it formed the basis for the earliest attempts by northeastern capitalists, many of
whom disliked slavery on both moral and practical economic grounds, to integrate perpetual
spinning machinery into American textile production. For men like Moses Brown, technological
advancement went hand-in-hand with the transformation in northeastern labor markets wrought
by state abolition of chattel slavery. The expansion of the “putting-out” system and mechanized
spinning showed that the northeastern regional economics exhibited diversified capitalist
relations of production, dependent on domestic consumption markets composed of free
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households unbound from external authority and with the legal right to their families.60 These
characteristics, combined with slavery abolition, were absent in the Upper and Lower South.
Early republican northeastern capitalists sought ways to incorporate time saving
machinery to produce yarn suitable for weaving quality cloths more efficiently and in greater
quantities. The arrival of English weaver Samuel Slater to the United States in 1790 is often
characterized as American manufacturing’s eureka moment, though machine-spinning initiatives
had previously been attempted in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York. Slater did,
however, first bring direct knowledge of Richard Arkwright’s power loom, and quickly set about
offering his services to enterprising capitalists. Finding the rudimentary spinning and carding
machines of an aspiring New York manufacturer “not worth using,” Slater wrote to Moses
Brown to offer his services.61 In his reply, Brown noted the early frustrations he and son-in-law
Nicholas Almy encountered in establishing machine spinning in Providence. Brown & Almy,
“destitute of a person acquainted with water-frame spinning,” had failed to make a recentlypurchased jenny frame operational and desperately needed someone with Slater’s expertise.
Moses offered Slater employment and a share in potential profits, and in January 1790 the
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Englishman relocated to Providence to begin assembling the first functional water-powered
spinning frame on American soil.62
Slater and his patrons encountered several critical problems in the quest to construct a
machine-spinning plant. The partnership lacked human capital, in the form of workers with
highly specialized weaving technology skills, lesser-skilled manufactory operatives, and
mechanics capable of fabricating machine components. Luckily for Slater, his first (Brownrecommended) landlord was Oziel Wilkinson, a highly-skilled mechanic who operated a shop in
Providence that soon after supplied many of the firm’s fabricated parts. Wilkinson’s family also
directly provided labor to the mill, as sons Smith and David worked variously for Slater in 1790
and 1791 as cotton carders, breakers, and spinners. The Wilkinson family also offered another
benefit to Slater: his future wife, Hannah, was Oziel Wilkinson’s youngest daughter. By early
spring 1791, after pains taking effort and many stops and starts, Slater was successful in bringing
the first American water-powered loom into operation.63 Cotton-linen thread and cloths produced
by Almy and Brown at this early stage included corduroys, royal rib denim, cottonettes, janes,
and fustians, 4,556 yards of which were produced by the firm from mid-1789 through the end of
1790.64
Almy and Brown’s early reliance on Oziel Wilkinson and his family is manifest in the
firm’s earliest records, as it purchased a wide variety of both manufactured goods and raw

Moses Brown to Samuel Slater, 10 December 1789, in Ibid., p. 73.
George S. White, ed., Memoir of Samuel Slater, The Father of American Manufactures… (Philadelphia: n.p.,
1836), pp. 76-83. For a thorough discussion of Slater and his early efforts that contextualizes his career
while avoiding hagiography, see Barbara M. Tucker, Samuel Slater and the Origins of the American Textile
Industry, 1790-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); see also James L. Conrad, “’Drive That
Branch’: Samuel Slater, the Power Loom, and the Writing of America’s Textile History,” Technology and
Culture, Vol. 36 No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 1-28.
64
Moses Brown to John Dexter, 22 July 1791, in Cole, ed., Correspondence of Alexander Hamilton, p. 80.
62
63

264

materials from Wilkinson. Fabricated iron and steel machine parts proved especially critical to
Slater’s attempts to build spindle frames, including rollers, nails, jenny spindles, carding machine
parts, and various kinds of purpose-made nails, screws, and nuts. Sylvanus Brown was another
Providence artisan that proved critical to the earliest stages of mill construction. A millwright, in
spring 1790 Sylvanus (no relation to Moses) provided the firm with dozens of wood products
that made the literal backbone of Slater’s spinning frame. These included several hundred feet of
plank boarding, ranging from maple to oak to pine, and Sylvanus Brown also crafted the wooden
spindles for Slater’s machines. By late 1790, the relationship between Slater and Brown had
soured, but his and Oziel Wilkinson’s critical contributions to Brown and Almy’s attempts to
erect a machine spinning plant sheds some light on the web of local economic connections
generated by the firm’s operations.65
Writing in April 1791 to the proprietors of the Beverley (MA) Factory, Moses Brown
noted with pride that Slater’s water loom had begun producing cotton yarn, and putting it out to
local families to weave into cotton-linen and woolen whole cloths. The congressional debates of
1789 prompted Brown to consider joining the growing chorus of manufacturing promoters led by
Tench Coxe and Alexander Hamilton, petitioning “for some encouragement to the cotton
manufactory, by an additional duty on the cotton goods imported, and the applying such duty as
a bounty, partly on the raising and saving of cotton in the southern states, and partly as a bounty
on cotton goods… manufactured in the United States.”66 Here the prerogatives of Brown the
slavery abolitionist and Brown the burgeoning manufacturing capitalist committed to economic
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nationalism collided uncomfortably. While Brown recognized that an adequate supply of quality
raw cotton was necessary for his and others’ machine spinning operations, nowhere did he
actively promote mechanized cotton spinning as a means of abetting the expansion of plantation
slavery in the Lower South.
Indeed, the availability of quality raw cotton supplies often impeded Brown & Almy’s
early efforts. Before the introduction of the cotton gin, textile capitalists and skilled weavers and
machinists often criticized southern cotton for its poor quality, and preferred to import cotton
supplies from the Caribbean, India, or Egypt, though they cost significantly more. Writing in
response to Secretary of Treasury Hamilton’s request for information on American
manufacturing in summer 1791, Brown noted that southern cotton “is as Imperfect, and more so,
than the manufacturing when raised,” a nod to the fact that Slater was continuing to perfect
mechanized spinning. Southern cotton was poorly cleaned and wrought havoc on Slater’s
delicate machinery, which “obliges the Manufacturer to have his supply from the Westindies
under the Discouragement of the Impost.” According to Brown, having to rely of slave-grown
British Caribbean cotton was “Mortifying to those who from Motives of Promoting the Produce
and Manufactures of Our Own Country…”67 Having to choose between slave-grown cotton in
the United States and slave-grown cotton in the West Indies was a choice that the abolitionist
Brown undoubtedly would rather have not made. Still, it would be a mistake to interpret Almy
and Brown’s attempts to develop cotton textile manufacturing as a means to promote the
expansion of slavery in the Lower South.
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After Almy and Brown established the Slater Mill in Pawtucket in 1790, the newly
named Almy, Brown, and Slater’s manufacturing capabilities expanded significantly, as did its
workforce and economic connections to the local community. In 1793, as Slater feverishly
worked to get the mill operating smoothly, the firm’s accounts detail dozens of transactions with
local vendors for items like pine boards, nails, candles, and sundry other supplies, and for
services rendered. In February 1793 alone, for example, Slater purchased 4,010 feet of pine and
maple boarding from local vendors. The next month, Slater purchased an additional 552 feet of
pine board and planks, as well as one grindstone and eleven pounds of “old brass.” The mill’s
accounts detail dozens of similar transactions in the subsequent years, and the funds spent by the
firm to establish Slater Mill must have contributed significantly to the local economy. What is
conspicuous early purchasing records for the Slater Mill is how little cotton it purchased from the
Lower South. The first entry for mainland cotton was dated June 25, 1794, for 348 pounds of
“Georgia cotton” priced at £23 8s. Cotton purchases did increase in subsequent years, for
example a February 1795 purchase of two bags of “Cotton Wool” weighing 612 pounds. The
firm’s cotton purchases increased over the course of the 1790s and first decade of the nineteenth
century, but at no point did Almy, Brown, and Slater envision their activities as a prop to the
expansion of southern slavery. 68
The Slater Mill’s account books also detail dozens of payments to local artisans and
laborers, a window into the mill’s labor requirements and as well as Slater’s vision of workforce
organization. While in later decades Slater and other northeastern mill operators were known for
imposing strict work discipline and morality with the implementation of “mill town” production
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facilities and living spaces, in the earliest years of operation Almy and Brown’s mills operated in
a much more fluid labor market.69 The firm’s early payroll records show that free-households
(either entirely or in part) were an important labor source, in addition to tradesmen with highly
specialized skills like Samuel Slater and his father-in-law, expert mechanic Oziel Wilkinson. In
winter 1790-1791, for example, the firm employed the Arnold family as carders and spinners,
including head of household Torpen and children Charles, Eunise, and Ann at various times.
Slater also employed his brothers-in-law Smith and David Wilkinson as machinists, breakers,
and spinners in 1790-1791, including ten-year-old Smith beginning in 1791. In addition, Almy &
Brown frequently hired free black laborers, many of whom Moses Brown had personal
connections with, as laborers. This system, later named the Rhode Island system, relied on free
family households to provide the vast majority of the textile plants’ labor needs, most often on a
part-time basis, supplemented by hiring highly-skilled artisans to full-time positions in
supervisory roles. This system, because it utilized local free household family members as textile
operatives, it offered the advantage of flexibility, as most families did not derive their entire
subsistence from mill employment. On the other hand, because these workers maintained
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autonomous existences separate from the factory space, employers like Slater often complained
of worker absences and labor shortages. 70
Almy and Brown payments to workers usually did not specify the exact work performed,
and the firm recorded labor in number of days worked, revealing the impermanent nature of early
mill employment. For example, in July 1793 Samuel Slater paid out £4 8s. and £4 5s. 9p. to
Uriah Hopkins and David Chilson for twenty-two and twenty-one days’ “labour,” respectively.
In January 1795 the mill paid James Packham £4 14s. 4p. for twenty-one days’ “work”
performed the previous July. Two frequent payees were the Jenckes brothers, John and David,
who labored intermittently for the Slater Mill from 1793-1795. The firm paid David Jenckes £58
8s. for several months of carpentry work in March 1793, as well as an additional nineteen pounds
“for lodging Washburn and the Masons” for seventy-eight days in his home.71 Both Jenckes
shared a surname with Peter Brunius Jenckes, a freed slave who manually powered Slater’s first
power loom in 1790 before it was harnessed to waterpower.72 The fluid patterns of labor at Almy
and Brown mills that characterized early textile mill production reveal the contours of the
ongoing transformation within northeastern capitalism in agriculture and manufacturing, and the
fluid relationship between employer and labor that was a consequence of northeastern state
slavery abolition.

**********
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In 1793, famed lexicographer and Connecticut Society for the Promotion of Freedom
member Noah Webster published a pamphlet entitled The Effects of Slavery on Morals and
Industry. Webster’s pamphlet encapsulated the political economy of northeastern abolitionism in
the republic’s first decade. Webster opened Effects with an extended comparative analysis of
world slavery to support his core argument that “to labor solely for the benefit of other men, is
repugnant to every principle of the human heart. Men will not be industrious… without a well
founded expectation of enjoying the fruits of their labor.”73 He then pivoted and applied this
argument to regional slavery in the United States. Well aware that Pennsylvania and the New
England states had already forbidden chattel status and gradual emancipation was underway,
Webster believed that a “general and complete abolition” of slavery in the Upper and Lower
South would result in chaos. His solution was to “raise the slaves, by gradual means, to the
condition of free tenants,” precisely what the northeastern states were doing.74 Of course, the
South’s dependence on slavery was much greater than in the Greater Northeast on after the
Revolution, but Webster’s proposed solution to the problem of slavery is significant in its
emphasis on the elimination of chattel status as a spur to increased labor productivity.
According to Webster, if a handful of humanitarian-minded southern planters would
provide their slaves “farms on a moderate rent, and their liberty, on the condition of being good
tenants,” they would find that black Americans were as capable of productively contributing to
society as whites. “Once inspire them with a love of property,” he urged, “let them go to the
market for themselves, accustom them to make bargains… and their want continually
Noah Webster, The Effects of Slavery on Morals and Industry (Hartford: Hudson and Goodwin, 1793), p.
22.
74
Ibid., pp. 34; 37.
73

270

multiplying will beget habits of industry and economy.” To prove this, he presented the example
of a similar experiment conducted by Polish Count Andrezj Zamoyski, who in 1760 eliminated
the status of serf on his estates. Webster gleefully noted that within the first seventeen years of
the former serfs’ freedom, their birth rates almost doubled, and their incomes almost tripled.75
This, he believed, was possible throughout the United States if gradual abolition could be
instituted, as it had been in most of the Northeast, and the evidence was all around him. Unlike
Webster’s home region, however, in the Upper and Lower South entrenched chattel slavery
rendered “the great portion of the actual capital of a state unproductive… their property, instead
of forming an actual capital in trade or manufactures, is converted into real estate or funded
stock…” This was “a most serious calamity, as it strikes at the very root of national industry, and
consequently national wealth and power.” 76
The American Revolution resulted in independence, but it also resulted in serious
economic calamity. The devastation of the war affected all regions of the United States, though
its impact was borne unevenly. Recent research suggests that the export economies of the
Chesapeake and Lower South were destroyed by the economic and political transformations that
accompanied American independence. Commodity exports from the slave societies of the
Chesapeake southward tumbled by 39.1% between 1772 and 1790, most importantly because of
the loss of trade with Great Britain and its Caribbean colonies. Meanwhile, over the same period
New England and mid-Atlantic exports grew by 1.2% and 9.9%, respectively. The Chesapeake

Ibid., pp. 37-38.
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and Lower South’s significant declines in exports exacerbated what were already significant
regional economic divergences from the mid-Atlantic and New England. While the American
regional economies regained some of the losses in exports in the 1790s through 1808, it is clear
that the American Revolution devastated the southern regional economies much more than the
more diversified agricultural, manufacturing, and export economies of the states from
Pennsylvania northward- not coincidentally, the states that undertook the processes of slavery
abolition during and after the revolution.77
Framed in terms of real income per capita, the uneven effects of the American Revolution
are further emphasized. While all regions of the United States saw declines in real income
between 1774 and 1800, New England and the mid-Atlantic were spared the worst. In those
years, the northeastern states experienced small annual average decline in real income, while the
Chesapeake and Lower South’s comparable declines were three times larger. Estimated regional
incomes are yet another metric that makes regional economic disparities clear. Framed in terms
of free labor income, the slave societies of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, the Carolinas, and
Georgia generated $87.77 million in 1800, while Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and the
New England states generated a combined $157.85 million.78 While economic historians have
debated the exact contours of economic change wrought by the American Revolution with
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varying interpretations of differing datasets, the 1780s and 1790s were decades of devastation,
depression, and recovery that accentuated pre-existing structural divergences. In many respects,
northeastern promoters of manufacturing responded to shifting regional and national political
economies in a manner that southern slaveholders could not or would not, given that much of
their available capital was invested in the bodies of the enslaved and the lands they forcibly
toiled.
The northeastern drift towards domestic manufacturing, especially proto-industrial textile
production, should not obscure the fact that in 1800 the United States remained overwhelmingly
agricultural. While transatlantic trade rebounded by the end of the century, and American
merchants began to develop new trade connections with China and southeast Asia, agriculture
and related commodity production remained the bedrock of the American regional economies.
Almost three-quarters of the American labor force (both free and enslaved) were agriculturalists
broadly defined, about 1.4 million people. In the increasingly diversified Greater Northeastern
regional economies, however, sixty-eight percent of the labor force was agricultural, while the
figure was eighty-two percent in the Upper and Lower South. The nascent cotton spinning
industry was still in its infant stages, as only one thousand workers were employed at machine
spinning mills like those of Almy, Brown, and Slater in Providence and Pawtucket, Rhode
Island.79
Meanwhile, the intensification of partisan political battles between Federalists and
Democratic-Republicans dominated the attention of policy makers and the press in the late
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1790s. Growing partisanship complicated neat political divisions between the slave societies of
the Upper and Lower South and the Northeast, as both factions attracted supporters across the
nation. But the fruits of state slavery abolition had a profound impact on the political economy of
the Northeast in the Early Republic, spurring the further spread of free household agriculture and
domestic consumption markets, as antislavery capitalists like Moses Brown and Tench Coxe
developed a culture of improvement to promote the economic modernization of the mid-Atlantic
and New England. The example of Samson, the formerly enslaved man ensconced on his free
household farm in rural Cumberland County, Pennsylvania by1787, encapsulated the
intersections between antislavery and capitalism in the Early Republic.
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Ch. 6: Slavery, Antislavery, and Capitalism: Production, Politics, and the Fraying Fabric of
Union, 1800-1820

When Thomas Paine sat down to write to President Thomas Jefferson in January 1805, he
did so as one of the most famed—and controversial—political philosophers and participants in
the convulsions of the Age of Revolutions. Much of Paine’s story is familiar, from his
spectacular emergence as a revolutionary propagandist with the publication of Common Sense
almost thirty years earlier, to his participation in the French Revolution and authorship of the
Rights of Man, to his disownment by much of the American Revolutionary generation in the late
1790s. Paine conducted a lengthy, and often one-sided, correspondence with Jefferson during the
presidency of the “Sage of Monticello,” hoping to secure government patronage in recognition
for his efforts to propagate the American Revolution, but his voice was increasingly ignored by
an American public that once devoured his writings.
The year before, 1804, Paine used what little political capital he had left to oppose the
resumption of slave importations into the Louisiana Territory, which had been temporarily
banned by Congress in 1803, as the territory transitioned to American control. French Louisiana
planters protested the ban on slave importations, and Paine responded publicly with a ringing
critique of slavery and the slave trade, in which he accused them, “you are arriving at freedom by
the easiest means that any people ever enjoyed it; without contest, without expense, and even
without any contrivance of your own.” The larger political and philosophical problem, according
to Paine, was that the planters “already so far mistake principles, that under the name of rights
you ask for powers; power to import and enslave Africans; and to govern a territory that we have
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purchased.”1 Writing to Jefferson the next year, Paine further laid out why encouraging the
further growth of slavery in the Louisiana Territory was an economic, as well as political and
social, evil.
Paine’s antislavery political economy centered on the deleterious effects of chattel
slavery on the labor productivity, as well as the ways in which slavery prevented the
development of diversified economies founded on free-household agriculture, manufactures, and
robust consumption markets. At the most basic level, Paine criticized congressional sanction for
slavery in Louisiana because “bringing poor Negroes to work the lands in a state of slavery and
wretchedness, is, besides the immorality of it, the certain way of preventing population and
consequently of revenue.” It was much better to promote the immigration of free or indentured
European servants, as typified labor markets in Pennsylvania, because of their industry—both the
cultural attribute of industriousness, but also as a spur to domestic manufactures, which
encouraged both local production and consumption. Paine was not above using stereotypes to
prove his point: Germans were the most desirable farmers, while “the Scotch turn their attention
to traffic [and] the English to manufactures,” while “the Irish in general are generous and
dissolute.”2 But as a matter of desirable contours of political economy, according to Paine, slave
importations should be made illegal and slavery outlawed in the new national domain.
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Philip S. Foner, ed., The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, 2 Vols. [hereafter WTP] (New York: The Citadel
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Why did antislavery northeasterners, and revolutionary cosmopolitans like Paine, so often
frame their critiques of slavery in economic, in addition to the more familiar moral terms? The
key lies in another of Paine’s comments to Jefferson, in which he asserted that ten slaves could
not match the consumption of goods of one white citizen, that “ in the articles of dress and of the
table it is almost impossible to make a comparison.”3 Visions of economic development in the
early nineteenth century emphasized the importance of developing a domestic manufacturing
base premised on the absence of chattel slavery in the Northeast, in part because slavery
suppressed the growth of domestic consumption markets.
Plantations, contemporaries knew, were self-sufficient units, as the enslaved forcibly
produced most of what they needed to survive. Planters and their families, of course, consumed
manufactured goods, but they most often purchased these luxury items from merchants with
British and European connections. Too often in modern scholarship, domestic northeastern
manufacturing, and later industrialization, are identified with cotton textiles, and thus directly
with chattel slavery. But this only tells a small part of the story, as slaveholding politicians and
their northeastern merchant allies consistently opposed American manufacturing in the first two
decades of the nineteenth century, in part because they sensed that conditions from which it
emerged presumed the absence of chattel slavery. In the American Northeast, capitalist relations
sprang from antislavery political economy, if not thunderous moral declamations against slavery
most historians now identify as true abolitionism. The spread of capitalist social relations in the
countryside and wage labor in domestic manufacturing in the American Northeast helped to
solidify the social and economic hegemony of a rising capitalist class, which believed antislavery
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political economy legitimated free labor systems—and at the same time, new methods of social
control.4

**********

After Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency in 1801, congressional debates over the
promotion of northeastern manufacturing intensified. Streams of memorials from manufacturers
and promotion societies asked that Congress raise tariffs on dozens of imported goods, including
but not limited to textiles, so that domestic manufacturers could capitalize on the rapidly
expanding home market, especially in New England and the mid-Atlantic. An 1804 report
submitted to Congress by New York’s antislavery Rep. Samuel Latham Mitchill on
“encouragement to manufactures” noted that the previous several years had seen a rise in
petitions from producers of numerous goods. In 1802, Congress received petitions and
memorials from “manufacturers of gunpowder, of hats, of printing types, of brushes, and of stone
ware.” The next year, manufacturers of starch, paper, and umbrellas petitioned Congress, as did
textile capitalists and shoemakers. Mitchill’s Democratic-Republican politics, as well his
antislavery beliefs, made him sympathetic to producerist arguments, that small-scale artisans and
domestic manufacturers should receive some level of government protection.5 While the national
government could not “encourage manufactures by imposing duties on certain domestic raw
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materials, if exported,” it could act to protect specific domestic manufactures. Whether or not
Congress would do so was a political question that partially hinged on conflicts over chattel
slavery and the way to best orient a national economy composed of regions that differed quite
significantly.6
The report also stated what political economists like Tench Coxe, Mathew Carey, and
others had been saying since the 1780s: that agriculture and domestic manufacturing went handin-hand to encourage American prosperity, and that external commerce should play an important
but ultimately secondary role. “Political economists will instantly see,” the report reiterated,
“that the good of the revenue, and the happiness of the people, are best promoted by offering part
of our unwrought materials, and of our surplus provisions, to domestic manufacturers,” while
exporting what “we can spare” in exchange for foreign-made goods. In a nation rooted in
agriculture, but especially the free-household patterns of the Northeast, “the cluster of arts and
trades which minister to its wants spring up of course, almost from necessity.” To Mitchill, who
had publicly supported endeavors like maple sugar production as an antislavery family
manufacture, and other northeasterners, this vision of political economy sprang from antislavery
conditions, states where chattel slavery had been abolished and bound servitude was on the
decline. It is telling that, outside elite liberal Virginians like Thomas Jefferson and George
Washington Parke Custis, few slaveholders promoted government policy designed to encourage
domestic manufactures.7

“Encouragement to Manufactures,” American State Papers, 010, Finance, II: pp. 80-81.
In a November 1804 address to Congress, for example, Jefferson asked legislators “whether the great
interests of agriculture, manufactures, commerce and navigation, can, within the pale of your
constitutional powers be aided in any of their relations?” Thomas Jefferson to United States Congress, 8
November 1804, Founders Online, National Archives. George Washington Parke Custis, An Address to the
People of the United States, on the Importance of Encouraging Agriculture and Domestic Manufactures…
(Alexandria, VA: S. Snowden, 1808).
6
7

279

As was the case in the 1780s and 1790s, during Jefferson’s presidency, northeasterners
made the strongest arguments in favor of domestic manufacturing, especially Pennsylvanians.
The Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufacturing, founded in 1787, continued
to lobby for manufacturing protections, maintaining they would “greatly [promote] Union, trade,
and intercourse among the States, and between the several grand divisions of our country.”
Unfortunately, by 1804 the Society reeled under the effects of several disastrous circumstances,
the worst being a fire that destroyed much of its capital stock and “some of the most valuable
cotton spinning machinery.” Under the leadership of President Tench Coxe and Board of
Managers that included Mathew Carey, the Society continued to promote the expansion of
mechanized cotton spinning, as they believed the fiber “is a production the best of all adapted to
labour-saving machinery, and fit for goods for American use, and for the most diversified and
extensive exportation.”8
While this support for American cotton production signaled some acquiescence to the
interests of southern planters, the Society went on to explain that its vision for American
manufacturing growth was not limited to cotton textiles alone. It had invested resources in
developing cotton-spinning technology, but also “machinery for coining or stamping metals,
leather, &c.,” as well as “for reducing old woolen cloths or rags to the state of wool, [and] for
boring cannon which have been solidly cast.” Other initiatives included developing machinery
for flax spinning, combing hemp and wool, staining and printing cloths, constructing steam
engines, and “various other machinery, facilitating or perfecting manufactures, and saving
labour, time, risk, or expense.”9 Important as cotton textiles were to manufacturing promoters
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like the Pennsylvania Society, they were not the only pillar in the foundation of American
industrialization’s northeastern core, which encompassed the manufacture of dozens of products.
It was not a surprise, for example, that in 1805 Thomas Jefferson had to cancel his Monticello
nailery manager’s order for iron nail rods from a firm seventy miles away in Richmond, “as it’s
high price… would take away all the profit from the manufacture.” He bought the rods more
cheaply from a firm in Philadelphia, two-hundred and fifty miles away.10
Aside from the manufacturing societies, whose members tended towards the social and
economic elite, smaller manufacturers and artisans made the case for protection of northeastern
manufacturing interests. In 1803 members of the Franklin Association, a northeastern artisan
group that included journeyman printers, as well as men from trades ranging from cork-cutting to
umbrella manufacturers, petitioned Congress to repeal import duties on raw materials not
obtainable from the United States, and to impose prohibitive duties on foreign manufactures. The
Congress Committee of Commerce and Manufactures expressed some sympathy to the
journeyman artisans, but declined to press the matter in the sitting Congress, recommending the
matter for the succeeding Congress to address.11
In Philadelphia, a memorial of the city’s artisans and manufacturers asked for tariff
protections for domestic goods against foreign competition, and went further by offering
refutations to the arguments typically made by opponent of tariffs—most often southern planters
and allies in the northeastern merchant class. First was the contention that “the country is too
young to begin the manufactory of cloathing for the citizens,” and therefore agriculture should be
the primary focus of economic policy and manufactures should be imported. This argument
Thomas Jefferson to George Jefferson, 14 November 1805, Founders Online, National Archives.
Report of the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures, of the Several Memorials and Petitions of the
“Franklin Association…” 21 February 1803, 7 Cong., 2 Sess.
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discriminated against the northeastern states in particular, because they stood to gain the most
from manufacturing promotion. “It will be bad policy indeed,” they wrote, “when the United
States shall retard the prosperity of the most ancient and best peopled states, for no other reason,
than that the new States are not equally forward in point of population agriculture, &c.” A
second argument the artisans and manufacturers addressed also concerned the newer western
states and territories, since opponents of domestic manufacturing argued that the growth of
industry would be prevent the peopling of the West. This the manufacturers flatly disagreed with,
replying, “as if the prosperity of the citizens, in old established situations, were to be sacrificed
to new projects and land speculators.”12 Two objections to protection stemmed from
misinformation about the effects of manufacturing on the health and morals of factory
operatives. The supposedly “sedentary” nature of factory work, compared to agricultural labor,
was an overblown concern: the only truly sedentary workers in factories, they argued, were
clerks, and merchants were more sedentary than factory workers for that matter. And the “vices”
and social ills which opponents believed infected European industrial zones, they asserted, did
not actually exist, at least to the degree some claimed. “A considerable number of your
memorialists have seen the manufacturing towns of Europe,” they countered, “and are
convinced, that the greatest portion of virtue is to be found there.”13
The weightiest argument against national government protections for domestic
manufacturing was also the most political: the national government should not treat domestic
manufacturing as a special privilege, thereby discriminating against the other branches of the
national economy, agriculture and commerce. Coming from the mouths of slaveholders,
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however, the argument against special privilege was also the most easily attacked, and in 1804
Tench Coxe took up his pen in An Essay on the Manufacturing Interest with this goal in mind.
The controversial Coxe, by Jefferson’s first administration frustrated and isolated within the
Jeffersonian coalition, opened the pamphlet spewing fire against manufacturing’s opponents. “To
excite the citizens to industry, without deviating into slavery or oppression on the one hand,” he
proclaimed to legislators, “is the standard by which the great Statesman ought to be estimated.”
His reference to industry encompassed two meanings—the tangible industry of manufactured
goods, as well as cultural attribute of industriousness. He made clear that the rhetorical opposite
of industry was slavery: “that man is the greatest Statesman, who, at the same time that he
banishes tyranny, oppression, slavery, and idleness from the land, encourages and protects
industry, and prevents it from being disgraced by poverty and contempt.” If not an explicit,
outright attack on slavery and slaveowners, at the least Coxe imbued his pro-manufacturing
argument with antislavery overtones.14
Coxe, to be sure, respected the role of agriculture as the foundation of the American
economy, and while he often butted heads with merchant elites, he believed that commerce had a
role to play in securing American prosperity. But, “although these three great branches of
National industry depend reciprocally on each other,” he wrote, “neither of them ought to be held
in higher estimation than the other, by the legislature of an extensive country…”15 He used
several interrelated arguments to convince opponents of domestic manufacturing. Coxe urged
southern planters to consider investing in cotton mills as a way to increase the productivity of
their plantations, that “there is not an individual among them that would think his destiny far
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happier than it is,” if they erect cotton mills with a number of spindles proportional to their
acreage. Implementing spinning at the source of cotton production, Coxe believed, would
support economic development because it would help attract immigrants and provide
employment to non-slaveholding, landless white southerners. In other words, Coxe encouraged
southern planters to pursue a developmental program that resembled the northeastern states.16
But was that what southern planters really wanted? Surely Coxe knew enough about the
thinking of southern slaveholders to suspect that it was not. Coxe’s political economy has not
usually been seen by historians as containing meaningful antislavery implications, in part
because of his emphasis on cotton textiles as an engine for economic development. Thus, it is
typically argued, Coxe must have supported southern slavery, at least implicitly.17 That
interpretation is difficult to square with the language he deployed in An Essay. Having laid out
the outlines of his case for protection of domestic manufacturing, he directly addressed what he
believed to be the weaknesses of the slave-based economies of the Chesapeake, Lower South,
and southwestern territories. The economic, not to mention social and political, inequality of
plantation economies were their fatal weakness, especially the unequal distribution of property
ownership that accompanied slavery. “The mere cultivator,” he wrote, “who has no tenure in
lands, must be a slave or a vagabond.” Therefore, “the landholders of the Southern States, and all
the advocates of slavery,” found themselves between a rock and a hard place— “placed betwixt
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Scylla and Charybes without a pilot.” The political economy of the slave states and territories
had been designed to emphasize large freeholds in the hands of a relative few, so that large
numbers of landless whites lived “vagabond lives… denied the privilege of manufacturing.”18
Surely, Coxe did not denounce chattel slavery in the scathing language of immorality some of his
contemporaries used, or later moral suasionists employed. But just as surely, his critique of the
political economy of plantation slavery rang with stringent tones of calumniation.
Nor was Coxe alone in laying out a vision of national political economy that had a place
for, but was not dominated by chattel slavery. In May 1809, Philadelphian Adam Seybert
delivered a lecture to Philadelphia Manufacturers and Mechanics which emphasized these
themes. Seybert, a scientist and candidate for U.S. Representative, offered something of a pitch
to the assembled artisans and manufacturing capitalists, repeatedly extolling domestic
manufactures as the bedrock of American prosperity. Seybert did not discuss slavery in the
speech, certainly not in direct reference to southern slavery, but his outline of support for
northeastern manufactures assumed the absence of chattel slavery. Northeastern manufacturer’s
point of comparison was Great Britain, and ironically at a time of escalating tension with the
British Empire over naval impressments and Jefferson’s embargo, Seybert devoted much of his
speech to detailing why America should follow the British manufacturing model. Like British
imperial policy dating back to Edward IV, Seybert hoped the American national government
would provide explicit protection for domestic manufactures. The “present circumstances,”
meaning Jefferson’s embargo, meant that “within the last eighteen months, the quantum of
capital devoted to and the number of persons who have engaged in the erection of
manufactories… far exceed any precedent in the annals of our history.” Seybert hoped that
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America would cease to export cotton wool to Europe, but rather cotton yarn, and yet he also
pointed to increases in woolen manufactures, chemical pursuits, iron and steel production, tool
manufactures, and dozens of other goods. Seybert’s point was not to deny the importance of
cotton, but rather that American economic prosperity encompassed the production of dozens of
manufactures made by free, and not enslaved laborers.19
In April 1810, textile capitalist John Howland delivered a lecture to the Providence
Association of Mechanics and Manufacturers, in which he served as Secretary. While Howland
did not deny the importance of agriculture, he did not express as much deference to landed
interests as did Pennsylvanians. He reversed the relationship between agriculture and
manufactures, arguing that the former was not possible in modern societies without the products
of artisans. “The mistake,” he said to his audience, “is this: that Agriculture constitutes the first
rank in useful employments… that all other arts are subordinate thereto… that the good oldfashioned phrase, WE THE PEOPLE… means nothing more or less than we the farmers…”
This, Howland countered, was “false doctrine,” because without fabricated implements farmers
would be relegated to the methods of ancient hunter-gatherers. Howland’s point was not to
unfairly disparage farming, but to remind his audience how wrong opponents of domestic
manufacturing were when they argued that government support for manufacturing discriminated
against agriculture.20
Howland, descended from a Mayflower passenger of the same name, grounded his
support for domestic manufactures in the economic and social history of New England from its

Adam Seybert, An Oration, Delivered on the 19th of May, at the Meeting of the Manufactures and Mechanics of
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settlement by the English. Here is where an antislavery bias showed, because the history he
described did not conform at all to the stories recent scholars have told, that New England was
not just complicit, but reliant on slavery and the slave trade, for its regional economic and social
development.21 Howland, to be sure, idealized the heroic struggles of his New England ancestors
in their efforts to establish a subsistence agriculture economy in the “wilderness” of Cape Cod,
and he most certainly ignored the depredations the English colonists visited upon local Native
Americans. But the story he told—of the slow development of household manufactures from
“raising wool and flax,” and the “many years witnessed their privations” in developing wool and
flax sources—was not wrong. Eventually, his ancestors developed ways to make their own
spinning wheels and looms, and “in the ever memorable year 1639, the first piece of cloth ever
wove in what is now the United States of America…” Even if we strip away the hagiography of
early New Englanders’ work ethic—and we should—the conclusion of Howland’s short history
of New England manufacturing hammered home an explicit, contemporary political-economic
point.22 “The genius and enterprize of the northern and middle states,” Howland argued, “will
not be restrained to manufactures of cotton.” The Northeast, in other words, would not be in
thrall to the desires of southern planters. “The time has arrived for manufactures in woolen to

Much of the inspiration for this interpretation seems to derives from Williams, Capitalism and Slavery
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). See, for example, Ronald Bailey, “The Slave(ry)
Trades and the Development of Capitalism in the United States: The Textile Industry in New England,”
Social Science History, Vol. 14 No. 3 (Autumn 1990), pp. 373-414. A more recent work offers the same
interpretation as Bailey: Eric Kimball, “‘What Have We To Do With Slavery?’” Seth Rockman has recently
presented work in which he argues that a “plantation belt” existed in New England in the 19 th century, by
which he means that several shoe and textile factories in New England produced some goods for
southern plantation markets. The overall significance of New England shoe and textile sales to southern
plantation markets is unclear, but there is no indication that they approached anything close to a majority
of industry sales overall.
22
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claim their share of public attention… and the state of population in the agricultural districts will
soon admit thousands to be employed in this profitable and already progressing manufacture.”23

**********

By the end of the decade, American mechanized textile production began to rise,
especially in response to a decline in British textile production as a result of the Napoleonic Wars
and the Jefferson administration’s 1808 embargo on British imports. Northeastern capitalists
piled investment into the construction of dozens of cotton, woolen, and linen spinning mills,
hoping to take advantage of the absence of British textiles and establish the region as a world
player in textile production.24 These investors followed a path trodden beginning in the late
1780s by men like Rhode Island’s Moses Brown, committed slavery abolitionist and pioneering
textile capitalist. Southern planters increasingly shifted to cotton production, and the slave states
also produced manufactured cotton goods of their own. As he had since the 1780s, Tench Coxe
compiled American economic production statistics in 1810 while serving as the Purveyor of
Public Supplies, a position to which he had been appointed by in 1803 Thomas Jefferson. The
tables of statistics Coxe compiled in 1810 are in no way complete, nor did Coxe claim them to be
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so.25 Nevertheless, they give a reasonable snapshot of American regional production of a number
of manufactured goods, as well as an indication of American agricultural yields.
The tables which recorded “Goods for apparel and furniture, of cotton, woollen [sic],
flaxen, hempen and silken yarn or thread” produced in 1810 reveal significant regional
difference. Coxe’s correspondents across the nation reported that “families” produced
16,581,299 yards of cotton goods, while cotton manufacturing establishments made 146,974.26
Production by families—a system that had existed since at least the 18th century in North
America, where families either spun yarn or received it from local merchants, and wove it into
cloths—was heavily skewed towards the slave states and territories, which produced roughly
three-quarters of family-made cotton goods. In the slave states and territories, crucially,
“family” referred to both nuclear free families and plantations, and therefore counted the
production of enslaved persons. South Carolina led the way, accounting for 3,688,534 yard of
cotton goods produced by families, unsurprising given the Palmetto State’s booming upcountry
cotton plantation economy.27 These statistics, moreover, in part contradict a common assertion in
modern scholarship on slavery and capitalism: that southern cotton was vital to the northeastern
economy. In the Early Republic, cotton was important to southern household-based (or
plantation) production of cotton goods, but not to northeastern free-households.

U.S. Treasury Department, Tabular Statements of the Several Branches of American Manufactures… 1810
[hereafter Tabular Statements] (Philadelphia: A. Cornman, 1813).
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Cotton manufacturing establishments, like the mechanized spinning mills that
increasingly peppered the New England and mid-Atlantic landscape near rivers and streams,
were far less common from the Chesapeake southward. Coxe’s information revealed that two
hundred and seven cotton manufactories had been established in the Northeast by 1810, while
the slave states and territories only supported fifty-nine. This accentuated the basic fact of slavebased economies: capital tied up in the bodies of the enslaved and the lands they forcibly toiled
was capital not invested in labor-saving machinery.28 In fact, according to Coxe the vast majority
of labor-saving machinery reported by his correspondents was located in the free states and
territories, made clear in a table entitled “Instruments and machinery for the manufacture of
cotton, flax, hemp, wool, and silk into cloths, & c.” Carding machines, which straightened raw
fibers into long strands suitable for spinning into yarn, significantly reduced the amount of labor
needed to card cotton, wool, and flax by hand. Of the 1,776 carding machines enumerated in the
table, the northeastern states contained 1,591. Northeastern manufactories also reported the vast
majority of other labor-saving textile machinery, including drawing and roving machines,
spinning mules and jennies, and looms with fly shuttles.29 Just as importantly, the majority of
foundries and mills which produced labor-saving machinery and their parts were also located in
the Northeast.30
Aside from cotton goods, woolens and linens constituted a significant portion of
American production in 1810, centered mainly in the mid-Atlantic and New England.
Unsurprisingly, given climate conditions, New England led the way in woolen yarn and cloth
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production. The Northeast produced more than ninety percent of woolens made in private
families, while the region contained twenty-one of twenty-four woolen manufacturing
establishments enumerated in Coxe’s tables. The free states and territories also dominated
production of flaxen cloths, as free households in New England, the mid-Atlantic, and Ohio
accounted for almost three-quarters of the national output even though flax was not as limited by
climate as wool.31 Production of “blended and unnamed cloths and stuffs,” various mixtures of
cotton, wool, and linen, were more equally distributed across the nation, with the slave states
producing about sixty percent.32 Overall, Coxe’s tabulations revealed that American production
of “cloths and stuffs” of all kinds cumulatively totaled $38,785,250. New York, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Massachusetts, in that order, ranked as the most valuable
textile-producing states; the free states and territories’ average ranking was 12.3, the and slave
states and territories 13.7.33 Textile production, then, was an important economic activity
throughout the Union, and each region had relative strength and weaknesses. What is clear is that
by 1810 the textile manufacturing economies of the Northeast were moving in a different
direction than the burgeoning Cotton Kingdom, towards mechanization and more efficient
production techniques. Cotton was important to the South, but not necessarily to the Northeast,
notwithstanding recent assertions by slavery capitalism historians.
The statistics presented in Coxe’s 1810 tabulations reflected the effects of Jefferson’s
1808 embargo on Great Britain and France, which negatively affected the American export
economies. The embargo angered many New England merchants, especially those with close
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connections to Britain and Europe, who saw their import-export businesses ruined. New
Englanders also interpreted the embargo as a political and economic attack on Federalists, and
their region generally, one waged at the insistence of southern slaveholding Republicans and
their Congressional representatives. “War Hawks” hailed most notably from the slave states,
leading calls for a declaration of war against Great Britain by slaveholding politicians and their
political allies in the Jeffersonian coalition.34 After Congress’s declaration of war in 1812, the
Chesapeake received the brunt of the British war effort, and the nation’s capital famously treated
to a conflagration by British forces. Just as in the American Revolution, the British Army
instituted a policy of wartime emancipation in an attempt to undermine southern slave society,
leading to the emancipation of several thousand slaves from Chesapeake masters. Meanwhile,
the Hartford Convention discussed New England secession seriously, and officially called for the
abrogation of the three-fifths clause in the Constitution, arguing that the founding fathers unfairly
“agreed to consider slaves as men, but as men whose value the loss of freedom has
depreciated...”35 At the end of war in 1815, Americans from all sections of the country looked
forward to an economic resurgence.
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While the mid-Atlantic and New England states shared many economic similarities,
especially as they concerned support for domestic manufactures, political conflicts related to the
War of 1812 temporarily complicated efforts to develop a unified base of support for domestic
industry. Mathew Carey, an Irish immigrant who devoted his life to publishing newspapers and
magazines which trumpeted Jeffersonian politics and domestic manufactures, struck hard at New
Englanders for betraying the Union by opposing the Embargo and the War of 1812. In The Olive
Branch, published first in 1814 and quickly running through more than a dozen updates and
reprints, Carey’s calumny fell most heavily upon wealthy and politically influential New
England merchant families, which he accused of disloyalty to the Union. Wealthy merchants, in
particular those of Boston, had spent several decades using “the most unceasing endeavours… to
poison the minds of the people of New England towards, and to alienate them from, their fellow
citizens of the southern states.” According to Carey, Federalists like the Cabots and Lodges
deceived ordinary New Englanders, and especially farmers, into thinking that southerners were
“demons incarnate, and destitute of all of the good qualities that dignify or adorn human nature.”
The root of hatred towards southerners, Carey argued, was a hatred of slavery, and he quoted
what he believed to be a representative New England merchant position on the subject, offered in
“Pelham” essays published by the Connecticut Courant in the mid-1790s. “Negroes are,” one of
the Pelham essays argued, “in all respects, except in regard to life and death, the cattle of the
citizens of the southern states.”36

Mathew Carey, The Olive Branch: Or, Faults on Both Sides, Federal and Democratic. A Serious Appeal on the
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Strong words, to be sure, but did Carey overstate the anti-southern planter convictions of
wealthy New England merchants? There is reason to believe that he did, in order to bolster his
overt attack on leading New England Federalists. New England merchants had long been the
national political allies of southern planters, particularly as it pertained to tariff duties, though
Jefferson’s Embargo clearly signaled temporary cracks in that alliance. Carey claimed that at the
time of the “Pelham” essays’ publication, “there were many slaves in Connecticut, who were
subject to the all the disadvantages that attended the southern slaves.” This statement clearly
ignored the fact that Connecticut’s 1784 abolition law declared chattel slavery illegal, and
transferred the status of the enslaved to long-term servitude. Carey further claimed that the “vile
character” of New England Federalists’ attack on Republican slaveholders was “greatly
aggravated by the consideration that a large portion of these very negroes, and their ancestors,
had been purchased, and rent from their homes and families by New Englanders… engaged in
the Slave Trade.” While it was certainly true that some New England merchants, especially those
of Newport, Rhode Island, participated in the transatlantic slave trade before and after the
Revolution, this statement ignored the fact that between 1803 and 1808 almost half of ships
bound for Africa embarked from South Carolina, most registered from Charleston.37
Carey’s partisan attack on New England merchants was most directly inspired by his
dislike for their (surely self-interested) claims that the New England carrying trade was the
bedrock of national economic prosperity, and therefore the southern plantation economies of
secondary importance. In his rush to defend his planter political allies, Carey claimed a measure
a fully integrated national economy that encompassed both the slave and free regions was southern
slaveholders, and not, as he argued in The Olive Branch, “extreme” New England Federalist merchants.
See Ibid., pp. 249-252.
37
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of national economic integration that he could not support with actual numbers. His stated
goal—his “deeper game”—was to disprove several points he claimed New England merchants
made repeatedly. First, “that New England was supereminently commercial,” and second that
“the states south of the Patowmac, were wholly agricultural.” Third was the mistaken notion that
“there is a natural and inevitable hostility between commercial and agricultural states,” a hostility
which “has uniformly pervaded the southern states.” Finally, he strove to disprove the idea that
“all the measures of congress were dictated by that hostility; and actually intended to ruin the
commercial, meaning the eastern states.”38
Carey provided more than a dozen tables designed to prove that the southern plantationexport economies were just as vital to national economic prosperity as the New England carrying
trade. Carey went out of his way to state that this was an attack on a specific subset of the New
England merchant class, not the yeomanry. “I feel a pride and pleasure in doing justice to the
New England yeomanry” whom he recognized as “upright, sober, orderly, and regular- shrewd,
intelligent, and well-informed…” Notwithstanding those virtues, the yeomanry had been
“egregiously duped” by leading Federalist Boston merchants, especially.39 Carey intended the
information he included in the tables to undermine the claims of these merchants to economic
superiority rooted in their supposed dominance of American commerce. Though carefully
selected statistics and using somewhat misleading categorizations, Carey claimed to prove that
southern exports were on par with New England and the mid-Atlantic. He lumped together
“domestic productions and manufactures,” and in doing so was able to show that slave-grown
Carey, The Olive Branch, p. 254. Carey was forced to admit that, “I do not assert that these positions
were ever laid down in regular form, as theses to argue upon,” but nonetheless turned around and
declared them the basis of “three fourths of all the essays, paragraphs, squibs, and crackers, that have
appeared in the Boston papers against the [Jefferson and Madison] administration for many years past.”
Ibid.
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export commodities constituted a significant economic activity. Between 1803 and 1813, he
noted that Massachusetts cumulatively exported $54,985,000, while South Carolina lagged just
behind at $50,523,000. Pennsylvania and Virginia produced export commodities totaling
$42,833,000 and $44,796,000, respectively, while New York led the nation at $85,283,000.40
In presenting these numbers, Carey repeatedly claimed that New England did not actually
produce the bulk of its exported goods, but instead benefitted from re-exporting southern
commodities. “The naked fact is,” he asserted, “that the demagogues in the eastern states, not
satisfied with deriving all the benefits from the southern states, that they would from so many
wealthy colonies… have uniformly treated them with outrage, insult, and injury.”41 These
claims, however, were only assertions, unsupported with evidence. Carey instead used
suppositions to prove his point. For example, he wrote “suppose among the exports of New
England, a million of dollars’ worth of cotton, half a million worth of flour, half a million worth
of naval stores, all drawn from the southern or middle states,” including Pennsylvania and New
York, and “[New England] appears two million dollars stronger on the face of the argument…
and there is no doubt that this is the case to a vast extent.”42 It certainly can be assumed that New
England merchants did carry a portion of southern products, but Carey’s selective use of
statistics and his biased assumptions also make it reasonable to question his veracity, especially
in the context of a work that was clearly designed to make a partisan political argument.
Moreover, The Olive Branch’s economic analysis almost entirely omitted discussion of one of
Carey’s life-long causes: promotion of American domestic manufacturing, which at the time was
beginning to grow in the mid-Atlantic—and, yes, New England.
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The cumulative effect of Carey’s attack on the New England merchant class was to
complicate political and economic alliances between the mid-Atlantic and New England states.
In his rage to defend the key Jeffersonian constituency of southern planters, he unleashed a
barrage against leading Federalist merchants, some of whom had just begun to shift towards
industrial capitalism, most famously Francis Cabot Lowell, who founded the first iteration of the
Lowell manufacturing system in 1814. It was New England merchants, he claimed, who were
responsible for the “very expensive habits of the planters of Virginia and South Carolina,”
because New England flooded southern markets with imported goods and luxury items. Blaming
New England merchants for southern planters’ “expensive habits” was more than a little
disingenuous, as was claiming that “the solemn truth will be borne in constant remembrance, that
the southern states are virtually colonies to those states whose demagogues have never ceased
slandering and persecuting them.”43 Carey imagined a neocolonial relationship between New
England and the South that did not exist, certainly not in the minds of southern planters
themselves, nor to promoters of northeastern domestic manufacturing that increasingly believed
that southern slaveholders had too much, not too little, control over the levers of national
economic policy.
The vision of national economic integration that Carey imagined, with the southern
plantation economies freed from the overbearing persecution of New England merchants, did not
unfold as he prophesied in The Olive Branch, or in his other writings on American political
economy in the mid-1810s.44 As Carey began to learn painfully in the years after the War of
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1812, just as southern planters resisted even the faint suggestion of national government
interference with slavery, so did they resist overtures to use government authority to promote
domestic manufacturing. Why would they promote manufacturing? Their plantation economies
did not stand to benefit directly from domestic production of textiles, metal and leather goods,
and myriad other products that had emerged in Northeast in the first decades of the century.
Promoting domestic manufacturing, as well as the Whiggish program of internal improvements
of which Carey also approved, required the use of national government authority to a degree that
alarmed slaveholders.
Southern planters, in league with powerful New England merchants, launched an attack
on the promotion of northeastern manufacturing capability that laid bare deep-rooted conflicts
and suggested that a single American national political economy might not be possible. In 1816,
for example, they accused the northeastern textile manufacturers of extortion during the war by
charging higher prices for American-made goods in the absence of British imports. But
according to Carey, in a change of heart from his thesis in the Olive Branch, the real extortion
occurred when planters “raised the price of cotton from thirteen cents per pound to twenty-seven,
between 1814 and 1816—the tobacco planter, who in 1816 raised the price of tobacco from $96
to $185.” To be sure, northeastern family farmers had raised the prices of wheat during times of
high European demand, but it was southern planters, in league with wealthy New England
merchants, who had done the most damage to his vision of political economy. 45
Sometimes northeastern manufacturing groups tried to appeal to a sense of common
interest with southern planters. In 1817, for example, the Connecticut Society for the
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Encouragement of American Manufactures went out of its way to assuage southern planters that
American cotton was vital to the economies of both regions. “American Manufactures,” they
wrote, “placed upon a proper footing, enjoying the protection of the government and the favour
of the people, would prove both nationally and individually, Economical and Moral.” The
Connecticut Society tried to impress upon southern planters that they “are materially concerned”
in American textile production, because American cotton, “their staple product,” should feed
American factories and not those of Great Britain. This, they argued, would increase American
textile consumption, and a rising tide of consumption would lift the all of the American regional
economies. They imagined a scenario in which the southern states, rather than enrich British and
European merchants, would keep raw material and specie from leaving American soil. The
Connecticut Society prophesied—incorrectly, as it would turn out—that “although the Northern
States have at this time a greater apparent interest” in domestic manufacturing, “the Southern
states will hereafter (in a short time, perhaps) be as much, nay, yet more deeply, concerned in the
encouragement of American manufactures.”46
That southern planters at the time of the Missouri Crisis and the concurrent Panic of 1819
did not see things this way was a painful lesson for Mathew Carey, and other northeasterners
with Jeffersonian producerist principles who desired to that American domestic manufacturing
rise to the level of powerful Great Britain. New Yorker Henry Lord wrote of his experiences
discussing national economic policy with southern planters that “in the southern states, there is
but one general interest… the labor is done by slaves who can neither remove or apply their
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industry to new objects.” This was almost the exact same point Thomas Paine made to Jefferson
in 1805, and one that northeasterners would continue to make as the Missouri Crisis unfolded.47

**********

The American economy struggled to recover after the devastation and embarrassments of
the War of 1812, and then the Panic of 1819 struck with vengeance. Northeastern manufacturers
of many varieties of goods, but especially textiles, bore the brunt of economic depression, and
called into question the supposedly harmonious balance of agriculture, commerce, and
manufacturing which political economists since the 1780s had trumpeted as the nation’s most
secure developmental path. Many farmers who had expanded to produce for European markets
during the Napoleonic Wars found themselves deeply in debt and increasingly insolvent by the
end of the 1810s. In 1819, rather than harmony, northeastern commentators saw economic
conflict and political divisiveness, and they blamed southern planters and their merchant allies.
The Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of National Industry (PSPNI), a leading trade group,
placed the blame squarely on misguided tariff policies that discriminated against domestic
manufactures. By instituting ill-advised policy prescriptions inspired by Adam Smith’s The
Wealth of Nations, before and after the war the U.S. Congress ruined domestic manufacturing by
not protecting the home market from imported goods. PSPNI leaders, led by Mathew Carey and
Tench Coxe, skewered Smithian tariff policy as interpreted by certain factions in U.S. Congress.
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Carey’s dislike of New Englanders had clearly softened, at the same time that his dislike for
slaveholder’s iron grip on national economic policy increased. These policies, but especially low
tariffs on dozens of imported manufactures, led the PSPNI to sneer that “the advocates of the
system of Adam Smith ought to be satisfied with the fatal experiment we have made of it.”48
According to the PSPNI, contra the maxims of Smithian political economy, a nation’s
prosperity rested on eleven principles, all of which congressional policy violated in the 1810s.
First and most important were high tariffs that protected the American home market from foreign
competitors. The lack of tariff protection for domestic manufactures pushed many northeastern
large- and small-scale textile producers to the brink of financial ruin, and many others over the
cliff. By discouraging American manufacturing, the opposition to domestic manufactures
violated the precept that “throughout the world, in all ages, wherever industry has been duly
encouraged, mankind have been uniformly industrious,” and that “the interests of agriculture,
manufactures, and commerce, are so inseparably connected, that any serious injury suffered by
one of them must materially affect the others.”49 Home markets existed to consume manufactures
made at home, they insisted, and to encourage policy to the contrary was selfish and unpatriotic.
Great Britain had done exactly this in its Tariff of 1818, and the PSPNI provided readers with an
exhaustive, but not complete, list of eighty-six varieties of manufactures protected by British
policy, ranging from silk-worm guts to textiles.50 What especially galled Carey and the society’s
supporters was that the United States contained natural resources almost unparalleled within the
boundaries of one nation. When casting their eyes toward the textile industries, they inveighed
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against allowing British and other foreign textile imports in a nation that could produce wool,
flax and most cotton in abundance.
By the end of the decade, southern planters increasingly shifted their enslaved peoples’
energy into cotton production, especially in upland country of South Carolina and Georgia, the
new state of Mississippi, and as of December that year, the new state of Alabama, accelerating
after the conclusion of war in 1815.51 By 1819, of course, the Missouri Territory also
increasingly filled with planters who migrated with their slaves from Kentucky and Tennessee.
Cotton could generate enormous profits, but British cotton markets could also be highly unstable.
And yet, the manufacturing promoters fumed, southern planting interests in Congress were
precisely the faction that led the charge to maintain low tariffs on imported textiles and other
manufactures. How on earth, the PSPNI wondered, could southern planters, in league with
wealthier sectors of the coastal merchant class, discriminate against northeastern textile
manufacturers and maintain their fidelity to the Union? Cottons did not completely dominate the
northeastern textile sector, as production of woolens and linens remained important, but for
southern planters to discriminate against their compatriots so that they could maintain good
relations with British merchants and manufacturers was a step too far.
The PSPNI was careful not to entirely blame the southern slaveholders—votes for
lowering tariffs came from congressmen throughout the Union—but the planters were the most
united group in favor of low tariffs. “We do not pretend that the low tariff proceeded solely from
the southern planters,” the society recognized, for “members from every state in the union,
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except three, voted for the existing rates.” Nonetheless, southern planters had been nearunanimous in their support for the low tariff schedule so harmful to northeastern manufacturing.
Only five congressmen from the “five southern states, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia” voted against tariffs on imported cotton goods. Southern planters and
their congressional representatives had been duly warned about the consequences failing to
protect domestic industry. Southern planters, they argued, had seen the value of their estates
plummet by one-third, northeastern commercial interests too often teetered on the brink of
bankruptcy, and manufacturing faced total ruin. This might have been avoided, they added, but
while “southern planters were admonished” to support tariff protections, they declined to “secure
a grand home market, independent of the caprice of foreign nations.”52 While respectful in their
entreaties to southern planting interests and their congressional allies, the society nonetheless
placed blame for manufacturers’ dire economic circumstances on slaveowners.
The PSPNI made this point clearly in a lengthy footnote in its fourth address of 1819,
published that April. The society intended this particular address to enlighten Americans on the
stringent protections for domestic manufacturing offered by the Russian Empire, as a
counterpoint to the United States’ lack of protection. In the midst of this analysis, the address
clearly pointed to sectional rivalries rooted in slavery as the cause of manufacturer and
northeastern family farmers’ ills. “It is too common, we apprehend, for many of the farmers and
planters of the southern states,” it proclaimed, “to regard with disesteem, or, to use a common
phrase, to look down on manufacturers as beneath them in point of respectability.” Southern
planters and farmers, then, reliant on chattel slavery and unwilling to concede the advantages of
the peculiar institution in matters of national economic policy, were the source of “the inflexible
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refusal of that protection.” The PSPNI treaded lightly, not wanting to further stoke sectional
tensions only two months after New York Rep. James Tallmadge proposed banning chattel
slavery from Missouri, the opening salvo in the escalating Missouri Crisis. While it was true that
northeastern manufacturers looked forward to a day when southern cotton could fully supply the
power looms of northeastern textile works—the special dream of Tench Coxe and his protégé
Mathew Carey—at every turn they encountered the stiff resistance of southern slave masters, as
it regarded national economic policy.53
Perhaps the PSPNI was too polite in their entreaties to southern slaveholders, but their
commentary laid bare the fundamental differences in American regional capitalism. “We freely
ask, and request a candid reply,” they wrote, “can there… be found on the most impartial
scrutiny any superiority in a South Carolina or Virginia planter, surrounded by five hundred
slaves, over a proprietor of one of the extensive factories in Rhode Island…?” In the latter,
unlike on the southern plantation, observers could find “free, independent, and happy workmen,
with their wives and children… employed.” This comment struck at the heart of the divide
between slavery and antislavery capitalism. In the latter, which accelerated in tandem with
northeastern state abolition of chattel slavery, economic development flowed from the
productivity of free households—patriarchal units in which parents retained legal control of their
children and were not bound to an external authority. Antislavery commentators had made this
point repeatedly since the British-American imperial crisis beginning in the 1760s, that to abolish
chattel slavery would be to unleash, after a period of servitude, free households into labor market
participation. Undoubtedly, the PSPNI underplayed the often harsh working conditions and
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seasonal instability of New England textile mills, and not all textile families were completely
happy and content. But on the other hand, they were not slaves either.54
Even without meaningful tariff protections for domestic textiles, the PSPNI pointed out,
the New England textile mills were still productive. An 1815 memorial to Congress showed that
within thirty miles of Providence, RI, 140 “cotton manufactories” produced goods valued at six
million dollars, including the mill originally founded by antislavery capitalist Moses Brown and
alongside the expert English mechanic Samuel Slater. “We trust this brief view,” commented the
PSPNI, “will serve to remove the film from the eyes of those citizens who, for want of due
consideration, have cherished opinions on the subject of manufactures, and manufacturers, so
diametrically opposite to fact, and so pregnant with ruinous consequences.” Just think, they
asked, what the northeastern textile mills could produce if properly protected by the national
government? Unfortunately for northeastern promoters of domestic manufactures, southern
planters wielded disproportionate power in Congress, and alongside factions of wealthy
northeastern merchants used it as a cudgel to suppress American manufacturers’ ability to
capitalize on growing domestic consumption markets in New England, the mid-Atlantic, and the
Northwest. For all the respectfulness of the PSPNI’s entreaties, however, they also offered a notso-veiled warning: “and the manufacturer of cottons, woolens, watches, paper, books, hats, or
shoes, who ‘acts his part’ has no reason to shrink, and we trust he will never shrink, from a
comparison with any of his fellow men, whether merchants, farmers, planters, or men of
overgrown wealth.”55
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**********

In streams of memorials to Congress, groups of manufacturers and burgeoning
industrialists repeatedly asked legislators to use their authority to promote domestic production,
only to encounter intransigence from slaveholding constituencies and their congressmen,
especially in the critical years of 1819 and 1820. In December 1819, the Fredricksburg, Virginia
Agricultural Society submitted a remonstrance to Congress spurred by the conviction that
northeastern manufacturing societies and their spokesmen had dominated too much of the public
attention in their pursuit of national protective policies. It opened by appealing to Revolution
principles, that “hostility… to partial taxation, exclusive privileges, and monopolies” was the
“primary cause of our glorious and ever-memorable revolution.” That they equated requests for
domestic manufacturing protection with eighteenth century British imperial monopolies signaled
the Society’s core point, that “free trade” was more beneficial to the nation than domestic
industry. Protective duties intended to promote domestic production, therefore, qualified as
“flagrant violations” of slave-based political economy, which depended on access to
manufactures as cheaply as possible—even if, ironically for the Society’s appeal to the
Revolution, they came from Great Britain. In a deeply paradoxical twist coming from
slaveholders, the Society further claimed that “the prosperity and happiness of [America] depend
not on immunities, privileges and monopolies granted to one class or order at the expense of
another.” To entirely exclude or levy discriminatory duties against foreign goods in the name of
promoting domestic industry, therefore, was unpatriotic. The Virginia Society closed by making
a perfunctory gesture to northeastern manufacturers, that they felt no enmity and “pledge
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ourselves to prefer whatever they may manufacture,” assuming relatively equivalent prices and
quality to foreign goods.56
Almost simultaneously, members of the United Agricultural Societies of Virginia,
including representatives from Prince George, Sussex, Surry, Petersburg, and Brunswick
Counties, petitioned Congress with an equally strident anti-manufacture protection message.
Like the Fredricksburg petition, these tobacco planters railed against protective tariffs as unfairly
monopolistic and favorable to special interests. They argued that prohibitive duties were
unnecessary, given that American manufacturers already possessed the advantage of lower tax
rates than European nations, as well as the “cheap terms on which the chief necessaries of life—
meat, bread, and fuel—can be procured; [and] the abundance in which the raw materials are
produced…” Thus, American manufacturers’ failure to compete with British and European
imports came down to two reasons, either a lack of capital or an unwillingness to compete with
foreign manufactures. “In every nation,” they congratulated themselves, “the landed interest has
been proverbial for liberality, in comparison with every other class,” unlike northeastern
manufacturers whom they claimed took umbrage against perceived threats to their interests far
too quickly. This amounted to a class war, with slaveholding planters and manufacturers arguing
that the other constituted a special interest that did not deserve government patronage.57
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That slaveholding Virginia planters claimed not to receive special protection from the
national government galled many northeasterners, especially in the context of the escalating
Missouri Crisis. The Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of American Manufactures
communicated its reply to the Virginia petitions in April 1820, little more than one month after
President James Monroe signed the Missouri Compromise bill shepherded through Congress by
House leader Henry Clay. The manufacturers took special offense to the planters’ claims to
superior “liberality,” claiming that “the contrast between this strong assumption, and the object
of the remonstrance, it no uncommon.” Then they offered an oblique critique of the planter class:
“Every day’s experience so strongly proves the extreme discrepancy between the profession and
practice” of the planters’ self-proclaimed liberality, “that no illustration can be necessary.”58
The Philadelphia Society offered a lengthy rebuttal to the Virginians couched in the
historic discrimination against domestic manufactures, and the simultaneous government
protection for commerce and slave-grown export commodities. As evidence for their assertion
that slave-grown commodities had always received special protection from Congress, the
Philadelphia Society pointed out that in 1789, cotton, snuff, manufactured tobacco, hemp, and
indigo received tariff protections that averaged forty-six percent, while imported manufactures
including cottons, woolens, and iron, received five percent. In 1820, import duties on the same
slave-grown commodities, with sugar added, averaged fifty-four percent, while in 1818 tariffs on
foreign textiles and manufactures averaged twenty percent.59 This, the Philadelphia Society
argued, constituted crystal-clear evidence of the real special interest in American political
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economy. “Of this striking contrast,” the Society reiterated, “adds one to the numerous
melancholy instances with which history abounds, that where one particular interest
predominates in a legislative body, the others rarely experience impartial justice.”60 They may
have well just directly mentioned the three-fifths clause; in the event, they hardly needed to
remind Congress of the disproportionate power of slaveholders in Congress, certainly not at a
time when legislators were embroiled in the debates over slavery’s proposed expansion in
Missouri.

**********

The introduction of labor-saving machinery, especially in textile manufactories, did not
have entirely positive effects on the lives of working men, women, and children. Historians have
long noted that wrenching shifts in work regimes accompanied the rise of mechanized textile
manufacturing in Great Britain in the 18th century, and later the United States. Older agricultural
and household textile production patterns in which laborers worked in the home and set their
own pace of production changed when textile capitalists established mechanized spinning plants
in many localities. In late eighteenth and early nineteenth century water-powered mechanized
plants like the one funded by abolitionist Moses Brown and operated by Samuel Slater in
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, proprietors operated machinery continuously in twelve hour shifts.
Textile capitalists’ labor demands often conflicted with the desires of working families to
maintain some measure of autonomy over their working lives, and proprietors faced constant
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labor shortages. Thus, according to Samuel Slater’s earliest biographer, the Englishman
encountered problems in the late 1780s as he tried to train boys to serve as factory operatives in
Pawtucket, where “nothing of the kind” had been familiar to locals.61
Slater replicated the labor system he learned from pioneer English textile manufacturer
Jedediah Strutt, in which he relied on families to supply labor to his factories on a mixed full and
part-time basis, as farm families increasingly relied on selling some of their family’s labor for
wages in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Slater’s method, also known as the Rhode
Island System, took advantage of labor markets in which farm families faced increasing pressure
to earn cash in order to compete in market society.62 Until the Lowell system emerged in
Massachusetts, where manufacturers hired and housed teenage girls from farming families in
massive plants, variants of the Rhode Island System typified manufacturing labor regimes in the
first decades of the century. Manufacturers and their allies in politics constantly encountered
criticisms from their opponents, primarily southern planters and northeastern merchants, that
manufacturing districts resulted in poverty and social decay. Thus, Slater famously insisted on
rigid codes of conduct for his workers, and enforced church attendance, all to prove that
manufacturing improved morality, not destroyed it.63
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The rise of mechanized manufacturing in the Northeast, however, did in many cases lead
to the rise of social problems and increased class differentiation. Poverty and related social
problems in the early American manufacturing economy were particularly obvious in urban
areas, where the establishment of manufacturing plants that produced a large variety of goods
rose in the early nineteenth century. In many cases, social ills stemmed from the fact that
manufacturing establishments could not always offer year-round employment to workers, an
especially acute problem in winter.64 Social reform organizations, in conjunction with local and
state governments, grappled with how to address issues like poverty, drunkenness, crime, and
domestic violence, and in the process documented the effects of manufacturing economies on the
lives of laborers.65
Pennsylvania, a state that produced more than four million dollars’ worth of both iron and
steel products and textiles in 1810, social ills were especially acute in the Philadelphia area, the
state’s largest concentration of population and base of manufacturing.66 Some of the city’s
leading residents formed the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Public Economy
(PSPPE), dedicated to finding solutions to poverty and related issues in Philadelphia. The
PSPPE, formed in 1816, undertook research to “investigate the causes which produce the
unhappy number of persons, who annually require public assistance.” The society’s
investigations showed that commerce and the building trades were the most unstable, with
manufacturing running just behind. That winter, the society wrote, “the various manufactories,
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whose operations have been suspended, have heretofore furnished employment to a very
considerable number of poor, especially women and children.” When those factories suspended
operations, family finances suffered and many became indigent, reliant on public assistance to
survive. In a comment that domestic manufacturing promoters surely agreed with, the society
blamed the lull in manufacturing on the availability of cheap foreign goods. They had “no doubt
there are in this city from seven to thousand young and old people, who, if manufactures were
prospering would earn two dollars per week, that are now idling and suffering.”67 Thus,
according to the statistics compiled by the PSPPE, the effects of the southern planternortheastern merchant alliance in favor of promoting cheap foreign imports had a negative
impact on the lives of Philadelphia’s working people.
The PSPPE also blamed alcoholism for destroying the moral fabric of Philadelphia
factory operatives and laborers, a charge which manufacturing promoters like Samuel Slater
constantly denied. “It is a melancholy fact,” it wrote, “that the excessive use of ardent spirits is
the cause of poverty, of a very large portion who receive public charity, probably 2-3ds…” The
instability of the manufacturing economy and related occupations certainly led many operatives
to drink, but the same was also true of sailors and the other maritime trades. Even though
alcoholism and related social problems affected the City of Brotherly Love’s working classes,
the society’s members remained unsure whether the prospect of year-long employment appealed
to the indigent. Addressing the question, “what portion of the poor are willing to labor if they
could obtain work all year,” the society admitted that there was significant difference of opinion.
The poor almost universally claimed to want year-round employment, one researcher noted, but
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“the fact is not so, and the number who subsist on daily wages does not… exceed the demand.”
Others believed that “many of the poor are willing to labour if they could procure employment,”
and that the labor supply exceeded demand.68 The perils of an emergent northeastern
manufacturing capitalism for the poor, especially in urban areas, undercut the arguments of some
of the more optimistic promoters of domestic manufacturing, who claimed it could improve the
workers’ moral fabric as they produced the real article. And yet, manufacturing promoters could
also claim that the pitfalls of manufacturing on the poor did not come close to the moral
depravity and stifling of motivation and innovation that defined the labor regime of slavery.
Though not one of the PSPPE’s stated goals, the 1817 report also illuminated the
conditions of black Philadelphians, almost thirty years after the Keystone State’s process of
slavery abolition began on March 1, 1780. The Society expressed surprise that its research did
not validate the popular opinion that “the greater part of the poor are descendants of Africa.”
While the available statistics were admittedly imperfect, the city’s Guardians of the Poor
reported that of 5,679 persons who had received some form of public or private assistance in the
previous months, blacks numbered 1,040, or 18.5%, a little more than one-sixth.69 But even
though presumed “experts” on the subject of unemployment disagreed about its root causes, it is
clear that the bourgeois leaders of the PSPPE believed that black Philadelphians warranted
special supervision. The society’s report suggested that blacks often “make the wont of work
only a plea to indulge in idleness.” Europeans and native-born whites did this as well, but the
society still recommended that the city’s black residents “should be registered and placed under
[the] strict care” of the city Guardians of the Poor.70 On the other hand, the society also noted
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that black Philadelphians had fewer scruples about binding their children out as servants or
apprentices when in dire financial circumstances. The PSPPE suggested that this was a beneficial
trait, and it is reasonable to assume that many black Philadelphians in 1817 had experienced the
process of gradual emancipation initiated in March 1780. Perhaps that was why black parents
were more comfortable binding out their children, or perhaps the pride that black parents felt in
their children was such that they had rather make sure of their children’s provision than force
them to nobly suffer in poverty.71

**********

In addition to the promotion of domestic manufactures, northeasterners continued to
trumpet agricultural improvements as a key initiative to bolster American economic productivity.
Since the 1780s, agricultural improvement enthusiasts had promoted a broad array of initiatives
with the hope of producing larger crop yields at lower labor and financial expense. In oldestsettled regions of the Northeast, family farmers increasingly converted their farm production to
supply growing urban areas, one consequence of both increased immigration to the United States
but also the spread of manufacturing establishments in coastal New England, and in and near
urban centers like Philadelphia, New York City. Between 1800 and 1820, there was no single
technological breakthrough that generated a massive spike in productivity; rather, the steady
accretion of incremental improvements drove farming productivity. Increased market production,
moreover, had two additional consequences: first, especially in New England, agricultural
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production for urban markets led to greater stratification with the agricultural classes, as families
began to release older children to labor in manufacturing establishments, while increasing land
scarcity drove many into the Northwest Territory seeking fresh lands.72
The Massachusetts Society for Promoting Agriculture (MSPA), as it had since the early
1790s, continued to sponsor contests to promote incremental improvements in farming
techniques and to introduce new crops and seed varieties to New England farmer. The MSPA
and other northeastern societies asked members and correspondents to focus their researches on
crops and techniques which appealed to the capabilities of the free household farm, in which
labor constraints led farmers to search for more efficient and productive farming techniques in
the Early Republic. The transition to new and more efficient farming techniques, like the use of
the molded English plow and nitrogen-rich clover in crop rotations, happened slowly, especially
in the New England hinterlands, and northeastern agricultural societies believed their chief
function was to accelerate agricultural production through experimentation and improvement.
An 1801 communication summarizing the MSPA’s annual activity, made these priorities
abundantly clear. The Society extracted a long excerpt of a letter written by Joseph Cooper of
New Jersey, in which Cooper described himself as a man “in a station of life which obliged me
to secure a living industry,” by which he meant manual labor, chiefly “in the agricultural line.”
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This also described the farmers the MSPA hoped to reach, and the rest of Cooper devoted most
of the letter to describing experiments in various manures, types of potatoes, radishes, and Indian
corn.73 Other communications included information from me like John Ellis of New York, who
submitted “Account of a Method of Preventing the Premature Decay of Peach Trees,” from J.
Kenrick, Jr of Newton, Massachusetts, “On Apple Trees,” and a short letter from Dr. Anthony
Fothergill of Bath, England, “On Manures.” While mundane, to be sure, attention to such topics
attested interest in making family farming as efficient and economical as possible.74
In autumn 1805, the MSPA’s Board of Trustees negotiated a land grant from the state
legislature, the proceeds of which were intended to establish an endowed chair on Natural
History at Harvard. The Board also decided to publish a letter from esteemed statesman Timothy
Pickering on new method of cultivating potatoes “from the Sprouts.”75 The Society continued to
coordinate the flow of information from its members and correspondents to farmers throughout
Massachusetts and England, alerting the public to experiments in new grain hybrids like
Portsmouth, New Hampshire resident Nathaniel Adams’s experiments with “Jerusalem
Wheat.”76 Other improvements the MSPA sponsored included one Paul Dodge’s new cider mill
design, as well as referring Society Vice President Aaron Dexter’s dissertation Food For Plants
for publication, and promoting Justin Ely’s experiments with “the long crooked necked worty
squash.” 77 The Society not only sponsored premiums for experimentation in fruits, vegetables,
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and grains, but also for initiatives that bridged the gap between agriculture and textile
manufacturing. In April 1809, the Board of Trustees offered a reward for “the person who shall
produce the largest quantity of wool, meat, and tallow, from the smallest number of sheep.”78
The MSPA repeated this call in 1812, and would continue to do so after the War of 1812.79
The premiums the MSPA and other northeastern agricultural societies offered for the
development and improvement of agricultural techniques were not merely academic, curiosities
that farmers toyed with in their spare time. The improvements they promoted had real
implications for promoting free household agriculture, widespread throughout the Northeast, and
after 1810 shifting towards market production in New England and the mid-Atlantic. These
complementary priorities—to make family farms more efficient for their own needs, as well as
able to produce goods competitively for the marketplace—can be seen in the various categories
in which farmers competed in local and county agricultural fairs. In 1819, for example, the
Worcester County (MA) Agricultural Society (WCAS) organized a “Cattle Show and Exhibition
of Manufactures,” which provides a revealing glimpse into the priorities of New England
agricultural promoters and the capabilities of free household family farms.
As was often the wont of improvement societies, the WCAS pleaded for more financial
support from the local community, in order to supplement “the most munificent provision” the
Massachusetts state legislature made for its projects. More money, the members said, would
mean higher prizes for the contests they sponsored. Among these were cattle competitions, with
the highest prize of twenty-five dollars for the best yoke of working oxen, and fifteen dollars for
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the second-best yoke. The WCAS also offered rewards for the best merino and “native” sheep, as
well as prizes for boars, pigs, bulls, and milch cows. The society’s criteria for judging the cattle
demanded that the owners be “practical farmers,” and they weighed “the strength… and docility
of the Cattle as well as to their size and appearance, with a view to decided highly in favor of
such, as in their judgement, are the most valuable for labor.” Clearly, the WCAS had the
capability of free household farms in mind.80
The WCAS held two different sets of competitions for agricultural improvements and
experiments. In the former, it offered rewards for “satisfying evidence for practical experiments”
in clearing brush for pasture, for improved methods of making cider, and for “satisfactory
evidence resulting from actual experiment of the relative value of Potatoes or other vegetable
boiled or steamed for fattening beef or pork,” the most valuable award at fifteen dollars. Contests
for agricultural experiments included a reward for growing the most wheat per acre, as well as
for growing the largest number of carrots and turnips on less than one-quarter acre. The society
also offered competitions in two categories of manufacturing, in “domestick” and “household”
manufactures. Domestic manufactures included textiles made in the home with cotton, linen, and
wool yarn distributed to families by textile mills, in addition to “manufactured calf skins” and
“Soal Leather” for shoemaking. Household manufacture prizes included manufacturing
processes completed with materials produced directly by the household, although there was some
overlap with “domestick” manufactures. These prizes awarded six dollars for “the best piece of
woolen cloth of household manufacture not less than 3-4 wide and at least 15 yards in length,”
five dollars for more than five pairs of woolen hose, and five dollars each for the best tub of
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butter of at least fifty pounds, and the best cheese of one hundred pounds or more. The WCAS, it
seems, offered agriculture and manufacturing contests to free household family farms that
simultaneously produced for personal consumption and external markets. These free household
units, according to manufacturing promoters like Tench Coxe and Mathew Carey, were the
precise constituency that domestic manufacturers could serve, especially as their increased
production for the market simultaneously deepened their consumption of manufactured goods. 81
In a speech delivered to the WCAS to open the 1819 Cattle Show, Levi Lincoln Jr., the
son of an eminent lawyer and former Attorney General in the Jefferson administration,
highlighted the importance of agriculture and the economic significance of the free household
farming-household manufacturing family. While Lincoln did not deny that commerce was
important, he reminded his audience that agriculture and household production were the bedrock
of the local and regional economies. “It is hardly considered,” said Lincoln, “that even
Commerce consists of an exchange of the productions of the soil…” In emphasizing the
importance of agriculture, Lincoln aptly summarized the transition within northeastern regional
capitalism that free household producers experienced in the Early Republic. To Lincoln—unlike
much modern scholarship—increased penetration of market relations into rural counties like
Worcester was a positive, rather negative development.82
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Contrasting New England with the Chesapeake and Lower South, Lincoln noted that “in
many of the most fertile parts of our country, the grower of the produce is either unable to make
sales, or must receive the avails reduced by the charges of tedious and expensive
transportation…” Lincoln wondered what good would it do to people the western territories,
which many had trumpeted as the foundation of future prosperity, “if the use for the product” of
western lands “be limited by the consumption of the grower?” The famously stony soil of New
England was not a hindrance to economic prosperity, precisely because agricultural
improvements and access to external markets allowed free household farmers to achieve a level
of economic independence that many white southerners—who were not slaveholders—could not
attain. “Ask the returning Emigrant from the West or South, which now he most highly
appreciates,” Lincoln challenged his audience, “the rough and hard, but vigorous soil of the East,
with the necessity of labour to subdue and improve it… or the extent of territory, useless fertility
and idleness, in a situation where the neighborhood is unknown, the means for educating
children denied…?”83 As Lincoln spoke those words, the Missouri Crisis continued to escalate in
the nation’s capital. He did not make direct reference to the political battle over slavery’s
expansion, but the implications of his argument in support of northeastern agricultural
improvement and domestic manufacturing traced the same contours as the debate over slavery’s
proposed expansion—or its prohibition—in the western territories.

**********
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As was the case on a national scale, settlement in the Old Northwest divided along a
North/South axis in the individual states. New Englanders settled the northern portions of Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois nearer the Great Lakes, while pioneers from Virginia, Kentucky, and
Tennessee settled the southern sections along the Ohio River. This brought conflicts over slavery
to the Old Northwest states, in which chattel slavery was formally banned as per the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787. Masters from the Upper South moved to the Old Northwest, and deviously
transferred their slaves’ status to lifetime indentured servitude in order to settle with their slaves
in north of the Ohio River. In Illinois, a particularly vicious political fight was triggered over the
proposals of a slave-holder dominated state legislature to legalize slavery between 1819-1823,
which antislavery Governor Edward Coles (a converted former Virginia slaveholder)
successfully squashed. Illinois, in particular, developed political-economic dynamics in which
the interests of southern masters in the southern portions of the state clashed with those of
settlers originally from New England in its northern portions, leading a recent historian to
describe the state from which Lincoln emerged “the nation’s conflict over slavery in
miniature.”84
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As the Northwest Territory states rapidly filled with settlers, especially New Englanders
flocking to the Western Reserve in Ohio beginning in 1803, many brought with them the instinct
for agricultural improvements and a desire to promote domestic manufacturers that gripped the
Northeast. Pioneers brought the free household model prevalent in New England with them, and
many of the reform-minded preoccupations of the rural middle classes. In 1819, family farmers
in the Western Reserve county of Trumbull, Ohio, joined together to form an agriculture and
manufacturing improvement society. The reform proposals spelled out in the society’s Articles
of the Association had a distinctly western flavor, though in broad strokes they followed the lead
of their eastern brethren. The society’s defined agriculture as “the art of so managing the earth,
as to make it produce the best crops, and in the greatest abundance.” Believing that lazy
techniques and a “prejudice” against using modern ploughing methods presented significant
obstacles to the expansion of productive family agriculture in the reserve, the society promoted
teaching family farmers the proper techniques for plowing fields.
The Trumbull County society further desired to promote “rural economy” and domestic
manufactures, which like easterners they viewed as critical adjuncts to crop and dairy
production. The society defined rural economy as all farm activities exclusive of ploughing fields
and raising crops, which “teaches the whole duty of a farmer as such, both in the management of
his farm, as well as his household interests.” The society defined domestic manufactures, the
second pillar of rural economic prosperity, in terms that made clear its free household priorities.
“By ‘domestic,’” they wrote, “we mean the productions of family industry.” Family industry—
pointedly, for there were no suggestions that slavery had any role to play in the schema of the
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Trumbull Co. society. The society’s proposals were tinged with a hint of disdain for the poorer
sort of farm families, whom they believed lacked industry and industriousness: domestic
manufactures should be encouraged, they argued, because “idleness is destructive to every social
as well as moral principle. Many families are idle because of the very best of reasons—they have
nothing to employ themselves about.” Therefore, they purchased cheap foreign articles,
simultaneously hurting themselves and the national interest. The Trumbull Co. society concluded
its debut communication by directly addressing its opponents, “the selfish [who] have already
begun to whisper their enmities against the society.” They strongly implied that these “selfish”
citizens included local merchants that depended on sales of imported goods to farm families, as
well as large landholders whose interest it was to “keep you and all of us, in a state of profound
ignorance as regards ‘rural economy.’”85
As was the case in New England, societies like Trumbull County’s offered rewards for
agricultural and domestic manufacturing improvements geared towards the capabilities of free
household farms who did not desire, or have access to bound labor. In summer 1819, the
Trumbull society offered cash rewards to the farmer who raised “the best three-fourths an acre of
flax,” the best piece of woolen cloths, and “the best specimen of linen diaper, not less than ten
yards…” The society’s capstone premium was indicative of their free household priorities: they
offered a reward to “the person who shall cultivate a farm of not less than twenty acres, in the
neatest and best manner, and at the least expense; view being had to the most lasting
improvements thereon.”86
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Throughout Ohio, free household farmers kept abreast of domestic manufacturing trends
and proposed methods to increase household farm and factory production in the late 1810s and
early 1820s. Newspapers across Ohio reprinted publications of domestic manufacturing
promotion groups like the PSPNI, concluding for themselves that “industry is the only sure
foundation for national virtue, happiness, and greatness,” and should be promoted by national
government policy.87 Initiatives to promote the cultivation of flax in the Old Northwest intended
to benefit both household mechanized industrial manufactures were disseminated throughout
Ohio. In 1821, for example, the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture’s proposal for
elevating mechanized spinning to the level of cotton textiles, reprinted in the Ohio Gazette,
distributed experimental plans for a mechanized linen thread spinning machine and encouraged
family farmers to grow flax as means of abetting the expansion of linen cloth production.88
In Scioto County, Ohio an agricultural society formed in 1821 with the aim of furthering
domestic manufactures on the free household scale, even though the county was located along
the Ohio River, near Cincinnati and Louisville—and therefore, along the borderland of slavery
and freedom. The society’s concern was to encourage the domestic agricultural and
manufacturing economies in the wake of the Panic of 1819; concerned over the “low price of the
products of the soil,” it urged experimentation with techniques that would maximize production
while utilizing “the least amount of labor.” Dependence on foreign manufactured goods had
rendered the Ohio Valley’s family farms and artisan workshops idle, its labor “misguided.” “We
must choose one of two alternatives,” the society’s leaders urged: “to be in a state of dependence,
clothed in foreign manufactures, or be independent, clothed in homespun, the products of our
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own labor.”89 Promoting homespun manufactures was especially important for the rapidly
growing western states and territories because their distance from the eastern seaboard increased
the costs of foreign-made goods. Before the Erie Canal opened in 1825 and before railroads
stretched their tentacles westward beginning in the 1820s, largely along an east-west axis.90
Like northeastern improvement societies, those in Ohio like the Scioto County
organization urged free household farm families to purse domestic manufactures and agricultural
activities in the interest of promoting industry and industriousness. In offering improvement
premiums, the Scioto society argued that “nothing but industry, rightly directed with economy,
can relieve us of our present embarrassments.” This referred to the earliest stages of household
manufactures in recently settled areas like southern Ohio. Farm families would have to make do
with somewhat crude household productions at first—just as they needed to be patient in
establishing their farms as productive units. “It is true,” the society’s leadership acknowledged,
“that in the first attempts to manufacture, the articles produced are more rude in their appearance,
than those of the same kind imported.” Two alternatives existed, as far as improvement societies
were concerned: either the new western states remained dependent on imported foreign
manufactures, or “be independent, clothed in homespun, the produce of our own labor.”91
Conflicts over slavery and the political economy in the Early American west reached a
crescendo in 1819, just as Ohio, Indiana, and finally Illinois increasingly peopled with free
household farming communities. Simultaneously, southern planters desiring to force through the
legalization of chattel slavery made concerted political efforts in the Indiana and Illinois state
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legislatures to overturn the ban on chattel slavery in the Northwest Ordinance. The collision
between “slaveholding nationalism”—the notion that slaveholders could force federal and state
government recognition of their property rights in the enslaved anywhere in the states or national
domain—clashed with a rising “popular antislavery politics,” opposition to slavery’s expansion
into formally free territories rooted in a moral and political economy which disdained the
disproportionate power wielded by slaveholders wherever they planted the sordid institution of
slavery.92

**********

The 2nd Session of the 16th Congress’s agenda faced issues fraught with major
consequences for the nation’s future, and the men involved knew it. In 1819-1820, the first three
decades of regional political, social, and economic change merged in the crucial debates over
whether to accept Missouri into the Union as a slave state. Widely recognized by historians as a
critical turning point in the politics of slavery and antislavery, the Crisis (and resulting
Compromise) marked a transition point where the politics of chattel slavery’s legality in the
states and territories became nationalized. Thus, in many ways the years 1819-1820 marked the
final chapter in the northeastern state processes of chattel slavery abolition. While some AfricanAmericans remained in a state of long-term servitude in New England and the mid-Atlantic
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through the 1820s, slavery’s rapid decline in the Northeast, within the span of one generation,
neared completion as the Missouri debates in Congress grew progressively more vitriolic.93
The divide between the political and economic interests of slaveholders and nonslaveholders that the Missouri Crisis brought to national attention conflicts over national
economic policy between 1800 and 1820. While it would be incorrect to say that all promoters of
northeastern manufacturing development were explicitly antislavery, the substance of their
visions of economic development premised on the absence of slavery in the Northeast—not
southern chattel slavery, even as manufactured goods like cotton textiles required raw material
inputs produced by slaves on southern plantations. But to reduce the United States’ path towards
industrial capitalism to cotton textiles ignores the panoply of goods that manufacturing
promoters like Tench Coxe envisioned as the bedrock of northeastern regional capitalism.
Furthermore, reducing northeastern capitalism to cotton textiles ignores the social relations of
production within the New England and mid-Atlantic states. When Thomas Paine wrote to
President Jefferson in 1805 to oppose the slave trade’s legalization in Louisiana on both moral
and economic grounds—slavery was wrong, but it also economically inefficient because it
retarded domestic consumption—he imagined patterns of economic development for Louisiana
that mimicked those of Pennsylvania and Westchester County, New York, his adopted American
homes.

Recent treatments of the Missouri Crisis and Compromise include Robert Pierce Forbes, The Missouri
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President James Monroe conducted backroom dealings during the Crisis not entirely to produce a
workable compromise, as Forbes argues, but to protect the interests of the southern planters. Hammond,
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While the Missouri Crisis marked the end of northeastern state slavery abolition, it just as
surely opened the beginning of a new chapter of slavery politics. The creation of the 36° 30´
parallel, of course, did not end conflict over slavery’s expansion, and southern cotton production
increased in the decades after 1820. The northern regional economies grew more tightly
connected after 1820, as free household agriculture expanded in the Old Northwest states, while
farmers in the Northeast increased their production for market, both to supply the needs of
rapidly expanding urban areas and their growing industrial cores. With the exception of some
mercantile and finance firms in cities like New York which dealt in southern cotton, the decades
after 1820 witnessed increasing economic divisions between the North and South, not the mutual
dependence described by slavery capitalism historians.
Near the end of his life in March 1820, Tench Coxe wrote to former president James
Madison to express his dismay over the Missouri Crisis, and his retrospective thoughts on the
state of American domestic manufacturing, which he spent his public life promoting assiduously.
Like many aged political elites of the founding generation, Coxe was aghast at the divisive tenor
of the Missouri debates. “I have been deeply impressed with the delicacy, delicacy, and high
inconveniences of the agitation of the Missouri question,” he wrote, and he believed that
Congress could not constitutionally prohibit slavery’s expansion into the Louisiana Territory.
Coxe latched on to the tired Jeffersonian idea of the diffusion of slavery, “in order to facilitate
and render safe, at the earliest day, their gradual abolition.” He also expressed interest in the
rising African colonization movement, but was unconvinced that voluntary colonization would
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work,” believing that African-Americans “would not go” to the newly founded American
Colonization Society colony in northwest Africa, Liberia.94
Coxe still remained confident that domestic manufacturing would become the basis of
American economic prosperity, and yet unlike earlier writings in which he castigated southern
slaveholders for opposing policies that would promote it, in 1820 he hoped that some kind of
compromise could be reached. Perhaps it was his growing worry over the Missouri Crisis
talking, but Coxe wrote Madison that “I remain convinced that [domestic manufactures] are
not… in need of more than necessary revenue from foreign goods does and will (with the
charges of importation) give them.” By that point in this life, Coxe no longer promoted domestic
manufacturing through prohibitive tariffs on foreign goods at all costs. “Agriculture, the laborer,
the improver, the industrious, the frugal cannot wisely be burdened to promote more rapidly our
great & growing manufactures,” he concluded.95 Yet Coxe’s apparent backtracking hinted at the
tensions in his thought in his old age. He moved away from promoting manufacturing
protections, precisely because domestic manufacturing continued to grow, and he would not live
to see the northeastern industrialization in the 1840s and 1850s. And while Coxe did not choose
to promote domestic manufacturing as forthrightly as he did earlier in his life, other
northeasterners were more than happy to carry the mantle.
An 1820 broadside poem entitled “Home Industry: The Most Direct Road to National
Prosperity,” encapsulated promoters’ expansive vision for national economic development. The
poem celebrated national industry and the cultural attribute of industriousness, both long used by
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northeastern abolitionists as critiques of chattel slavery and the power of southern planters. The
poem’s opening lines expressed the dual meanings of northeastern industry:

Sages conven’d from delegating States,
Who bears the charge of unborn millions fates,
From early systems states their habits take,
And morals more than climes a difference make,
The give to toil a bias aid his cause,
With all the force and majesty of laws;
While you preside in useful arts direct,
Create new fabrics and the old protect.96

The poem, of course, did not offer a direct critique of chattel slavery and slaveholders,
but the reference to “morals” and “climes” had a telling resonance in the unfolding politicaleconomic conflict between slave labor and free labor regimes in 1820 and after. And just as
economic policy had become nationalized in the debates over tariff policy and promotion of
domestic manufacturing versus prioritizing foreign imports and commodity crop exportations by
1820, so would slavery politics become nationalized as a result of the Missouri Crisis.
Northeastern state slavery abolition was, by definition, a state-level phenomenon, but after 1820
political abolitionists began to develop plans for national abolition. Benjamin Lundy, a Quaker
abolitionist originally from New Jersey, began to publish the Genius of Universal Emancipation
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in 1821, the first step in what would become a new, more aggressive tack for abolitionism that
rose in significance in the 1830s and 1840s.
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Conclusion: Abolitionism, Antislavery Political Economy, and the Roots of the Civil War

For much of 1832, Quaker abolitionist Benjamin Lundy traveled overland through the
Deep South—slave country, a dangerous move for an outspoken abolitionist—to the Mexican
state of Texas. Lundy hoped to secure land grants there in order to settle a colony of free black
Americans, part of his career-long interest in emigration schemes, first to Haiti in the mid-1820s
and later Texas. By the early 1830s, Texas was increasingly swollen with white American
settlers, chiefly from the Upper and Deep South states. They brought plantation slavery with
them, viewing Texas as the next, most logical territory for slavery’s expansion. During his
travels, Lundy noted the productivity of four cotton plantations near present-day Gonzales,
Texas, between San Antonio and the Gulf of Mexico, to demonstrate the suitability of slave labor
there. The four plantations' combined forty-six slave “hands” produced 162,545 pounds of
cotton, 3,533 each for that growing season. Lundy envisioned that free black settlements in
territories like Texas- contiguous to the southern United States but not yet part of the unioncould function as bulwarks against slavery's expansion, while at the same time demonstrating
blacks’ capacity for self-governance.1
Born in New Jersey, Lundy made himself front and center during the Missouri Crisis,
having moved to St. Louis from Mt. Pleasant, Ohio in 1819 to “[devote] myself sedulously to an
exposition, in the newspapers of Missouri and Illinois, of the evils of slavery.”2 Lundy
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participated in, and in many ways was responsible for, the expansion of political abolitionism to
the west during the 1810s and 1820s, a product of the nation’s rapid western expansion.3 The
Missouri Crisis and residence in slave country taught him that slavery had to be fought through
political means. Lundy began developing a plan for the abolition of slavery in the mid-1810s, as
a founding member of Tennessee’s Union Humane Society and traveling agent for Elihu
Embree’s antislavery newspaper the Philanthropist. After founding abolitionist newspaper, the
Genius of Universal Emancipation in 1821 in Greeneville, Tennessee, he frequently reprinted his
abolition plan throughout the 1820s. As his biographer notes, although Lundy did not view his
plan dogmatically and often modified it, his emphasis on political abolitionism was consistent.4
He viewed the national government as an indispensable agent in promoting the abolition of
slavery, and assumed that antislavery interests needed to take control of the national Congress, in
addition to state legislatures. While Lundy never lost interest in promoting the implementation of
state-level gradual abolition laws, he ultimately believed that southern slaveholders would not
submit to such legislation without external pressure from political abolitionists working through
the national government. In late 1823, Lundy made this point explicitly in his newspaper. “I
would wish it to be understood that I do not expect to ‘persuade’ the advocates of slavery to do
justice,” he wrote, because slaveholders were inherently dishonest. Lundy’s solution was simple
and direct: “WE MUST VOTE THEM DOWN,” he thundered, and “something more effectual
than ‘persuasion’ will be brought to bear upon the iniquitous and unprincipled conduct of
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Tyrants in disguise.” “The subject of universal emancipation is a political one,” he wrote
elsewhere, “in the most emphatic sense of the word…”5
Lundy’s abolition plan was a forerunner of the policy of slavery “denationalization” that
political abolitionists in the 1840s later developed into antislavery party politics. He began the
plan with the blanket argument that the federal government should abolish slavery in districts
under its exclusive constitutional control, most importantly Washington D.C., while
acknowledging the “federal consensus,” that the national government could not interfere with
slavery in states where it was legal. Next, Congress should use its constitutional authority to
prohibit the introduction of slavery into United States territories, for “the purpose of guarding
more effectually against its extension.” As a veteran of the Missouri Crisis, Lundy knew that the
non-extension of slavery was a crucial pillar of political abolitionism. His and other early
antebellum abolitionists' emphasis on non-extension was the precursor of the “cordon of
freedom” policy developed by the next generation of political abolitionists. He also argued for
continued vigilance in suppressing the illegal foreign slave trade, and that the internal slave trade
should be made illegal through Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Lundy
proposed that all free blacks should immediately be given the legal status of aliens, therefore
making them eligible for national citizenship on the same terms as European immigrants. 6 In

Genius of Universal Emancipation, III (November 1823), p. 70; Dillon, Benjamin Lundy, 58; Life of Benjamin
Lundy, p. 191.
6 Lundy’s fight against the internal slave trade is covered in some detail in David Lightner, Slavery and the
Commerce Power: How the Struggle Against the Interstate Slave Trade Led to the Civil War (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2006), pp. 59-62. Lightner argues that debates over whether the Constitution’s
commerce clause empowered the national government to regulate and perhaps abolish the internal slave
trade “burst into prominence” during the Missouri Crisis. Ibid., 37. On issues of African American
citizenship in antebellum America, see James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 287-333. Early National antislavery societies made African
American education and preparation for citizenship central to their activities. See Paul J. Polgar, “'To
Bring Them To An Equal Participation', Early National Abolitionism, Gradual Emancipation, and the
5

334

addition, he argued that the slave states should make legislation for the “certain” emancipation
of slaves, repeal laws that forced freed blacks to leave their states upon gaining their freedom,
and to accord them the same legal status as the free states granted their black inhabitants. Finally,
Lundy argued for a constitutional amendment to abolish the three-fifths clause, a source of
political strength for the slave states.7
Although the Genius of Universal Emancipation never achieved high circulation numbers
and was never a profitable enterprise, the scope of Lundy’s network of abolitionist acquaintances
was impressive, especially given the hostility abolitionists often encountered in the post-Missouri
Crisis context.8 In 1822, Lundy printed a list of seventy-four men he hoped would act as agents
for the Genius, presumably abolitionist subscribers who he thought would not mind being
publicly identified. The bulk of them resided in the Upper South and Old Northwest states,
which made sense given that abolitionism had expanded westward in the midst of the Missouri
Crisis. Still, Lundy’s network included residents of almost every state in the Union, including
individuals in South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and West Florida. By publishing
abolitionist correspondence from across the nation Lundy made the Genius a crucial resource for
sounding out the various abolitionist positions that circulated in the 1820s. Because
correspondents used noms de plume, the loss of his personal papers in a Philadelphia anti-
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abolitionist riot in 1838 makes it difficult to identify individual members of the antislavery
network he worked to develop.9 Even so, the correspondence included in the pages of the Genius
is evidence of the array of abolitionist arguments circulating in the 1820s. Often militant in their
denunciations of slavery, they deployed language and style that would be familiar to readers of
1830s Garrisonian “moral suasion” literature.
A Tennessee citizen writing as “The Farmer” in 1822 espoused a brand of back-country,
republican, abolitionist political economy that Lundy was well acquainted with from his time in
Ohio and Missouri. “The Farmer” argued for non-extension of slavery, citing the inability of
poorer non-slaveholding farmers to obtain western lands in competition with slaveholders.10
Slaveholding, according to “The Farmer,” was wrong for this reason alone, and “the toleration of
slavery” was the source of the nation’s “political evils.” He cited Montesquieu as authority to
support this argument, before launching into a denunciation of his fellow citizens for failing to
engage in antislavery politics. “The Farmer” complained that although non-slaveholders
throughout the trans-Mississippi west were aware of the incompatibility of slavery and
republicanism in the abstract, yet “we fill our legislatures with persons who live and feed on the
blood and sweat” of their slaves. After lengthy quotations from slaveholding republicans like St.
George Tucker and Thomas Jefferson to prove the moral and political dangers of slavery, he
repeated his frustration by proclaiming that “we cannot expect to be blessed with just &
equitable laws while we continue to fill our legislatures with such who are deaf to justice, mercy,
and humanity.” The “Farmer” concluded his missive by denying that his views were influenced
Dillon, Benjamin Lundy, 253-254, describes this episode. On anti-abolitionist riots more generally, see
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by membership in an antislavery society, claiming that he only represented “the society of
farmers.” 11 Abolitionist farmers, it might be added, small ‘r’ republicans who believed that
slavery’s expansion was not just the problem of moral abolitionists, but all non-slaveholders.
Lundy's network of abolitionist correspondents, whether as individuals or in abolition
society statements, presented antislavery arguments that varied in their relative radicalism. But at
their core, they were defined by the conviction that antislavery politics were necessary to achieve
universal emancipation. The Tennessee Manumission Society made this exact point in its 1822
Annual Report. Signed by President James Jones, the Society urged its network of local branches
to use political means to fight slavery. They acknowledged that while many Americans believed
Congress had no power to “interfere with slavery, as practised in the United States of America,”
they argued that in fact the opposite was true. Congress could “mitigate slavery in several ways”:
through abolishing it in the nation's capital, pressuring slave states to pass post-nati emancipation
legislation, and taxing the sellers and purchasers of slaves on the domestic market to discourage
that traffic. The Society also urged its supporters to “indeavor to be unanimous in giving their
suffrage” to antislavery candidates for office at all governmental levels. On the ground, the
antislavery political project could only be accomplished through the distribution of antislavery
materials in the Deep South- which alarmed slave state authorities.12
That same year, South Carolina governor Thomas Bennett noted the effect of political
abolitionism in a statement that clarified his administration’s handling of Denmark Vesey’s
abortive slave rebellion. After explaining the details of Vesey’s plan and the actions of his coconspirators at length, Bennett specifically noted that northern members of Congress had
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inspired Vesey and his conspirators to action. Antislavery speeches in Congress during the
Missouri Crisis, he said, “gave a serious and imposing effect to the machinations” of Vesey and
his colleagues as they planned their slave uprising. The larger problem, according to Bennett,
was that antislavery literature was making inroads into his state. Vesey’s “artful and insidious
delusions were kept in perpetual exercise” because of the efforts of Lundy’s antislavery network.
They had made sure that antislavery pamphlets had been “abundantly furnished” throughout the
Palmetto State. Bennett called the abolitionists “culpable mercenaries” in the Vesey rebellion,
insisting that the proposed abolition of slavery would fatally destabilize the United States and
result in widespread violence and horror. But abolitionists like Lundy, while concerned to about
the possibility of racial violence, ultimately would not be deterred from their ultimate objective:
freeing slaves and destroying the political and economic power of slaveholders.13
In 1826 and 1829, Lundy pushed the American Convention of abolition societies to pass
official resolutions based on aspects of his abolition plan, including pressing for petitions to
Congress to abolish the interstate slave trade and slavery in Washington D.C., and legislation to
ameliorate the physical conditions of slavery and affirm slaves' competency to testify in court.
As the 1820s progressed, Lundy and his abolitionist network continued to forge ahead in the face
of a national political climate increasingly hostile to discussion of slavery-related questions.14
After moving to Baltimore in 1824, Lundy and abolitionist colleague Daniel Raymond set about
constructing an antislavery political coalition in a slave state. Their efforts failed spectacularly.
Raymond ran twice for the Maryland general assembly as nominee of the Maryland Anti-Slavery
Genius of Universal Emancipation, II (September 1822), pp. 42-44. On the Vesey rebellion, see Douglas R.
Egerton, He Shall Go Out Free: The Lives of Denmark Vesey (New York: Madison House, 1999).
14 On the “shutdown” of antislavery politics in the Second Party system, see Donald J. Ratcliffe, “The
Decline of Antislavery Politics, 1815-1840,” in John Craig Hammond and Matthew Mason, eds.,
Contesting Slavery: The Politics of Bondage and Freedom in the New American Nation (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2011), 267-290.
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Society with disastrous results. Running on an antislavery platform with planks derived from
Lundy’s “Plan For Abolition,” Raymond received only 974 of 13,312 votes in 1826, and 186 of
7,769 in 1829.15 Soon thereafter, Lundy took on an abolitionist apprentice to help operate the
Genius of Universal Emancipation who would soon far outstrip him in notoriety, William Lloyd
Garrison. Even though efforts to develop an effective antislavery political coalition failed in the
1820s, they set the template for antislavery politics in the succeeding decades. As the 1830s
began, Lundy continued to operate the Genius and promote direct political agitation against
slavery, though he steadily diverted his attention to developing his Texan emigration scheme and
spent the better part of two years traveling to Mexico in hopes of acquiring territory in Texas.

**********

While early antebellum abolitionists like Lundy forged ahead with their political
campaigns attempts to sway public opinion in their favor, by the 1830s agrarian and industrial
capitalism rapidly expanded in the Northeast and Old Northwest states. In the antebellum period,
the free household model prevailed throughout the Northwest, and family farms formed the
bedrock of the region’s agricultural economy. In contrast to the slave-based plantation system,
free household farms relied on family and temporary wage labor, which incentivized the
adoption of farm machines when financially possible, like the horse-drawn McCormick reaper
which became widely available in the 1840s and 1850s.16 Family farmers shipped corn and

15 Dillon,

Benjamin Lundy, pp. 114-115, 150-151.
Daniel Rood, “An International Harvest: The Second Slavery, the Virginia-Brazil Connection, and the
Development of the McCormick Reaper,” in Beckert and Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism, pp. 87-104,
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wheat to growing northeastern cities and towns through conduits of internal improvement like
the Erie Canal and an expanding network of smaller canals that reached their tendrils across the
free states.
By the 1840s and 1850s, burgeoning northwestern cities like Chicago developed into
hubs for commodity crop collection and distribution, and rapidly expanding railroad networks
complemented and ultimately superseded canals and turnpikes as the sinews of free state
capitalist commodity distribution. In addition to grain products, family farms near urban clusters
supplied city dwellers with garden vegetables, dairy products, and fresh beef, chicken and pork
products, further tightening economic connections between the cities and countryside. The
growth of agricultural production for internal markets, spurred by investment in farm structures
and modernized equipment, laid the basis for the intense industrialization of the North in the
antebellum period. 17
Farm and agricultural equipment values suggest that the American regional agricultural
economies developed divergent characteristics by 1850—divergences rooted in the absence of
slavery in the North and its significant expansion in the South. That year’s federal census
recorded that the free states and territories contained farmland and buildings valued at $2.2
billion dollars, sixty-seven percent of the national total. These statistics do not take into account
the fact that slaveholders’ chief capital investment was in the bodies of the enslaved, thus

discusses the development of the reaper by the Virginia-born Robert McCormick (and later his son
Cyrus) in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley. Rood notes that in the context of planation slavery, the reaper
functioned as a “time-saving” device, while in the Northwest it was a “labor-saving” invention for free
household farms. He further acknowledges, but does not emphasize, that sales of McCormick reapers did
not take off until Cyrus moved operations to Chicago and explicitly marketed them to free household
farms.
17
Meyer, The Roots of American Industrialization, pp. 125-188; William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago
and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).
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rendering it more difficult to invest in plantation buildings and mechanized production. Southern
farms (including plantations), however, were larger on average, 332 acres compared to 203 for
the free states and territories. This reflected the fact that non-slaveholding whites tended to farm
smaller, poorer plots of land, while southern plantation owners possessed larger landholdings.
But even though southern agricultural landholdings remained larger in terms of size, free state
and territory farms’ valuations averaged $280 more than their southern counterparts, which
reflected both land scarcity (particularly in the Northeast), as well as the fact that the average
northern farm family had invested more capital in farm structures and machines, unlike the debt
that many southern slaveowners often contracted to increase their holdings of commoditized
human beings, and thus their individual paper wealth.18
To say that the American regional agricultural economies increasingly diverged by midcentury, however, is not to suggest that they co-existed as an exaggerated “clash of extremes” in
the same polity before the Civil War.19 Agricultural innovations, for example, touched all regions
of the country. Southern planters had long demonstrated an interest in improving the productivity
of their land and slaves through practicing modern management techniques and experimenting
with new seed varieties and methods of farm production. Their zeal to improve plantation
productivity was evident in the proliferation of journals and magazines aimed at the planter class,
which offered advice and marketed new seeds and farm implements.20 Biological innovations
that helped to produce newer, more adaptable, hybrid crop varieties found adopters throughout
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the nation, spurring production gains over the course of the antebellum period.21 Clearly
southern planters were not backward-looking remnants of a feudalistic pseudo-aristocracy, but
modern-minded men with capitalistic, profit-making instincts, just as free household farmers,
manufacturers, and mercantile interests in the North sought to maximize production and profits
as did good capitalists. But King Cotton’s leaders and complicit subjects proudly perpetuated an
oppressive system of labor which bred social and economic instability.
The abolition of chattel slavery in the Northeast and the pre-emptive ban on the
institution in the Northwest constituted the key difference between the antebellum northern and
southern agricultural economies, one that everyone at the time noticed—which antebellum
abolitionists like Benjamin Lundy and many others hoped to eliminate for moral and political
reasons. The sharply different political economies of southern slave, and northern free household
and wage labor regimes, led not to unbreakable economic bonds between the regions, but instead
toward political and social conflict. In terms of long-term economic development, the most
critical regional divergence had an indirect, yet still powerful connection to southern slave and
northern unbound labor regimes: industrial manufacturing, by the antebellum period the most
important divergence between the North and South. Capitalism cut several different ways in
Early and Antebellum America, and the industrial variety clearly differentiated the slave and
non-slave regions of nineteenth century America.
From origins in the free household domestic manufacturing economy in seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, individuals and partnerships that operated extractive industry sites like iron
mines and foundries, and the attempts of men like Moses Brown and Samuel Slater to develop
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modern mechanized spinning plants, northeastern industrial capitalism skyrocketed in the
antebellum period. Northeastern industrial plants and workshops of many sizes, though not to the
scale of Great Britain or later post-bellum American industrial facilities, produced a wide variety
of consumer goods and heavy industry components by the 1830s. From relatively meager
beginnings, northern industrial production of consumer products spiked and so did the spread of
industrial wage work. These developments carried with them negative consequences for the
many working men, women, and children that experienced often horrifying work regimes in
industrial plants. Southern slaveholders defensively took to calling industrial work “wage
slavery,” while northern workingmen’s unions and organizations responded to industrial
capitalists’ growing economic and political power with stringent calls for labor reform and onthe-ground resistance to strict work regimes. Yet notwithstanding the critiques of slaveholders,
for as much economic dislocation and misery that industrialization visited upon the northern
industrial working classes, it was industrialization that economically separated the North and
South. Oppressed as they were, wage workers in the North owned their own bodies, and
maintained secure legal right to their families. Southern slaves did not.
The conjunction of the rise of heavy industrialization and the westward expansion of free
household agriculture into the Northwest by the antebellum period was reflected in the rise of the
northern railroad system and the development of farm machines increasingly produced by wage
laborers with industrial methods, a development that had no real counterpart in the Upper or
Lower South, nor the southwestern Cotton Kingdom.22 As settlement and free household

There were exceptions, most importantly iron mines and foundries in Virginia and Maryland. But
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agriculture expanded in the antebellum period, so did railway networks that flowed from east-towest to accommodate the need for commodity crop transportation to major consumption markets
nearer the eastern seaboard. The southern railroad system, by contrast, was famously
underdeveloped in the antebellum period, with tracks of mismatched gauges common and lines
that ran not in a discernible pattern that followed migration flows, but from interior regions to a
handful of ports to facilitate cotton exports to Great Britain and the Northeast, to a lesser extent.
Concurrent with these developments was the construction of banking and finance networks to
serve the needs of family farms, an explosion of investment by northeastern, and also British,
financial interests that underwrote westward expansion. Meanwhile, a separate regional finance
system emerged to grease the wheels of slavery-based cotton production, with bedrock collateral
that differed wildly from the systems of finance in the North: chattel slaves. While banking
partnerships in the Northeast did business with southern planters, especially in New York City, it
would be a mistake to characterize the regional finance systems as inextricably co-dependent.23
For all their differences, the slave-based plantation and free household and wage labor
political economies managed to co-exist, albeit uneasily, in a polity rooted in republican
governance and concepts of liberty and equality for white men. But in the aftermath of the
Missouri Crisis, faith in those concepts, even among white men, increasingly fractured over the
political question of slavery, and the social and economic structures that flowed from the spread
of the peculiar institution. Abolitionists like Benjamin Lundy faced considerable hostility from
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southern quarters, as well as free state Democrats who feared suggestions of racial equality that
flowed from plans for slavery abolition. Conflicts over national political and economic policy—
from import tariffs, to proposed federal and state government support for domestic
manufacturing, to western expansion and proposed methods of land distribution—all issued from
a fundamental divide over slavery that was unleashed during the Revolutionary Era. The
achievement of national independence set in motion a national paradox, unleashing northeastern
state slavery abolitionism, but also leading to the construction of a federal government over
which slaveholders maintained considerable sway. The balance of power often shifted towards
slaveholders and their political allies in the northeastern merchant allies before 1820, and
abolitionists found themselves on the defensive as the Age of Jackson dawned.

**********

On December 4, 5, and 6, 1833, sixty-four delegates attended a convention in
Philadelphia convened to reorganize political abolitionism by laying the foundation for a new,
national antislavery society. The Anti-Slavery Convention's Constitution owed much to
Benjamin Lundy's abolition plan, which he had tirelessly promoted for years. It recognized the
“federal consensus,” that “each state, in which Slavery exists, has, by the Constitution of the
United States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to abolition in said State...” Still, the
Convention called for slavery's “immediate abandonment, without expatriation.” How did they
propose to do that? Supporters of the new American Anti-Slavery Society pledged to
“endeavour, in a constitutional way, to influence Congress to put an end to the domestic slave
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trade, and to abolish slavery in all those portions of our common country,” beginning with
Washington D.C. They also called for antislavery political action to “prevent the extension of
[slavery] to any State that may hereafter be admitted to the Union.” The delegates acknowledged
Lundy's influence: they resolved, “That in the opinion of this Convention the early, disinterested
and persevering labors of BENJAMIN LUNDY, in the cause of Emancipation, deserve the lively
gratitude of this Convention, and the friends of human rights across the world."24
In 1830, Lundy reached the same conclusion that Abraham Lincoln would arrive at in
1854. He reminded his readers that “the politics of this Republic are verging to one important
point, namely, the Question of Slavery.” In a statement Lincoln would echo twenty-eight years
later in his series of debates with Stephen Douglas, Lundy argued that “no harmony- no
LASTING union- can possibly exist between the advocates of freedom and the advocates of
slavery.” American national politics had always pivoted on the slavery question, because “In
every Presidential contest the struggle for power has been measurably between northern and
southern politicians.”25 Lincoln and the Republican Party’s victory in the 1860 presidential
election was the apotheosis of the decades-long development of antislavery party politics.
Benjamin Lundy, his predecessors in the abolitionist movement like Moses Brown, and the many
members of abolition societies from the Revolutionary Era to the antebellum period would have
been pleased.

Proceedings of the Anti-Slavery Convention, Assembled at Philadelphia, December 4, 5, and 6, 1833 (New York:
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Boston News-Letter
Boston Post-Boy
Charleston City Gazette and Daily Advertiser
Connecticut Courant
Connecticut Journal
Connecticut Journal and New-Haven Post-Boy
Dunlap’s American Daily Advertiser
Federal Gazette
Genius of Universal Emancipation
Massachusetts Centinel
Massachusetts Independent Chronicle
New-Jersey Gazette
New-York Journal
New-York Morning Post
Niles’ Weekley Register
Ohio Register
Pennsylvania Evening Post
Pennsylvania Freemen’s Journal
Pennsylvania Journal and Advertiser
Pennsylvania Mercury and General Advertiser
Pennsylvania Packet
Philadelphia Aurora
Philadelphia Independent Gazeteer
Philadelphia Journal
Providence Gazette
Scioto (OH) Gazette
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Trump of Fame (Warren, OH)
United States Chronicle
Western Reserve Chronicle
Worcester Magazine

v.

Electronic Sources

Envisaging the West, jeffersonwest.unl.edu.
Founders Online, Library of Congress, founders.archives.gov.
Library of Congress Online, archives.gov.
The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, slavevoyages.org.
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